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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-lamps-kyber-certificates-03" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
  <!-- xml2rfc v2v3 conversion 3.20.0 -->
  <front>
    <title abbrev="ML-KEM in Certificates">Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Algorithm Identifiers for Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM)</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-lamps-kyber-certificates-03"/>
    <author initials="S." surname="Turner" fullname="Sean Turner">
      <organization>sn3rd</organization>
      <address>
        <email>sean@sn3rd.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="P." surname="Kampanakis" fullname="Panos Kampanakis">
      <organization>AWS</organization>
      <address>
        <email>kpanos@amazon.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="J." surname="Massimo" fullname="Jake Massimo">
      <organization>AWS</organization>
      <address>
        <email>jakemas@amazon.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="B." surname="Westerbaan" fullname="Bas Westerbaan">
      <organization>Cloudflare</organization>
      <address>
        <email>bas@westerbaan.name</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2024" month="March" day="04"/>
    <area>SEC</area>
    <workgroup>LAMPS</workgroup>
    <keyword>Kyber KEM Certificate X.509 PKIX</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 88?>

<t>Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM), also
known as Kyber, is a key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM). This
document specifies algorithm identifiers and ASN.1 encoding
format for ML-KEM in public key certificates. The encoding for
public and private keys are also provided.</t>
      <t>[EDNOTE:
This document is not expected to be finalized before the NIST PQC
Project has standardized PQ algorithms. This specification will use
object identifiers for the new algorithms that are assigned by NIST,
and will use placeholders until these are released.]</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        The latest revision of this draft can be found at <eref target="https://lamps-wg.github.io/kyber-certificates/#go.draft-ietf-lamps-kyber-certificates.html"/>.
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-kyber-certificates/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps) Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:spasm@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/spasm/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/lamps-wg/kyber-certificates"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 102?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <aside>
        <t>WARNING: This I-D includes examples. These examples were generated
  prior to NIST finalizing <xref target="DRAFTFIPS203"/>.</t>
      </aside>
      <t>Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM), also
known as Kyber, is a key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM) standardized
by the US NIST PQC Project <xref target="DRAFTFIPS203"/>. This document specifies the
use of the ML-KEM algorithm at three security levels: ML-KEM-512,
ML-KEM-768, and ML-KEM-1024, in X.509 public key certificates; see
<xref target="RFC5280"/>. Public and private key encodings are also specified.</t>
      <section anchor="asn1-and-ml-kem-identifiers">
        <name>ASN.1 and ML-KEM Identifiers</name>
        <t>An ASN.1 module <xref target="X680"/> is included for reference purposes. Note that
as per <xref target="RFC5280"/>, certificates use the Distinguished Encoding Rules;
see <xref target="X690"/>. Also note that NIST defined the object identifiers for
the ML-KEM algorithms in an ASN.1 modulle; see (TODO insert reference).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="applicability-statement">
        <name>Applicability Statement</name>
        <t>ML-KEM certificates are used in protocols where the public key is used to
generate and encapsulate a shared secret used to derive a symmetric key used to
encrypt a payload; see <xref target="I-D.ietf-lamps-kyber"/>. To be used in
TLS, ML-KEM certificates could only be used as end-entity identity
certificates and would require significant updates to the protocol; see
<xref target="I-D.celi-wiggers-tls-authkem"/>.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions">
      <name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      <?line -18?>

