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SEC LAMPS Working Group Internet-Draft RFC5280 specifies several extended key purpose identifiers (KeyPurposeIds) for X.509 certificates. This document defines a general purpose document signing KeyPurposeId for inclusion in the Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension of X.509 public key certificates. Document Signing applications may require that the EKU extension be present and that a document signing KeyPurposeId be indicated in order for the certificate to be acceptable to that Document Signing application. About This Document Status information for this document may be found at . Discussion of this document takes place on the Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (LAMPS) Working Group mailing list (), which is archived at . Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at .

Introduction specifies several extended key purpose identifiers (KeyPurposeIds) for X.509 certificates. In addition, several KeyPurposeIds have been added under the IANA repository "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpose" . While usage of the "anyExtendedKeyUsage" KeyPurposeId is bad practice for publicly trusted certificates, there is no public and general KeyPurposeId explicitly assigned for Document Signing. The current practice is to use id-kp-emailProtection, id-kp-codeSigning or a vendor-defined KeyPurposeId for general document signing purposes. In circumstances where code signing and S/MIME certificates are also used for document signing, technical or policy changes made to the code signing and S/MIME ecosystem may cause unexpected behaviors or have an adverse impact such as decreased cryptographic agility on the document signing ecosystem and vice versa. There is no issue if the vendor-defined KeyPurposeIds are used in a PKI governed by the vendor or a set of specific group of vendors. However, if the KeyPurposeId is used outside of vendor governance, the usage can easily become out of control. For instance, when the end user encounters certificates with vendor-defined KeyPurposeIds, they might want to ask that vendor about use of the certificate. However, if those certificates were not governed by the KeyPurposeIds owner but by another vendor, the vender who own the KeyPurposeIds may not able to control use, or even do not know about the use. - If the issuance of the cert is not under the control of the KeyPurposeIds owner, it is hard to estimate the impact of change to made on the KeyPurposeId. Changes related to KeyPurposeIds possibly make negative impacts that some group of people do not tolerate, and it could become a migration agility issue. Therefore, it is not favorable to use a vendor-defined KeyPurposeId for signing a document that is not governed by the vendor. This document defines an extended key purpose identifier for Document Signing.

Conventions and Definitions The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Extended Key Purpose for Document Signing This specification defines the KeyPurposeId id-kp-documentSigning. As described in , "[i]f the [Extended Key Usage] extension is present, then the certificate MUST only be used for one of the purposes indicated." also describes that "[i]f multiple [key] purposes are indicated the application need not recognize all purposes indicated, as long as the intended purpose is present." Document Signing applications MAY require that the Extended Key Usage extension be present and that the id-kp-documentSigning be indicated in order for the certificate to be acceptable to that Document Signing application. The term "Document Signing" in this document refers to digitally signing contents that are consumed by people. To be more precise, contents are intended to be shown to a person with printable or displayable form by means of services or software, rather than processed by machines.

Including the Extended Key Purpose for Document Signing in Certificates specifies the EKU X.509 certificate extension for use on the Internet. The extension indicates one or more purposes for which the certified public key is valid. The EKU extension can be used in conjunction with the key usage extension, which indicates the set of basic cryptographic operations for which the certified key may be used. The EKU extension syntax is repeated here for convenience: As described in , EKU extension may, at the option of the certificate issuer, be either critical or non-critical. This specification defines the KeyPurposeId id-kp-documentSigning. Inclusion of this KeyPurposeId in a certificate indicates that the public key encoded in the certificate has been certified to be used for cryptographic operations on contents that are consumed by people.

Using the Extended Key Purpose for Document Signing in a Certificate The signed contents of Internet-Drafts are primarily intended to be consumed by people. To be more precise, contents are intended to be shown to a person in a printable or displayable form by means of services or software, rather than processed by machines. The digital signature on the contents is to indicate to the recipient of the contents that the content has not changed since it was signed by the identity indicated as the subject of the certificate. To validate the digital signature which is signed on contents intended to be consumed by people, implementations MAY perform the steps below during certificate validation: The following procedure is used to examine the KeyPurposeId(s) included in the Extended Key Usage extension. Restrictions on Extended Key Usage is derived and implemented from (or configured with) the policy to which the implementation conforms.

