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ops dnsop IPv6 DNS64 RFC7050 describes a method for detecting the presence of DNS64 and for learning the IPv6 prefix used for protocol translation (RFC7915). This methodology depends on the existence of a well-known IPv4-only fully qualified domain name "ipv4only.arpa.". Because newer methods exist that lack the requirement of a higher level protocol, instead using existing operations in the form of native router advertisements, discovery of the IPv6 prefix used for protocol translation using RFC7050 should be discouraged. RFC7050 MAY only be used if other methods (such as RFC8781]) can not be used. The latest revision of this draft can be found at . Status information for this document may be found at . Discussion of this document takes place on the dnsop Working Group mailing list (), which is archived at . Subscribe at . Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at .

Introduction The DNS-based mechanism defined in was the very first mechanism available for nodes to discover the PREF64 information. However since the publication of RFC7050, other methods have been developed to address some of limitations. For example, describes a Neighbor Discovery option to be used in Router Advertisements (RAs) to communicate prefixes of Network Address and Protocol Translation from IPv6 clients to IPv4 servers (NAT64) to hosts. This approach has the advantage of using the same communication channel IPv6 clients use to discover other network configurations such as the network's default route. This means network administrators can secure this configuration along with other configurations IPv6 requires using a single approach such as RA Guard . Taking into account some fundamental flaws of mechanism, it seems desirable to prefer for all new deployments and for implementations to use consistent methods to obtain PREF64 information. RFC 7050 should be used only in cases where there is an inability to offer PREF64 information with a router advertisement, and as a fallback for legacy systems incapable of processing those RA options.

Conventions and Definitions NAT64: a mechanism for translating IPv6 packets to IPv4 packets and vice versa. The translation is done by translating the packet headers according to the IP/ICMP Translation Algorithm defined in . DNS64: a mechanism for synthesizing AAAA records from A records, defined in . Router Advertisement: A packet used by Neighbor Discovery and StateLess Address AutoConfiguration (SLAAC, ) to advertize the presence of the routers, together with other IPv6 configuration information. PREF64 (or NAT64 prefix): An IPv6 prefix used for IPv6 address synthesis and for network addresses and protocols translation from IPv6 clients to IPv4 servers, . The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Existing issues with RFC 7050 DNS-based method of discovering the NAT64 prefix introduces some challenges, which make this approach less preferable than most recently developed alternatives (such as PREF64 RA option, ). This section outlines the key issues, associated with .

Dependency on Network-Provided Recursive Resolvers Fundamentally, the presence of the NAT64 and the exact value of the prefix used for the translation are network-specific attributes. Therefore, to discover the PREF64 the device needs to use the DNS resolvers provided by the network. If the device is configured to use other recursive resolvers, its name resolution APIs and libraries are required to recognize 'ipv4only.arpa.' as a special name and give it special treatment. This issue and remediation approach are discussed in . However, it has been observed that not all implementations support requirements for special treatment of 'ipv4only.arpa.'. As a result, configuring such systems to use resolvers other than the one provided by the network might break the PREF64 discovery, leading to degraded user experience.

Network Stack Initialization Delay When using SLAAC (), an IPv6 host usually needs just one Router Advertisement (RA, ) packet to obtain all information required to complete the host's network configuration. For an IPv6-only host, the PREF64 information is essential, especially if the host implements the customer-side translator (CLAT) (). The mechanism defined in implies that the PREF64 information is not bundled with all other network configuration parameters provided by RAs, and can only be obtained after the host has configured the rest of its IPv6 stack. Therefore, until the process described in Section 3 of is completed, the CLAT process can not start, which negatively impacts IPv4-only applications which have already started.

Inflexibility Section 3 of requires that the node SHALL cache the replies received during the PREF64 discovery and SHOULD repeat the discovery process ten seconds before the TTL of the Well-Known Name's synthetic AAAA resource record expires. As a result, once the PREF64 is discovered, it will be used until the TTL expired, or until the node disconnects from the network. There is no mechanism for an operator to force the PREF64 rediscovery on the node without disconnecting the node from the network. If the operator needs to change the PREF64 value used in the network, they need to proactively reduce the TTL value returned by the DNS64 server. This method has two significant drawbacks: Many networks utilize external DNS64 servers and therefore have no control over the TTL value. The PREF64 changes need to be planned and executed at least TTL seconds in advance. If the operator needs to notify nodes that a particular prefix must not be used (e.g. during a network outage or if the nodes learnt a rogue PREF64 as a result of an attack), it might not be possible without interrupting the network connectivity for the affected nodes.

Security Implications As discussed in Section 7 of , the DNS-based PREF64 discovery is prone to DNS spoofing attacks. In addition to creating a wider attack surface for IPv6 deployments, has other security challenges worth noting to justify declaring it legacy.

Definition of secure channel requires a node's communication channel with a DNS64 server to be a "secure channel" which it defines to mean "a communication channel a node has between itself and a DNS64 server protecting DNS protocol-related messages from interception and tampering." This need is redundant when another communication mechanism of IPv6-related configuration, specifically Router Advertisements, can already be defended against tampering by RA Guard . Requiring nodes to implement two defense mechanisms when only one is necessary when is used in place of creates unnecessary risk.

Secure channel example of IPsec One of the two examples defines to qualify a communication channel with a DNS64 server is the use of an "IPsec-based virtual private network (VPN) tunnel". As of the time of this writing, this is not supported as a practice by any common operating system DNS client. While they could, there have also since been multiple mechanisms defined for performing DNS-specific encryption such as those defined in that would be more appropriately scoped to the applicable DNS traffic. These are also compatible with encrypted DNS advertisement by the network using Discovery of Network-designated Resolvers that would ensure the clients know in advance that the DNS64 server supported the encryption mechanism.