</section>
    <section anchor="algorithm-identifiers">
      <name>Algorithm Identifiers</name>
      <t>Certificates conforming to <xref target="RFC5280"/> can convey a public key for any
public key algorithm. The certificate indicates the algorithm through
an algorithm identifier. An algorithm identifier consists of an object
identifier and optional parameters.</t>
      <t>The AlgorithmIdentifier type, which is included herein for convenience,
is defined as follows:</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
  AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM-TYPE, ALGORITHM-TYPE:AlgorithmSet} ::=
    SEQUENCE {
      algorithm   ALGORITHM-TYPE.&id({AlgorithmSet}),
      parameters  ALGORITHM-TYPE.
                    &Params({AlgorithmSet}{@algorithm}) OPTIONAL
    }
]]></artwork>
      <aside>
        <t>NOTE: The above syntax is from <xref target="RFC5912"/> and is compatible with the
  2021 ASN.1 syntax <xref target="X680"/>.</t>
      </aside>
      <t>The fields in AlgorithmIdentifier have the following meanings:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>algorithm identifies the cryptographic algorithm with an object
identifier.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>parameters, which are optional, are the associated parameters for
the algorithm identifier in the algorithm field.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t><xref target="ML-KEM-TBD1"/> includes object identifiers for ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, and
ML-KEM-1024. For all of these OIDs, the parameters <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be absent.</t>
      <aside>
        <t>NOTE: It is possible to find systems that require the parameters to be
  present. This can be due to either a defect in the original 1997
  syntax or a programming error where developers never got input where
  this was not true. The optimal solution is to fix these systems;
  where this is not possible, the problem needs to be restricted to
  that subsystem and not propagated to the Internet.</t>
      </aside>
    </section>
    <section anchor="ML-KEM-TBD1">
      <name>ML-KEM Public Key Identifiers</name>
      <t>The AlgorithmIdentifier for a ML-KEM public key <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use one of the
id-alg-ml-kem object identifiers listed below, based on the security
level. The parameters field of the AlgorithmIdentifier for the ML-KEM
public key <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be absent.</t>
      <t>When any of the ML-KEM AlgorithmIdentifier appears in the
SubjectPublicKeyInfo field of an X.509 certificate, the key usage
certificate extension <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> only contain keyEncipherment
<xref section="4.2.1.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC5280"/>.</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
  pk-ml-kem-512 PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
    IDENTIFIER id-alg-ml-kem-512
    -- KEY no ASN.1 wrapping --
    PARAMS ARE absent
    CERT-KEY-USAGE
      { keyEncipherment }
    --- PRIVATE-KEY no ASN.1 wrapping --
    }

  pk-ml-kem-768 PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
    IDENTIFIER id-alg-ml-kem-768
    -- KEY no ASN.1 wrapping --
    PARAMS ARE absent
    CERT-KEY-USAGE
      { keyEncipherment }
    --- PRIVATE-KEY no ASN.1 wrapping --
    }

  pk-ml-kem-1024 PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
    IDENTIFIER id-alg-ml-kem-1024
    -- KEY no ASN.1 wrapping --
    PARAMS ARE absent
    CERT-KEY-USAGE
      { keyEncipherment }
    --- PRIVATE-KEY no ASN.1 wrapping --
    }
]]></artwork>
      <aside>
        <t>NOTE: As noted in Section 3, the values for these object identifers
  will be assigned by NIST.  Once assigned, they will be added to a future
  revision of this document.</t>
      </aside>
    </section>
    <section anchor="subject-public-key-fields">
      <name>Subject Public Key Fields</name>
      <t>In the X.509 certificate, the subjectPublicKeyInfo field has the
SubjectPublicKeyInfo type, which has the following ASN.1 syntax:</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
  SubjectPublicKeyInfo {PUBLIC-KEY: IOSet} ::= SEQUENCE {
      algorithm        AlgorithmIdentifier {PUBLIC-KEY, {IOSet}},
      subjectPublicKey BIT STRING
  }
]]></artwork>
      <aside>
        <t>NOTE: The above syntax is from <xref target="RFC5912"/> and is compatible with the
  2021 ASN.1 syntax <xref target="X680"/>.</t>
      </aside>
      <t>The fields in SubjectPublicKeyInfo have the following meaning:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>algorithm is the algorithm identifier and parameters for the
public key (see above).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>subjectPublicKey contains the byte stream of the public key.  The
algorithms defined in this document always encode the public key
as TODO pick format e.g., exact multiple of 8 bits?.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>The following is an example of a ML-KEM-512 public key encoded using the
textual encoding defined in <xref target="RFC7468"/>:</t>
      <aside>
        <t>WARNING: This example was generated prior to NIST
  finalizing <xref target="DRAFTFIPS203"/>.</t>
      </aside>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
  -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
  TODO insert example public key
  -----END PUBLIC KEY-------
]]></artwork>
    </section>
    <section anchor="private-key-format">
      <name>Private Key Format</name>
      <t>"Asymmetric Key Packages" <xref target="RFC5958"/> describes how to encode a private
key in a structure that both identifies what algorithm the private key
is for and allows for the public key and additional attributes about the
key to be included as well. For illustration, the ASN.1 structure
OneAsymmetricKey is replicated below. The algorithm-specific details of
how a private key is encoded are left for the document describing the
algorithm itself.</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
  OneAsymmetricKey ::= SEQUENCE {
    version                  Version,
    privateKeyAlgorithm      SEQUENCE {
    algorithm                PUBLIC-KEY.&id({PublicKeySet}),
    parameters               PUBLIC-KEY.&Params({PublicKeySet}
                               {@privateKeyAlgorithm.algorithm})
                                  OPTIONAL}
    privateKey               OCTET STRING (CONTAINING
                               PUBLIC-KEY.&PrivateKey({PublicKeySet}
                                 {@privateKeyAlgorithm.algorithm})),
    attributes           [0] Attributes OPTIONAL,
    ...,
    [[2: publicKey       [1] BIT STRING (CONTAINING
                               PUBLIC-KEY.&Params({PublicKeySet}
                                 {@privateKeyAlgorithm.algorithm})
                                 OPTIONAL,
    ...
  }

