Signature Authentication in the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) using ML-DSA and SLH-DSA

Introduction The Internet Key Exchange, or IKEv2 , is a key agreement and security negotiation protocol; it is used for key establishment in IPsec. In the initial set of exchanges, both parties independently select and use their preferred authentication method, which may even differ between the initiator and the responder. In IKEv2, it occurs in the exchange called IKE_AUTH. One option for the authentication method is digital signatures using public key cryptography. Currently, traditional digital signatures are defined for use within IKE_AUTH: RSA signatures, Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) Digital Signature Standard (DSS) and ECDSA. The presence of a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC) would render state-of-the-art traditional public-key algorithms obsolete and insecure. This is because the assumptions about the intractability of the mathematical problems these algorithms rely on, which offer confident levels of security today, no longer apply in the presence of a CRQC. Consequently, there is a requirement to update protocols and infrastructure to use post-quantum algorithms. Post-quantum algorithms are public-key algorithms designed to be secure against CRQCs as well as classical computers. The traditional cryptographic primitives that need to be replaced by PQC algorithms are discussed in . Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signatures (ML-DSA) and Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signatures (SLH-DSA) are quantum-resistant digital signature schemes standardized by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) PQC project. This document specifies the use of the ML-DSA and SLH-DSA algorithms in IKEv2.

Conventions and Definitions The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. This document uses terms defined in . For the purposes of this document, it is helpful to be able to divide cryptographic algorithms into two classes: "Asymmetric Traditional Cryptographic Algorithm": An asymmetric cryptographic algorithm based on integer factorisation, finite field discrete logarithms or elliptic curve discrete logarithms, elliptic curve discrete logarithms, or related mathematical problems. "Post-Quantum Algorithm": An asymmetric cryptographic algorithm that is believed to be secure against attacks using quantum computers as well as classical computers. Post-quantum algorithms can also be called quantum-resistant or quantum-safe algorithms. Examples of quantum-resistant digital signature schemes include ML-DSA and SLH-DSA.

Specifying ML-DSA within IKEv2 ML-DSA is a digital signature algorithm (part of the CRYSTALS suite) based on the hardness lattice problems over module lattices (i.e., the Module Learning with Errors problem (MLWE)). The design of the algorithm is based on the "Fiat-Shamir with Aborts" framework introduced by Lyubashevsky, that leverages rejection sampling to render lattice based FS schemes compact and secure. ML-DSA uses uniform distribution over small integers for computing coefficients in error vectors, which makes the scheme easier to implement. ML-DSA is instantiated with 3 parameter sets for the security categories 2, 3 and 5. Security properties of ML-DSA are discussed in Section 9 of . This document specifies the use of the ML-DSA algorithm in IKEv2 at three security levels: ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, and ML-DSA-87.

Specifying SLH-DSA within IKEv2 SLH-DSA utilizes the concept of stateless hash-based signatures. In contrast to stateful signature algorithms, SLH-DSA eliminates the need for maintaining state information during the signing process. SLH-DSA is designed to sign up to 2^64 messages and it offers three security levels. The parameters for each of the security levels were chosen to provide 128 bits of security, 192 bits of security, and 256 bits of security. This document specifies the use of the SLH-DSA algorithm in IKEv2 at three security levels. It includes the small (S) or fast (F) versions of the algorithm. For security level 1, SHA-256 () is used. For security levels 3 and 5, SHA-512 () is used. SHAKE256 () is applicable for all security levels. The small version prioritizes smaller signature sizes, making them suitable for resource-constrained environments IoT devices. Conversely, the fast version prioritizes speed over signature size, minimizing the time required to generate signatures. However, signature verification with the small version is faster than with the fast version. On the other hand, ML-DSA outperforms SLH-DSA in both signature generation and validation time, as well as signature size. SLH-DSA, in contrast, offers smaller key sizes but larger signature sizes. The following combinations are defined in SLH-DSA :

SLH-DSA-128S-SHA2
SLH-DSA-128F-SHA2
SLH-DSA-192S-SHA2
SLH-DSA-192F-SHA2
SLH-DSA-256S-SHA2
SLH-DSA-256F-SHA2
SLH-DSA-128S-SHAKE
SLH-DSA-128F-SHAKE
SLH-DSA-192S-SHAKE
SLH-DSA-192F-SHAKE
SLH-DSA-256S-SHAKE
SLH-DSA-256F-SHAKE

