Benchmarking Methodology for Source Address Validation

Benchmarking Tests

Intra-domain SAV

SAV Accuracy Objective: Measure the accuracy of the DUT to process legitimate traffic and spoofing traffic across various intra-domain network scenarios including SAV for customer or host Network, SAV for Internet-facing network, and SAV for aggregation-router-facing network, defined as the proportion of legitimate traffic which is blocked improperly by the DUT across all the legitimate traffic and the proportion of spoofing traffic which is permitted improperly by the DUT across all the spoofing traffic. In the following, this document introduces the classic scenarios for testing the accuracy of DUT for intra-domain SAV.

SAV for customer or host network in intra-domain symmetric routing scenario. SAV for Customer or Host Network: shows the case of SAV for customer or host network in intra-domain symmetric routing scenario, and the DUT performs SAV as a customer/host-facing router and connects to Router 1 to access the Internet. Network 1 is a customer/host network within the AS, connects to the DUT, and its own prefix is 10.0.0.0/15. The Tester can emulate Network 1 to advertise its prefix in the control plane and generate spoofing and legitimate traffic in the data plane. In this case, the Tester configs to make the inbound traffic destined for 10.0.0.0/15 come from the DUT. The DUT learns the route to prefix 10.0.0.0/15 from the Tester, while the Tester can send outbound traffic with source addresses in prefix 10.0.0.0/15 to the DUT, which emulates the a symmetric routing scenario between the Tester and the DUT. The IP addrsses in this test case is optional and users can use other IP addresses, and this holds true for other test cases as well. The procedure is listed below for testing SAV for customer or host network in intra-domain symmetric routing scenario:

First, in order to test whether the DUT can generate accurate SAV rules for SAV for customer or host network in intra-domain symmetric routing scenario, a testbed can be built as shown in to construct the test network environment. The Tester is connected to the DUT and performs the functions as Network 1.
Then, the devices including the DUT and Router 1 are configured to form the symmetric routing scenario.
Finally, the Tester generates traffic using 10.0.0.0/15 as source addresses (legitimate traffic) and traffic using 10.2.0.0/15 as source addresses (spoofing traffic) to the DUT, respectively. The ratio of spoofing traffic to legitimate traffic can vary, such as from 1:9 to 9:1.

The expected results are that the DUT can block the spoofing traffic and permit the legitimate traffic from Network 1 for this test case.

SAV for customer or host network in intra-domain asymmetric routing scenario. shows the case of SAV for customer or host network in intra-domain asymmetric routing scenario, and the DUT performs SAV as a customer/host-facing router. Network 1 is a customer/host network within the AS, connects to the DUT and Router 1, respectively, and its own prefix is 10.0.0./15. The Tester can emulate Network 1 and performs its control plane and data plane functions. In this case, the Tester configs to make the inbound traffic destined for 10.1.0.0/16 come only from the DUT and the inbound traffic destined for 10.0.0.0/16 to come only from Router 1. The DUT only learns the route to prefix 10.1.0.0/16 from the Tester, while Router 1 only learns the route to the prefix 10.0.0.0/16 from Network 1. Then, the DUT and Router 1 avertise their learned prefixes to Router 2. Besides, the DUT learns the route to 10.0.0.0/16 from Router 2, and Router 1 learns the route to 10.1.0.0/16 from Router 2. The Tester can send outbound traffic with source addresses of prefix 10.0.0.0/16 to the DUT, which emulates the an asymmetric routing scenario between the Tester and the DUT. The procedure is listed below for testing SAV for customer or host network in intra-domain asymmetric routing scenario:

First, in order to test whether the DUT can generate accurate SAV rules for SAV for customer or host network in intra-domain asymmetric routing scenario, a testbed can be built as shown in to construct the test network environment. The Tester is connected to the DUT and Router 1 and performs the functions as Network 1.
Then, the devices including the DUT, Router 1, and Router 2, are configured to form the asymmetric routing scenario.
Finally, the Tester generates traffic using 10.1.0.0/16 as source addresses (spoofing traffic) and traffic using 10.0.0.0/16 as source addresses (legitimate traffic) to the DUT, respectively. The ratio of spoofing traffic to legitimate traffic can vary, such as from 1:9 to 9:1.

The expected results are that the DUT can block the spoofing traffic and permit the legitimate traffic from Network 1 for this test case.