  PrivateKey ::= OCTET STRING

  PublicKey ::= BIT STRING
]]></artwork>
      <aside>
        <t>NOTE: The above syntax is from <xref target="RFC5958"/> and is compatible with the
  2021 ASN.1 syntax <xref target="X680"/>.</t>
      </aside>
      <t>For the keys defined in this document, the private key is always an
opaque byte sequence. The ASN.1 type PqckemPrivateKey is defined in
this document to hold the byte sequence. Thus, when encoding a
OneAsymmetricKey object, the private key is wrapped in a
PqckemPrivateKey object and wrapped by the OCTET STRING of the
"privateKey" field.</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
  PqckemPrivateKey ::= OCTET STRING
]]></artwork>
      <t>The following is an example of a ML-KEM-512 private key encoded using the
textual encoding defined in <xref target="RFC7468"/>:</t>
      <aside>
        <t>WARNING: This example was generated prior to NIST
  finalizing <xref target="DRAFTFIPS203"/>.</t>
      </aside>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
  -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
  TODO iser example private key
  -----END PRIVATE KEY-------
]]></artwork>
      <t>The following example, in addition to encoding the ML-KEM-512 private key,
has an attribute included as well as the public key. As with the
prior example, the textual encoding defined in <xref target="RFC7468"/> is used:</t>
      <aside>
        <t>WARNING: This example was generated prior to NIST
  finalizing <xref target="DRAFTFIPS203"/>.</t>
      </aside>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
  -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
  TODO insert example private key with attribute
  -----END PRIVATE KEY-------
]]></artwork>
      <aside>
        <t>NOTE: There exist some private key import functions that have not
  implemented the new ASN.1 structure OneAsymmetricKey that is defined in
  <xref target="RFC5958"/>. This means that they will not accept a private key
  structure that contains the public key field.  This means a balancing
  act needs to be done between being able to do a consistency check on the
  key pair and widest ability to import the key.</t>
      </aside>
    </section>
    <section anchor="asn1-module">
      <name>ASN.1 Module</name>
      <t>TODO ASN.1 Module</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>The Security Considerations section of <xref target="RFC5280"/> applies to this specification as well.</t>
      <aside>
        <t>To Do: Discuss side-channels for Kyber TBD1.</t>
      </aside>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document will have some IANA actions.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references>
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="X680" target="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680">
          <front>
            <title>Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation</title>
            <author>
              <organization>ITU-T</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2021" month="February"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="ITU-T Recommendation" value="X.680"/>
          <seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC" value="8824-1:2021"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="X690" target="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690">
          <front>
            <title>Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)</title>
            <author>
              <organization>ITU-T</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2021" month="February"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="ITU-T Recommendation" value="X.690"/>
          <seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC" value="8825-1:2021"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5280">
          <front>
            <title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile</title>
            <author fullname="D. Cooper" initials="D." surname="Cooper"/>
            <author fullname="S. Santesson" initials="S." surname="Santesson"/>
            <author fullname="S. Farrell" initials="S." surname="Farrell"/>
            <author fullname="S. Boeyen" initials="S." surname="Boeyen"/>
            <author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>
            <author fullname="W. Polk" initials="W." surname="Polk"/>
            <date month="May" year="2008"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5280"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5280"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5912">
          <front>
            <title>New ASN.1 Modules for the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)</title>
            <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
            <author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