SLH-DSA does not introduce a new hardness assumption beyond those inherent to the underlying hash functions. It builds upon established foundations in cryptography, making it a reliable and robust digital signature scheme for a post-quantum world. While attacks on lattice-based schemes like ML-DSA can compromise their security, SLH-DSA will remain unaffected by these attacks due to its distinct mathematical foundations. This ensures the continued security of systems and protocols that utilize SLH-DSA for digital signatures.

Signature Algorithm Use and Hashing in IKEv2 with ML-DSA and SLH-DSA For integrating ML-DSA and SLH-DSA into IKEv2, the approach used in is followed. The implementation MUST send a SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS notify with an "Identity" (5) hash function. ML-DSA and SLH-DSA are only defined with the "Identity" hash and MUST NOT be sent to a receiver that has not indicated support for the "Identity" hash. When generating a signature with ML-DSA or SLH-DSA, the IKEv2 implementation would take the InitiatorSignedOctets string or the ResponderSignedOctets string (as appropriate), logically send it to the identity hash (which leaves it unchanged), and then pass it into the ML-DSA or SLH-DSA signer as the message to be signed (with no context string). The resulting signature is placed into the Signature Value field of the Authentication Payload. When verifying a signature with ML-DSA or SLH-DSA, the IKEv2 implementation would take the InitiatorSignedOctets string or the ResponderSignedOctets string (as appropriate), logically send it to the identity hash (which leaves it unchanged), and then pass it into the ML-DSA or SLH-DSA signer as the message to be verified (with no context string).

Implementation Alternatives for ML-DSA With ML-DSA, there are two different approaches to implementing the signature process. The first one is to simply hand the SignedOctets string to the crypto library to generate the full signature; this works for SLH-DSA as well. The second approach involves using the ExternalMu-ML-DSA API defined in . In this method, the implementation calls the ExternalMU-ML-DSA.Prehash API with the SignedOctets string and the ML-DSA public key, generating an hash. This hash is then passed to the cryptographic library to execute the ExternalMU-ML-DSA.Sign API, which takes the hash and the ML-DSA private key to produce the signature. These methods are equivalent, and so either may be used.

Discussion of ML-DSA and SLH-DSA and Prehashing This section discusses various approaches for integrating ML-DSA and SLH-DSA into IKEv2, not just the method proposed above. The signature architecture within IKE was designed around RSA (and later extended to ECDSA). In this architecture, the actual message (the SignedOctets) are first hashed (using a hash that the verifier has indicated support for), and then passed for the remaining part of the signature generation processing. That is, it is designed for signature algorithms that first apply one of a number of hash functions to the message and then perform processing on that hash. Neither ML-DSA nor SLH-DSA fits cleanly into this architecture. We see three ways to address this mismatch. The first consideration is that both ML-DSA and SLH-DSA provide prehashed parameter sets, which are designed to sign messages that have already been hashed by an external source. At first glance, this might seem like an ideal solution. However, several practical challenges arise:

The prehashed versions of ML-DSA and SLH-DSA appear to be rarely used, making it likely that support for them in cryptographic libraries is limited or unavailable.
The public keys for the prehashed variants use different OIDs, which means that certificates for IKEv2 would differ from those used in other protocols. Additionally, some certificate authorities (CAs) may not support issuing certificates for prehashed ML-DSA or SLH-DSA due to their limited adoption.
Some users have explicitly indicated a preference not to use the prehashed parameter sets.

The second is to note that, while IKEv2 normally acts this way, it doesn't always. EdDSA has a similar constraint on not working cleanly with the standard 'hash and then sign' paradigm, and so the existing provides an alternative method, which ML-DSA would cleanly fit into. We could certainly adopt this same strategy; our concern would be that it might be more difficult for IKEv2 implementors which do not already have support for EdDSA. The third way is what we can refer to as 'fake prehashing'; IKEv2 would generate the hash as current, but instead of running ML-DSA or SLH-DSA in prehash mode, we have it sign it in pure mode as if it was the message. This is a violation of the spirit, if not the letter of FIPS 204, 205. However, it is secure (assuming the hash function is strong), and fits in cleanly with both the existing IKEv2 architecture, and what crypto libraries provide. Additionally, for SLH-DSA, this means that we're now dependent on collision resistance (while the rest of the SLH-DSA architecture was carefully designed not to be).

