]> Ericsson

francesca.palombini@ericsson.com

RISE AB

Isafjordsgatan 22 Kista 16440 Stockholm Sweden marco.tiloca@ri.se

RISE AB

Isafjordsgatan 22 Kista 16440 Stockholm Sweden rikard.hoglund@ri.se

Fraunhofer AISEC

stefan.hristozov@eriptic.com

Ericsson

goran.selander@ericsson.com

Internet CoRE Working Group Internet-Draft The lightweight authenticated key exchange protocol EDHOC can be run over CoAP and used by two peers to establish an OSCORE Security Context. This document details this use of the EDHOC protocol, by specifying a number of additional and optional mechanisms. These especially include an optimization approach for combining the execution of EDHOC with the first OSCORE transaction. This combination reduces the number of round trips required to set up an OSCORE Security Context and to complete an OSCORE transaction using that Security Context. Discussion Venues Discussion of this document takes place on the Constrained RESTful Environments Working Group mailing list (core@ietf.org), which is archived at . Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at .

Introduction Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC) is a lightweight authenticated key exchange protocol, especially intended for use in constrained scenarios. In particular, EDHOC messages can be transported over the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) and used for establishing a Security Context for Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) . This document details this use of the EDHOC protocol, and specifies a number of additional and optional mechanisms. These especially include an optimization approach that combines the EDHOC execution with the first OSCORE transaction (see ). This allows for a minimum number of round trips necessary to setup the OSCORE Security Context and complete an OSCORE transaction, e.g., when an IoT device gets configured in a network for the first time. This optimization is desirable, since the number of protocol round trips influences the minimum number of flights, which in turn can have a substantial impact on the latency of conveying the first OSCORE request, when using certain radio technologies. Without this optimization, it is not possible, not even in theory, to achieve the minimum number of flights. This optimization makes it possible also in practice, since the last message of the EDHOC protocol can be made relatively small (see ), thus allowing additional OSCORE-protected CoAP data within target MTU sizes. Furthermore, this document defines a number of parameters corresponding to different information elements of an EDHOC application profile (see ). These can be specified as target attributes in the link to an EDHOC resource associated with that application profile, thus enabling an enhanced discovery of such a resource for CoAP clients.

Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. The reader is expected to be familiar with terms and concepts defined in CoAP , CBOR , OSCORE , and EDHOC .

EDHOC Overview This section is not normative and summarizes what is specified in , in particular its Appendix A.2. Thus, it provides a baseline for the enhancements in the subsequent sections. The EDHOC protocol specified in allows two peers to agree on a cryptographic secret, in a mutually-authenticated way and by using Diffie-Hellman ephemeral keys to achieve forward secrecy. The two peers are denoted as Initiator and Responder, as the one sending or receiving the initial EDHOC message_1, respectively. After successful processing of EDHOC message_3, both peers agree on a cryptographic secret that can be used to derive further security material, and especially to establish an OSCORE Security Context . The Responder can also send an optional EDHOC message_4 to achieve key confirmation, e.g., in deployments where no protected application message is sent from the Responder to the Initiator. specifies how to transfer EDHOC over CoAP. That is, the EDHOC data (referred to as "EDHOC messages") are transported in the payload of CoAP requests and responses. The default, forward message flow of EDHOC consists in the CoAP client acting as Initiator and the CoAP server acting as Responder. Alternatively, the two roles can be reversed, as per the reverse message flow of EDHOC. In the rest of this document, EDHOC messages are considered to be transferred over CoAP. shows a CoAP client and a CoAP server running EDHOC as Initiator and Responder, respectively. That is, the client sends a POST request to a reserved EDHOC resource at the server, by default at the Uri-Path "/.well-known/edhoc". The request payload consists of the CBOR simple value "true" (0xf5) concatenated with EDHOC message_1, which also includes the EDHOC connection identifier C_I of the client encoded as per . The Content-Format of the request can be set to application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq. This triggers the EDHOC execution at the server, which replies with a 2.04 (Changed) response. The response payload consists of EDHOC message_2, which also includes the EDHOC connection identifier C_R of the server encoded as per . The Content-Format of the response can be set to application/edhoc+cbor-seq. Finally, the client sends a POST request to the same EDHOC resource used earlier to send EDHOC message_1. The request payload consists of the EDHOC connection identifier C_R encoded as per , concatenated with EDHOC message_3. The Content-Format of the request can be set to application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq. After this exchange takes place, and after successful verifications as specified in the EDHOC protocol, the client and server can derive an OSCORE Security Context, as defined in . After that, they can use OSCORE to protect their communications as per . The client and server are required to agree in advance on certain information and parameters describing how they should use EDHOC. These are specified in an application profile associated with the EDHOC resource addressed (see .

