]> Orange

bruno.decraene@orange.com

Juniper Networks

jgs@juniper.net

Nokia

wim.henderickx@nokia.com

Juniper Networks

kireeti@juniper.net

Cisco Systems

satyamoh@cisco.com

Independent Contributor

juttaro@ieee.org

Comcast

Bin_Wen@comcast.com

rtg Internet Engineering Task Force bgp nhc entropy label RFC 5492 allows a BGP speaker to advertise its capabilities to its peer. When a route is propagated beyond the immediate peer, it is useful to allow certain capabilities to be conveyed further. In particular, it is useful to advertise forwarding plane features. This specification defines a BGP transitive attribute to carry such capability information, the "Next-Hop Dependent Capabilities Attribute," or NHC. Unlike the capabilities defined by RFC 5492, those conveyed in the NHC apply solely to the routes advertised by the BGP UPDATE that contains the particular NHC. This specification also defines an NHC capability that can be used to advertise the ability to process the MPLS Entropy Label as an egress LSR for all NLRI advertised in the BGP UPDATE. It updates RFC 6790 and RFC 7447 concerning this BGP signaling.

Introduction allows a Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) speaker to advertise its capabilities to its peer. When a route is propagated beyond the immediate peer, it is useful to allow certain capabilities to be conveyed further. In particular, it may be useful to advertise forwarding plane features. This specification defines a BGP optional transitive attribute to carry such capability information, the "Next-Hop Dependent Capabilities Attribute", or NHC. (Note that this specification should not be confused with RFC 5492 BGP Capabilities.) Since the NHC is intended chiefly for conveying information about forwarding plane features, it needs to be regenerated whenever the BGP route's next hop is changed. Since owing to the properties of BGP transitive attributes this can't be guaranteed (an intermediate router that doesn't implement this specification would be expected to propagate the NHC as opaque data), the NHC encodes the next hop of its originator, or the router that most recently updated the attribute. If the NHC passes through a router that changes the next hop without regenerating the NHC, they will fail to match when later examined, and the recipient can act accordingly. This scheme allows NHC support to be introduced into a network incrementally. Informally, the intent is that,

• If a router is not changing the next hop, it can obliviously propagate the NHC just like any other optional transitive attribute.
• If a router is changing the next hop, then it has to be able to vouch for every capability it includes in the NHC.

Complete details are provided in . An NHC carried in a given BGP UPDATE message conveys information that relates to all Network Layer Reachability Information (NLRI) advertised in that particular UPDATE, and only to those NLRI. A different UPDATE message originated by the same source might not include an NHC, and if so, NLRI carried in that UPDATE would not be affected by the NHC. By implication, if a router wishes to use NHC to describe all NLRI it originates, it needs to include an NHC with each UPDATE it sends. In this respect, despite its similar naming, the NHC is unlike RFC 5492 BGP Capabilities. Informally, a capability included in a given NHC should not be thought of as a capability of the next hop, but rather a capability of the path, that depends on the ability of the next hop to support it. Hence it is said to be "dependent on" the next hop. This specification also defines an NHC capability, called "ELCv3", to advertise the ability to process the Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) Entropy Label as an egress Label Switching Router (LSR) for all NLRI advertised in the BGP UPDATE. It updates and with regard to this BGP signaling, this is further discussed in . Although ELCv3 is only relevant to NLRI of labeled address families, in general, a future NHC capability might be applicable to NLRI of any address family.

Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

BGP Next-Hop Dependent Capabilities Attribute

Encoding The BGP Next-Hop Dependent Capabilities attribute (NHC attribute, or just NHC) is an optional, transitive BGP path attribute with type code 39. The NHC always includes a network layer address identifying the next hop of the route the NHC accompanies. The NHC signals potentially useful information, so it is desirable to make it transitive; the next hop data is to ensure correctness if it traverses BGP speakers that do not understand the NHC. This is further explained below. The Attribute Data field of the NHC attribute is encoded as a header portion that identifies the router that created or most recently updated the attribute, followed by one or more capability Type-Length-Value (TLV) triples:

NHC Format

The meanings of the header fields (Address Family Identifier, SAFI or Subsequent Address Family Identifier, Length of Next Hop, and Network Address of Next Hop) are as given in Section 3 of . In turn, each Capability is a TLV:

Capability TLV Format

Capability Code: a two-octet unsigned binary integer that indicates the type of capability advertised and unambiguously identifies an individual capability. Capability Length: a two-octet unsigned binary integer that indicates the length, in octets, of the Capability Value field. A length of 0 indicates that the Capability Value field is zero-length, i.e. it has a null value. Capability Value: a variable-length field. It is interpreted according to the value of the Capability Code. A BGP speaker MUST NOT include more than one instance of a capability with the same Capability Code, Capability Length, and Capability Value. Note, however, that processing multiple instances of such a capability does not require special handling, as additional instances do not change the meaning of the announced capability; thus, a BGP speaker MUST be prepared to accept such multiple instances. BGP speakers MAY include more than one instance of a capability (as identified by the Capability Code) with different Capability Value. Processing of these capability instances is specific to the Capability Code and MUST be described in the document introducing the new capability. Capability TLVs MUST be placed in the NHC in increasing order of Capability Code. (In the event of multiple instances of a capability with the same Capability Code as discussed above, no further sorting order is defined here.) Although the major sorting order is mandated, an implementation MUST elect to be prepared to consume capabilities in any order, for robustness reasons.

Sending the NHC Suppose a BGP speaker S has a route R it wishes to advertise with next hop N to its peer. If S is originating R into BGP, it MAY include an NHC attribute with it, that carries capability TLVs that describe aspects of R. S MUST set the next hop depicted in the header portion of the NHC to be equal to N, using the encoding given above. If S has received R from some other BGP speaker, two possibilities exist. First, S could be propagating R without changing N. In that case, S need take no special action, it SHOULD simply propagate the NHC unchanged unless specifically configured otherwise. Indeed, we observe that this is no different from the default action a BGP speaker takes with an unrecognized optional transitive attribute -- it is treated as opaque data and propagated. Second, S could be changing R in some way, and in particular, it could be changing N. If S has changed N it MUST NOT propagate the NHC unchanged. It SHOULD include a newly-constructed NHC attribute with R, constructed as described above in the "originating R into BGP" case. Any given capability TLV carried by the newly-constructed NHC attribute might use information from the received NHC attribute as input to its construction, possibly as straightforwardly as simply copying the TLV. The details of how the capabilities in the new NHC are constructed are specific to the definition of each capability. Any capability TLVs received by S that are for capabilities not supported by S will not be included in the version of R constructed by S. An implementation SHOULD send the NHC and its contained capabilities by default. An implementation SHOULD provide configuration control of whether any given capability is sent. An implementation MAY provide finer-grained control on propagation based on attributes of the peering session, as discussed in . Due to the nature of BGP optional transitive path attributes, any BGP speaker that does not implement this specification will propagate the NHC, the requirements of this section notwithstanding. Such a speaker will not update the NHC, however.

