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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-lamps-caa-issuemail-01" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="CAA for Email Addresses">Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Processing for Email Addresses</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-lamps-caa-issuemail-01"/>
    <author fullname="Corey Bonnell">
      <organization>DigiCert, Inc.</organization>
      <address>
        <email>corey.bonnell@digicert.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2023" month="April" day="12"/>
    <area>Security</area>
    <keyword>caa</keyword>
    <keyword>certification authority authorization</keyword>
    <keyword>email address</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <t>The Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) DNS resource record (RR)
provides a mechanism for domains to express the allowed set of
Certification Authorities (CAs) that are authorized issue certificates
for the domain. RFC 8659 contains the core CAA specification, where
Property Tags that restrict the issuance of certificates which certify
domain names are defined. This specification defines a Property Tag that
grants authorization to CAs to issue certificates which certify
email addresses that include the domain name.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        The latest revision of this draft can be found at <eref target="https://CBonnell.github.io/caa-issuemail/draft-ietf-lamps-caa-issuemail.html"/>.
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-caa-issuemail/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps) Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:spasm@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/spasm/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/CBonnell/caa-issuemail"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>The Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) DNS resource record (RR)
provides a mechanism for domains to express the allowed set of
Certification Authorities (CAs) that are authorized issue certificates
for the domain. <xref target="RFC8659"/> contains the core CAA specification, where
Property Tags that restrict the issuance of certificates which certify
domain names are defined. <xref target="RFC8659"/> does not define a mechanism to
restrict the issuance of certificates which certify email
addresses that include the domain name.</t>
      <t>This document defines a CAA Property Tag which restricts the allowed set
of issuers of certificates which certify email addresses. Its
syntax and processing are similar to the "issue" Property Tag as defined
in section 4.2 of <xref target="RFC8659"/>.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions">
      <name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="syntax">
      <name>Syntax of the "issuemail" Property Tag</name>
      <t>This document defines the "issuemail" Property Tag. The presence of
one or more "issuemail" Properties in the Relevant Resource Record
Set (<xref target="RFC8659"/>) indicates that the domain is requesting that
Certification Authorities restrict the issuance of certificates that
certify email addresses.</t>
      <t>The CAA "issuemail" Property Value has the following sub-syntax
(specified in ABNF as per <xref target="RFC5234"/>):</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
  issuemail-value = *WSP [issuer-domain-name *WSP]
    [";" *WSP [parameters *WSP]]

  issuer-domain-name = label *("." label)
  label = (ALPHA / DIGIT) *( *("-") (ALPHA / DIGIT))

  parameters = (parameter *WSP ";" *WSP parameters) / parameter
  parameter = tag *WSP "=" *WSP value
  tag = (ALPHA / DIGIT) *( *("-") (ALPHA / DIGIT))
  value = *(%x21-3A / %x3C-7E)
]]></artwork>
      <t>The production rules for "WSP", "ALPHA", and "DIGIT" are defined in
Appendix B.1 of <xref target="RFC5234"/>. Readers who are familiar with the sub-syntax
of the "issue" and "issuewild" Property Tags will recognize that this
sub-syntax is identical.</t>
      <t>The meanings of each production rule within "issuemail-value" are as
follows:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>"issuer-domain-name": A domain name of the CA comprised of one or
more labels</li>
        <li>"label": A single LDH domain label</li>
        <li>"parameters": A semicolon-separated list of parameters</li>
        <li>"parameter": A tag and a value, separated by an equals sign ("=")</li>
        <li>"tag": A keyword which identifies the type of parameter</li>
        <li>"value": The string value for a parameter</li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section anchor="processing-of-the-issuemail-property-tag">
      <name>Processing of the "issuemail" Property Tag</name>
      <t>Prior to issuing a certificate that certifies an email address, the
Certification Authority <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> check for publication of a Relevant
Resource Record Set (RRSet). The discovery of such a Relevant RRSet <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
be performed using the algorithm specified in section 3 of <xref target="RFC8659"/>.
