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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-rats-epoch-markers-01" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="Epoch Markers">Epoch Markers</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-rats-epoch-markers-01"/>
    <author initials="H." surname="Birkholz" fullname="Henk Birkholz">
      <organization abbrev="Fraunhofer SIT">Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>Rheinstrasse 75</street>
          <city>Darmstadt</city>
          <code>64295</code>
          <country>Germany</country>
        </postal>
        <email>henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="T." surname="Fossati" fullname="Thomas Fossati">
      <organization>Arm Limited</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <country>UK</country>
        </postal>
        <email>Thomas.Fossati@arm.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="W." surname="Pan" fullname="Wei Pan">
      <organization>Huawei Technologies</organization>
      <address>
        <email>william.panwei@huawei.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="C." surname="Bormann" fullname="Carsten Bormann">
      <organization>Universität Bremen TZI</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>Bibliothekstr. 1</street>
          <city>Bremen</city>
          <code>D-28359</code>
          <country>Germany</country>
        </postal>
        <phone>+49-421-218-63921</phone>
        <email>cabo@tzi.org</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2025" month="April" day="11"/>
    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>RATS Working Group</workgroup>
    <keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 91?>

<t>This document defines Epoch Markers as a means to establish a notion of freshness among actors in a distributed system.
Epoch Markers are similar to "time ticks" and are produced and distributed by a dedicated system known as the Epoch Bell.
Systems receiving Epoch Markers do not need to track freshness using their own understanding of time (e.g., via a local real-time clock).
Instead, the reception of a specific Epoch Marker establishes a new epoch that is shared among all recipients.
This document defines Epoch Marker types, including CBOR time tags, RFC 3161 TimeStampToken, nonce-like structures, and a CWT Claim to embed Epoch Markers in RFC 8392 CBOR Web Tokens, which serve as vehicles for signed protocol messages.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-rats-epoch-markers/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        rats Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:rats@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/rats/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/ietf-rats/draft-birkholz-rats-epoch-marker"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 99?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>Systems that need to interact securely often require a shared understanding of the freshness of conveyed information.
This is certainly the case in the domain of remote attestation procedures.
In general, securely establishing a shared notion of freshness of the exchanged information among entities in a distributed system is not a simple task.</t>
      <t>The entire <xref section="A" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9334"/> deals solely with the topic of freshness, which is in itself an indication of how relevant, and complex, it is to establish a trusted and shared understanding of freshness in a RATS system.</t>
      <t>This document defines Epoch Markers as a way to establish a notion of freshness among actors in distributed systems.
Epoch Markers are similar to "time ticks" and are produced and distributed by a dedicated system, the Epoch Bell.
Actors in a system that receive Epoch Markers do not have to track freshness using their own understanding of time (e.g., via a local real-time clock).
Instead, the reception of a certain Epoch Marker establishes a new epoch that is shared between all recipients.
In essence, the emissions and corresponding receptions of Epoch Markers are like the ticks of a clock, with these ticks being conveyed over the Internet.</t>
      <t>In general (barring highly symmetrical topologies), epoch ticking incurs differential latency due to the non-uniform distribution of receivers with respect to the Epoch Bell.
This introduces skew that needs to be taken into consideration when Epoch Markers are used.</t>
      <t>While all Epoch Markers share the same core property of behaving like clock ticks in a shared domain, various "Epoch ID" values are defined as Epoch Marker types in this document to accommodate different use cases and diverse kinds of Epoch Bells.</t>
      <t>While most Epoch Markers types are encoded in CBOR <xref target="STD94"/>, and many of the Epoch ID types are themselves encoded in CBOR, a prominent format in this space is the TimeStampToken (TST) defined by <xref target="RFC3161"/>, a DER-encoded TSTInfo value wrapped in a CMS envelope <xref target="RFC5652"/>.
TSTs are produced by Time-Stamp Authorities (TSA) and exchanged via the Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP).
At the time of writing, TSAs are the most common providers of secure time-stamping services.
Therefore, reusing the core TSTInfo structure as an Epoch ID type for Epoch Markers is instrumental for enabling smooth migration paths and promote interoperability.
There are, however, several other ways to represent a signed timestamp or the start of a new freshness epoch, respectively, and therefore other Epoch Marker types.</t>
      <t>To inform the design, this document discusses a number of interaction models in which Epoch Markers are expected to be exchanged.
The default top-level structure of Epoch Markers described in this document is CBOR Web Tokens (CWT) <xref target="RFC8392"/>.
The present document specifies an extensible set of Epoch Marker types, along with the <tt>em</tt> CWT claim to include them in CWTs.
CWTs are signed using COSE <xref target="STD96"/> and benefit from wide tool support.
However, CWTs are not the only containers in which Epoch Markers can be embedded.
Epoch Markers can be included in any type of message that allows for the embedding of opaque bytes or CBOR data items.
Examples include the Collection CMW in <xref target="I-D.ietf-lamps-csr-attestation"/>, Evidence formats such as <xref target="TCG-CoEvidence"/> or <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-eat"/>, <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-ar4si"/>, or the CWT Claims Header Parameter of <xref target="I-D.ietf-scitt-architecture"/>.</t>
      <section anchor="requirements-notation">
        <name>Requirements Notation</name>
        <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
        <?line -18?>