Receiving the NHC An implementation SHOULD accept the NHC and its contained capabilities by default. An implementation SHOULD provide configuration control of whether any given capability is accepted. An implementation MAY provide finer-grained control on propagation based on attributes of the peering session, as discussed in . When a BGP speaker receives a BGP route that includes the NHC, it MUST compare the address given in the header portion of the NHC and illustrated in to the next hop of the BGP route. If the two match, the NHC may be further processed. If the two do not match, it means some intermediate BGP speaker that handled the route in transit both does not support NHC, and changed the next hop of the route. In this case, the contents of the NHC cannot be used, and the NHC MUST be discarded without further processing, except that the contents MAY be logged. In considering whether the next hop "matches", a semantic match is sought. While bit-for-bit equality is a trivial test of matching, there may be certain cases where the two are not bit-for-bit equal, but still "match". An example is when an MP_REACH Next Hop encodes both a global and a link-local IPv6 address. In that case, the link-local address might be removed during Internal BGP (IBGP) propagation, the two would still be considered to match if they were equal on the global part. See Section 3 of . A BGP speaker receiving a Capability Code that it supports behaves as defined in the document defining the Capability Code. A BGP speaker receiving a Capability Code that it does not support MUST ignore that Capability Code. In particular, the receipt of an unrecognized Capability Code MUST NOT be handled as an error. The presence of a capability SHOULD NOT influence route selection or route preference, unless tunneling is used to reach the BGP next hop, the selected route has been learned from External BGP (that is, the next hop is in a different Autonomous System), or by configuration (see following). Indeed, it is in general impossible for a node to know that all BGP routers of the Autonomous System (AS) will understand a given capability, and if different routers within an AS were to use a different preference for a route, forwarding loops could result unless tunneling is used to reach the BGP next hop. Following this reasoning, if the administrator of the network is confident that all routers within the AS will interpret the presence of the capability in the same way, they could relax this restriction by configuration.

Attribute Error Handling An NHC is considered malformed if the length of the attribute, encoded in the Attribute Length field of the BGP Path Attribute header (Section 4.3 of ), is inconsistent with the lengths of the contained capability TLVs. In other words, the sum of the sizes (Capability Length plus 4) of the contained capability TLVs, plus the length of the NHC header (), must be equal to the overall Attribute Length. A BGP UPDATE message with a malformed NHC SHALL be handled using the approach of "attribute discard" defined in . Unknown Capability Codes MUST NOT be considered to be an error. An NHC that contains no capability TLVs MAY be considered malformed, although it is observed that the prescribed behavior of "attribute discard" is semantically no different from that of having no TLVs to process. A document that specifies a new NHC Capability should provide specifics regarding what constitutes an error for that NHC Capability. If a capability TLV is malformed, that capability TLV SHOULD be ignored and removed. Other capability TLVs SHOULD be processed as usual. If a given capability TLV requires different error-handling treatment than described in the previous sentences, its specification should provide specifics.

Network Operation Considerations In the corner case where multiple nodes use the same IP address as their BGP next hop, such as with anycast nodes as described in , a BGP speaker MUST NOT advertise a given capability unless all nodes sharing this same IP address support this capability. The network operator operating those anycast nodes is responsible for ensuring that an anycast node does not advertise a capability not supported by all nodes sharing this anycast address. The means for accomplishing this are beyond the scope of this document.

Entropy Label Capability (ELCv3) The foregoing sections define the NHC as a container for capability TLVs. The Entropy Label Capability is one such capability. When BGP is used for distributing labeled NLRI as described in, for example, , the route may include the ELCv3 as part of the NHC. The inclusion of this capability with a route indicates that the egress of the associated Label Switched Path (LSP) can process entropy labels as an egress LSR for that route -- see Section 4.1 of . Below, we refer to this for brevity as being "EL-capable." For historical reasons, this capability is referred to as "ELCv3", to distinguish it from the prior Entropy Label Capability (ELC) defined in and deprecated in , and the ELCv2 described in . This section (and its subsections) replaces Section 5.2 of , which was previously deprecated by .

Encoding The ELCv3 has capability code 1, capability length 0, and carries no value:

ELCv3 TLV Format

Sending the ELCv3 When a BGP speaker S has a route R it wishes to advertise with next hop N to its peer, it SHOULD include the ELCv3 capability if it knows that the egress of the associated LSP L is EL-capable, otherwise it MUST NOT include the ELCv3 capability. Specific conditions where S would know that the egress is EL-capable are if S:

• Is itself the egress, and knows itself to be EL-capable, or
• Is re-advertising a BGP route it received with a valid ELCv3 capability, and is not changing the value of N, or
• Is re-advertising a BGP route it received with a valid ELCv3 capability, and is changing the value of N, and knows (for example, through configuration) that the router represented by N is either the LSP egress and is EL-capable, or that it will simply swap labels without popping the BGP-advertised label stack and processing the label below, as with a transit LSR, or
• Is redistributing a route learned from another protocol, and that other protocol conveyed the knowledge that the egress of L was EL-capable. (For example, this might be known through the Label Distribution Protocol (LDP) ELC TLV, Section 5.1 of .)