SAV for Internet-facing network in intra-domain symmetric routing scenario. SAV for Internet-facing Network: shows the test case of SAV for Internet-facing network in intra-domain symmetric routing scenario. In this test case, the network topology is the same as , and the difference is the location of the DUT in the network topology, where the DUT is connected to Router 1 and the Internet, and the Tester is used to emulate the Internet. The DUT performs Internet-facing SAV instead of customer/host-network-facing SAV. The procedure is listed below for testing SAV for Internet-facing network in intra-domain symmetric routing scenario**:

First, in order to test whether the DUT can generate accurate SAV rules for SAV for Internet-facing network in intra-domain symmetric routing scenario, a testbed can be built as shown in to construct the test network environment. The Tester is connected to the DUT and performs the functions as the Internet.
Then, the devices including the DUT and Router 1 are configured to form the symmetric routing scenario.
Finally, the Tester can send traffic using 10.0.0.0/15 as source addresses (spoofing traffic) and traffic using 10.2.0.0/15 as source addresses (legitimate traffic) to the DUT, respectively. The ratio of spoofing traffic to legitimate traffic can vary, such as from 1:9 to 9:1.

The expected results are that the DUT can block the spoofing traffic and permit the legitimate traffic from the Internet for this test case.

SAV for Internet-facing network in intra-domain asymmetric routing scenario. shows the test case of SAV for Internet-facing network in intra-domain asymmetric routing scenario. In this test case, the network topology is the same with , and the difference is the location of the DUT in the network topology, where the DUT is connected to Router 1 and Router 2 within the same AS, as well as the Internet. The Tester is used to emulate the Internet. The DUT performs Internet-facing SAV instead of customer/host-network-facing SAV. The procedure is listed below for testing SAV for Internet-facing network in intra-domain asymmetric routing scenario**:

First, in order to test whether the DUT can generate accurate SAV rules for SAV for Internet-facing network in intra-domain asymmetric routing scenario, a testbed can be built as shown in to construct the test network environment. The Tester is connected to the DUT and performs the functions as the Internet.
Then, the devices including the DUT, Router 1, and Router 2 are configured to form the asymmetric routing scenario.
Finally, the Tester can send traffic using 10.0.0.0/15 as source addresses (spoofing traffic) and traffic using 10.2.0.0/15 as source addresses (legitimate traffic) to the DUT, respectively. The ratio of spoofing traffic to legitimate traffic can vary, such as from 1:9 to 9:1.

The expected results are that the DUT can block the spoofing traffic and permit the legitimate traffic from the Internet for this test case.

SAV for aggregation-router-facing network in intra-domain symmetric routing scenario. SAV for Aggregation-router-facing Network: shows the test case of SAV for aggregation-router-facing network in intra-domain symmetric routing scenario. The test network environment of is the same with . The Tester is connected to Router 1 to emulate the functions of Network 1 to test the SAV accuracy of the DUT facing the direction of Router 1. The procedure is listed below for testing SAV for aggregation-router-facing network in intra-domain symmetric routing scenario:

First, in order to test whether the DUT can generate accurate SAV rules for SAV for Internet-facing network in intra-domain symmetric routing scenario, a testbed can be built as shown in to construct the test network environment. The Tester is connected to Router 1 and performs the functions as Network 1.
Then, the devices including the DUT and Router 1 are configured to form the symmetric routing scenario.
Finally, the Tester can send traffic using 10.1.0.0/15 as source addresses (legitimate traffic) and traffic using 10.2.0.0/15 as source addresses (spoofing traffic) to Router 1, respectively. The ratio of spoofing traffic to legitimate traffic can vary, such as from 1:9 to 9:1.

The expected results are that the DUT can block the spoofing traffic and permit the legitimate traffic from the direction of Router 1 for this test case.