<t>In this document, CDDL <xref target="RFC8610"/> is used to describe the data formats.  The examples in <xref target="examples"/> use the CBOR Extended Diagnostic Notation (EDN, <xref target="I-D.ietf-cbor-edn-literals"/>).</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="epoch-ids">
      <name>Epoch IDs</name>
      <t>The RATS architecture introduces the concept of Epoch IDs that mark certain events during remote attestation procedures ranging from simple handshakes to rather complex interactions including elaborate freshness proofs.
The Epoch Markers defined in this document are a solution that includes the lessons learned from TSAs, the concept of Epoch IDs defined in the RATS architecture, and provides several means to identify a new freshness epoch. Some of these methods are introduced and discussed in <xref section="10.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9334"/> (the RATS architecture).</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="interaction-models">
      <name>Interaction Models</name>
      <t>The interaction models illustrated in this section are derived from the RATS Reference Interaction Models <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models"/>.
In general, there are three major interaction models used in remote attestation:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>ad-hoc requests (e.g., via challenge-response requests addressed at Epoch Bells), corresponding to <xref section="7.1" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models"/></t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>unsolicited distribution (e.g., via uni-directional methods, such as broad- or multicasting from Epoch Bells), corresponding to <xref section="7.2" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models"/></t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>solicited distribution (e.g., via a subscription to Epoch Bells), corresponding to <xref section="7.3" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models"/></t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>In all three interaction models, Epoch Markers can be used as content for the generic information element <tt>handle</tt> as introduced by <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models"/>.
Handles are used to establish freshness in ad-hoc, unsolicited, and solicited distribution mechanisms of an Epoch Bell.
For example, an Epoch Marker can be used as a nonce in challenge-response remote attestation (e.g., for limiting the number of ad-hoc requests by a Verifier).
If embedded in a CWT, an Epoch Marker can be used as a <tt>handle</tt> by extracting the value of the <tt>em</tt> Claim or by using the complete CWT including an <tt>em</tt> Claim (e.g., functioning as a signed time-stamp token).
Using an Epoch Marker requires the challenger to acquire an Epoch Marker beforehand, which may introduce a sensible overhead compared to using a simple nonce.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-epoch-markers">
      <name>Epoch Marker Structure</name>
      <t>Epoch Markers are tagged CBOR data items.
As a default, Epoch Markers are transported via the <tt>em</tt> Claim in CWTs.
In cases of challenge-response interactions that employ a nonce to show recentness, the <tt>em</tt> Claim can be paired with a <tt>Nonce</tt> Claim to bind the nonce with the Epoch Marker as a response message in an ad-hoc request.
This in fact means that it is possible to request an Epoch Marker via a challenge-response interaction using a nonce to than use the received CWT or the Epoch Marker included as a different nonce in a separate RATS reference interaction model.</t>
      <figure anchor="fig-epoch-marker-cddl">
        <name>Epoch Marker types (tag numbers 2698x are suggested, not yet allocated)</name>
        <artwork type="cddl" align="left"><![CDATA[
epoch-marker = $tagged-epoch-id

; epoch-id types independent of interaction model
$tagged-epoch-id /= cbor-time
$tagged-epoch-id /= #6.26980(classical-rfc3161-TST-info)
$tagged-epoch-id /= #6.26981(TST-info-based-on-CBOR-time-tag)
$tagged-epoch-id /= #6.26982(epoch-tick)
$tagged-epoch-id /= #6.26983(epoch-tick-list)
$tagged-epoch-id /= #6.26984(strictly-monotonic-counter)
]]></artwork>
      </figure>
      <figure anchor="fig-epoch-marker-cwt">
        <name>Epoch Marker as a CWT Claim (CWT claim number 2000 is suggested, not yet allocated)</name>
        <artwork type="cddl" align="left"><![CDATA[
$$Claims-Set-Claims //= (&(em: 2000) => epoch-marker)
]]></artwork>
      </figure>
      <section anchor="epoch-payloads">
        <name>Epoch Marker Types</name>
        <t>This specification comes with a set of predefined Epoch Marker types.</t>
        <section anchor="cbor-time-tags">
          <name>CBOR Time Tags</name>
          <t>CBOR Time Tags are CBOR time representations choosing from CBOR tag 0 (<tt>tdate</tt>, RFC3339 time as a string), tag 1 (<tt>time</tt>, Posix time as int or float), or tag 1001 (extended time data item).</t>
          <t>See <xref section="3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9581"/> for the (many) details about the CBOR extended time format (tag 1001).
See Sections <xref target="RFC8949" section="3.4.1" sectionFormat="bare"/> and <xref target="RFC8949" section="3.4.2" sectionFormat="bare"/> of RFC 8949 <xref target="STD94"/> for <tt>tdate</tt> (tag 0) and <tt>time</tt> (tag 1).</t>
          <sourcecode type="cddl"><![CDATA[
cbor-time = tdate / time / etime