The ELCv3 MAY be advertised with routes that are labeled, such as those using SAFI 4 . It MUST NOT be advertised with unlabeled routes.

Receiving the ELCv3 (Below, we assume that "includes the ELCv3" implies that the containing NHC has passed the checks specified in . If it had not passed, then the NHC would have been discarded and the ELCv3 would be deemed not to have been included.) When a BGP speaker receives an unlabeled route that includes the ELCv3, it MUST discard the ELCv3. When a BGP speaker receives a labeled route that includes the ELCv3, it indicates the associated LSP supports entropy labels. This implies that the receiving BGP speaker if acting as ingress, MAY insert an entropy label as per Section 4.2 of .

ELCv3 Error Handling The ELCv3 is considered malformed and must be disregarded if its length is other than zero.

Legacy ELC The ELCv3 functionality introduced in this document replaces the "BGP Entropy Label Capability Attribute" (ELC attribute) that was introduced by , and deprecated by . The latter RFC specifies that the ELC attribute, BGP path attribute 28, "MUST be treated as any other unrecognized optional, transitive attribute". This specification revises that requirement. As the current specification was developed, it became clear that due to incompatibilities between how the ELC attribute is processed by different fielded implementations, the most prudent handling of attribute 28 is not to propagate it as an unrecognized optional, transitive attribute, but to discard it. Therefore, this specification updates , by instead requiring that an implementation that receives the ELC attribute MUST discard any received ELC attribute.

IANA Considerations IANA has made a temporary allocation in the BGP Path Attributes registry of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Parameters group. IANA is requested to make this allocation permanent.

Value	Code	Reference
39	BGP Next-Hop Dependent Capabilities (NHC)	(this doc)

IANA is requested to create a new registry called "BGP Next-Hop Dependent Capability Codes" within the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Parameters group. The registry's allocation policy is First Come, First Served, except where designated otherwise in . It is seeded with the following values:

Value	Description	Reference	Change Controller
0	reserved	(this doc)	IETF
1	ELCv3	(this doc)	IETF
65400 - 65499	private use	(this doc)	IETF
65500 - 65534	reserved for experimental use	(this doc)	IETF
65535	reserved	(this doc)	IETF

Security Considerations

Considerations for the NHC The header portion of the NHC contains the next hop the attribute's originator included when sending it, or that an intermediate router included when updating the attribute (in the latter case, the "contract" with the intermediate router is that it performed the checks in before propagating the attribute). This will typically be an IP address of the router in question. This may be an infrastructure address the network operator does not intend to announce beyond the border of its Autonomous System, and it may even be considered in some weak sense, confidential information. A motivating application for this attribute is to convey information between Autonomous Systems that are under the control of the same administrator. In such a case, it would not need to be sent to other Autonomous Systems. At time of writing, work is underway to standardize a method of distinguishing between the two categories of external Autonomous Systems, and if such a distinction is available, an implementation can take advantage of it by constraining the NHC and its contained capabilities to only propagate by default to and from the former category of Autonomous Systems. If such a distinction is not available, a network operator may prefer to configure routers peering with Autonomous Systems not under their administrative control to not send or accept the NHC or its contained capabilities, unless there is an identified need to do so. The foregoing notwithstanding, control of NHC propagation can't be guaranteed in all cases -- if a border router doesn't implement this specification, the attribute, like all BGP optional transitive attributes, will propagate to neighboring Autonomous Systems. (This can be seen as a specific case of the general "attribute escape" phenomenon discussed in .) Similarly, if a border router receiving the attribute from an external Autonomous System doesn't implement this specification, it will store and propagate the attribute, the requirements of notwithstanding. So, sometimes this information could leak beyond its intended scope. (Note that it will only propagate as far as the first router that does support this specification, at which point it will typically be discarded due to a non-matching next hop, per .) If the attribute leaks beyond its intended scope, capabilities within it would potentially be exposed. Specifications for individual capabilities should consider the consequences of such unintended exposure, and should identify any necessary constraints on propagation.

