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  <front>
    <title abbrev="ECH in SVCB">Bootstrapping TLS Encrypted ClientHello with DNS Service Bindings</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-tls-svcb-ech-01"/>
    <author initials="B." surname="Schwartz" fullname="Ben Schwartz">
      <organization>Meta Platforms, Inc.</organization>
      <address>
        <email>ietf@bemasc.net</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="M." surname="Bishop" fullname="Mike Bishop">
      <organization>Akamai Technologies</organization>
      <address>
        <email>mbishop@evequefou.be</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="E." surname="Nygren" fullname="Erik Nygren">
      <organization>Akamai Technologies</organization>
      <address>
        <email>erik+ietf@nygren.org</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date/>
    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>TLS Working Group</workgroup>
    <keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 33?>

<t>To use TLS Encrypted ClientHello (ECH) the client needs to learn the ECH configuration for a server before it attempts a connection to the server.  This specification provides a mechanism for conveying the ECH configuration information via DNS, using a SVCB or HTTPS record.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 37?>

<section anchor="overview">
      <name>Overview</name>
      <t>The Service Bindings framework <xref target="SVCB"/> allows server operators to publish a detailed description of their service in the Domain Name System <xref target="RFC1034"/> using SVCB or HTTPS records.  Each SVCB record describes a single "alternative endpoint", and contains a collection of "SvcParams" that can be extended with new kinds of information that may be of interest to a client.  Clients can use the SvcParams to improve the privacy, security, and performance of their connection to this endpoint.</t>
      <t>This specification defines a new SvcParam to enable the use of TLS Encrypted ClientHello <xref target="ECH"/> in TLS-based protocols.  This SvcParam can be used in SVCB, HTTPS or any future SVCB-compatible DNS records, and is intended to serve as the primary bootstrap mechanism for ECH.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="ech-param">
      <name>SvcParam for ECH configuration</name>
      <t>The "ech" SvcParamKey is defined for conveying the ECH configuration of an alternative endpoint.  It is applicable to all TLS-based protocols (including DTLS <xref target="RFC9147"/> and QUIC version 1 <xref target="RFC9001"/>) unless otherwise specified.</t>
      <t>In wire format, the value of the parameter is an ECHConfigList (<xref section="4" sectionFormat="of" target="ECH"/>), including the redundant length prefix.  In presentation format, the value is the ECHConfigList in Base 64 Encoding (<xref section="4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC4648"/>).  Base 64 is used here to simplify integration with TLS server software.  To enable simpler parsing, this SvcParam MUST NOT contain escape sequences.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="server-behavior">
      <name>Server behavior</name>
      <t>When publishing a record containing an "ech" parameter, the publisher MUST ensure that all IP addresses of TargetName correspond to servers that have access to the corresponding private key or are authoritative for the public name. (See <xref section="7.2.2" sectionFormat="of" target="ECH"/> for more details about the public name.)  Otherwise, connections will fail entirely.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="ech-client-behavior">
      <name>Client behavior</name>
      <t>This section describes client behavior in using ECH configurations provided in SVCB or HTTPS records.</t>
      <section anchor="disabling-fallback">
        <name>Disabling fallback</name>
        <t>The SVCB-optional client behavior specified in (<xref section="3" sectionFormat="of" target="SVCB"/>) permits clients to fall back to a direct connection if all SVCB options fail.  This behavior is not suitable for ECH, because fallback would negate the privacy benefits of ECH.  Accordingly, ECH-capable SVCB-optional clients MUST switch to SVCB-reliant connection establishment if SVCB resolution succeeded (as defined in <xref section="3" sectionFormat="of" target="SVCB"/>) and all alternative endpoints have an "ech" SvcParam.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="clienthello-construction">
        <name>ClientHello construction</name>
        <t>When ECH is in use, the TLS ClientHello is divided into an unencrypted "outer" and an encrypted "inner" ClientHello.  The outer ClientHello is an implementation detail of ECH, and its contents are controlled by the ECHConfig in accordance with <xref target="ECH"/>.  The inner ClientHello is used for establishing a connection to the service, so its contents may be influenced by other SVCB parameters.  For example, the requirements related to ALPN protocol identifiers in <xref section="7.1.2" sectionFormat="of" target="SVCB"/> apply only to the inner ClientHello.  Similarly, it is the inner ClientHello whose Server Name Indication identifies the desired service.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="performance-optimizations">
        <name>Performance optimizations</name>
        <t>Prior to retrieving the SVCB records, the client does not know whether they contain an "ech" parameter.  As a latency optimization, clients MAY prefetch DNS records that will only be used if this parameter is not present (i.e. only in SVCB-optional mode).</t>
        <t>The "ech" SvcParam alters the contents of the TLS ClientHello if it is present.  Therefore, clients that support ECH MUST NOT issue any TLS ClientHello until after SVCB resolution has completed.  (See <xref section="5.1" sectionFormat="of" target="SVCB"/>).</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="interaction-with-http-alt-svc">
      <name>Interaction with HTTP Alt-Svc</name>
      <t>HTTP clients that implement both HTTP Alt-Svc <xref target="RFC7838"/> and the HTTPS record type <xref target="SVCB"/> can use them together, provided that they only perform connection attempts that are "consistent" with both sets of parameters (<xref section="9.3" sectionFormat="of" target="SVCB"/>).  At the time of writing, there is no defined parameter related to ECH for Alt-Svc.  Accordingly, a connection attempt that uses ECH is considered "consistent" with an Alt-Svc Field Value that does not mention ECH.</t>
      <t>Origins that publish an "ech" SvcParam in their HTTPS record SHOULD also publish an HTTPS record with the "ech" SvcParam for every alt-authority offered in its Alt-Svc Field Values.  Otherwise, clients might reveal the name of the server in an unencrypted ClientHello to an alt-authority.</t>
      <t>If all HTTPS records for an alt-authority contain "ech" SvcParams, the client MUST adopt SVCB-reliant behavior (as in <xref target="disabling-fallback"/>) for that RRSet.  This precludes the use of certain connections that Alt-Svc would otherwise allow, as discussed in <xref section="9.3" sectionFormat="of" target="SVCB"/>.</t>
      <section anchor="security-considerations">
        <name>Security Considerations</name>
        <t>A SVCB RRSet containing some RRs with "ech" and some without is vulnerable to a downgrade attack: a network intermediary can block connections to the endpoints that support ECH, causing the client to fall back to a non-ECH endpoint.  This configuration is NOT RECOMMENDED. Zone owners who do use such a mixed configuration SHOULD mark the RRs with "ech" as more preferred (i.e. lower SvcPriority value) than those without, in order to maximize the likelihood that ECH will be used in the absence of an active adversary.</t>
        <t>Use of ECH yields an anonymity set of cardinality equal to the number of ECH-enabled server domains supported by a given client-facing server. Thus, even with an encrypted ClientHello, an attacker who can enumerate the set of ECH-enabled domains supported by a client-facing server can guess the correct SNI with probability at least 1/K, where K is the size of this ECH-enabled server anonymity set. This probability may be increased via traffic analysis or other mechanisms.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>IANA is instructed to modify the Service Binding (SVCB) Parameter Keys Registry entry for "ech" as follows:</t>
      <table>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">Number</th>
            <th align="left">Name</th>
            <th align="left">Meaning</th>
            <th align="left">Format Reference</th>
            <th align="left">Change Controller</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">5</td>
            <td align="left">ech</td>
            <td align="left">TLS Encrypted ClientHello Config</td>
            <td align="left">(This document)</td>
            <td align="left">IETF</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references>
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="SVCB">
          <front>
            <title>Service Binding and Parameter Specification via the DNS (SVCB and HTTPS Resource Records)</title>
            <author fullname="Benjamin M. Schwartz" initials="B. M." surname="Schwartz">
              <organization>Google</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Mike Bishop" initials="M." surname="Bishop">
              <organization>Akamai Technologies</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Erik Nygren" initials="E." surname="Nygren">
              <organization>Akamai Technologies</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="11" month="March" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies the "SVCB" ("Service Binding") and "HTTPS" DNS resource record (RR) types to facilitate the lookup of information needed to make connections to network services, such as for HTTP origins.  SVCB records allow a service to be provided from multiple alternative endpoints, each with associated parameters (such as transport protocol configuration), and are extensible to support future uses (such as keys for encrypting the TLS ClientHello).  They also enable aliasing of apex domains, which is not possible with CNAME.  The HTTPS RR is a variation of SVCB for use with HTTP (see RFC 9110, "HTTP Semantics").  By providing more information to the client before it attempts to establish a connection, these records offer potential benefits to both performance and privacy.
              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-https-12"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC1034">
          <front>
            <title>Domain names - concepts and facilities</title>
            <author fullname="P. Mockapetris" initials="P." surname="Mockapetris"/>
            <date month="November" year="1987"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This RFC is the revised basic definition of The Domain Name System. It obsoletes RFC-882. This memo describes the domain style names and their used for host address look up and electronic mail forwarding. It discusses the clients and servers in the domain name system and the protocol used between them.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="13"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="1034"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC1034"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ECH">
          <front>
            <title>TLS Encrypted Client Hello</title>
            <author fullname="Eric Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla">
              <organization>Windy Hill Systems, LLC</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Kazuho Oku" initials="K." surname="Oku">
              <organization>Fastly</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Nick Sullivan" initials="N." surname="Sullivan">
              <organization>Cryptography Consulting LLC</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Christopher A. Wood" initials="C. A." surname="Wood">
              <organization>Cloudflare</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="4" month="March" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document describes a mechanism in Transport Layer Security (TLS)
   for encrypting a ClientHello message under a server public key.