EDHOC and OSCORE run sequentially. The optional message_4 is included in this example, without which that message needs no payload. | | Header: 0.02 (POST) | | Uri-Path: "/.well-known/edhoc" | | Content-Format: application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq | | Payload: true, EDHOC message_1 | | | | <---------------- EDHOC Response------------------ | | Header: 2.04 (Changed) | | Content-Format: application/edhoc+cbor-seq | | Payload: EDHOC message_2 | | | EDHOC verification | | | | ----------------- EDHOC Request -----------------> | | Header: 0.02 (POST) | | Uri-Path: "/.well-known/edhoc" | | Content-Format: application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq | | Payload: C_R, EDHOC message_3 | | | | EDHOC verification | + | OSCORE Sec Ctx | Derivation | | | <---------------- EDHOC Response------------------ | | Header: 2.04 (Changed) | | Content-Format: application/edhoc+cbor-seq | | Payload: EDHOC message_4 | | | OSCORE Sec Ctx | Derivation | | | | ---------------- OSCORE Request -----------------> | | Header: 0.02 (POST) | | Payload: OSCORE-protected data | | | | <--------------- OSCORE Response ----------------- | | Header: 2.04 (Changed) | | Payload: OSCORE-protected data | | | ]]>

As shown in , this purely-sequential flow where EDHOC is run first and then OSCORE is used takes three round trips to complete. defines an optimization for combining EDHOC with the first OSCORE transaction. This reduces the number of round trips required to set up an OSCORE Security Context and to complete an OSCORE transaction using that Security Context.

EDHOC Combined with OSCORE This section defines an optimization for combining the EDHOC message exchange with the first OSCORE transaction, thus minimizing the number of round trips between the two peers. This approach can be used only if the default, forward message flow of EDHOC is used, i.e., when the client acts as Initiator and the server acts as Responder. That is, it cannot be used in the case with reversed roles as per the reverse message flow of EDHOC. When running the purely-sequential flow of , the client has all the information to derive the OSCORE Security Context already after receiving EDHOC message_2 and before sending EDHOC message_3. Hence, the client can potentially send both EDHOC message_3 and the subsequent OSCORE Request at the same time. On a semantic level, this requires sending two REST requests at once, as in .

EDHOC and OSCORE combined. | | Header: 0.02 (POST) | | Uri-Path: "/.well-known/edhoc" | | Content-Format: application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq | | Payload: true, EDHOC message_1 | | | | <----------------- EDHOC Response------------------ | | Header: Changed (2.04) | | Content-Format: application/edhoc+cbor-seq | | Payload: EDHOC message_2 | | | EDHOC verification | + | OSCORE Sec Ctx | Derivation | | | | -------------- EDHOC + OSCORE Request ------------> | | Header: 0.02 (POST) | | Payload: EDHOC message_3 + OSCORE-protected data | | | | EDHOC verification | + | OSCORE Sec Ctx | Derivation | | | <--------------- OSCORE Response ------------------ | | Header: 2.04 (Changed) | | Payload: OSCORE-protected data | | | ]]>

To this end, the specific approach defined in this section consists of sending a single EDHOC + OSCORE request, which conveys the pair (C_R, EDHOC message_3) within an OSCORE-protected CoAP message. That is, the EDHOC + OSCORE request is composed of the following two parts combined together in a single CoAP message:

• The OSCORE Request from , which is also in this case sent to a protected resource, with the correct CoAP method and options intended for accessing that resource.
• EDHOC data consisting of the pair (C_R, EDHOC message_3) required for completing the EDHOC session. Note that, as specified in , C_R is transported in the OSCORE Option of the OSCORE Request rather than in the CoAP payload of the EDHOC + OSCORE request. Since EDHOC message_3 may be too large to be included in a CoAP Option, e.g., if conveying a large public key certificate chain as ID_CRED_I (see ) or if conveying large External Authorization Data as EAD_3 (see ), EDHOC message_3 has instead to be transported in the CoAP payload of the EDHOC + OSCORE request, as prepended to the payload of the OSCORE Request.

The rest of this section specifies how to transport the data in the EDHOC + OSCORE request and their processing order. In particular, the use of this approach is explicitly signalled by including an EDHOC Option (see ) in the EDHOC + OSCORE request. The processing of the EDHOC + OSCORE request is specified in for the client side and in for the server side.

EDHOC Option This section defines the EDHOC Option. The option is used in a CoAP request, to signal that the request payload conveys both an EDHOC message_3 and OSCORE-protected data, combined together. The EDHOC Option has the properties summarized in , which extends Table 4 of . The option is Critical, Safe-to-Forward, and part of the Cache-Key. The option MUST occur at most once and MUST be empty. If any value is sent, the recipient MUST ignore it. (Future documents may update the definition of the option, by expanding its semantics and specifying admitted values.) The option is intended only for CoAP requests and is of Class U for OSCORE . The EDHOC Option. C=Critical, U=Unsafe, N=NoCacheKey, R=Repeatable

No.	C	U	N	R	Name	Format	Length	Default
TBD21	x				EDHOC	Empty	0	(none)

Note to RFC Editor: Following the registration of the CoAP Option Number 21 as per , please replace "TBD21" with "21" in the figure above. Then, please delete this paragraph. The presence of this option means that the message payload also contains EDHOC data, which must be extracted and processed as defined in , before the rest of the message can be processed. shows an example of a CoAP message transported over UDP and containing both the EDHOC data and the OSCORE ciphertext, using the newly defined EDHOC option for signalling.

Example of CoAP message transported over UDP, combining EDHOC data and OSCORE data as signalled with the EDHOC Option.

Client Processing The client prepares an EDHOC + OSCORE request as follows.