Use of ML-DSA and SLH-DSA Both ML-DSA and SLH-DSA offer deterministic and randomized signing options. By default, ML-DSA uses a non-deterministic approach, where the private random seed rho' is derived pseudorandomly from the signer’s private key, the message, and a 256-bit string, rnd, generated by an approved Random Bit Generator (RBG). In the deterministic version, rnd is instead a constant 256-bit string. Similarly, SLH-DSA can be deterministic or randomized, depending on whether opt_rand is set to a fixed value or a random one. When opt_rand is set to a public seed (from the public key), SLH-DSA produces deterministic signatures, meaning signing the same message twice will result in the same signature. In the context of signature-based authentication in IKEv2, the data used for generating a digital signature is unique for each IKEv2 session, as it includes session-specific information like nonces, cryptographic parameters, and identifiers. Thus, both ML-DSA and SLH-DSA can utilize their deterministic versions when used within IKEv2. In both cases, the 'context' input parameter for the signature generation algorithm is set to an empty string. IKEv2 can use arbitrary signature algorithms as described in , where the "Digital Signature" authentication method supersedes previously defined signature authentication methods. The three security levels of ML-DSA are identified via AlgorithmIdentifier ASN.1 objects, as specified in . The different combinations of SLH-DSA are identified via AlgorithmIdentifier ASN.1 objects, as specified in . Both ML-DSA and SLH-DSA define two signature modes: pure mode and pre-hash mode, as specified in and , respectively. This document specifies only the use of pure mode for signature-based authentication in IKEv2, where the content is signed directly along with some domain separation information. In pre-hash mode, a digest of the message is signed instead. Both and prefer pure mode over pre-hash mode, and neither nor discusses pre-hash mode. The data signed to prove the identity of the initiator and responder (as discussed in Section 2.15 of ) typically fits within the memory constraints of the devices involved in the IKEv2 exchange, consisting of nonces, SPIs, and the initial exchange messages, which are manageable in size.

Mechanisms for Signaling Supported Key Pair Types The following mechanisms can be used by peers to signal the types of public/private key pairs they possess:

One method to ascertain that the key pair type the initiator wants the responder to use is through a Certificate Request payload sent by the initiator. For example, the initiator could indicate in the Certificate Request payload that it trusts a certificate authority certificate signed by an ML-DSA or SLH-DSA key. This indication implies that the initiator can process ML-DSA or SLH-DSA signatures, which means that the responder can use ML-DSA or SLH-DSA keys when authenticating.
Another method is to leverage that allows peers to announce their supported authentication methods. It improves interoperability when IKEv2 partners are configured with multiple credentials of different type to authenticate each other. The responder includes a SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS notification in the IKE_SA_INIT response message containing the PQC digital signature scheme(s) it supports. The initiator includes the SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS notification in either the IKE_AUTH request message or in the IKE_INTERMEDIATE request. This notification lists the PQC digital signature scheme(s) supported by the initiator, ordered by preference.

Security Considerations ML-DSA and SLH-DSA are modeled under existentially unforgeable digital signatures with respect to an adaptive chosen message attack (EUF-CMA). ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, and ML-DSA-87 are designed to offer security comparable with the SHA-256/SHA3-256, AES-192, and AES-256 respectively. Similarly, SLH-DSA-128{S,F}-{SHA2,SHAKE}, SLH-DSA-192{S,F}-{SHA2,SHAKE}, and SLH-DSA-256{S,F}-{SHA2,SHAKE} are designed to offer security comparable with the AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 respectively. The Security Considerations section of and applies to this specification as well.

Acknowledgements Thanks to Stefaan De Cnodder, Loganaden Velvindron, Paul Wouters, Andreas Steffen, and Daniel Van Geest for the discussion and comments.