etime = #6.1001({* (int/tstr) => any})
]]></sourcecode>
          <t>The CBOR Time Tag represents a freshly sourced timestamp represented as either <tt>time</tt> or <tt>tdate</tt>
(Sections <xref target="RFC8949" section="3.4.2" sectionFormat="bare"/> and <xref target="RFC8949" section="3.4.1" sectionFormat="bare"/> of RFC 8949 <xref target="STD94"/>, <xref section="D" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8610"/>), or <tt>etime</tt> <xref target="RFC9581"/>.</t>
          <section anchor="creation">
            <name>Creation</name>
            <t>To generate the cbor-time value, the emitter <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> follow the requirements in <xref target="sec-time-reqs"/>.</t>
          </section>
        </section>
        <section anchor="sec-rfc3161-classic">
          <name>Classical RFC 3161 TST Info</name>
          <t>DER-encoded <xref target="X.690"/> TSTInfo <xref target="RFC3161"/>.  See <xref target="classic-tstinfo"/> for the layout.</t>
          <sourcecode type="cddl"><![CDATA[
classical-rfc3161-TST-info = bytes
]]></sourcecode>
          <t>The following describes the classical-rfc3161-TST-info type.</t>
          <dl>
            <dt>classical-rfc3161-TST-info:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>The DER-encoded TSTInfo generated by a <xref target="RFC3161"/> Time Stamping Authority.</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
          <section anchor="creation-1">
            <name>Creation</name>
            <t>The Epoch Bell <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the following value as MessageImprint in its request to the TSA:</t>
            <sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[
SEQUENCE {
  SEQUENCE {
    OBJECT      2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1 (sha256)
    NULL
  }
  OCTET STRING
    BF4EE9143EF2329B1B778974AAD445064940B9CAE373C9E35A7B23361282698F
}
]]></sourcecode>
            <t>This is the sha-256 hash of the string "EPOCH_BELL".</t>
            <t>The TimeStampToken obtained by the TSA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be stripped of the TSA signature.
Only the TSTInfo is to be kept the rest <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be discarded.
The Epoch Bell COSE signature will replace the TSA signature.</t>
          </section>
        </section>
        <section anchor="sec-rfc3161-fancy">
          <name>CBOR-encoded RFC3161 TST Info</name>
          <t><cref anchor="issue">Issue tracked at:</cref> https://github.com/ietf-rats/draft-birkholz-rats-epoch-marker/issues/18</t>
          <t>The TST-info-based-on-CBOR-time-tag is semantically equivalent to classical <xref target="RFC3161"/> TSTInfo, rewritten using the CBOR type system.</t>
          <sourcecode type="cddl"><![CDATA[
TST-info-based-on-CBOR-time-tag = {
  &(version : 0) => v1
  &(policy : 1) => oid
  &(messageImprint : 2) => MessageImprint
  &(serialNumber : 3) => integer
  &(eTime : 4) => profiled-etime
  ? &(ordering : 5) => bool .default false
  ? &(nonce : 6) => integer
  ? &(tsa : 7) => GeneralName
  * $$TSTInfoExtensions
}

v1 = 1

oid = #6.111(bstr) / #6.112(bstr)

MessageImprint = [
  hashAlg : int
  hashValue : bstr
]

profiled-etime = #6.1001(timeMap)
timeMap = {
  1 => ~time
  ? -8 => profiled-duration
  * int => any
}
profiled-duration = {* int => any}