1. Compose EDHOC message_3 as per .
2. Establish the new OSCORE Security Context and use it to encrypt the original CoAP request as per . Note that the OSCORE ciphertext is not computed over EDHOC message_3, which is not protected by OSCORE. That is, the result of this step is the OSCORE Request as in .
3. Build COMB_PAYLOAD as the concatenation of EDHOC_MSG_3 and OSCORE_PAYLOAD in this order: COMB_PAYLOAD = EDHOC_MSG_3 | OSCORE_PAYLOAD, where | denotes byte string concatenation and:
   • EDHOC_MSG_3 is the binary encoding of EDHOC message_3 resulting from step 1. As per , EDHOC message_3 consists of one CBOR data item CIPHERTEXT_3, which is a CBOR byte string. Therefore, EDHOC_MSG_3 is the binary encoding of CIPHERTEXT_3.
   • OSCORE_PAYLOAD is the OSCORE ciphertext of the OSCORE-protected CoAP request resulting from step 2.
4. Compose the EDHOC + OSCORE request, as the OSCORE-protected CoAP request resulting from step 2, where the payload is replaced with COMB_PAYLOAD built at step 3. Note that the new payload includes EDHOC message_3, but it does not include the EDHOC connection identifier C_R. As the client is the EDHOC Initiator, C_R is the OSCORE Sender ID of the client, which is already specified as 'kid' in the OSCORE Option of the request from step 2, hence of the EDHOC + OSCORE request.
5. Signal the usage of this approach, by including the new EDHOC Option defined in into the EDHOC + OSCORE request. The application/cid-edhoc+cbor-seq media type does not apply to this message, whose media type is unnamed.
6. Send the EDHOC + OSCORE request to the server.

With the same server, the client SHOULD NOT have multiple simultaneous outstanding interactions (see ) such that: they consist of an EDHOC + OSCORE request; and their EDHOC data pertain to the EDHOC session with the same connection identifier C_R. (An exception might apply for clients that operate under particular time constraints over particularly unreliable networks, thus raising the chances to promptly complete the EDHOC execution with the server through multiple, simultaneous EDHOC + OSCORE requests. As discussed in , this does not have any impact in terms of security.)

Supporting Block-wise If Block-wise is supported, the client may fragment the first application CoAP request before protecting it as an original message with OSCORE, as defined in . In such a case, the OSCORE processing in step 2 of is performed on each inner block of the first application CoAP request, and the following also applies.

• The client takes the additional following step between steps 2 and 3 of . A. If the OSCORE-protected request from step 2 conveys a non-first inner block of the first application CoAP request (i.e., the Block1 Option processed at step 2 had NUM different than 0), then the client skips the following steps and sends the OSCORE-protected request to the server. In particular, the client MUST NOT include the EDHOC Option in the OSCORE-protected request.
• The client takes the additional following step between steps 3 and 4 of . B. If the size of COMB_PAYLOAD exceeds MAX_UNFRAGMENTED_SIZE (see ), the client MUST stop processing the request and MUST abandon the Block-wise transfer. Then, the client can continue by switching to the purely sequential workflow shown in . That is, the client first sends EDHOC message_3 prepended by the EDHOC Connection Identifier C_R encoded as per , and then sends the OSCORE-protected CoAP request once the EDHOC execution is completed.

The performance advantage of using the EDHOC + OSCORE request can be lost when used in combination with Block-wise transfers that rely on specific parameter values and block sizes.

Server Processing In order to process a request containing the EDHOC option, i.e., an EDHOC + OSCORE request, the server MUST perform the following steps.

1. Check that the EDHOC + OSCORE request includes the OSCORE option and that the request payload has the format defined at step 3 of for COMB_PAYLOAD. If this is not the case, the server MUST stop processing the request and MUST reply with a 4.00 (Bad Request) error response.
2. Extract EDHOC message_3 from the payload COMB_PAYLOAD of the EDHOC + OSCORE request, as the first element EDHOC_MSG_3 (see step 3 of ).
3. Take the value of 'kid' from the OSCORE option of the EDHOC + OSCORE request (i.e., the OSCORE Sender ID of the client), and use it as the EDHOC connection identifier C_R.
4. Retrieve the correct EDHOC session by using the connection identifier C_R from step 3. If the application profile used in the EDHOC session specifies that EDHOC message_4 shall be sent, the server MUST stop the EDHOC processing and consider it failed, as due to a client error. Otherwise, perform the EDHOC processing on the EDHOC message_3 extracted at step 2 as per , based on the protocol state of the retrieved EDHOC session. The application profile used in the EDHOC session is the same one associated with the EDHOC resource where the server received the request conveying EDHOC message_1 that started the session. This is relevant in case the server provides multiple EDHOC resources, which may generally refer to different application profiles.
5. Establish a new OSCORE Security Context associated with the client as per , using the EDHOC output from step 4.
6. Extract the OSCORE ciphertext from the payload COMB_PAYLOAD of the EDHOC + OSCORE request, as the second element OSCORE_PAYLOAD (see step 3 of ).
7. Rebuild the OSCORE-protected CoAP request, as the EDHOC + OSCORE request where the payload is replaced with the OSCORE ciphertext extracted at step 6. Then, remove the EDHOC option.
8. Decrypt and verify the OSCORE-protected CoAP request rebuilt at step 7, as per , by using the OSCORE Security Context established at step 5. When the decrypted request is checked for any critical CoAP options (as it is during regular CoAP processing), the presence of an EDHOC option MUST be regarded as an unprocessed critical option, unless it is processed by some further mechanism.
9. Deliver the CoAP request resulting from step 8 to the application.