The input domain to the discovery algorithm <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be the domain "part"
(<xref target="RFC5322"/>) of the email address that is being certified. If the domain
"part" of the email address being certified is an Internationalized
Domain Name (<xref target="RFC5890"/>) that contains one or more U-Labels, then all
U-Labels <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be converted to their A-Label representation (<xref target="RFC5891"/>)
for the purpose of discovering the Relevant RRSet for that email
address.</t>
      <t>If the Relevant RRSet is empty, or the Relevant RRSet does not contain
any "issuemail" Properties , then the domain has not requested any
restrictions on the issuance of certificates for email addresses. The
presence of other Property Tags, such as "issue" or "issuewild", does
not restrict the issuance of certificates which certify email addresses.</t>
      <t>For each "issuemail" Property in the Relevant RRSet, the
Certification Authority <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> compare its issuer-domain-name with the
issuer-domain-name as expressed in the Property Value. If there is not
any "issuemail" record whose issuer-domain-name (as expressed in the
Property Value) matches the Certification Authority's
issuer-domain-name, then the Certification Authority <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> issue
the certificate. If the Relevant RRSet contains any "issuemail"
Property whose issuemail-value does not conform to the ABNF syntax as
defined section 3 of this document, then those records <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be treated
as if the issuer-domain-name in the issuemail-value is the empty string.</t>
      <t>If the certificate certifies more than one email address, then the
Certification Authority <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> perform the above procedure for each
email address being certified.</t>
      <t>The assignment of issuer-domain-names to Certification Authorities is
beyond the scope of this document.</t>
      <t>The processing of parameters in the issuemail-value are beyond the scope
of this document.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="examples-of-the-issuemail-property-tag">
      <name>Examples of the "issuemail" Property Tag</name>
      <t>Several illustrative examples of Relevant RRSets and their expected
processing semantics follow. All examples assume that the
issuer-domain-name for the Certification Authority is
"authority.example".</t>
      <section anchor="no-issuemail-property">
        <name>No issuemail Property</name>
        <t>The following RRSet does not contain any "issuemail" Properties,
so there are no restrictions on the issuance of certificates which
certify email addresses for that domain:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
mail.client.example         CAA 0 issue "authority.example"
mail.client.example         CAA 0 issue "other-authority.example"
]]></artwork>
      </section>
      <section anchor="single-issuemail-property">
        <name>Single issuemail Property</name>
        <t>The following RRSet contains a single "issuemail" Property where the
issuer-domain-name is the empty string, so the issuance of certificates
certifying email addresses for the domain is prohibited:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
mail.client.example         CAA 0 issuemail ";"
]]></artwork>
      </section>
      <section anchor="multiple-issuemail-properties">
        <name>Multiple issuemail Properties</name>
        <t>The following RRSet contains multiple "issuemail" Properties,
one of which matches the issuer-domain-name of the example Certification
Authority ("authority.example") and one Property which does not match.
Given that there is at least one record whose issuer-domain-name
matches the Certification Authority's issuer-domain-name, issuance is
permitted.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
mail.client.example         CAA 0 issuemail ";"
mail.client.example         CAA 0 issuemail "authority.example"
]]></artwork>
      </section>
      <section anchor="malformed-issuemail-property">
        <name>Malformed issuemail Property</name>
        <t>The following RRSet contains a single "issuemail" Property whose
sub-syntax does not conform to the ABNF as specified in <xref target="syntax"/>.