GeneralName = [ GeneralNameType : int, GeneralNameValue : any ]
; See Section 4.2.1.6 of RFC 5280 for type/value
]]></sourcecode>
          <t>The following describes each member of the TST-info-based-on-CBOR-time-tag map.</t>
          <dl newline="true">
            <dt>version:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>The integer value 1.  Cf. version, <xref section="2.4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC3161"/>.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>policy:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>A <xref target="RFC9090"/> object identifier tag (111 or 112) representing the TSA's policy under which the tst-info was produced.
Cf. policy, <xref section="2.4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC3161"/>.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>messageImprint:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>A <xref target="RFC9054"/> COSE_Hash_Find array carrying the hash algorithm
identifier and the hash value of the time-stamped datum.
Cf. messageImprint, <xref section="2.4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC3161"/>.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>serialNumber:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>A unique integer value assigned by the TSA to each issued tst-info.
Cf. serialNumber, <xref section="2.4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC3161"/>.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>eTime:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>The time at which the tst-info has been created by the TSA.
Cf. genTime, <xref section="2.4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC3161"/>.
Encoded as extended time <xref target="RFC9581"/>, indicated by CBOR tag 1001, profiled as follows:</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>The "base time" is encoded using key 1, indicating Posix time as int or float.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>The stated "accuracy" is encoded using key -8, which indicates the maximum
allowed deviation from the value indicated by "base time". The duration map
is profiled to disallow string keys. This is an optional field.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>The map <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> also contain one or more integer keys, which may encode
supplementary information <cref anchor="tf1">Allowing unsigned integer (i.e., critical) keys goes counter interoperability</cref>.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <dl newline="true">
            <dt>ordering:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>boolean indicating whether tst-info issued by the TSA can be ordered solely based on the "base time".
This is an optional field, whose default value is "false".
Cf. ordering, <xref section="2.4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC3161"/>.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>nonce:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>int value echoing the nonce supplied by the requestor.
Cf. nonce, <xref section="2.4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC3161"/>.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>tsa:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>a single-entry GeneralNames array <xref section="11.8" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert"/> providing a hint in identifying the name of the TSA.
Cf. tsa, <xref section="2.4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC3161"/>.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>$$TSTInfoExtensions:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>A CDDL socket (<xref section="3.9" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8610"/>) to allow extensibility of the data format.
Note that any extensions appearing here <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> match an extension in the
corresponding request.
Cf. extensions, <xref section="2.4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC3161"/>.</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
          <section anchor="creation-2">
            <name>Creation</name>
            <t>The Epoch Bell <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the following value as messageImprint in its request to the TSA:</t>
            <sourcecode type="cbor-diag"><![CDATA[
[
    / hashAlg   / -16, / sha-256 /
    / hashValue / h'BF4EE9143EF2329B1B778974AAD44506
                    4940B9CAE373C9E35A7B23361282698F'
]
]]></sourcecode>
            <t>This is the sha-256 hash of the string "EPOCH_BELL".</t>
          </section>
        </section>
        <section anchor="sec-epoch-tick">
          <name>Epoch Tick</name>
          <t>An Epoch Tick is a single opaque blob sent to multiple consumers.</t>
          <sourcecode type="cddl"><![CDATA[
; Epoch-Tick

epoch-tick = tstr / bstr / int
]]></sourcecode>
          <t>The following describes the epoch-tick type.</t>
          <dl>
            <dt>epoch-tick:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>Either a string, a byte string, or an integer used by RATS roles within a trust domain as extra data (<tt>handle</tt>) included in conceptual messages <xref target="RFC9334"/> to associate them with a certain epoch, similar to a nonce.
Technically, an Epoch Tick is not used just once (like a nonce), but by every Epoch Marker consumer involved.</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
          <section anchor="creation-3">
            <name>Creation</name>
            <t>The emitter <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> follow the requirements in <xref target="sec-nonce-reqs"/>.</t>
          </section>
        </section>
        <section anchor="sec-epoch-tick-list">
          <name>Epoch Tick List</name>
          <t>A list of Epoch Ticks send to multiple consumers.
The consumers use each Epoch Tick in the list of sequentially, similar to a list of nonces.
Technically, each sequential Epoch Tick in the distributed list is not used just once (like a nonce), but by every Epoch Marker consumer involved.</t>
          <sourcecode type="cddl"><![CDATA[
; Epoch-Tick-List