Secure channel example of link layer encryption The other example given by that would allow a communication channel with a DNS64 server to qualify as a "secure channel" is the use of a "link layer utilizing data encryption technologies". As of the time of this writing, most common link layer implementations use data encryption already with no extra effort needed on the part of network nodes. While this appears to be a trivial way to satisfy this requirement, it also renders the requirement meaningless since any node along the path can still read the higher-layer DNS traffic containing the translation prefix. This seems to be at odds with the definition of "secure channel" as explained in .

Recommendations for PREF64 Discovery

Deployment Recommendations Operators deploying NAT64 networks SHOULD provide PREF64 information in Router Advertisements as per .

Clients Implementation Recommendations Clients SHOULD obtain PREF64 information from Router Advertisements as per instead of using method. In the absence of the PREF64 information in RAs, a client MAY choose to fall back to RFC7050.

Security Considerations Obtaining PREF64 information from Router Advertisements improves the overall security of an IPv6-only client as it mitigates all attack vectors related to spoofed or rogue DNS response, as discussed in Section 7 of . Security considerations related to obtaining PREF64 information from RAs are discussed in Section 7 of .

IANA Considerations It is expected that there will be a long tail of both clients and networks still relying on as a sole mechanism to discover PREF64 information. Therefore IANA still need to maintain "ipv4only.arpa." as described in and this document has no IANA actions.

This document describes a method for detecting the presence of DNS64 and for learning the IPv6 prefix used for protocol translation on an access network. The method depends on the existence of a well-known IPv4-only fully qualified domain name "ipv4only.arpa.". The information learned enables nodes to perform local IPv6 address synthesis and to potentially avoid NAT64 on dual-stack and multi-interface deployments. In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. This document specifies the Neighbor Discovery protocol for IP Version 6. IPv6 nodes on the same link use Neighbor Discovery to discover each other's presence, to determine each other's link-layer addresses, to find routers, and to maintain reachability information about the paths to active neighbors. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document specifies the steps a host takes in deciding how to autoconfigure its interfaces in IP version 6. The autoconfiguration process includes generating a link-local address, generating global addresses via stateless address autoconfiguration, and the Duplicate Address Detection procedure to verify the uniqueness of the addresses on a link. [STANDARDS-TRACK] Routed protocols are often susceptible to spoof attacks. The canonical solution for IPv6 is Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND), a solution that is non-trivial to deploy. This document proposes a light-weight alternative and complement to SEND based on filtering in the layer-2 network fabric, using a variety of filtering criteria, including, for example, SEND status. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes. This document describes the Stateless IP/ICMP Translation Algorithm (SIIT), which translates between IPv4 and IPv6 packet headers (including ICMP headers). This document obsoletes RFC 6145. DNS64 is a mechanism for synthesizing AAAA records from A records. DNS64 is used with an IPv6/IPv4 translator to enable client-server communication between an IPv6-only client and an IPv4-only server, without requiring any changes to either the IPv6 or the IPv4 node, for the class of applications that work through NATs. This document specifies DNS64, and provides suggestions on how it should be deployed in conjunction with IPv6/IPv4 translators. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document describes an architecture (464XLAT) for providing limited IPv4 connectivity across an IPv6-only network by combining existing and well-known stateful protocol translation (as described in RFC 6146) in the core and stateless protocol translation (as described in RFC 6145) at the edge. 464XLAT is a simple and scalable technique to quickly deploy limited IPv4 access service to IPv6-only edge networks without encapsulation. This document specifies a Neighbor Discovery option to be used in Router Advertisements (RAs) to communicate prefixes of Network Address and Protocol Translation from IPv6 clients to IPv4 servers (NAT64) to hosts. NAT64 (Network Address and Protocol Translation from IPv6 Clients to IPv4 Servers) allows client devices using IPv6 to communicate with servers that have only IPv4 connectivity. The specification for how a client discovers its local network's NAT64 prefix (RFC 7050) defines the special name 'ipv4only.arpa' for this purpose. However, in its Domain Name Reservation Considerations section (Section 8.1), that specification (RFC 7050) indicates that the name actually has no particularly special properties that would require special handling. Consequently, despite the well-articulated special purpose of the name, 'ipv4only.arpa' was not recorded in the Special-Use Domain Names registry as a name with special properties. This document updates RFC 7050. It describes the special treatment required and formally declares the special properties of the name. It also adds similar declarations for the corresponding reverse mapping names. This document specifies new DHCP and IPv6 Router Advertisement options to discover encrypted DNS resolvers (e.g., DNS over HTTPS, DNS over TLS, and DNS over QUIC). Particularly, it allows a host to learn an Authentication Domain Name together with a list of IP addresses and a set of service parameters to reach such encrypted DNS resolvers. The Domain Name System (DNS) is defined in literally dozens of different RFCs. The terminology used by implementers and developers of DNS protocols, and by operators of DNS systems, has changed in the decades since the DNS was first defined. This document gives current definitions for many of the terms used in the DNS in a single document. This document updates RFC 2308 by clarifying the definitions of "forwarder" and "QNAME". It obsoletes RFC 8499 by adding multiple terms and clarifications. Comprehensive lists of changed and new definitions can be found in Appendices A and B.

Acknowledgments The authors would like to than the following people for their valuable contributions: Lorenzo Colitti, Tom Costello.