Given that "issuemail" Properties with malformed syntax are treated the
same as "issuemail" Properties whose issuer-domain-name is the empty
string, issuance is prohibited.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
malformed.client.example     CAA 0 issuemail "%%%%%"
]]></artwork>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>The security considerations that are expressed in <xref target="RFC8659"/> are relevant
to this specification.</t>
      <t>CAA Properties may have the "critical" flag asserted, which specifies
that the Property is critical and must be processed by conforming
Certification Authorities. If a Certification Authority does not
understand the Property, then it must not issue the certificate in
question.</t>
      <t>If a single CAA RRSet is processed by multiple Certification Authorities
for the issuance of multiple certificate types, then a Certification
Authority's lack of support for a critical CAA Property in the RRSet
will prevent the Certification Authority from issuing any certificates
for that domain.</t>
      <t>For example, assume that an RRSet contains the following Properties:</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
client.example         CAA 128 issue "other-authority.example"
client.example         CAA 0 issuemail "authority.example"
]]></artwork>
      <t>In this case, if the Certification Authority whose issuer-domain-name
matches "authority.example" does not recognize the "issue" Property Tag,
then that Certification Authority will not be able to issue S/MIME
certificates that certify email addresses for "client.example".</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>The author requests the registration of the following "Certification
Authority Restriction Properties":</t>
      <table>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">Tag</th>
            <th align="left">Meaning</th>
            <th align="left">Reference</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">issuemail</td>
            <td align="left">Authorization Entry by Email Address</td>
            <td align="left">[This document]</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references>
      <name>References</name>
      <references>
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC5322">
          <front>
            <title>Internet Message Format</title>
            <author fullname="P. Resnick" initials="P." role="editor" surname="Resnick">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date month="October" year="2008"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies the Internet Message Format (IMF), a syntax for text messages that are sent between computer users, within the framework of "electronic mail" messages.  This specification is a revision of Request For Comments (RFC) 2822, which itself superseded Request For Comments (RFC) 822, "Standard for the Format of ARPA Internet Text Messages", updating it to reflect current practice and incorporating incremental changes that were specified in other RFCs.  [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5322"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5322"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5234">
          <front>
            <title>Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF</title>
            <author fullname="D. Crocker" initials="D." role="editor" surname="Crocker">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="P. Overell" initials="P." surname="Overell">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date month="January" year="2008"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Internet technical specifications often need to define a formal syntax.  Over the years, a modified version of Backus-Naur Form (BNF), called Augmented BNF (ABNF), has been popular among many Internet specifications.  The current specification documents ABNF. It balances compactness and simplicity with reasonable representational power.  The differences between standard BNF and ABNF involve naming rules, repetition, alternatives, order-independence, and value ranges.  This specification also supplies additional rule definitions and encoding for a core lexical analyzer of the type common to several Internet specifications.  [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="68"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5234"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5234"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5891">
          <front>
            <title>Internationalized Domain Names in Applications (IDNA): Protocol</title>
            <author fullname="J. Klensin" initials="J." surname="Klensin">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date month="August" year="2010"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document is the revised protocol definition for Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs).  The rationale for changes, the relationship to the older specification, and important terminology are provided in other documents.  This document specifies the protocol mechanism, called Internationalized Domain Names in Applications (IDNA), for registering and looking up IDNs in a way that does not require changes to the DNS itself.  IDNA is only meant for processing domain names, not free text.  [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5891"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5891"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8659">
          <front>
            <title>DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record</title>
            <author fullname="P. Hallam-Baker" initials="P." surname="Hallam-Baker">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="R. Stradling" initials="R." surname="Stradling">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="J. Hoffman-Andrews" initials="J." surname="Hoffman-Andrews">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date month="November" year="2019"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) DNS Resource Record allows a DNS domain name holder to specify one or more Certification Authorities (CAs) authorized to issue certificates for that domain name. CAA Resource Records allow a public CA to implement additional controls to reduce the risk of unintended certificate mis-issue.  This document defines the syntax of the CAA record and rules for processing CAA records by CAs.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 6844.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8659"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8659"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification.  These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents.  This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol  specifications.  This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the  defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references>
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC5890">
          <front>
            <title>Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework</title>
            <author fullname="J. Klensin" initials="J." surname="Klensin">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date month="August" year="2010"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document is one of a collection that, together, describe the protocol and usage context for a revision of Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA), superseding the earlier version.  It describes the document collection and provides definitions and other material that are common to the set.  [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5890"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5890"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>The author would like to thank the participants on the LAMPS Working
Group mailing list for their insightful feedback and comments. In
particular, the author extends sincere appreciation to Russ Housley,
Seo Suchan, and Michael Richardson for their suggestions which greatly
improved the quality of this document.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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