            <date month="June" year="2010"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) certificate format, and many associated formats, are expressed using ASN.1. The current ASN.1 modules conform to the 1988 version of ASN.1. This document updates those ASN.1 modules to conform to the 2002 version of ASN.1. There are no bits-on-the-wire changes to any of the formats; this is simply a change to the syntax. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5912"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5912"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5958">
          <front>
            <title>Asymmetric Key Packages</title>
            <author fullname="S. Turner" initials="S." surname="Turner"/>
            <date month="August" year="2010"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines the syntax for private-key information and a content type for it. Private-key information includes a private key for a specified public-key algorithm and a set of attributes. The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS), as defined in RFC 5652, can be used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt the asymmetric key format content type. This document obsoletes RFC 5208. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5958"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5958"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="DRAFTFIPS203" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography">
          <front>
            <title>DRAFT Module-Lattice-based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard</title>
            <author>
              <organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2023" month="August"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="FIPS PUB" value="203"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-lamps-kyber">
          <front>
            <title>Use of KYBER in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)</title>
            <author fullname="PRAT Julien" initials="J." surname="Prat">
              <organization>CryptoNext Security</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Mike Ounsworth" initials="M." surname="Ounsworth">
              <organization>Entrust Limited</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="10" month="November" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document describes the conventions for using a Key Encapsulation
   Mechanism algorithm (KEM) within the Cryptographic Message Syntax
   (CMS). The CMS specifies the envelopped-data content type, which
   consists of an encrypted content and encrypted content-encryption
   keys for one or more recipients. The mechanism proposed here can
   rely on either post-quantum KEMs, hybrid KEMs or classical KEMs but 
   this document specifies the use of Kyber.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-lamps-kyber-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.celi-wiggers-tls-authkem">
          <front>
            <title>KEM-based Authentication for TLS 1.3</title>
            <author fullname="Thom Wiggers" initials="T." surname="Wiggers">
              <organization>PQShield</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Sofia Celi" initials="S." surname="Celi">
              <organization>Brave Software</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Peter Schwabe" initials="P." surname="Schwabe">
              <organization>Radboud University and MPI-SP</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Douglas Stebila" initials="D." surname="Stebila">
              <organization>University of Waterloo</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Nick Sullivan" initials="N." surname="Sullivan">
         </author>
            <date day="18" month="August" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document gives a construction for a Key Encapsulation Mechanism
   (KEM)-based authentication mechanism in TLS 1.3.  This proposal
   authenticates peers via a key exchange protocol, using their long-
   term (KEM) public keys.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-celi-wiggers-tls-authkem-02"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7468">
          <front>
            <title>Textual Encodings of PKIX, PKCS, and CMS Structures</title>
            <author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
            <author fullname="S. Leonard" initials="S." surname="Leonard"/>
            <date month="April" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes and discusses the textual encodings of the Public-Key Infrastructure X.509 (PKIX), Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS), and Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). The textual encodings are well-known, are implemented by several applications and libraries, and are widely deployed. This document articulates the de facto rules by which existing implementations operate and defines them so that future implementations can interoperate.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7468"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7468"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 400?>

<section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>TODO acknowledge.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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