If steps 4 (EDHOC processing) and 8 (OSCORE processing) are both successfully completed, the server MUST reply with an OSCORE-protected response (see ). The usage of EDHOC message_4 as defined in is not applicable to the approach defined in this document. If step 4 (EDHOC processing) fails, the server discontinues the protocol as per and responds with an EDHOC error message with error code 1, formatted as defined in . The server MUST NOT establish a new OSCORE Security Context from the present EDHOC session with the client, hence the CoAP response conveying the EDHOC error message is not protected with OSCORE. As per , the server has to make sure that the error message does not reveal sensitive information. The CoAP response conveying the EDHOC error message MUST have Content-Format set to application/edhoc+cbor-seq defined in . If step 4 (EDHOC processing) is successfully completed but step 8 (OSCORE processing) fails, the same OSCORE error handling as defined in applies.

Supporting Block-wise If Block-wise is supported, the server takes the additional following step before any other in . A. If Block-wise is present in the request, then process the Outer Block options according to , until all blocks of the request have been received (see ).

Example of EDHOC + OSCORE Request shows an example of EDHOC + OSCORE Request transported over UDP. In particular, the example assumes that:

• The OSCORE Partial IV in use is 0, consistently with the first request protected with the new OSCORE Security Context.
• The OSCORE Sender ID of the client is 0x01. As per , this straightforwardly corresponds to the EDHOC connection identifier C_R 0x01. As per , when using the purely-sequential flow shown in , the same C_R with value 0x01 would be encoded on the wire as the CBOR integer 1 (0x01 in CBOR encoding), and prepended to EDHOC message_3 in the payload of the second EDHOC request.
• The EDHOC option is registered with CoAP option number 21.

Note to RFC Editor: Please delete the last bullet point in the previous list, since, at the time of publication, the CoAP option number will be in fact registered. This results in the following components shown in :

• OSCORE option value: 0x090001 (3 bytes)
• EDHOC option value: - (0 bytes)
• EDHOC message_3: 0x52d5535f3147e85f1cfacd9e78abf9e0a81bbf (19 bytes)
• OSCORE ciphertext: 0x612f1092f1776f1c1668b3825e (13 bytes)

Example of CoAP message transported over UDP, combining EDHOC data and OSCORE data as signalled with the EDHOC Option.

Use of EDHOC Connection Identifiers with OSCORE defines the straightforward mapping from an EDHOC connection identifier to an OSCORE Sender/Recipient ID. That is, an EDHOC identifier and the corresponding OSCORE Sender/Recipient ID are both byte strings with the same value. Therefore, the conversion from an OSCORE Sender/Recipient ID to an EDHOC identifier is equally straightforward. In particular, at step 3 of , the value of 'kid' in the OSCORE Option of the EDHOC + OSCORE request is both the server's Recipient ID (i.e., the client's Sender ID) and the EDHOC Connection Identifier C_R of the server.

Additional Processing of EDHOC Messages When using EDHOC to establish an OSCORE Security Context, the client and server MUST perform the following additional steps during an EDHOC execution, thus extending .

Initiator Processing of Message 1 The Initiator selects an EDHOC Connection Identifier C_I as follows. The Initiator MUST choose a C_I that is neither used in any current EDHOC session as this peer's EDHOC Connection Identifier, nor the Recipient ID in a current OSCORE Security Context where the ID Context is not present. The chosen C_I SHOULD NOT be the Recipient ID of any current OSCORE Security Context. Note that, unless the two peers concurrently use alternative methods to establish OSCORE Security Contexts, this allows the Responder to always omit the 'kid context' in the OSCORE Option of its messages sent to the Initiator, when protecting those with an OSCORE Security Context where C_I is the Responder's OSCORE Sender ID (see ).

Responder Processing of Message 2 The Responder selects an EDHOC Connection Identifier C_R as follows. The Responder MUST choose a C_R that is neither used in any current EDHOC session as this peer's EDHOC Connection Identifier, nor is equal to the EDHOC Connection Identifier C_I specified in the EDHOC message_1 of the present EDHOC session (i.e., after its decoding as per ), nor is the Recipient ID in a current OSCORE Security Context where the ID Context is not present. The chosen C_R SHOULD NOT be the Recipient ID of any current OSCORE Security Context. Note that, for a reason analogous to the one given above with C_I, this allows the Initiator to always omit the 'kid context' in the OSCORE Option of its messages sent to the Responder, when protecting those with an OSCORE Security Context where C_R is the Initiator's OSCORE Sender ID (see ).

Initiator Processing of Message 2 If the following condition holds, the Initiator MUST discontinue the protocol and reply with an EDHOC error message with error code 1, formatted as defined in .

• The EDHOC Connection Identifier C_I is equal to the EDHOC Connection Identifier C_R specified in EDHOC message_2 (i.e., after its decoding as per ).

