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This document retires the use of GOST R 34.10-2001 (mnemonic "ECC-GOST") within DNSSEC. RFC5933 (now historic) defined the use of GOST R 34.10-2001 and GOST R 34.11-94 algorithms with DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC). This document updates RFC5933 by deprecating the use of ECC-GOST. [RFC Editor: please remove this before publication: It is unclear if updating RFC5933 (a Historic document) is the correct thing to do or not. We did it so that it shows up in Datatracker and similar, but this may be a mistake. We are happy to change this if the RFC Editor / IESG / whoever thinks this is a bad idea.]

Introduction The use of the GOST R 34.10-2001 and GOST R 34.11-94 algorithms with the DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) was documented in . These two algorithms were deprecated by the Orders of the Federal Agency for Technical Regulation and Metrology of Russia (Rosstandart) in August 2012, and were superseded by GOST 34.10-2012 and GOST 34.11-2012 respectively. The use of GOST 34.10-2012 and GOST 34.11-2012 in DNSSEC is documented in , and so has been made Historic. Thus, the use of GOST R 34.10-2001 (mnemonic GOST-ECC) and GOST R 34.11-94 is no longer recommended for use in DNSSEC . Note that this document does not change or discuss the use of GOST 34.10-2012 and GOST 34.11-2012.

Requirements notation The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Deprecating ECC-GOST algorithms in DNSSEC The GOST R 34.11-94 algorithm MUST NOT be used when creating DS records. Validating resolvers MUST treat GOST R 34.11-94 DS records as insecure. If no other DS records of accepted cryptographic algorithms are available, the DNS records below the delegation point MUST be treated as insecure. The ECC-GOST algorithm MUST NOT be used when creating DNSKEY and RRSIG records. Validating resolvers MUST treat RRSIG records created from DNSKEY records using these algorithms as an unsupported algorithm. If no other RRSIG records of accepted cryptographic algorithms are available, the validating resolver MUST consider the associated resource records as insecure.

Security Considerations This document potentially increases the security of the DNSSEC ecosystem by deprecating algorithms that are no longer recommended for use.

Operational Considerations This document removes support for ECC-GOST. Zone operators currently making use of ECC-GOST based algorithms should switch to algorithms that remain supported. DNS registries should prohibit their clients from uploading and publishing ECC-GOST based DS records to ensure that they are using algorithms which are supported by DNSSEC validators, and so can be DNSSEC validated.

IANA Considerations [Note to IANA, to be removed by the RFC Editor: the registry fields listed above will be created by draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc8624-bis.] IANA is requested to set the "Use for DNSSEC Signing", "Use for DNSSEC Validation", "Implement for DNSSEC Signing", and "Implement for DNSSEC Validation" columns of the DNS Security Algorithm Numbers registry for ECC-GOST (12) to MUST NOT. Note that previously the "Use for DNSSEC Signing" and "Implement for DNSSEC Delegation" columns were already MUST NOT. IANA is requested to set the "Use for DNSSEC Delegation", "Use for DNSSEC Validation", "Implement for DNSSEC Delegation", and "Implement for DNSSEC Validation" columns of the "Digest Algorithms" registry for GOST R 34.11-94 (3) to MUST NOT. Note that previously the "Use for DNSSEC Signing" and "Implement for DNSSEC Delegation" columns were already MUST NOT.

In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. This document describes how to produce digital signatures and hash functions using the GOST R 34.10-2001 and GOST R 34.11-94 algorithms for DNSKEY, RRSIG, and DS resource records, for use in the Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC). This document describes the DNS Security Extensions (commonly called "DNSSEC") that are specified in RFCs 4033, 4034, and 4035, as well as a handful of others. One purpose is to introduce all of the RFCs in one place so that the reader can understand the many aspects of DNSSEC. This document does not update any of those RFCs. A second purpose is to state that using DNSSEC for origin authentication of DNS data is the best current practice. A third purpose is to provide a single reference for other documents that want to refer to DNSSEC. This document describes how to produce digital signatures and hash functions using the GOST R 34.10-2012 and GOST R 34.11-2012 algorithms for DNSKEY, RRSIG, and DS resource records, for use in the Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC). RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.

Acknowledgments The authors appreciate the comments and suggestions from the following IETF participants in helping produce this document: Mark Andrews, Steve Crocker, Brian Dickson, Thomas Graf, Russ Housely, Shumon Huque, Paul Hoffman, S Moonesamy, Peter Dickson, Peter Thomassen, Stefan Ubbink, Paul Wouters, Tim Wicinski, and the many members of the DNSOP working group that discussed this draft.

Current algorithm usage levels The DNSSEC scanning project by Viktor Dukhovni and Wes Hardaker highlights the current deployment of various algorithms on the https://stats.dnssec-tools.org/ website. <RFC Editor: please delete this section upon publication>

Github Version of this document While this document is under development, it can be viewed, tracked, fill here: https://github.com/hardaker/draft-hardaker-dnsop-must-not-gost <RFC Editor: please delete this section upon publication>