<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<?xml-model href="rfc7991bis.rnc"?>  <!-- Required for schema validation and schema-aware editing -->
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<!DOCTYPE rfc [
  <!ENTITY nbsp    "&#160;">
  <!ENTITY zwsp   "&#8203;">
  <!ENTITY nbhy   "&#8209;">
  <!ENTITY wj     "&#8288;">
]>
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<rfc
  xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"
  category="std"
  docName="draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-01"
  ipr="trust200902"
  obsoletes="8954"
  updates="6960, 5912"
  submissionType="IETF"
  xml:lang="en"
  version="3">

  <front>
    <title abbrev="draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-01">Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Nonce Extension</title>
    <!--  [REPLACE/DELETE] abbrev. The abbreviated title is required if the full title is longer than 39 characters -->
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-01"/>
    <author fullname="Himanshu Sharma" initials="H" role="editor" surname="Sharma">
      <!-- [CHECK]
             * initials should not include an initial for the surname
             * role="editor" is optional -->
    <!-- Can have more than one author -->
      
    <!-- all of the following elements are optional -->
      <organization>Netskope Inc</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <!-- Reorder these if your country does things differently -->
          <street>2445 Augustine Dr 3rd floor</street>
          <city>Santa Clara</city>
          <region>California</region>
          <code>95054</code>
          <country>USA</country>
          <!-- Uses two letter country code -->
        </postal>        
        <email>himanshu@netskope.com</email>  
        <uri>www.netskope.com</uri>
      </address>
    </author>
   
    <date year="2024"/>
    <!-- On draft subbmission:
         * If only the current year is specified, the current day and month will be used.
         * If the month and year are both specified and are the current ones, the current day will
           be used
         * If the year is not the current one, it is necessary to specify at least a month and day="1" will be used.
    -->

    <area>General</area>
    <workgroup>Internet Engineering Task Force</workgroup>
    <!-- "Internet Engineering Task Force" is fine for individual submissions.  If this element is 
          not present, the default is "Network Working Group", which is used by the RFC Editor as 
          a nod to the history of the RFC Series. -->

    <keyword>Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Nonce Extension</keyword>
    <!-- [REPLACE/DELETE]. Multiple allowed.  Keywords are incorporated into HTML output files for 
         use by search engines. -->

    <abstract>
        <t>
            This document updates the Nonce extension section of RFC-8954.  Nonce
            extension is an optional extension for Online Certificate Status
            Protocol (OCSP) request and response messages.  OCSP is used for
            checking the status of a certificate, and the Nonce extension is used
            to cryptographically bind an OCSP response message to a particular
            OCSP request message. Some environments use cryptographic algorithms that generate
            a Nonce that is longer than 32 octets. This document updates the maximum allowed length of Nonce to 128 octets.
        </t>
    </abstract>
 