Discussion Venues

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni
   (https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni).

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-tls-esni-18"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4648">
          <front>
            <title>The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings</title>
            <author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
            <date month="October" year="2006"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes the commonly used base 64, base 32, and base 16 encoding schemes. It also discusses the use of line-feeds in encoded data, use of padding in encoded data, use of non-alphabet characters in encoded data, use of different encoding alphabets, and canonical encodings. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4648"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4648"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC9147">
          <front>
            <title>The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
            <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
            <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
            <author fullname="N. Modadugu" initials="N." surname="Modadugu"/>
            <date month="April" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies version 1.3 of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. DTLS 1.3 allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.</t>
              <t>The DTLS 1.3 protocol is based on the Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3 protocol and provides equivalent security guarantees with the exception of order protection / non-replayability. Datagram semantics of the underlying transport are preserved by the DTLS protocol.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 6347.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9147"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9147"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9001">
          <front>
            <title>Using TLS to Secure QUIC</title>
            <author fullname="M. Thomson" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Thomson"/>
            <author fullname="S. Turner" initials="S." role="editor" surname="Turner"/>
            <date month="May" year="2021"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes how Transport Layer Security (TLS) is used to secure QUIC.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9001"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9001"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7838">
          <front>
            <title>HTTP Alternative Services</title>
            <author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." surname="Nottingham"/>
            <author fullname="P. McManus" initials="P." surname="McManus"/>
            <author fullname="J. Reschke" initials="J." surname="Reschke"/>
            <date month="April" year="2016"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies "Alternative Services" for HTTP, which allow an origin's resources to be authoritatively available at a separate network location, possibly accessed with a different protocol configuration.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7838"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7838"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
  </back>
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