epoch-tick-list = [ + epoch-tick ]
]]></sourcecode>
          <t>The following describes the Epoch Tick List type.</t>
          <dl>
            <dt>epoch-tick-list:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>A sequence of byte strings used by RATS roles in trust domain as extra data (<tt>handle</tt>) in the generation of conceptual messages as specified by the RATS architecture <xref target="RFC9334"/> to associate them with a certain epoch.
Each Epoch Tick in the list is used in a consecutive generation of a conceptual message.
Asserting freshness of a conceptual message including an Epoch Tick from the epoch-tick-list requires some state on the receiver side to assess if that Epoch Tick is the appropriate next unused Epoch Tick from the epoch-tick-list.</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
          <section anchor="creation-4">
            <name>Creation</name>
            <t>The emitter <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> follow the requirements in <xref target="sec-nonce-reqs"/>.</t>
          </section>
        </section>
        <section anchor="sec-strictly-monotonic">
          <name>Strictly Monotonically Increasing Counter</name>
          <t>A strictly monotonically increasing counter.</t>
          <t>The counter context is defined by the Epoch bell.</t>
          <sourcecode type="cddl"><![CDATA[
strictly-monotonic-counter = uint
]]></sourcecode>
          <t>The following describes the strictly-monotonic-counter type.</t>
          <dl>
            <dt>strictly-monotonic-counter:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>An unsigned integer used by RATS roles in a trust domain as extra data in the production of conceptual messages as specified by the RATS architecture <xref target="RFC9334"/> to associate them with a certain epoch. Each new strictly-monotonic-counter value must be higher than the last one.</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sec-time-reqs">
        <name>Time Requirements</name>
        <t>Time <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be sourced from a trusted clock.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sec-nonce-reqs">
        <name>Nonce Requirements</name>
        <t>A nonce value used in a protocol or message to retrieve an Epoch Marker <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be freshly generated.
The generated value <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have at least 64 bits of entropy (before encoding).
The generated value <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be generated via a cryptographically secure random number generator.</t>
        <t>A maximum nonce size of 512 bits is set to limit the memory requirements.
All receivers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be able to accommodate the maximum size.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>TODO</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-iana-cons">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t><cref anchor="rfced-replace">RFC Editor: please replace RFCthis with the RFC
number of this RFC and remove this note.</cref></t>
      <section anchor="sec-iana-cbor-tags">
        <name>New CBOR Tags</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to allocate the following tags in the "CBOR Tags" registry
<xref target="IANA.cbor-tags"/>, preferably with the specific CBOR tag value requested:</t>
        <table align="left" anchor="tbl-cbor-tags">
          <name>New CBOR Tags</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Tag</th>
              <th align="left">Data Item</th>
              <th align="left">Semantics</th>
              <th align="left">Reference</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">26980</td>
              <td align="left">bytes</td>
              <td align="left">DER-encoded RFC3161 TSTInfo</td>
              <td align="left">
                <xref target="sec-rfc3161-classic"/> of RFCthis</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">26981</td>
              <td align="left">map</td>
              <td align="left">CBOR representation of RFC3161 TSTInfo semantics</td>
              <td align="left">
                <xref target="sec-rfc3161-fancy"/> of RFCthis</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">26982</td>
              <td align="left">tstr / bstr / int</td>
              <td align="left">a nonce that is shared among many participants but that can only be used once by each participant</td>
              <td align="left">
                <xref target="sec-epoch-tick"/> of RFCthis</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">26983</td>
              <td align="left">array</td>
              <td align="left">a list of multi-nonce</td>
              <td align="left">
                <xref target="sec-epoch-tick-list"/> of RFCthis</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">26984</td>
              <td align="left">uint</td>
              <td align="left">strictly monotonically increasing counter</td>
              <td align="left">
                <xref target="sec-strictly-monotonic"/> of RFCthis</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sec-iana-em-claim">
        <name> New EM CWT Claim</name>
        <t>This specification adds the following value to the "CBOR Web Token Claims" registry <xref target="IANA.cwt"/>.</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Claim Name: em</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Claim Description: Epoch Marker</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Claim Key: 2000 (IANA: suggested assignment)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Claim Value Type(s): CBOR array</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Change Controller: IETF</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Specification Document(s): <xref target="sec-epoch-markers"/> of RFCthis</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC3161">
          <front>
            <title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP)</title>
            <author fullname="C. Adams" initials="C." surname="Adams"/>
            <author fullname="P. Cain" initials="P." surname="Cain"/>
            <author fullname="D. Pinkas" initials="D." surname="Pinkas"/>
            <author fullname="R. Zuccherato" initials="R." surname="Zuccherato"/>
            <date month="August" year="2001"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes the format of a request sent to a Time Stamping Authority (TSA) and of the response that is returned. It also establishes several security-relevant requirements for TSA operation, with regards to processing requests to generate responses. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3161"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3161"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5652">
          <front>
            <title>Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)</title>
            <author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>
            <date month="September" year="2009"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). This syntax is used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message content. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="70"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5652"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5652"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8392">
          <front>
            <title>CBOR Web Token (CWT)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="E. Wahlstroem" initials="E." surname="Wahlstroem"/>
            <author fullname="S. Erdtman" initials="S." surname="Erdtman"/>
            <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
            <date month="May" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>CBOR Web Token (CWT) is a compact means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a CWT are encoded in the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR), and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) is used for added application-layer security protection. A claim is a piece of information asserted about a subject and is represented as a name/value pair consisting of a claim name and a claim value. CWT is derived from JSON Web Token (JWT) but uses CBOR rather than JSON.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8392"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8392"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8610">
          <front>
            <title>Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and JSON Data Structures</title>
            <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
            <author fullname="C. Vigano" initials="C." surname="Vigano"/>
            <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/>
            <date month="June" year="2019"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document proposes a notational convention to express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) data structures (RFC 7049). Its main goal is to provide an easy and unambiguous way to express structures for protocol messages and data formats that use CBOR or JSON.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8610"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8610"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9090">