  </front>

  <middle>
    
    <section>
      <name>Introduction</name>
        <t>
            Nonce extension was previously defined in Section 4.4.1 of <xref target="RFC6960"/>
   and updated in <xref target="RFC8954"/>.  <xref target="RFC8954"/> enforces the maximum Nonce
   length to 32 octets.  To support cryptographic algorithms that generate
   a Nonce that is longer than 32 octets, this document updates the
   maximum allowed size of the Nonce to 128 octets.  In addition, this
   document recommends that the OCSP client and responder use a 
                Nonce with a minimum length of 32 octets.
        </t>
      <section>
        <name>Requirements Language</name>
        <t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL",
          "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT
          RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be
          interpreted as described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/>
          <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in
          all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    
    <section>
      <name>OCSP Extensions</name>
      <t>
          The message formats for OCSP requests and responses are defined in
   <xref target="RFC6960"/> and Nonce extension was updated in <xref target="RFC8954"/>.  <xref target="RFC6960"/>
   also defines the standard extensions for OCSP messages based on the
   extension model employed in X.509 version 3 certificates (see
   <xref target="RFC5280"/>).  <xref target="RFC8954"/> replaces this section to enforce the minimum
   and maximum length for the Nonce value.
   This document extends the maximum allowed nonce length to 128 octets and does not change the specifications
   of any of the other standard extensions defined in [RFC6960].
      </t>
   <section>
   <name>Nonce Extension</name>
   <t>This section replaces the entirety of Section 2.1 of <xref target="RFC8954"/>, which
       describes the OCSP Nonce extension.
   </t>
   <t>
        The Nonce cryptographically binds a request and a response to prevent
       replay attacks. The Nonce is included as one of the requestExtensions
       in requests; in responses, it would be included as one of the
       responseExtensions.In both the request and the response, the Nonce
       will be identified by the object identifier id-pkix-ocsp-Nonce, while
       the extnValue is the value of the Nonce.  If the Nonce extension is
       present, then the length of the Nonce MUST be at least 1 octet and
       can be up to 128 octets.
   </t>
   <t>
        An OCSP client that implements this document SHOULD use a
       minimum length of 32 octets for Nonce in the Nonce extension. RFC 8954-compliant implementations will be unable to process nonces generated per the new specification with sizes in excess of what was permitted by RFC 8954. 
   </t>
   <t>
       OCSP resonder that implements this document MUST reject 
       any OCSP request that has a Nonce in the Nonce extension with a length
       of either 0 octets or more than 128 octets, with the malformedRequest
       OCSPResponseStatus as described in Section 4.2.1 of <xref target="RFC6960"/>.
       Responders, supporting the Nonce extension, MUST accept lengths of at least
       16 octets and MAY choose to ignore the Nonce extension for requests where the 
       length of the nonce is less than 16 octets or more than 32 octets.
   </t>
   <t>
       The value of the Nonce MUST be generated using a cryptographically 
       strong pseudorandom number generator (see <xref target="RFC4086"/>). The minimum
           Nonce length of 1 octet is defined to provide backward compatibility 
           with older clients that follow <xref target="RFC6960"/>.
   </t>
    <sourcecode type="asn.1" markers="false">
    id-pkix-ocsp           OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad-ocsp }
    id-pkix-ocsp-Nonce     OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
    Nonce ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..128))
     </sourcecode>
</section>
    </section>   

    <section> 
        <name>Security Considerations</name>
        <t>The security considerations of OCSP, in general, are described in
   <xref target="RFC6960"/>.  During the interval in which the previous OCSP response
   for a certificate is not expired but the responder has a changed
   status for that certificate, a copy of that OCSP response can be used
   to indicate that the status of the certificate is still valid.
   Including a client's nonce value in the OCSP response makes sure that
   the response is the latest response from the server and not an old
       copy.</t>
        <section>
            <name>Replay Attack</name>
            <t>The Nonce extension is used to avoid replay attacks.  Since the OCSP
   responder may choose not to send the Nonce extension in the OCSP
   response even if the client has sent the Nonce extension in the
   request <xref target="RFC5019"/>, an on-path attacker can intercept the OCSP request
   and respond with an earlier response from the server without the
   Nonce extension.  This can be mitigated by configuring the server to
   use a short time interval between the thisUpdate and nextUpdate
       fields in the OCSP response.</t>
        </section>
    </section> 
    <section anchor="IANA">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>
          For the ASN.1 Module in Appendix A.1, IANA is requested to assign an
          object identifier (OID) for the module identifier to replace TBD1. The
          OID for the module should be allocated in the "SMI Security for PKIX
          Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0), and the Description
          for the new OID should be set to "id-mod-ocsp-2024-88".
      </t>
      <t>
          For the ASN.1 Module in Appendix A.2, IANA is requested to assign an
          object identifier (OID) for the module identifier to replace TBD2. The
          OID for the module should be allocated in the "SMI Security for PKIX
          Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0), and the Description
              for the new OID should be set to "id-mod-ocsp-2024-08".
      </t>
    </section>
    <!-- NOTE: The Acknowledgements and Contributors sections are at the end of this template -->
  </middle>

  <back>
    <references>
      <name>References</name>
      <references>
        <name>Normative References</name>
        
