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General ELEGY Internet-Draft The IETF Nominating Committee (NomCom) appoints candidates to several IETF leadership committees. RFC8713 provides criteria for membership on NomCom that attempt to ensure that NomCom volunteers are members of the loosely defined IETF community, by requiring in-person attendance in three of the past five in- person meetings. In 2020 and 2021, the IETF had six consecutive fully online plenary meetings that drove rapid advancement in remote meeting technologies and procedures, including an experiment that included remote attendance for NomCom eligibility. This document updates RFC8713 by building a new set of eligibility criteria from first principles, with consideration for the increased salience of remote attendance. Discussion Venues Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at .

Introduction defines the process for selection of the Internet Architecture Board (IAB), Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG), IETF Trust, and one IETF LLC Director. A key actor in the process is the Nominating Committee (NomCom), which nominates a single candidate for each open position, subject to confirmation by other bodies. NomCom voting members are volunteers that have met certain eligibility requirements. The actual NomCom is selected at random from the pool of eligible volunteers. Thus, it is important that members of the pool be IETF participants likely to have knowledge of IETF processes and practices. There are restrictions to ensure that no more than two volunteers with the same primary affiliation are chosen. requires that volunteers must have attended three of the previous five meetings. In practice, this has meant that the volunteer picked up their registration badge. Current members of the Internet Society Board of Trustees and bodies for which the NomCom nominates members are ineligible. specified an experiment in the wake of six consecutive fully online meetings from 2020 to 2021, where the traditional interpretation of the requirement would have resulted in no eligible volunteers. It extended the attendance requirement to define meeting attendance as including logging in to at least one session of a fully-online IETF meeting. RFC8989 also created two other tracks to obtain eligibility: (1) serving as a working group chair or secretary in the past 3 years, and (2) author or editor of an IETF Stream RFC in the past five years, including internet-drafts in the RFC Editor queue. This document discusses some of the first principles that inform the design of NomCom eligibility, and makes recommendations on how the process of qualification based on attendance should work. This document replaces the attendance criteria in with criteria based on those in , and obsoletes RFC8989 to make it clear that that document has been superceded. The other paragraphs of remain intact.

Conventions and Definitions The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

NomCom Principles The NomCom is intended to be composed of randomly selected members of "the community." For many years, in-person attendance was a reasonable proxy for the commitment associated with being a member. Two days of travel and an attendance fee is a relatively large expenditure of time and money. Additionally, in-person attendance is thought to increase personal familiarity with candidates for leadership positions and with the spirit of the IETF, although there is no mechanism to ensure any interactions. Finally, the NomCom interview process was largely conducted in-person at IETF meetings, so the ability to attend was a prerequisite to participate. A basic principle is that the community should govern itself, so volunteers must have a demonstrated commitment to the IETF. Limiting the number of volunteers sponsored by any one organization avoids the potential for mischief that disrupts IETF operations or works against the interests of the community as a whole. However, attitudes to business travel evolve, and remote meeting technology continues to improve, to the extent that many longstanding community members choose to participate remotely. The system has always excluded some from attendance, and thus qualification from the NomCom, due to cost or personal reasons. Further, the NomCom has completed two cycles using entirely online tools. Counting remote attendance lowers the barriers to entry. As IETF is committed to having a no-fee remote option () the only required investment is to log on once per meeting at a specific time (sometimes a locally inconvenient hour). While this document does not formally impose a requirement for the NomCom to function entirely remotely, including remote-only attendees in the pool is likely to effectively require a remote component to NomCom operations. Finally, overly restrictive criteria work against getting a deep talent pool.

Criteria The following paths to qualification replace . Any one of the paths is sufficient, unless the person is otherwise disqualified under . Path 1: The person has registered for and attended 3 out of the last 5 IETF meetings, either in-person or online. In-person attendance is as determined by the record keeping of the Secretariat. Online attendance is based on being a registered person who logged in for at least one session of an IETF meeting. Path 2: The person has been a Working Group Chair or Secretary within the 3 years prior to the day the call for NomCom volunteers is sent to the community. Path 3: The person has been a listed author or editor (on the front page) of at least two IETF Stream RFCs within the last 5 years prior to the day the call for NomCom volunteers is sent to the community. An Internet-Draft that has been approved by the IESG and is in the RFC Editor queue counts the same as a published RFC, with the relevant date being the date the draft was added to the RFC Editor queue. For avoidance of doubt, the 5-year timer extends back to the date 5 years before the date when the call for NomCom volunteers is sent to the community.

Security Considerations

NomCom capture The most potent threat associated with NomCom eligibility is that an organization or group of coordinating organizations would attempt to obtain a majority of NomCom positions, in order to select an IETF leadership in support of an agenda that might be self-serving and against the interests of the community as a whole. Note that lets the Chair decide the NomCom voting requirement, so a simple majority may be inadequate. However, 7 of 10 forms a quorum, so at worst seven NomCom members working together can almost certainly impose their will. Whatever the merits of admitting remote attendees, it reduces the minimum cost of creating a NomCom-eligible volunteer from three in-person trips of ~5 days each over the course of at least 8 months, to zero financial cost and the time required to log in three times over at least 8 months. Some organizations might not be deterred in either case, while others might now find such an attack to not be feasible.

A Surge of Volunteers A large number of "legitimate" volunteers makes it quite difficult to control 6 of 10 NomCom slots. Setting aside limitations on the number of selections from any organization, basic probability shows that to have even a 50% chance of controlling 6 or more NomCom positions, an attacker needs roughly 60% of the volunteer pool. For example, if there are 300 "legitimate" volunteers, an attacker must produce 365 volunteers to exceed a 50% chance of NomCom capture (see ). A sudden surge in the number of volunteers, particularly of people that no one recognizes as a part of the community, is an early-warning sign for the community, leadership and the IETF Secretariat to further investigate. The IETF should monitor and assess a sudden increase in the number of online registration fee waivers awarded in accordance with . While loosening eligibility criteria lowers the cost to an attacker of producing eligible volunteers, it also increases the number of "legitimate" volunteers that increases the difficulty of an attack.