• If there are no restrictions set for the relying party and the relying party software, the certificate is acceptable.
• If there are restrictions set for the relying party and relying party software, then process the KeyPurposeId(s) as described below. This procedure is intended to permit or prohibit presence of a certain KeyPurposeId or complete absence of KeyPurposeIds. It is outside the scope of this document, but the relying party can permit or prohibit combinations of KeyPurposeIds, instead of single KeyPurposeId. A consideration on prohibiting combinations of KeyPurposeIds is described in the Security Considerations section of this document. If both "Excluded KeyPurposeId" and "Permitted KeyPurposeId" exists, the relying party or the relying party software proresses each restriction on "Excluded KeyPurposeId" first, and then processes each restriction on "Permitted KeyPurposeId".

  Excluded KeyPurposeId procedure:

  "Excluded KeyPurposeId" is a KeyPurposeId which the relying party or the relying party software prohibits. Examples of "Excluded KeyPurposeId" are, presence of the anyExtendedKeyUsage KeyPurposeId or complete absence of the EKU extension in a certificate. If a KeyPurposeId of the certificate meets the conditions set by the "Excluded KeyPurposeId" restriction, the relying party or the relying party software rejects the certificate.

  Permitted KeyPurposeId procedure:

  "Permitted KeyPurposeId" is a KeyPurposeId which the relying party or the relying party software accepts. Examples of "Permitted KeyPurposeId" are, presence of this general document signing KeyPurposeId and/or protocol specific document signing-type KeyPurposeIds. If a KeyPurposeId of the certificate meets the condition set by a "Permitted KeyPurposeId" restriction, the certificate is acceptable. Otherwise, relying party or the relying party software rejects the certificate.

When a single application has the capability to process various data formats, the software may choose to make the excluded and permitted decisions separately in accordance with the format it is handling (e.g. text, pdf, etc).

Implications for a Certification Authority The procedures and practices employed by a certification authority MUST ensure that the correct values for the EKU extension are inserted in each certificate that is issued. Unless certificates are governed by a vendor(s) specific PKI, certificates that indicate usage for document signing MAY include the id-kp-documentSigning KeyPurposeId. The inclusion of the id-kp-documentSigning KeyPurposeId does not preclude the inclusion of other KeyPurposeIds.

Security Considerations The usage of id-kp-documentSigning KeyPurposeId is to provide an alternative to id-kp-emailProtection being used for non-email purposes and id-kp-codeSigning being used to sign objects other than binary code. This extended key purpose does not introduce new security risks but instead reduces existing security risks by providing means to separate other extended key purposes used for communication protocols namely, TLS (id-kp-clientAuth) or S/MIME (id-kp-emailProtection) etc. in order to minimize the risk of cross-protocol attacks. To reduce the risk of specific cross-protocol attacks, the relying party or relying party software may additionally prohibit use of specific combinations of KeyPurposeIds. While a specific protocol or signing scheme may choose to come up with their own KeyPurposeIds, some may not have significant motive or resources to set up and manage their own KeyPurposeIds. This general document signing KeyPurposeId may be used as a stop-gap for those that intend to define their own KeyPurposeId or those who do not intend to set up a KeyPurposeId but still would like to distinguish document signing from other usages. Introduction of this id-kp-documentSigning KeyPurposeId does not introduce any new security or privacy concerns.

IANA Considerations This document requests that IANA make two assignments. One assignment is for the addition of the id-kp-documentSigning object identifier (OID), as defined in , to the "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpose" (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3) registry. The other assignment is for the addition of the id-mod-docsign-eku ASN.1 module object identifier (OID), as defined in Appendix A, to the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0) registry. No further action is necessary by IANA.

References Normative References ITU-T This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK] In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. Informative References When the Public-Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) Working Group was chartered, an object identifier arc was allocated by IANA for use by that working group. This document describes the object identifiers that were assigned in that arc, returns control of that arc to IANA, and establishes IANA allocation policies for any future assignments within that arc.

Appendix A. ASN.1 Module The following ASN.1 module provides the complete definition of the Document Signing KeyPurposeId.

Acknowledgments We would like to thank Russ Housley for verifying the ASN.1 module. Additionally, we would like to thank Corey Bonnell, Wendy Brown, Russ Housley, Prachi Jain, and Stefan Santesson for their comments.