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2560.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4086.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5019.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5280.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5912.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6960.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8954.xml"/>
        <!-- The recommended and simplest way to include a well known reference -->
        
    </references>
    <references>
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="Errata5891" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5891" quoteTitle="false">
          <front>
            <title>Erratum ID 5891</title>
            <author>
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true">RFC Errata</organization>
            </author>
          </front>
          <refcontent>RFC 6960</refcontent>
        </reference>
    </references>
    </references>

    <section anchor="asn-modules" title="ASN.1 Modules">
    <t>
        This section includes the ASN.1 modules for OCSP and replaces the entirity of Section 5 of <xref target="RFC8954"/>. 
        It addresses Errata id 5891 <xref target="Errata5891"/> as well.
    </t>
    <t>
        Appendix A.1 includes an ASN.1 module that conforms to the 1998
        version of ASN.1 for all syntax elements of OCSP.
        This module replaces the modules Appendix B.1 of <xref target="RFC6960"/>.
    </t>
    <t>
        Appendix A.2 includes an ASN.1 module, corresponding to the module 
        present in A.1, that conforms to the 2008 version of ASN.1.  This module 
        replaces the modules in Section 4 of <xref target="RFC5912"/> and Appendix B.2 of 
        <xref target="RFC6960"/>. Although a 2008 ASN.1 module is provided, the module in 
        Appendix A.1 remains the normative module as per the policy of the PKIX working group.
    </t>
    <section anchor="asn-1998" title="OCSP in ASN.1 - 1998 Syntax">
<sourcecode type="asn.1" markers="false">
OCSP-2024-88
      {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
      security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
      id-mod-ocsp-2024-88(TBD1)}

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=

BEGIN

IMPORTS

   -- PKIX Certificate Extensions
      AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax, CRLReason, GeneralName
      FROM PKIX1Implicit88 { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
           dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
           id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit(19) }

      Name, CertificateSerialNumber, Extensions,
      id-kp, id-ad-ocsp, Certificate, AlgorithmIdentifier
      FROM PKIX1Explicit88 { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
           dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
           id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(18) };

OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
   tbsRequest              TBSRequest,
   optionalSignature   [0] EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL }

TBSRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
   version             [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
   requestorName       [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL,
   requestList             SEQUENCE OF Request,
   requestExtensions   [2] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }

Signature ::= SEQUENCE {
   signatureAlgorithm      AlgorithmIdentifier,
   signature               BIT STRING,
   certs               [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }

Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) }

Nonce ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..128))

Request ::= SEQUENCE {
   reqCert                     CertID,
   singleRequestExtensions [0] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }

CertID ::= SEQUENCE {
   hashAlgorithm           AlgorithmIdentifier,
   issuerNameHash          OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's DN
   issuerKeyHash           OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's public key
   serialNumber            CertificateSerialNumber }

OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
   responseStatus          OCSPResponseStatus,
   responseBytes       [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL }

OCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED {
   successful          (0),  -- Response has valid confirmations
   malformedRequest    (1),  -- Illegal confirmation request
   internalError       (2),  -- Internal error in issuer
   tryLater            (3),  -- Try again later
                             -- (4) is not used
   sigRequired         (5),  -- Must sign the request
   unauthorized        (6)   -- Request unauthorized
}

ResponseBytes ::= SEQUENCE {
   responseType            OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
   response                OCTET STRING }

BasicOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
  tbsResponseData          ResponseData,
  signatureAlgorithm       AlgorithmIdentifier,
  signature                BIT STRING,
  certs                [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }

ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE {
   version             [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
   responderID             ResponderID,
   producedAt              GeneralizedTime,
   responses               SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse,
   responseExtensions  [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }

ResponderID ::= CHOICE {
   byName              [1] Name,
   byKey               [2] KeyHash }

KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING -- SHA-1 hash of responder's public key
                         -- (i.e., the SHA-1 hash of the value of the
                         -- BIT STRING subjectPublicKey [excluding
                         -- the tag, length, and number of unused
                         -- bits] in the responder's certificate)

SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
   certID                  CertID,
   certStatus              CertStatus,
   thisUpdate              GeneralizedTime,
   nextUpdate          [0] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
   singleExtensions    [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }

CertStatus ::= CHOICE {
   good                [0] IMPLICIT NULL,
   revoked             [1] IMPLICIT RevokedInfo,
   unknown             [2] IMPLICIT UnknownInfo }

RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
   revocationTime          GeneralizedTime,
   revocationReason    [0] EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL }

UnknownInfo ::= NULL

ArchiveCutoff ::= GeneralizedTime

AcceptableResponses ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER

ServiceLocator ::= SEQUENCE {
   issuer                  Name,
   locator                 AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax }

CrlID ::= SEQUENCE {
    crlUrl               [0]     EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL,
    crlNum               [1]     EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
    crlTime              [2]     EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }

PreferredSignatureAlgorithms ::= SEQUENCE OF PreferredSignatureAlgorithm

PreferredSignatureAlgorithm ::= SEQUENCE {
   sigIdentifier   AlgorithmIdentifier,
   certIdentifier  AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL }

    

-- Object Identifiers
    
id-kp-OCSPSigning            OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 }
id-pkix-ocsp                 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad-ocsp }
id-pkix-ocsp-basic           OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 1 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nonce           OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
id-pkix-ocsp-crl             OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 3 }
id-pkix-ocsp-response        OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 4 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck         OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 5 }
id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 6 }
id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 7 }
id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 8 }
id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 9 }

END
        </sourcecode>
    </section>
    <section anchor="asn-2008" title="OCSP in ASN.1 - 2008 Syntax">
        <sourcecode type="asn.1" markers="false">
OCSP-2024-08
     {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
     security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
     id-mod-ocsp-2024-08(TBD2)}

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=

BEGIN

IMPORTS

Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
   {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
   mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)}

AlgorithmIdentifier{}, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, PUBLIC-KEY
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
   {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
   mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
   id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)}

AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax, GeneralName, CrlEntryExtensions, CRLReason
FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
   {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
   mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)}

Name, CertificateSerialNumber, id-kp, id-ad-ocsp, Certificate
FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
   {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
   mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)}

sa-dsaWithSHA1, sa-rsaWithMD2, sa-rsaWithMD5, sa-rsaWithSHA1
FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
   {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
   mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
   id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56)};

OCSPRequest     ::=     SEQUENCE {
   tbsRequest                  TBSRequest,
   optionalSignature   [0]     EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL }

TBSRequest      ::=     SEQUENCE {
   version             [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
   requestorName       [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL,
   requestList             SEQUENCE OF Request,
   requestExtensions   [2] EXPLICIT Extensions {{re-ocsp-nonce |
                    re-ocsp-response, ...,
                    re-ocsp-preferred-signature-algorithms}} OPTIONAL }

Signature       ::=     SEQUENCE {
   signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier
                            { SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {...}},
   signature            BIT STRING,
   certs            [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }

Version  ::=  INTEGER  {  v1(0) }

Nonce ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..128))

Request ::=     SEQUENCE {
   reqCert                    CertID,
   singleRequestExtensions    [0] EXPLICIT Extensions
                                      { {re-ocsp-service-locator,
                                             ...}} OPTIONAL }

CertID ::= SEQUENCE {
   hashAlgorithm            AlgorithmIdentifier
                                {DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
   issuerNameHash     OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's DN
   issuerKeyHash      OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's public key
   serialNumber       CertificateSerialNumber }

OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
  responseStatus         OCSPResponseStatus,
  responseBytes          [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL }



OCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED {
   successful            (0), -- Response has valid confirmations
   malformedRequest      (1), -- Illegal confirmation request
   internalError         (2), -- Internal error in issuer
   tryLater              (3), -- Try again later
                              -- (4) is not used
   sigRequired           (5), -- Must sign the request
   unauthorized          (6)  -- Request unauthorized
}