Extension and Consistency of Application Profiles The application profile referred by the client and server can include the information below, according to the specified consistency rules. If the server supports the EDHOC + OSCORE request within an EDHOC execution started at a certain EDHOC resource, then the application profile associated with that resource SHOULD explicitly specify support for the EDHOC + OSCORE request. In case the application profile indicates that the server supports the optional EDHOC message_4 (see ), the client has to bear in mind that the usage of EDHOC message_4 is not applicable to the optimized workflow based on the EDHOC + OSCORE request (see ).

Web Linking registers the resource type "core.edhoc", which can be used as target attribute in a web link to an EDHOC resource, e.g., using a link-format document . This enables clients to discover the presence of EDHOC resources at a server, possibly using the resource type as filter criterion. At the same time, the application profile associated with an EDHOC resource provides information describing how the EDHOC protocol can be used through that resource. While a client may become aware of the application profile through several means, it would be convenient to obtain its information elements upon discovering the EDHOC resources at the server. This might aim at discovering especially the EDHOC resources whose associated application profile denotes a way of using EDHOC which is most suitable to the client, e.g., with EDHOC cipher suites or authentication methods that the client also supports or prefers. That is, it would be convenient that a client discovering an EDHOC resource contextually obtains relevant pieces of information from the application profile associated with that resource. The resource discovery can occur by means of a direct interaction with the server, or instead by means of the CoRE Resource Directory , where the server may have registered the links to its resources. In order to enable the above, this section defines a number of parameters, each of which can be optionally specified as a target attribute with the same name in the link to the respective EDHOC resource, or as filter criteria in a discovery request from the client. When specifying these parameters in a link to an EDHOC resource, the target attribute rt="core.edhoc" MUST be included, and the same consistency rules defined in for the corresponding information elements of an application profile MUST be followed. The following parameters are defined.

• 'ed-i', specifying, if present, that the server supports the EDHOC Initiator role, hence the reverse message flow of EDHOC. A value MUST NOT be given to this parameter and any present value MUST be ignored by the recipient.
• 'ed-r', specifying, if present, that the server supports the EDHOC Responder role, hence the forward message flow of EDHOC. A value MUST NOT be given to this parameter and any present value MUST be ignored by the recipient.
• 'ed-method', specifying an authentication method supported by the server. This parameter MUST specify a single value, which is taken from the 'Value' column of the "EDHOC Method Type" registry defined in . This parameter MAY occur multiple times, with each occurrence specifying an authentication method.
• 'ed-csuite', specifying an EDHOC cipher suite supported by the server. This parameter MUST specify a single value, which is taken from the 'Value' column of the "EDHOC Cipher Suites" registry defined in . This parameter MAY occur multiple times, with each occurrence specifying a cipher suite.
• 'ed-cred-t', specifying a type of authentication credential supported by the server. This parameter MUST specify a single value, which is taken from the 'Value' column of the "EDHOC Authentication Credential Types" Registry defined in of this document. This parameter MAY occur multiple times, with each occurrence specifying a type of authentication credential.
• 'ed-idcred-t', specifying a type of identifier supported by the server for identifying authentication credentials. This parameter MUST specify a single value, which is taken from the 'Label' column of the "COSE Header Parameters" registry . This parameter MAY occur multiple times, with each occurrence specifying a type of identifier for authentication credentials. Note that the values in the 'Label' column of the "COSE Header Parameters" registry are strongly typed. On the contrary, Link Format is weakly typed and thus does not distinguish between, for instance, the string value "-10" and the integer value -10. Thus, if responses in Link Format are returned, string values which look like an integer are not supported. Therefore, such values MUST NOT be used in the 'ed-idcred-t' parameter.
• 'ed-ead', specifying the support of the server for an External Authorization Data (EAD) item (see ). This parameter MUST specify a single value, which is taken from the 'Label' column of the "EDHOC External Authorization Data" registry defined in . This parameter MAY occur multiple times, with each occurrence specifying the ead_label of an EAD item that the server supports.
• 'ed-comb-req', specifying, if present, that the server supports the EDHOC + OSCORE request defined in . A value MUST NOT be given to this parameter and any present value MUST be ignored by the recipient.

(Future documents may update the definition of the parameters 'ed-i', 'ed-r', and 'ed-comb-req', by expanding their semantics and specifying admitted values.) The example in shows how a client discovers one EDHOC resource at a server, obtaining information elements from the respective application profile. The Link Format notation from is used.

The Web Link. ;osc, ;if=sensor, ;rt=core.edhoc;ed-csuite=0;ed-csuite=2; ed-method=0;ed-cred-t=1;ed-cred-t=3;ed-idcred-t=4; ed-i;ed-r;ed-comb-req ]]>

Security Considerations The same security considerations from OSCORE and EDHOC hold for this document. In addition, the following considerations also apply. specifies that a client SHOULD NOT have multiple outstanding EDHOC + OSCORE requests pertaining to the same EDHOC session. Even if a client did not fulfill this requirement, it would not have any impact in terms of security. That is, the server would still not process different instances of the same EDHOC message_3 more than once in the same EDHOC session (see ), and would still enforce replay protection of the OSCORE-protected request (see Sections and of ). When using the optimized workflow in Figure 2, a minimum of 128-bit security against online brute force attacks is achieved after the client receives and successfully verifies the first OSCORE-protected response (see ). As an example, if EDHOC is used with method 3 (see ) and cipher suite 2 (see ), then the following holds.