Considerations for the ELCv3 Capability Insertion of an ELCv3 by an attacker could cause forwarding to fail. Deletion of an ELCv3 by an attacker could cause one path in the network to be overutilized and another to be underutilized. However, we note that an attacker able to accomplish either of these (below, an "on-path attacker") could equally insert or remove any other BGP path attribute or message. The former attack described above denies service for a given route, which can be accomplished by an on-path attacker in any number of ways even absent ELCv3. The latter attack defeats an optimization but nothing more; it seems dubious that an attacker would go to the trouble of doing so rather than launching some more damaging attack.

References Normative References In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. BGP-4 Multiprotocol Extensions (BGP-MP) defines the format of two BGP attributes (MP_REACH_NLRI and MP_UNREACH_NLRI) that can be used to announce and withdraw the announcement of reachability information. This document defines how compliant systems should make use of those attributes for the purpose of conveying IPv6 routing information. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document discusses the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), which is an inter-Autonomous System routing protocol. The primary function of a BGP speaking system is to exchange network reachability information with other BGP systems. This network reachability information includes information on the list of Autonomous Systems (ASes) that reachability information traverses. This information is sufficient for constructing a graph of AS connectivity for this reachability from which routing loops may be pruned, and, at the AS level, some policy decisions may be enforced. BGP-4 provides a set of mechanisms for supporting Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR). These mechanisms include support for advertising a set of destinations as an IP prefix, and eliminating the concept of network "class" within BGP. BGP-4 also introduces mechanisms that allow aggregation of routes, including aggregation of AS paths. This document obsoletes RFC 1771. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document defines extensions to BGP-4 to enable it to carry routing information for multiple Network Layer protocols (e.g., IPv6, IPX, L3VPN, etc.). The extensions are backward compatible - a router that supports the extensions can interoperate with a router that doesn't support the extensions. [STANDARDS-TRACK] Load balancing is a powerful tool for engineering traffic across a network. This memo suggests ways of improving load balancing across MPLS networks using the concept of "entropy labels". It defines the concept, describes why entropy labels are useful, enumerates properties of entropy labels that allow maximal benefit, and shows how they can be signaled and used for various applications. This document updates RFCs 3031, 3107, 3209, and 5036. [STANDARDS-TRACK] The BGP Entropy Label Capability attribute is defined in RFC 6790. Regrettably, it has a bug: although RFC 6790 mandates that routers incapable of processing Entropy Labels must remove the attribute, fulfillment of this requirement cannot be guaranteed in practice. This specification deprecates the attribute. A forthcoming document will propose a replacement. According to the base BGP specification, a BGP speaker that receives an UPDATE message containing a malformed attribute is required to reset the session over which the offending attribute was received. This behavior is undesirable because a session reset would impact not only routes with the offending attribute but also other valid routes exchanged over the session. This document partially revises the error handling for UPDATE messages and provides guidelines for the authors of documents defining new attributes. Finally, it revises the error handling procedures for a number of existing attributes. This document updates error handling for RFCs 1997, 4271, 4360, 4456, 4760, 5543, 5701, and 6368. RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. Informative References Juniper Networks BGP-4 [RFC 4271] has been very successful in being extended over the years it has been deployed. A significant part of that success is due to its ability to incrementally add new features to its Path Attributes when they are marked "optional transitive". Implementations that are ignorant of a feature for an unknown Path Attribute that are so marked will propagate BGP routes with such attributes. Unfortunately, this blind propagation of unknown Path Attributes may happen for features that are intended to be used in a limited scope. When such