SAV for aggregation-router-facing network in intra-domain asymmetric routing scenario. shows the test case of SAV for aggregation-router-facing network in intra-domain asymmetric routing scenario. The test network environment of is the same with . The Tester is connected to Router 1 and Router 2 to emulate the functions of Network 1 to test the SAV accuracy of the DUT facing the direction of Router 1 and Router 2. The procedure is listed below for testing SAV for aggregation-router-facing network in intra-domain asymmetric routing scenario:

First, in order to test whether the DUT can generate accurate SAV rules for SAV for aggregation-router-facing network in intra-domain asymmetric routing scenario, a testbed can be built as shown in to construct the test network environment. The Tester is connected to Router 1 and Router 2 and performs the functions as Network 1.
Then, the devices including the DUT, Router 1, and Router 2 are configured to form the asymmetric routing scenario.
Finally, the Tester generates traffic using 10.1.0.0/16 as source addresses (spoofing traffic) and traffic using 10.0.0.0/16 as source addresses (legitimate traffic) to Router 1, respectively. The ratio of spoofing traffic to legitimate traffic can vary, such as from 1:9 to 9:1.

The expected results are that the DUT can block the spoofing traffic and permit the legitimate traffic from the direction of Router 1 and Router 2 for this test case.

Control Plane Performance Objective: Measure the control plane performance of the DUT including protocol convergence performance and protocol message processing performance when route changes happen due to network failures or operator configurations. The prootocol convergence performance is defined as the protocol convergence time representing the time elapsed from the begining of routing change to the completion of SAV rule update, and the protocol message processing performance is defined as the protocol message processing throughput representing the overall size of protocol messages per second.

Test setup for protocol convergence performance measurement. | DUT | +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+ +-------------+ +-----------+ ]]> Protocol Convergence Performance: shows the test setup for protocol convergence performance measurement. The protocol convergence process of the DUT to update SAV rules launches when the route changes happen. Route changes is the cause of updating SAV rules and may be because of network failures or operator configurations. Therefore, in , the Tester is direclty connects to the DUT and emulates the route changes to launch the convergence process of the DUT by adding or withdrawing the prefixes. The procedure is listed below for testing the protocol convergence performance:

First, in order to test the protocol convergence time of the DUT, a testbed can be built as shown in to construct the test network environment. The Tester is directly connected to the DUT.
Then, the Tester proactively withdraws the prefixes in a certern percentage of the overall prefixes supported by the DUT, such as 10%, 20%, ..., 100%.
Finally, the protocol convergence time is calculated according to the logs of the DUT about the beginning and completion of the protocol convergence.

Note that withdrawing prefixes proportionally for IGP can be achieved by shutting down interfaces proportionally. For example, the Tester connects to an emulated network topology with each interface connecting to an emulated device. The Tester can connect to ten emulated devices via ten interfaces. Initially, the ten emulated devices advertise their prefixes to the DUT. To withdraw 10% prefixes, the Tester can shut down one interface to the emulated device randomly. For 20%, it can shut down two interfaces randomly, and other proportions perform in a similar fashion. This is just a recommendation, and so can other approaches that can achive the same goal. The time between the last hello received on DUT from the emulated device connected by the disabled interface and finishing the SAV rule generation on DUT should be taken as the amount of time required for the DUT to complete protocol convergence. To measure the protocol convergence time, the logs of the DUT records the time of receiving the last hello and the time when the SAV rule update is finished, and the protocol convergence time is obtained by calculating their gap. Note that if the emulated device sends a ""goodbye hello"", in the process of shutting down the Tester's interface, using the time when this hello message is received instead of the time when the last hello was would provide a more accurate measurement . Protocol Message Processing Performance: The test of the protocol message processing performance uses the same test setup shown in . The protocol message processing performance measures the protocol message processing throughput to process the protocol messages. Therefore, the Tester can vary the rate for sending protocol messages, such as from 10% to 100% of the overall link capacity between the Tester and the DUT. Then, the DUT records the size of the processed total protocol messages and processing time. The procedure is listed below for testing the protocol message processing performance:

First, in order to test the protocol message processing throughput of the DUT, a testbed can be built as shown in to construct the test network environment. The Tester is directly connected to the DUT.
Then, the Tester proactively sends the protocol messages to the DUT in a certern percentage of the overall link capacity between the Tester and the DUT, such as 10%, 20%, ..., 100%.
Finally, the protocol message processing throughput is calculated according to the logs of the DUT about the overall size of the protocol messages and the overall processing time.

To measure the protocol message processing throughput, the logs of the DUT records the overall size of the protocol messages and the overall processing time, and the protocol message processing throughput is calculated by dividing the overall size of the protocol messages by the overall processing time.