• The Initiator is authenticated with 128-bit security against online attacks. This is the sum of the 64-bit MACs in EDHOC message_3 and of the MAC in the AEAD of the first OSCORE-protected CoAP request, as rebuilt at step 7 of .
• The Responder is authenticated with 128-bit security against online attacks. This is the sum of the 64-bit MACs in EDHOC message_2 and of the MAC in the AEAD of the first OSCORE-protected CoAP response.

With reference to the purely sequential workflow in , the OSCORE request might have to undergo access control checks at the server, before being actually executed for accessing the target protected resource. The same MUST hold when the optimized workflow in is used, i.e., when using the EDHOC + OSCORE request. That is, the rebuilt OSCORE-protected application request from step 7 in MUST undergo the same access control checks that would be performed on a traditional OSCORE-protected application request sent individually as shown in . To this end, validated information to perform access control checks (e.g., an access token issued by a trusted party) has to be available at the server before starting to process the rebuilt OSCORE-protected application request. Such information may have been provided to the server separately before starting the EDHOC execution altogether, or instead as External Authorization Data during the EDHOC execution (see ). Thus, a successful completion of the EDHOC protocol and the following derivation of the OSCORE Security Context at the server do not play a role in determining whether the rebuilt OSCORE-protected request is authorized to access the target protected resource at the server.

IANA Considerations This document has the following actions for IANA. Note to RFC Editor: Please replace all occurrences of "[RFC-XXXX]" with the RFC number of this specification and delete this paragraph.

CoAP Option Numbers Registry IANA is asked to enter the following option number to the "CoAP Option Numbers" registry within the "CoRE Parameters" registry group. Registrations in CoAP Option Numbers Registry

Number	Name	Reference
TBD21	EDHOC	[RFC-XXXX]

Note to RFC Editor: Following the registration of the CoAP Option Number 21, please replace "TBD21" with "21" in the table above. Then, please delete this paragraph and all the following text within the present . [ The CoAP option number 21 is consistent with the properties of the EDHOC Option defined in , and it allows the EDHOC Option to always result in an overall size of 1 byte. This is because:

• The EDHOC option is always empty, i.e., with zero-length value; and
• Since the OSCORE Option with option number 9 is always present in the EDHOC + OSCORE request, the EDHOC Option is encoded with a delta equal to at most 12.

Therefore, this document suggests 21 (TBD21) as option number to be assigned to the new EDHOC Option. Although the currently unassigned option number 13 would also work well for the same reasons in the use case in question, different use cases or protocols may make a better use of the option number 13. Hence the preference for the option number 21, and why it is not necessary to register additional option numbers than 21. ]

Target Attributes Registry IANA is asked to register the following entries in the "Target Attributes" registry within the "CoRE Parameters" registry group, as per . For all entries, the Change Controller is IESG, and the reference is [RFC-XXXX]. Registrations in Target Attributes Registry

Attribute Name:	Brief Description:
ed-i	Hint: support for the EDHOC Initiator role
ed-r	Hint: support for the EDHOC Responder role
ed-method	A supported authentication method for EDHOC
ed-csuite	A supported cipher suite for EDHOC
ed-cred-t	A supported type of authentication credential for EDHOC
ed-idcred-t	A supported type of authentication credential identifier for EDHOC
ed-ead	A supported External Authorization Data (EAD) item for EDHOC
ed-comb-req	Hint: support for the EDHOC+OSCORE request

EDHOC Authentication Credential Types Registry IANA is requested to create a new "EDHOC Authentication Credential Types" registry within the "Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)" registry group defined in . The registry uses the "Expert Review" registration procedure . Expert Review guidelines are provided in . The columns of this registry are:

• Value: This field contains the value used to identify the type of authentication credential. These values MUST be unique. The value can be an unsigned integer or a negative integer. Different ranges of values use different registration policies :
  • Integer values from -24 to 23 are designated as "Standards Action With Expert Review".
  • Integer values from -65536 to -25 and from 24 to 65535 are designated as "Specification Required".
  • Integer values smaller than -65536 and greater than 65535 are marked as "Private Use".
• Description: This field contains a short description of the type of authentication credential.
• Reference: This field contains a pointer to the public specification for the type of authentication credential.