Path Attributes inadvertantly are carried beyond that scope, it can lead to things such as unintended disclosure of sensitive information, or cause improper routing. In their worst cases, such propagation may be for malformed Path Attributes and lead to BGP session resets or crashes. This document calls such inadvertent propagation of BGP Path Attributes, "attribute escape". This document further describes some of the scenarios that leads to this behavior and makes recommendations on practices that may limit its impact. Orange Juniper Networks, Inc. Nokia RFC 5492 advertises the capabilities of the BGP peer. When the BGP peer is not the same as the BGP Next-Hop, it is useful to also be able to advertise the capability of the BGP Next-Hop, in particular to advertise forwarding plane features. This document defines a mechanism to advertise such BGP Next Hop dependent Capabilities. This document defines a new BGP non-transitive attribute to carry Next-Hop Capabilities. This attribute is guaranteed to be deleted or updated when the BGP Next Hop is changed, in order to reflect the capabilities of the new BGP Next-Hop. This document also defines a Next-Hop capability to advertise the ability to process the MPLS Entropy Label as an egress LSR for all NLRI advertised in the BGP UPDATE. It updates RFC 6790 with regard to this BGP signaling. Juniper Networks Juniper Networks RFC 6790 defined the Entropy Label Capability Attribute (ELC); RFC 7447 deprecated that attribute. This specification, dubbed "Entropy Label Capability Attribute version 2" (ELCv2), was intended to be offered for standardization, to replace the ELC as a way to signal that a BGP protocol speaker is capable of processing entropy labels. Although ultimately a different specification was chosen for that purpose, at least one implementation of ELCv2 was shipped by Juniper Networks and is currently in use in service provider networks. This document is published in order to document what was implemented. Individual Contributor Futurewei Technologies, Inc. Google Arrcus, Inc. Comcast This document defines a new External BGP (EBGP) peering type known as EBGP-OAD, which is used between two EBGP peers that belong to One Administrative Domain (OAD). As the Internet has grown, and as systems and networked services within enterprises have become more pervasive, many services with high availability requirements have emerged. These requirements have increased the demands on the reliability of the infrastructure on which those services rely. Various techniques have been employed to increase the availability of services deployed on the Internet. This document presents commentary and recommendations for distribution of services using anycast. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. This document defines an Optional Parameter, called Capabilities, that is expected to facilitate the introduction of new capabilities in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) by providing graceful capability advertisement without requiring that BGP peering be terminated. This document obsoletes RFC 3392. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document specifies a set of procedures for using BGP to advertise that a specified router has bound a specified MPLS label (or a specified sequence of MPLS labels organized as a contiguous part of a label stack) to a specified address prefix. This can be done by sending a BGP UPDATE message whose Network Layer Reachability Information field contains both the prefix and the MPLS label(s) and whose Next Hop field identifies the node at which said prefix is bound to said label(s). This document obsoletes RFC 3107.

Other Means of Signaling EL Capability A router that supports this specification could also have other means to know that an egress is EL-capable, for example, it could support ELCv2 , or it could know through configuration. If a router learns through any means that an egress is EL-capable, it MAY treat the egress as EL-capable. For example, reception of a valid ELCv2 would be sufficient (even if a valid ELCv3 is not received), and similarly, reception of a valid ELCv3 would be sufficient (even if a valid ELCv2 is not received). The details of which methods are accepted for signaling EL capability are beyond the scope of this specification but SHOULD be configurable by the user.

Acknowledgements The authors of this specification thank Randy Bush, Wes Hardaker, Susan Hares, and Gyan Mishra for their review and comments. This specification derives from two earlier documents, and . included the following acknowledgements: included the following acknowledgements:

Contributors Cisco Systems

sekrier@cisco.com

Juniper Networks

kfwang@juniper.net