Data Plane Performance Objective: Measure the data plane performance of the DUT including data plane SAV table refreshing performance when updating the SAV table on the control plane according to the new updated SAV rules and data plane forwarding performance. The data plane SAV table refreshing performance is defined as the data plane SAV table refreshing rate representing the rate at which a DUT updates its SAV table with new SAV rules and the data plane forwarding performance is defined as the data plane forwarding rate representing the overall size of the forwarded packets per second. Data Plane SAV Table Refreshing Performance: The test of the data plane SAV table refreshing performance uses the same test setup shown in . The data plane SAV table refreshing performance measures the rate at which a DUT updates its SAV table with new SAV rules. Therefore, the Tester can vary the rate for sending protocol messages, such as from 10% to 100% of the overall link capacity between the Tester and the DUT, which will affect the proportions of updated SAV rules, and as a result, affect the proportions of the entries of SAV table. Then, the DUT records the overall number of updated SAV table entries and refreshing time. The procedure is listed below for testing the data plane SAV table refreshing performance:

First, in order to test the data plane SAV table refreshing rate of the DUT, a testbed can be built as shown in to construct the test network environment. The Tester is directly connected to the DUT.
Then, the Tester proactively sends the protocol messages to the DUT in a certern percentage of the overall link capacity between the Tester and the DUT, such as 10%, 20%, ..., 100%.
Finally, the data plane SAV table refreshing rate is calculated according to the logs of the DUT about the overall number of updated SAV table entries and the overall refreshing time.

To measure the data plane SAV table refreshing rate, the logs of the DUT records the overall number of updated SAV table entries and the overall refreshing time, and the data plane SAV table refreshing rate is calculated by dividing the overall number of updated SAV table entries by the overall refreshing time. Data Plane Forwarding Performance: The test of the data plane forwarding performance uses the same test setup shown in . The Tester needs to send the traffic which include spoofing and legitimate traffic at the rate of the overall link capacity between the Tester and the DUT, and the DUT build a SAV table with occupying the overall allocated storage space. The ratio of spoofing traffic to legitimate traffic can vary, such as from 1:9 to 9:1. The DUT records the overall size of the forwarded packets and the overall forwarding time. The procedure is listed below for testing the data plane forwarding performance:

First, in order to test the data plane forwarding rate of the DUT, a testbed can be built as shown in to construct the test network environment. The Tester is directly connected to the DUT.
Then, the Tester proactively sends the data plane traffic including spoofing and legitimate traffic to the DUT at the rate of the overall link capacity between the Tester and the DUT. The ratio of spoofing traffic to legitimate traffic can vary, such as from 1:9 to 9:1.
Finally, the data plane forwarding rate is calculated according to the logs of the DUT about the overall size of the forwarded traffic and the overall forwarding time.

To measure the data plane forwarding rate, the logs of the DUT records the overall size of the forwarded traffic and the overall forwarding time, and the data plane forwarding rate is calculated by dividing the overall size of the forwarded traffic by the overall forwarding time.

Inter-domain SAV

SAV Accuracy Objective: Measure the accuracy of the DUT to process legitimate traffic and spoofing traffic across various inter-domain network scenarios including SAV for customer-facing ASes and SAV for provider/peer-facing ASes, defined as the proportion of legitimate traffic which is blocked improperly by the DUT across all the legitimate traffic and the proportion of spoofing traffic which is permitted improperly by the DUT across all the spoofing traffic.

SAV for customer-facing ASes in inter-domain symmetric routing scenario. SAV for Customer-facing ASes: presents a test case of SAV for customer-facing ASes in inter-domain symmetric routing scenario. In this test case, AS 1, AS 2, AS 3, the DUT, and AS 5 constructs the test network environment, and the DUT performs SAV as an AS. AS 1 is a customer of AS 2 and the DUT, AS 2 is a customer of the DUT, which is a customer of AS 3, and AS 5 is a customer of both AS 3 and the DUT. AS 1 advertises prefixes P1 and P6 to AS 2 and the DUT, respectively, and then AS 2 further propagates the route for prefix P1 and P6 to the DUT. Consequently, the DUT can learn the route for prefixes P1 and P6 from AS 1 and AS 2. In this test case, the legitimate path for the traffic with source addresses in P1 and destination addresses in P4 is AS 1->AS 2->AS 4, and the Tester is connected to the AS 1 and the SAV for customer-facing ASes of the DUT is tested. The procedure is listed below for testing SAV for customer-facing ASes in inter-domain symmetric routing scenario:

First, in order to test whether the DUT can generate accurate SAV rules for SAV for customer-facing ASes in inter-domain symmetric routing scenario, a testbed can be built as shown in to construct the test network environment. The Tester is connected to AS 1 and generates the test traffic to the DUT.
Then, the ASes including AS 1, AS 2, AS 3, the DUT, and AS 5, are configured to form the symmetric routing scenario.
Finally, the Tester sends the traffic using P1 as source addresses and P4 as destination addresses (legitimate traffic) to the DUT via AS 2 and traffic using P5 as source addresses and P4 as destination addresses (spoofing traffic) to the DUT via AS 2, respectively. The ratio of spoofing traffic to legitimate traffic can vary, such as from 1:9 to 9:1.

The expected results are that the DUT can block the spoofing traffic and permit the legitimate traffic from the direction of AS 2 for this test case. Note that the locations of the DUT in can be set at AS 1 and AS 2 to evaluate its SAV accuracy according to the procedure outlined above. The expected results are that the DUT will effectively block spoofing traffic.

SAV for customer-facing ASes in inter-domain asymmetric routing scenario caused by NO_EXPORT. presents a test case of SAV for customer-facing ASes in inter-domain asymmetric routing scenario caused by NO_EXPORT configuration. In this test case, AS 1, AS 2, AS 3, the DUT, and AS 5 constructs the test network environment, and the DUT performs SAV as an AS. AS 1 is a customer of AS 2 and the DUT, AS 2 is a customer of the DUT, which is a customer of AS 3, and AS 5 is a customer of both AS 3 and the DUT. AS 1 advertises prefixes P1 to AS 2 and adds the NO_EXPORT community attribute to the BGP advertisement sent to AS 2, preventing AS 2 from further propagating the route for prefix P1 to the DUT. Similarly, AS 1 adds the NO_EXPORT community attribute to the BGP advertisement sent to the DUT, resulting in the DUT not propagating the route for prefix P6 to AS 3. Consequently, the DUT only learns the route for prefix P1 from AS 1 in this scenario. In this test case, the legitimate path for the traffic with source addresses in P1 and destination addresses in P4 is AS 1->AS 2->DUT, and the Tester is connected to the AS 1 and the SAV for customer-facing ASes of the DUT is tested. The procedure is listed below for testing SAV for customer-facing ASes in inter-domain asymmetric routing scenario caused by NO_EXPORT:

First, in order to test whether the DUT can generate accurate SAV rules for SAV for customer-facing ASes in inter-domain asymmetric routing scenario caused by NO_EXPORT, a testbed can be built as shown in to construct the test network environment. The Tester is connected to AS 1 and generates the test traffic to the DUT.
Then, the ASes including AS 1, AS 2, AS 3, the DUT, and AS 5, are configured to form the asymmetric routing scenario.
Finally, the Tester sends the traffic using P1 as source addresses and P4 as destination addresses (legitimate traffic) to the DUT via AS 2 and traffic using P5 as source addresses and P4 as destination addresses (spoofing traffic) to the DUT via AS 2, respectively. The ratio of spoofing traffic to legitimate traffic can vary, such as from 1:9 to 9:1.

SAV for customer-facing ASes in the scenario of direct server return (DSR). presents a test case of SAV for customer-facing ASes in the scenario of direct server return (DSR). In this test case, AS 1, AS 2, AS 3, the DUT, and AS 5 constructs the test network environment, and the DUT performs SAV as an AS. AS 1 is a customer of AS 2 and the DUT, AS 2 is a customer of the DUT, which is a customer of AS 3, and AS 5 is a customer of both AS 3 and the DUT. When users in AS 2 send requests to the anycast destination IP, the forwarding path is AS 2->DUT->AS 3. The anycast servers in AS 3 receive the requests and tunnel them to the edge servers in AS 1. Finally, the edge servers send the content to the users with source addresses in prefix P3. The reverse forwarding path is AS 1->DUT->AS 2. The Tester sends the traffic with source addresses in P3 and destination addresses in P2 along the path AS 1->DUT->AS 2. The procedure is listed below for testing SAV for customer-facing ASes in the scenario of direct server return (DSR):

First, in order to test whether the DUT can generate accurate SAV rules for SAV for customer-facing ASes in the scenario of DSR, a testbed can be built as shown in to construct the test network environment. The Tester is connected to AS 1 and generates the test traffic to the DUT.
Then, the ASes including AS 1, AS 2, AS 3, the DUT, and AS 5, are configured to form the scenario of DSR.
Finally, the Tester sends the traffic using P3 as source addresses and P2 as destination addresses (legitimate traffic) to AS 2 via the DUT.