RESPONSE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER

ResponseSet RESPONSE ::= {basicResponse, ...}

ResponseBytes ::=       SEQUENCE {
   responseType        RESPONSE.
                           &amp;id ({ResponseSet}),
   response            OCTET STRING (CONTAINING RESPONSE.
                           &amp;Type({ResponseSet}{@responseType}))}

basicResponse RESPONSE ::=
   { BasicOCSPResponse IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-basic }

BasicOCSPResponse       ::= SEQUENCE {
  tbsResponseData      ResponseData,
  signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier{SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM,
                           {sa-dsaWithSHA1 | sa-rsaWithSHA1 |
                                sa-rsaWithMD5 | sa-rsaWithMD2, ...}},
  signature            BIT STRING,
  certs            [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }

ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE {
  version              [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
  responderID              ResponderID,
  producedAt               GeneralizedTime,
  responses                SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse,
  responseExtensions   [1] EXPLICIT Extensions
                              {{re-ocsp-nonce, ...,
                                re-ocsp-extended-revoke}} OPTIONAL }

ResponderID ::= CHOICE {
  byName   [1] Name,
  byKey    [2] KeyHash }

KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING -- SHA-1 hash of responder's public key
                        -- (excluding the tag and length fields)

SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
  certID                       CertID,
  certStatus                   CertStatus,
  thisUpdate                   GeneralizedTime,
  nextUpdate           [0]     EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
  singleExtensions     [1]     EXPLICIT Extensions{{re-ocsp-crl |
                                            re-ocsp-archive-cutoff |
                                            CrlEntryExtensions, ...}
                                            } OPTIONAL }

CertStatus ::= CHOICE {
   good                [0]     IMPLICIT NULL,
   revoked             [1]     IMPLICIT RevokedInfo,
   unknown             [2]     IMPLICIT UnknownInfo }

RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
   revocationTime              GeneralizedTime,
   revocationReason    [0]     EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL }

UnknownInfo ::= NULL

ArchiveCutoff ::= GeneralizedTime

AcceptableResponses ::= SEQUENCE OF RESPONSE.&amp;id({ResponseSet})

ServiceLocator ::= SEQUENCE {
   issuer    Name,
   locator   AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax }

CrlID ::= SEQUENCE {
   crlUrl               [0]     EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL,
   crlNum               [1]     EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
   crlTime              [2]     EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }

PreferredSignatureAlgorithms ::= SEQUENCE OF PreferredSignatureAlgorithm

PreferredSignatureAlgorithm ::= SEQUENCE {
  sigIdentifier  AlgorithmIdentifier{SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {...}},
  certIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier{PUBLIC-KEY, {...}} OPTIONAL
}

-- Certificate Extensions

ext-ocsp-nocheck EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX NULL IDENTIFIED
                                BY id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck }

-- Request Extensions

re-ocsp-nonce EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX Nonce
                             IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-nonce }

re-ocsp-response EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX AcceptableResponses IDENTIFIED
                                BY id-pkix-ocsp-response }

re-ocsp-service-locator EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX ServiceLocator
                                       IDENTIFIED BY
                                       id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator }

re-ocsp-preferred-signature-algorithms EXTENSION ::= {
  SYNTAX PreferredSignatureAlgorithms
  IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs  }

-- Response Extensions

re-ocsp-crl EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX CrlID IDENTIFIED BY
                               id-pkix-ocsp-crl }

re-ocsp-archive-cutoff EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX ArchiveCutoff
                                      IDENTIFIED BY
                                      id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff }

re-ocsp-extended-revoke EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX NULL IDENTIFIED BY
                                       id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke }

-- Object Identifiers

id-kp-OCSPSigning            OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 }
id-pkix-ocsp                 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-ad-ocsp
id-pkix-ocsp-basic           OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 1 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nonce           OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
id-pkix-ocsp-crl             OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 3 }
id-pkix-ocsp-response        OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 4 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck         OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 5 }
id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 6 }
id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 7 }
id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 8 }
id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 9 }

END
    </sourcecode>
    </section>
    </section>
</back>
</rfc>