The Two-Per-Organization Limit The two-per-organization limit in complicates such an attack. To circumvent it, an organization must either (1) coordinate with at least two like-minded organizations to produce a NomCom majority, (2) incentivize members of other organizations (possibly through a funding agreement) to support its agenda, or (3) propose candidates with false affiliations. While the IETF does not routinely confirm the affiliation of volunteers, as part of an investigation it could eliminate volunteers who have misrepresented said affiliation. Publishing the list of volunteers and affiliations also gives the community an opportunity to review the truth of such claims. Assuming that 300 legitimate volunteers are all from different organizations, three conspiring organizations would need 771 volunteers (257 per organization) for a 50% chance of NomCom capture (see ).

One Year of Participation Attendance at 3 meetings requires at least 8 months. Given the volume of volunteers necessary to capture the process, an attack requires a surge in attendees over the course of a year. Such a surge might trigger a community challenge to the list of eligible volunteers, and/or a leadership investigation to detect suspicious behavior (e.g. logging in to a single session and then immediately logging out). In the event of abuse of process, the leadership would then have months to adjust policy in response before the NomCom cycle begins.

Disruptive candidates Note that the normalization of consistent remote participation allows for a single individual to mount an attack that previously required coordination. By registering for IETF meetings using a number of different identities over a year, an individual can make each of those identities NomCom eligible and then serve under any one of them that is selected for the NomCom. Once selected, an individual could seek to disrupt the process or prevent the timely conclusion of its work. This attack is much harder to detect or prevent than equivalent attacks were previously, as it does not require coordination among multiple attendees. While the attacker cannot be sure of fee waivers for some or all of the different identities, the lower cost for remote participation also makes this attack more feasible than it would have been under prior rules. However, the voting member recall procedure in exists to allow removal and replacement of disruptive figures.

Additional remedies Additional changes to the process to further obstruct attacks against the NomCom are beyond the scope of this document. However, a challenge process against volunteers with a suspicious reported affiliation, or that might be aliases of a single volunteer, could trigger an investigation. Similarly, the challenge to the random selection described in can explicitly include appeals against the data used to qualify the volunteer, rather than the randomization process.

IANA Considerations This document has no IANA actions.

References Normative References The process by which the members of the IAB and IESG, some Trustees of the IETF Trust, and some Directors of the IETF Administration LLC (IETF LLC) are selected, confirmed, and recalled is specified in this document. This document is based on RFC 7437. Only those updates required to reflect the changes introduced by IETF Administrative Support Activity (IASA) 2.0 have been included. Any other changes will be addressed in future documents. This document obsoletes RFC 7437 and RFC 8318. In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. Informative References This document defines a process experiment under RFC 3933 that temporarily updates the criteria for qualifying volunteers to participate in the IETF Nominating Committee. It therefore also updates the criteria for qualifying signatories to a community recall petition. The purpose is to make the criteria more flexible in view of increasing remote participation in the IETF and a reduction in face-to-face meetings. The experiment is of fixed duration and will apply to one, or at most two, consecutive Nominating Committee cycles, starting in 2021. This document temporarily varies the rules in RFC 8713. Ericsson Akamai Akamai This document outlines a principle for open participation that extends the open process principle defined in RFC3935 by stating that there must always be a free option for online participation to IETF meetings and, if possible, related IETF-hosted events over the Internet.

NomCom Capture Calculations offers some mathematical results for the probability of NomCom capture. This appendix shows the work. Let (a ch b) mean the number of combinations of b items chosen from a population of a items, or (a ch b) = fact(a) / (fact(a-b) * fact(b))

No per-organization limit The first computation assumes there is no limit of two per organization, or equivalently, no organization produces more than two volunteers. Let L be the number of "legitimate" volunteers (i.e. those not allied with an attacker" and A be the number of attacking volunteers. Then there are ((L+A) ch 10) ways to select a NomCom. The number of outcomes where attackers capture the NomCom is Sum(i=6..10)[(A ch i) * (L ch (10-i))] and the probability of capture is therefore Sum(i=6..10)[(A ch i) * (L ch (10-i))] / ((L+A) ch 10). For L = 300, this probability crosses 50% at A = 365.

Two per Organization Assume that the population of L is drawn from L different organizations (this assumption is unfavorable to the attacker). Assume also that there are three conspiring organizations. Then no more than 6 members can be drawn from A. Let B be the number of nominees per attacking organization, so that A = 3B. The number of combinations to pick exactly N attackers, N <= 6, is C(N) = (L ch (10-N)) * Sum(i=0:min(N,2))[(B ch i)Sum(j=0..min(2, N-i))[(B ch j)(B ch min(2, N-i-j))]] And the probability of capture is C(6) / Sum(i=0..6)[C(i)] For L = 300, the A required to exceed a 50% probability of capture is 771.

Change Log

• RFC Editor's Note: Please remove this section prior to publication of a final version of this document.

Since draft-duke-elegy-rfc8989bis-00

• Added more security considerations
• Editorial improvements

Since draft-duke-gendispatch-rfc8989bis-00

• Matched normative section to RFC8989
• Added security considerations and appendix

Acknowledgments Brian Carpenter and Stephen Farrell wrote RFC8989, which provides the core of this document. Luc Andre Burdet, Brian Carpenter, and Donald Eastlake provided useful editorial suggestions.