Note that in , to direct the return traffic from the edge server to the user to the path AS 1->DUT->AS 2, the document recommends to config static route to direct the traffic with source addresses in P3 and destination addresses in P2 to the DUT. The expected results are that the DUT can permit the legitimate traffic with source addresses in P3 from the direction of AS 1 for this test case. Note that the locations of the DUT in can be set at AS 1 and AS 2 to evaluate its SAV accuracy according to the procedure outlined above. The expected results are that the DUT will effectively block spoofing traffic.

SAV for customer-facing ASes in the scenario of reflection attacks. | | | \ \ | |(Attacker)| | | AS 2(P2) | | \ \ | | (P1') |<|--| | | P1[AS 1] \ \ | +----------+ | +---------+/\+---+ | P6[AS 1] \ \ | | P6[AS 1] \ | NO_EXPORT \ \ | | P1[AS 1] \ | \ \ | | NO_EXPORT \ | \ \ | | \ (C2P) | (C2P) (C2P) \ (C2P) \ | | +----------------+ +----------------+ | | Victim+-+ AS 1(P1, P6) | Server+-+ AS 5(P5) | | | +----------------+ +----------------+ | +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+ P1' is the spoofed source prefix P1 by the attacker which is inside of AS 2 or connected to AS 2 through other ASes. ]]> depicts the test case of SAV for customer-facing ASes in the scenario of reflection attacks. In this test case, the reflection attack by source address spoofing takes place within DUT's customer cone, where the attacker spoofs the victim's IP address (P1) and sends requests to servers' IP address (P5) that are designed to respond to such requests. The Tester performs the source address spoofing function as an attacker. The arrows in illustrate the commercial relationships between ASes. AS 3 serves as the provider for the DUT and AS 5, while the DUT acts as the provider for AS 1, AS 2, and AS 5. Additionally, AS 2 is the provider for AS 1. The procedure is listed below for testing SAV for customer-facing ASes in the scenario of reflection attacks:

First, in order to test whether the DUT can generate accurate SAV rules for SAV for customer-facing ASes in the scenario of reflection attacks, a testbed can be built as shown in to construct the test network environment. The Tester is connected to AS 2 and generates the test traffic to the DUT.
Then, the ASes including AS 1, AS 2, AS 3, the DUT, and AS 5, are configured to form the scenario of reflection attacks.
Finally, the Tester sends the traffic using P1 as source addresses and P5 as destination addresses (spoofing traffic) to AS 5 via the DUT.

The expected results are that the DUT can block the spoofing traffic with source addresses in P1 from the direction of AS 2 for this test case. Note that the locations of the DUT in can be set at AS 1 and AS 2 to evaluate its SAV accuracy according to the procedure outlined above. The expected results are that the DUT will effectively block spoofing traffic.

SAV for customer-facing ASes in the scenario of direct attacks. | | | \ \ | |(Attacker)| | | AS 2(P2) | | \ \ | | (P5') |<|--| | | P1[AS 1] \ \ | +----------+ | +---------+/\+---+ | P6[AS 1] \ \ | | P6[AS 1] \ | NO_EXPORT \ \ | | P1[AS 1] \ | \ \ | | NO_EXPORT \ | \ \ | | \ (C2P) | (C2P) (C2P) \ (C2P) \ | | +----------------+ +----------------+ | | Victim+-+ AS 1(P1, P6) | | AS 5(P5) | | | +----------------+ +----------------+ | +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+ P5' is the spoofed source prefix P5 by the attacker which is inside of AS 2 or connected to AS 2 through other ASes. ]]> presents the test case of SAV for customer-facing ASes in the scenario of direct attacks. In this test case, the direct attack by source address spoofing takes place within the DUT's customer cone, where the attacker spoofs a source address (P5) and directly targets the victim's IP address (P1), overwhelming its network resources. The Tester performs the source address spoofing function as an attacker. The arrows in illustrate the commercial relationships between ASes. AS 3 serves as the provider for the DUT and AS 5, while the DUT acts as the provider for AS 1, AS 2, and AS 5. Additionally, AS 2 is the provider for AS 1. The procedure is listed below for testing SAV for customer-facing ASes in the scenario of direct attacks**:

First, in order to test whether the DUT can generate accurate SAV rules for SAV for customer-facing ASes in the scenario of direct attacks, a testbed can be built as shown in to construct the test network environment. The Tester is connected to AS 2 and generates the test traffic to the DUT.
Then, the ASes including AS 1, AS 2, AS 3, the DUT, and AS 5, are configured to form the scenario of direct attacks.
Finally, the Tester sends the traffic using P5 as source addresses and P1 as destination addresses (spoofing traffic) to AS 1 via the DUT.

The expected results are that the DUT can block the spoofing traffic with source addresses in P5 from the direction of AS 2 for this test case. Note that the locations of the DUT in can be set at AS 1 and AS 2 to evaluate its SAV accuracy according to the procedure outlined above. The expected results are that the DUT will effectively block spoofing traffic.

SAV for provider-facing ASes in the scenario of reflection attacks. SAV for Provider/Peer-facing ASes: depicts the test case of SAV for provider-facing ASes in the scenario of reflection attacks. In this test case, the attacker spoofs the victim's IP address (P1) and sends requests to servers' IP address (P2) that respond to such requests. The Tester performs the source address spoofing function as an attacker. The servers then send overwhelming responses back to the victim, exhausting its network resources. The arrows in represent the commercial relationships between ASes. AS 3 acts as the provider or lateral peer of the DUT and the provider for AS 5, while the DUT serves as the provider for AS 1, AS 2, and AS 5. Additionally, AS 2 is the provider for AS 1. The procedure is listed below for testing SAV for provider-facing ASes in the scenario of reflection attacks:

First, in order to test whether the DUT can generate accurate SAV rules for SAV for provider-facing ASes in the scenario of reflection attacks, a testbed can be built as shown in to construct the test network environment. The Tester is connected to AS 3 and generates the test traffic to the DUT.
Then, the ASes including AS 1, AS 2, AS 3, the DUT, and AS 5, are configured to form the scenario of reflection attacks.
Finally, the Tester sends the traffic using P1 as source addresses and P2 as destination addresses (spoofing traffic) to AS 2 via AS 3 and the DUT.

The expected results are that the DUT can block the spoofing traffic with source addresses in P1 from the direction of AS 3 for this test case. Note that the locations of the DUT in can be set at AS 1 and AS 2 to evaluate its SAV accuracy according to the procedure outlined above. The expected results are that the DUT will effectively block spoofing traffic.

SAV for provider-facing ASes in the scenario of direct attacks. showcases a testcase of SAV for provider-facing ASes in the scenario of direct attacks. In this test case, the attacker spoofs another source address (P2) and directly targets the victim's IP address (P1), overwhelming its network resources. The arrows in represent the commercial relationships between ASes. AS 3 acts as the provider or lateral peer of the DUT and the provider for AS 5, while the DUT serves as the provider for AS 1, AS 2, and AS 5. Additionally, AS 2 is the provider for AS 1. The procedure is listed below for testing SAV for provider-facing ASes in the scenario of direct attacks:

First, in order to test whether the DUT can generate accurate SAV rules for SAV for provider-facing ASes in the scenario of direct attacks, a testbed can be built as shown in to construct the test network environment. The Tester is connected to AS 3 and generates the test traffic to the DUT.
Then, the ASes including AS 1, AS 2, AS 3, the DUT, and AS 5, are configured to form the scenario of direct attacks.
Finally, the Tester sends the traffic using P2 as source addresses and P1 as destination addresses (spoofing traffic) to AS1 via AS 3 and the DUT.

The expected results are that the DUT can block the spoofing traffic with source addresses in P2 from the direction of AS 3 for this test case. Note that the locations of the DUT in can be set at AS 1 and AS 2 to evaluate its SAV accuracy according to the procedure outlined above. The expected results are that the DUT will effectively block spoofing traffic.

Control Plane Performance The test setup, procedure, and measures can refer to for testing the protocl convergence performance and protocol message processing performance.

Data Plane Performance The test setup, procedure, and measures can refer to for testing the data plane SAV table refreshing performance and data plane forwarding performance.