          <front>
            <title>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) Tags for Object Identifiers</title>
            <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/>
            <date month="July" year="2021"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR), defined in RFC 8949, is a data format whose design goals include the possibility of extremely small code size, fairly small message size, and extensibility without the need for version negotiation.</t>
              <t>This document defines CBOR tags for object identifiers (OIDs) and is the reference document for the IANA registration of the CBOR tags so defined.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9090"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9090"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9054">
          <front>
            <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Hash Algorithms</title>
            <author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
            <date month="August" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) syntax (see RFC 9052) does not define any direct methods for using hash algorithms. There are, however, circumstances where hash algorithms are used, such as indirect signatures, where the hash of one or more contents are signed, and identification of an X.509 certificate or other object by the use of a fingerprint. This document defines hash algorithms that are identified by COSE algorithm identifiers.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9054"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9054"/>
        </reference>
        <referencegroup anchor="STD94" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/std94">
          <reference anchor="RFC8949" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949">
            <front>
              <title>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)</title>
              <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/>
              <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
              <date month="December" year="2020"/>
              <abstract>
                <t>The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format whose design goals include the possibility of extremely small code size, fairly small message size, and extensibility without the need for version negotiation. These design goals make it different from earlier binary serializations such as ASN.1 and MessagePack.</t>
                <t>This document obsoletes RFC 7049, providing editorial improvements, new details, and errata fixes while keeping full compatibility with the interchange format of RFC 7049. It does not create a new version of the format.</t>
              </abstract>
            </front>
            <seriesInfo name="STD" value="94"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8949"/>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8949"/>
          </reference>
        </referencegroup>
        <referencegroup anchor="STD96" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/std96">
          <reference anchor="RFC9052" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9052">
            <front>
              <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process</title>
              <author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
              <date month="August" year="2022"/>
              <abstract>
                <t>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. There is a need to be able to define basic security services for this data format. This document defines the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) protocol. This specification describes how to create and process signatures, message authentication codes, and encryption using CBOR for serialization. This specification additionally describes how to represent cryptographic keys using CBOR.</t>
                <t>This document, along with RFC 9053, obsoletes RFC 8152.</t>
              </abstract>
            </front>
            <seriesInfo name="STD" value="96"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9052"/>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9052"/>
          </reference>
          <reference anchor="RFC9338" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9338">
            <front>
              <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Countersignatures</title>
              <author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
              <date month="December" year="2022"/>
              <abstract>
                <t>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) defines a set of security services for CBOR. This document defines a countersignature algorithm along with the needed header parameters and CBOR tags for COSE. This document updates RFC 9052.</t>
              </abstract>
            </front>
            <seriesInfo name="STD" value="96"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9338"/>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9338"/>
          </reference>
        </referencegroup>
        <reference anchor="RFC9581">
          <front>
            <title>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) Tags for Time, Duration, and Period</title>
            <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/>
            <author fullname="B. Gamari" initials="B." surname="Gamari"/>
            <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
            <date month="August" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR, RFC 8949) is a data format whose design goals include the possibility of extremely small code size, fairly small message size, and extensibility without the need for version negotiation.</t>
              <t>In CBOR, one point of extensibility is the definition of CBOR tags. RFC 8949 defines two tags for time: CBOR tag 0 (RFC 3339 time as a string) and tag 1 (POSIX time as int or float). Since then, additional requirements have become known. The present document defines a CBOR tag for time that allows a more elaborate representation of time, as well as related CBOR tags for duration and time period. This document is intended as the reference document for the IANA registration of the CBOR tags defined.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9581"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9581"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert">
          <front>
            <title>CBOR Encoded X.509 Certificates (C509 Certificates)</title>
            <author fullname="John Preuß Mattsson" initials="J. P." surname="Mattsson">
              <organization>Ericsson AB</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Göran Selander" initials="G." surname="Selander">
              <organization>Ericsson AB</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Shahid Raza" initials="S." surname="Raza">
              <organization>RISE AB</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Joel Höglund" initials="J." surname="Höglund">
              <organization>RISE AB</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Martin Furuhed" initials="M." surname="Furuhed">
              <organization>Nexus Group</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="3" month="March" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document specifies a CBOR encoding of X.509 certificates.  The
   resulting certificates are called C509 Certificates.  The CBOR
   encoding supports a large subset of RFC 5280 and all certificates
   compatible with the RFC 7925, IEEE 802.1AR (DevID), CNSA, RPKI, GSMA
   eUICC, and CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements profiles.  When
   used to re-encode DER encoded X.509 certificates, the CBOR encoding
   can in many cases reduce the size of RFC 7925 profiled certificates
   with over 50% while also significantly reducing memory and code size
   compared to ASN.1.  The CBOR encoded structure can alternatively be
   signed directly ("natively signed"), which does not require re-
   encoding for the signature to be verified.  The TLSA selectors
   registry defined in RFC 6698 is extended to include CBOR
   certificates.  The document also specifies C509 Certificate Signing
   Requests, C509 COSE headers, a C509 TLS certificate type, and a C509
   file format.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert-13"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-cbor-edn-literals">
          <front>
            <title>CBOR Extended Diagnostic Notation (EDN)</title>
            <author fullname="Carsten Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann">
              <organization>Universität Bremen TZI</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="8" month="January" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document formalizes and consolidates the definition of the
   Extended Diagnostic Notation (EDN) of the Concise Binary Object
   Representation (CBOR), addressing implementer experience.