Initial entries in this registry are as listed in . Initial Entries in the "EDHOC Authentication Credential Types" Registry

Value	Description	Reference
0	CBOR Web Token (CWT) containing a COSE_Key in a 'cnf' claim
1	CWT Claims Set (CCS) containing a COSE_Key in a 'cnf' claim
2	X.509 certificate
3	C509 certificate

Expert Review Instructions The IANA registry established in this document is defined as "Expert Review". This section gives some general guidelines for what the experts should be looking for; but they are being designated as experts for a reason, so they should be given substantial latitude. Expert reviewers should take into consideration the following points:

• Clarity and correctness of registrations. Experts are expected to check the clarity of purpose and use of the requested entries. Experts need to make sure that registered identifiers indicate a type of authentication credential whose format and encoding is clearly defined in the corresponding specification. Identifiers of types of authentication credentials that do not meet these objective of clarity and completeness must not be registered.
• Point squatting should be discouraged. Reviewers are encouraged to get sufficient information for registration requests to ensure that the usage is not going to duplicate one that is already registered and that the point is likely to be used in deployments. The zones tagged as "Private Use" are intended for testing purposes and closed environments. Code points in other ranges should not be assigned for testing.
• Specifications are required for the "Standards Action With Expert Review" range of point assignment. Specifications should exist for "Specification Required" ranges, but early assignment before a specification is available is considered to be permissible. When specifications are not provided, the description provided needs to have sufficient information to identify what the point is being used for.
• Experts should take into account the expected usage of fields when approving point assignment. The fact that there is a range for Standards Track documents does not mean that a Standards Track document cannot have points assigned outside of that range. The length of the encoded value should be weighed against how many code points of that length are left, the size of device it will be used on, and the number of code points left that encode to that size.

References Normative References This specification defines Web Linking using a link format for use by constrained web servers to describe hosted resources, their attributes, and other relationships between links. Based on the HTTP Link Header field defined in RFC 5988, the Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link Format is carried as a payload and is assigned an Internet media type. "RESTful" refers to the Representational State Transfer (REST) architecture. A well-known URI is defined as a default entry point for requesting the links hosted by a server. [STANDARDS-TRACK] The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) is a specialized web transfer protocol for use with constrained nodes and constrained (e.g., low-power, lossy) networks. The nodes often have 8-bit microcontrollers with small amounts of ROM and RAM, while constrained networks such as IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs) often have high packet error rates and a typical throughput of 10s of kbit/s. The protocol is designed for machine- to-machine (M2M) applications such as smart energy and building automation. CoAP provides a request/response interaction model between application endpoints, supports built-in discovery of services and resources, and includes key concepts of the Web such as URIs and Internet media types. CoAP is designed to easily interface with HTTP for integration with the Web while meeting specialized requirements such as multicast support, very low overhead, and simplicity for constrained environments. The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) is a RESTful transfer protocol for constrained nodes and networks. Basic CoAP messages work well for small payloads from sensors and actuators; however, applications will need to transfer larger payloads occasionally -- for instance, for firmware updates. In contrast to HTTP, where TCP does the grunt work of segmenting and resequencing, CoAP is based on datagram transports such as UDP or Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS). These transports only offer fragmentation, which is even more problematic in constrained nodes and networks, limiting the maximum size of resource representations that can practically be transferred. Instead of relying on IP fragmentation, this specification extends basic CoAP with a pair of "Block" options for transferring multiple blocks of information from a resource representation in multiple request-response pairs. In many important cases, the Block options enable a server to be truly stateless: the server can handle each block transfer separately, with no need for a connection setup or other server-side memory of previous block transfers. Essentially, the Block options provide a minimal way to transfer larger representations in a block-wise fashion. A CoAP implementation that does not support these options generally is limited in the size of the representations that can be exchanged, so there is an expectation that the Block options will be widely used in CoAP implementations. Therefore, this specification updates RFC 7252. Many protocols make use of points of extensibility that use constants to identify various protocol parameters. To ensure that the values in these fields do not have conflicting uses and to promote interoperability, their allocations are often coordinated by a central record keeper. For IETF protocols, that role is filled by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). To make assignments in a given registry prudently, guidance describing the conditions under which new values should be assigned, as well as when and how modifications to existing values can be made, is needed. This document defines a framework for the documentation of these guidelines by specification authors, in order to assure that the provided guidance for the IANA Considerations is clear and addresses the various issues that are likely in the operation of a registry. This is the third edition of this document; it obsoletes RFC 5226. This specification defines a model for the relationships between resources on the Web ("links") and the type of those relationships ("link relation types"). It also defines the serialisation of such links in HTTP headers with the Link header field. This document defines Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE), a method for application-layer protection of the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), using CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE). OSCORE provides end-to-end protection between endpoints communicating using CoAP or CoAP-mappable HTTP. OSCORE is designed for constrained nodes and networks supporting a range of proxy operations, including translation between different transport protocols. Although an optional functionality of CoAP, OSCORE alters CoAP options processing and IANA registration. Therefore, this document updates RFC 7252. The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format whose design goals include the possibility of extremely small code size, fairly small message size, and extensibility without the need for version negotiation. These design goals make it different from earlier binary serializations such as ASN.1 and MessagePack. This document obsoletes RFC 7049, providing editorial improvements, new details, and errata fixes while keeping full compatibility with the interchange format of RFC 7049. It does not create a new version of the format. In many Internet of Things (IoT) applications, direct discovery of resources is not practical due to sleeping nodes or networks where multicast traffic is inefficient. These problems can be solved by employing an entity called a Resource Directory (RD), which contains information about resources held on other servers, allowing lookups to be performed for those resources. The input to an RD is composed of links, and the output is composed of links constructed from the information stored in the RD. This document specifies the web interfaces that an RD supports for web servers to discover the RD and to register, maintain, look up, and remove information on resources. Furthermore, new target attributes useful in conjunction with an RD are defined. Ericsson AB Ericsson AB Ericsson AB This document specifies Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC), a very compact and lightweight authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange with ephemeral keys. EDHOC provides mutual authentication, forward secrecy, and identity protection. EDHOC is intended for usage in constrained scenarios and a main use case is to establish an OSCORE security context. By reusing COSE for cryptography, CBOR for encoding, and CoAP for transport, the additional code size can be kept very low. Universität Bremen TZI The Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) specifications apply Web technologies to constrained environments. One important such technology is Web Linking (RFC 8288), which CoRE specifications use as the basis for a number of discovery protocols, such as the Link Format (RFC 6690) in CoAP's Resource Discovery Protocol (Section 7.2 of RFC7252) and the Resource Directory (RD, RFC 9176). Web Links can have target attributes, the names of which are not generally coordinated by the Web Linking specification (Section 2.2 of RFC 8288). This document introduces an IANA registry for coordinating names of target attributes when used in CoRE. It updates the RD Parameters IANA Registry created by RFC 9176 to coordinate with this registry. IANA In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. Informative References This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK] CBOR Web Token (CWT) is a compact means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a CWT are encoded in the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR), and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) is used for added application-layer security protection. A claim is a piece of information asserted about a subject and is represented as a name/value pair consisting of a claim name and a claim value. CWT is derived from JSON Web Token (JWT) but uses CBOR rather than JSON. Ericsson AB Ericsson AB RISE AB RISE AB Nexus Group This document specifies a CBOR encoding of X.509 certificates. The resulting certificates are called C509 Certificates. The CBOR encoding supports a large subset of RFC 5280 and all certificates compatible with the RFC 7925, IEEE 802.1AR (DevID), CNSA, RPKI, GSMA eUICC, and CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements profiles. When used to re-encode DER encoded X.509 certificates, the CBOR encoding can in many cases reduce the size of RFC 7925 profiled certificates with over 50%. The CBOR encoded structure can alternatively be signed directly ("natively signed"), which does not require re- encoding for the signature to be verified. The document also specifies C509 COSE headers, a C509 TLS certificate type, and a C509 file format.

