Yandex

a.e.azimov@gmail.com

JetLend

eu@jetlend.ru

Internet Initiative Japan

randy@psg.com

Arrcus, Inc.

keyur@arrcus.com

Fastly

Amsterdam The Netherlands job@fastly.com

Vigil Security, LLC

918 Spring Knoll Drive Herndon VA 20170 USA housley@vigilsec.com

BGP Route leak Hijacks This document defines a standard profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure. An Autonomous System Provider Authorization is a digitally signed object that provides a means of validating that a Customer Autonomous System holder has authorized members of Provider set to be its upstream providers or provide route server service at internet exchange point. For the Providers it means that they are legal to send prefixes received from the Customer Autonomous System in all directions including providers and peers. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is to improve routing security. (See for more information.) As part of this infrastructure, a mechanism is needed to validate that a AS has permission from a Customer AS (CAS) holder to send routes in all directions. The digitally signed Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object provides this validation mechanism. The ASPA uses the template for RPKI digitally signed objects , which defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) wrapper for the ASPA content as well as a generic validation procedure for RPKI signed objects. As ASPAs need to be validated with RPKI certificates issued by the current infrastructure, we assume the mandatory-to-implement algorithms in , or its successor. To complete the specification of the ASPA (see Section 4 of ), this document defines: The object identifier (OID) that identifies the ASPA signed object. This OID appears in the eContentType field of the encapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed attribute within the signerInfo structure). The ASN.1 syntax for the ASPA content, which is the payload signed by the CAS. The ASPA content is encoded using the ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) . The steps required to validate an ASPA beyond the validation steps specified in ).

The content-type for an ASPA is defined as id-ct-ASPA, which has the numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.49. This OID MUST appear both within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo structure as well as the content-type signed attribute within the signerInfo structure (see ).

The content of an ASPA identifies the Customer AS (CAS) as well as the Set of Provider ASes (SPAS) that are authorized to further propagate announcements received from the customer. Not all route servers at internet exchange points are transparent, e.g. in some cases they are present in the ASPATH. In this case route server AS is acting as provider AS, which propagates routes between its customers. Thus, a customer MUST add both upstream providers and route sever AS it is connected to its SPAS. If customer is connected to multiple transit providers/route servers they MUST be registered in a single ASPA object. This rule is important to avoid possible race conditions during updates. The eContent of an ASPA is an instance of ASProviderAttestation, formally defined by the following ASN.1 module: RPKI-ASPA-2022 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-rpki-aspa-2020(TBD) } DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS CONTENT-TYPE FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- RFC 6268 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ; id-ct-ASPA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) 49 } ct-ASPA CONTENT-TYPE ::= { TYPE ASProviderAttestation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-ASPA } ASProviderAttestation ::= SEQUENCE { version [0] ASPAVersion DEFAULT v0, customerASID ASID, providers ProviderASSet } ASPAVersion ::= INTEGER { v0(0) } ProviderASSet ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ProviderAS ProviderAS ::= SEQUENCE { providerASID ASID, afiLimit AddressFamilyIdentifier OPTIONAL } ASID ::= INTEGER AddressFamilyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE (2)) END Note that this content appears as the eContent within the encapContentInfo as specified in .

The version number of the ASProviderAttestation MUST be v0.

The customerASID field contains the AS number of the Autonomous System (AS) that authorizes a collection of provider ASes (as listed in the providerASSet) to propagate prefixes in the specified address family to other ASes.

The providers field contains the listing of ASes that are authorized to further propagate announcements in the specified address family received from the customer. Each element contained in the providers field is an instance of ProviderAS.

The providerASID field contains the AS number of an AS that has been authorized by the customer AS to propagate prefixes in the specified address family to other ASes.

The afiLimit field optionally constrains the authorization given to the provider AS to a single address family. If present, it contains the two-octet Address Family Identifier (AFI) for which the relation between the customer and provider is authorized. AFI values are specified in . If omitted, the authorization is valid for both IPv4 and IPv6 announcements.

Before a relying party can use an ASPA to validate a routing announcement, the relying party MUST first validate the ASPA object itself. To validate an ASPA, the relying party MUST perform all the validation checks specified in as well as the following additional ASPA-specific validation step. The autonomous system identifier delegation extension is present in the end-entity (EE) certificate (contained within the ASPA), and the customer AS number in the ASPA is contained within the set of AS numbers specified by the EE certificate's autonomous system identifier delegation extension.

Please add the id-mod-rpki-aspa-2022 to the SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xml#security-smime-0) as follows:

Decimal | Description | Specification ----------------------------------------------------------- TBD2 | id-mod-rpki-aspa-2022 | [ThisRFC]

Please add the ASPA to the SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xml#security-smime-1) as follows:

Decimal | Description | Specification ----------------------------------------------------------- 49 | id-ct-ASPA | [ThisRFC]

Please add Autonomous System Provider Authorization to the RPKI Signed Object registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/rpki/rpki.xhtml#signed-objects) as follows:

Name | OID | Specification -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Autonomous System Provider Authorization | 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.49 | [ThisRFC]

Please add an item for the Autonomous System Provider Authorization file extension to the "RPKI Repository Name Scheme" registry created by as follows:

While it's not restricted, but it's highly recommended maintaining for selected Customer AS a single ASPA object that covers all connected providers/route servers. Such policy should prevent race conditions during ASPA updates that might affect prefix propagation. The software that provides hosting for ASPA records SHOULD support enforcement of this rule. In the case of the transition process between different CA registries, the ASPA records SHOULD be kept identical in all registries.

The authors would like to thank Ben Maddison for substantial review and contributions to the ASN.1 specification.

In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. This document defines two X.509 v3 certificate extensions. The first binds a list of IP address blocks, or prefixes, to the subject of a certificate. The second binds a list of autonomous system identifiers to the subject of a certificate. These extensions may be used to convey the authorization of the subject to use the IP addresses and autonomous system identifiers contained in the extensions. [STANDARDS-TRACK] RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. This document describes the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). This syntax is used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message content. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document specifies the algorithms, algorithms' parameters, asymmetric key formats, asymmetric key size, and signature format for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) subscribers that generate digital signatures on certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, and signed objects as well as for the relying parties (RPs) that verify these digital signatures. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document defines a profile for the structure of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) distributed repository. Each individual repository publication point is a directory that contains files that correspond to X.509/PKIX Resource Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists and signed objects. This profile defines the object (file) naming scheme, the contents of repository publication points (directories), and a suggested internal structure of a local repository cache that is intended to facilitate synchronization across a distributed collection of repository publication points and to facilitate certification path construction. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document defines a generic profile for signed objects used in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). These RPKI signed objects make use of Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) as a standard encapsulation format. [STANDARDS-TRACK] ITU-T ITU-T IANA This document describes an architecture for an infrastructure to support improved security of Internet routing. The foundation of this architecture is a Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) that represents the allocation hierarchy of IP address space and Autonomous System (AS) numbers; and a distributed repository system for storing and disseminating the data objects that comprise the RPKI, as well as other signed objects necessary for improved routing security. As an initial application of this architecture, the document describes how a legitimate holder of IP address space can explicitly and verifiably authorize one or more ASes to originate routes to that address space. Such verifiable authorizations could be used, for example, to more securely construct BGP route filters. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.