   Replacing EDN's previous informal descriptions, it updates RFC 8949,
   obsoleting its Section 8, and RFC 8610, obsoleting its Appendix G.

   It also specifies and uses registry-based extension points, using one
   to support text representations of epoch-based dates/times and of IP
   addresses and prefixes.


   // (This cref will be removed by the RFC editor:) The present
   // revision (–16) addresses the first half of the WGLC comments,
   // except for the issues around the specific way how to best achieve
   // pluggable ABNF grammars for application-extensions.  It is
   // intended for use as a reference document for the mid-WGLC CBOR WG
   // interim meeting on 2025-01-08.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-cbor-edn-literals-16"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="X.690" target="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690">
          <front>
            <title>Information technology — ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)</title>
            <author>
              <organization>International Telecommunications Union</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2015" month="August"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="ITU-T" value="Recommendation X.690"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC9334">
          <front>
            <title>Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture</title>
            <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
            <author fullname="D. Thaler" initials="D." surname="Thaler"/>
            <author fullname="M. Richardson" initials="M." surname="Richardson"/>
            <author fullname="N. Smith" initials="N." surname="Smith"/>
            <author fullname="W. Pan" initials="W." surname="Pan"/>
            <date month="January" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In network protocol exchanges, it is often useful for one end of a communication to know whether the other end is in an intended operating state. This document provides an architectural overview of the entities involved that make such tests possible through the process of generating, conveying, and evaluating evidentiary Claims. It provides a model that is neutral toward processor architectures, the content of Claims, and protocols.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9334"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9334"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models">
          <front>
            <title>Reference Interaction Models for Remote Attestation Procedures</title>
            <author fullname="Henk Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz">
              <organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Michael Eckel" initials="M." surname="Eckel">
              <organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Wei Pan" initials="W." surname="Pan">
              <organization>Huawei Technologies</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Eric Voit" initials="E." surname="Voit">
              <organization>Cisco Systems</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="26" month="February" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document describes interaction models for remote attestation
   procedures (RATS) [RFC9334].  Three conveying mechanisms --
   Challenge/Response, Uni-Directional, and Streaming Remote Attestation
   -- are illustrated and defined.  Analogously, a general overview
   about the information elements typically used by corresponding
   conveyance protocols are highlighted.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models-13"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-scitt-architecture">
          <front>
            <title>An Architecture for Trustworthy and Transparent Digital Supply Chains</title>
            <author fullname="Henk Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz">
              <organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Antoine Delignat-Lavaud" initials="A." surname="Delignat-Lavaud">
              <organization>Microsoft Research</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Cedric Fournet" initials="C." surname="Fournet">
              <organization>Microsoft Research</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yogesh Deshpande" initials="Y." surname="Deshpande">
              <organization>ARM</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Steve Lasker" initials="S." surname="Lasker">
              <organization>DataTrails</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="3" month="March" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Traceability of physical and digital Artifacts in supply chains is a
   long-standing, but increasingly serious security concern.  The rise
   in popularity of verifiable data structures as a mechanism to make
   actors more accountable for breaching their compliance promises has
   found some successful applications to specific use cases (such as the
   supply chain for digital certificates) but lacks a generic and
   scalable architecture that can address a wider range of use cases.

   This document defines a generic, interoperable and scalable
   architecture to enable transparency across any supply chain with
   minimum adoption barriers.  It provides flexibility, enabling
   interoperability across different implementations of Transparency
   Services with various auditing and compliance requirements.  Issuers
   can register their Signed Statements on one or more Transparency
   Services, with the guarantee that any Relying Parties will be able to
   verify them.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-11"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-rats-eat">
          <front>
            <title>The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)</title>
            <author fullname="Laurence Lundblade" initials="L." surname="Lundblade">
              <organization>Security Theory LLC</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Giridhar Mandyam" initials="G." surname="Mandyam">
              <organization>Mediatek USA</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Jeremy O'Donoghue" initials="J." surname="O'Donoghue">
              <organization>Qualcomm Technologies Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Carl Wallace" initials="C." surname="Wallace">
              <organization>Red Hound Software, Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="6" month="September" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   An Entity Attestation Token (EAT) provides an attested claims set
   that describes state and characteristics of an entity, a device like
   a smartphone, IoT device, network equipment or such.  This claims set
   is used by a relying party, server or service to determine the type
   and degree of trust placed in the entity.

   An EAT is either a CBOR Web Token (CWT) or JSON Web Token (JWT) with
   attestation-oriented claims.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-rats-eat-31"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-lamps-csr-attestation">
          <front>
            <title>Use of Remote Attestation with Certification Signing Requests</title>
            <author fullname="Mike Ounsworth" initials="M." surname="Ounsworth">
              <organization>Entrust Limited</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Hannes Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig">
              <organization>Siemens</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Henk Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz">
              <organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Monty Wiseman" initials="M." surname="Wiseman">
              <organization>Beyond Identity</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Ned Smith" initials="N." surname="Smith">
              <organization>Intel Corporation</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="19" month="March" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   A PKI end entity requesting a certificate from a Certification
   Authority (CA) may wish to offer trustworthy claims about the
   platform generating the certification request and the environment
   associated with the corresponding private key, such as whether the
   private key resides on a hardware security module.