Document Updates

Version -07 to -08

• Fixes and clarifications from the Shepherd's review.

Version -06 to -07

• Changed document title.
• The client creates the OSCORE Security Context after creating EDHOC message_3.
• Revised selection of EDHOC connection identifiers.
• Use of "forward message flow" and "reverse message flow".
• The payload of the combined request is not a CBOR sequence anymore.
• EDHOC error messages from the server are not protected with OSCORE.
• More future-proof error handling on the server side.
• Target attribute names prefixed by "ed-".
• Defined new target attributes "ed-i" and "ed-r".
• Defined single target attribute "ed-ead" signaling supported EAD items.
• Security consideration on the minimally achieved 128-bit security.
• Defined and used the "EDHOC Authentication Credential Types" Registry.
• High-level sentence replacing the appendix on Block-wise performance.
• Revised examples.
• Editorial improvements.

Version -05 to -06

• Extended figure on EDHOC sequential workflow.
• Revised naming of target attributes.
• Clarified semantics of target attributes 'eadx'.
• Registration of target attributes.

Version -04 to -05

• Clarifications on Web Linking parameters.
• Added security considerations.
• Revised IANA considerations to focus on the CoAP option number 21.
• Guidelines on using Block-wise moved to an appendix.
• Editorial improvements.

Version -03 to -04

• Renamed "applicability statement" to "application profile".
• Use the latest Content-Formats.
• Use of SHOULD NOT for multiple simultaneous outstanding interactions.
• No more special conversion from OSCORE ID to EDHOC ID.
• Considerations on using Block-wise.
• Wed Linking signaling of multiple supported EAD labels.
• Added security considerations.
• Editorial improvements.

Version -02 to -03

• Clarifications on transporting EDHOC message_3 in the CoAP payload.
• At most one simultaneous outstanding interaction as an EDHOC + OSCORE request with the same server for the same session with connection identifier C_R.
• The EDHOC option is removed from the EDHOC + OSCORE request after processing the EDHOC data.
• Added explicit constraints when selecting a Recipient ID as C_X.
• Added processing steps for when Block-wise is used.
• Improved error handling on the server.
• Improved section on Web Linking.
• Updated figures; editorial improvements.

Version -01 to -02

• New title, abstract and introduction.
• Restructured table of content.
• Alignment with latest format of EDHOC messages.
• Guideline on ID conversions based on application profile.
• Clarifications, extension and consistency on application profile.
• Section on web-linking.
• RFC8126 terminology in IANA considerations.
• Revised Appendix "Checking CBOR Encoding of Numeric Values".

Version -00 to -01

• Improved background overview of EDHOC.
• Added explicit rules for converting OSCORE Sender/Recipient IDs to EDHOC connection identifiers following the removal of bstr_identifier from EDHOC.
• Revised section organization.
• Recommended number for EDHOC option changed to 21.
• Editorial improvements.

Acknowledgments The authors sincerely thank , , , , , , , and for their feedback and comments. The work on this document has been partly supported by VINNOVA and the Celtic-Next project CRITISEC; and by the H2020 project SIFIS-Home (Grant agreement 952652).