   This specification defines an attribute and an extension that allow
   for conveyance of Evidence and Attestation Results in Certificate
   Signing Requests (CSRs), such as PKCS#10 or Certificate Request
   Message Format (CRMF) payloads.  This provides an elegant and
   automatable mechanism for transporting Evidence to a Certification
   Authority.

   Including Evidence and Attestation Results along with a CSR can help
   to improve the assessment of the security posture for the private
   key, and can help the Certification Authority to assess whether it
   satisfies the requested certificate profile.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-lamps-csr-attestation-18"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TCG-CoEvidence" target="https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG-DICE-Concise-Evidence-Binding-for-SPDM-Version-1.0-Revision-53_1August2023.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>TCG DICE Concise Evidence Binding for SPDM</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Trusted Computing Group</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2023" month="June"/>
          </front>
          <refcontent>Version 1.00</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-rats-ar4si">
          <front>
            <title>Attestation Results for Secure Interactions</title>
            <author fullname="Eric Voit" initials="E." surname="Voit">
              <organization>Cisco Systems</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Henk Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz">
              <organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Thomas Hardjono" initials="T." surname="Hardjono">
              <organization>MIT</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Thomas Fossati" initials="T." surname="Fossati">
              <organization>Linaro</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Vincent Scarlata" initials="V." surname="Scarlata">
              <organization>Intel</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="6" month="February" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines reusable Attestation Result information
   elements.  When these elements are offered to Relying Parties as
   Evidence, different aspects of Attester trustworthiness can be
   evaluated.  Additionally, where the Relying Party is interfacing with
   a heterogeneous mix of Attesting Environment and Verifier types,
   consistent policies can be applied to subsequent information exchange
   between each Attester and the Relying Party.

   This document also defines two serialisations of the proposed
   information model, utilising CBOR and JSON.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-rats-ar4si-08"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IANA.cwt" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt">
          <front>
            <title>CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims</title>
            <author>
              <organization>IANA</organization>
            </author>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IANA.cbor-tags" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/cbor-tags">
          <front>
            <title>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) Tags</title>
            <author>
              <organization>IANA</organization>
            </author>
          </front>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 485?>

<section anchor="examples">
      <name>Examples</name>
      <t>The example in <xref target="fig-ex-1"/> shows an Epoch Marker with an <tt>etime</tt> as the Epoch Marker type.</t>
      <figure anchor="fig-ex-1">
        <name>CBOR Epoch Marker based on `etime` (EDN)</name>
        <artwork type="cbor-diag" align="center"><![CDATA[
/ epoch-marker for
  1996-12-19T16:39:57-08:00[America//Los_Angeles][u-ca=hebrew] /
/ etime / 1001({
    1: 851042397,
  -10: "America/Los_Angeles",
  -11: { "u-ca": "hebrew" }
})
]]></artwork>
      </figure>
      <t>The encoded data item in CBOR pretty-printed form (hex with comments) is shown in <xref target="fig-ex-1-pretty"/>.</t>
      <figure anchor="fig-ex-1-pretty">
        <name>CBOR Epoch Marker based on `etime` (pretty hex)</name>
        <artwork type="cbor-pretty" align="center"><![CDATA[
d9 03e9                                 # tag(1001)
   a3                                   # map(3)
      01                                # unsigned(1)
      1a 32b9e05d                       # unsigned(851042397)
      29                                # negative(9)
      73                                # text(19)
         416d65726963612f4c6f735f416e67656c6573 # "America/Los_Angeles"
      2a                                # negative(10)
      a1                                # map(1)
         64                             # text(4)
            752d6361                    # "u-ca"
         66                             # text(6)
            686562726577                # "hebrew"
]]></artwork>
      </figure>
      <section anchor="classic-tstinfo">
        <name>RFC 3161 TSTInfo</name>
        <t>As a reference for the definition of TST-info-based-on-CBOR-time-tag the code block below depicts the original layout of the TSTInfo structure from <xref target="RFC3161"/>.</t>
        <sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[
TSTInfo ::= SEQUENCE  {
   version                      INTEGER  { v1(1) },
   policy                       TSAPolicyId,
   messageImprint               MessageImprint,
     -- MUST have the same value as the similar field in
     -- TimeStampReq
   serialNumber                 INTEGER,
    -- Time-Stamping users MUST be ready to accommodate integers
    -- up to 160 bits.
   genTime                      GeneralizedTime,
   accuracy                     Accuracy                 OPTIONAL,
   ordering                     BOOLEAN             DEFAULT FALSE,
   nonce                        INTEGER                  OPTIONAL,
     -- MUST be present if the similar field was present
     -- in TimeStampReq.  In that case it MUST have the same value.
   tsa                          [0] GeneralName          OPTIONAL,
   extensions                   [1] IMPLICIT Extensions   OPTIONAL  }
]]></sourcecode>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgements">
      <name>Acknowledgements</name>
      <t>TBD</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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