Bootstrapping TLS Encrypted ClientHello with DNS Service Bindings

Overview The Service Bindings framework allows server operators to publish a detailed description of their service in the Domain Name System (see , ) using SVCB or HTTPS records. Each SVCB record describes a single "alternative endpoint", and contains a collection of "SvcParams" that can be extended with new kinds of information that may be of interest to a client. Clients can use the SvcParams to improve the privacy, security, and performance of their connection to this endpoint. This specification defines a new SvcParam to enable the use of TLS Encrypted ClientHello in TLS-based protocols. This SvcParam can be used in SVCB, HTTPS or any future SVCB-compatible DNS records, and is intended to serve as the primary bootstrap mechanism for ECH.

Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

SvcParam for ECH configuration The "ech" SvcParamKey is defined for conveying the ECH configuration of an alternative endpoint. It is applicable to all schemes that use TLS-based protocols (including DTLS and QUIC version 1 ) unless otherwise specified. In wire format, the value of the parameter is an ECHConfigList (), including the redundant length prefix. In presentation format, the value is the ECHConfigList in Base 64 Encoding (). Base 64 is used here to simplify integration with TLS server software. To enable simpler parsing, this SvcParam MUST NOT contain escape sequences.

ECH SvcParam with a public_name of "ech-sites.example.net".

Server behavior When publishing a record containing an "ech" parameter, the publisher MUST ensure that all IP addresses of TargetName correspond to servers that have access to the corresponding private key or are authoritative for the public name. (See Sections and of for requirements related to the public name.) Otherwise, connections will fail entirely. These servers SHOULD support a protocol version that is compatible with ECH. At the time of writing, the compatible versions are TLS 1.3, DTLS 1.3, and QUIC version 1. If the server does not support a compatible version, each connection attempt will have to be retried, delaying the connection and wasting resources.

Client behavior This section describes client behavior in using ECH configurations provided in SVCB or HTTPS records.

Disabling fallback The SVCB-optional client behavior specified in () permits clients to fall back to a direct connection if all SVCB options fail. This behavior is not suitable for ECH, because fallback would negate the privacy benefits of ECH. Accordingly, ECH-capable SVCB-optional clients MUST switch to SVCB-reliant connection establishment if SVCB resolution succeeded (as defined in ) and all alternative endpoints have an "ech" SvcParam.

ClientHello construction When ECH is in use, the TLS ClientHello is divided into an unencrypted "outer" and an encrypted "inner" ClientHello. The outer ClientHello is an implementation detail of ECH, and its contents are controlled by the ECHConfig in accordance with . The inner ClientHello is used for establishing a connection to the service, so its contents may be influenced by other SVCB parameters. For example, the requirements related to ALPN protocol identifiers in apply only to the inner ClientHello. Similarly, it is the inner ClientHello whose Server Name Indication (SNI) identifies the desired service.

Performance optimizations Prior to retrieving the SVCB records, the client does not know whether they contain an "ech" parameter. As a latency optimization, clients MAY prefetch DNS records that will only be used if this parameter is not present (i.e. only in SVCB-optional mode). The "ech" SvcParam alters the contents of the TLS ClientHello if it is present. Therefore, clients that support ECH MUST NOT issue any TLS ClientHello until after SVCB resolution has completed. (See ).

Interaction with HTTP Alt-Svc HTTP clients that implement both HTTP Alt-Svc and the HTTPS record type can use them together, provided that they only perform connection attempts that are "consistent" with both sets of parameters (). At the time of writing, there is no defined parameter related to ECH for Alt-Svc. Accordingly, a connection attempt that uses ECH is considered "consistent" with an Alt-Svc Field Value that does not mention ECH. Origins that publish an "ech" SvcParam in their HTTPS record SHOULD also publish an HTTPS record with the "ech" SvcParam for every alt-authority offered in its Alt-Svc Field Values. Otherwise, clients might reveal the name of the server in an unencrypted ClientHello to an alt-authority. If all HTTPS records for an alt-authority contain "ech" SvcParams, the client MUST adopt SVCB-reliant behavior (as in ) for that RRSet. This precludes the use of certain connections that Alt-Svc would otherwise allow, as discussed in .

Examples

Simple example zone with the same configuration on the apex and web domain. It is compatible with clients that do or do not support HTTPS records.

Service that allows clients to choose between two server pools with different ECH configurations.

ECH usage pattern for an aliasing-based CDN.

A domain that is only reachable using ECH.

Multi-CDN configuration using server-side selection.

Example of a DNS server that supports ECH.

Security Considerations A SVCB RRSet containing some RRs with "ech" and some without is vulnerable to a downgrade attack: a network intermediary can block connections to the endpoints that support ECH, causing the client to fall back to a non-ECH endpoint. This configuration is NOT RECOMMENDED, but it may be unavoidable when combining endpoints from different providers or conducting a staged rollout. Zone owners who do use such a mixed configuration SHOULD mark the RRs with "ech" as more preferred (i.e. lower SvcPriority value) than those without, in order to maximize the likelihood that ECH will be used in the absence of an active adversary. When Encrypted ClientHello is deployed, the inner TLS SNI is protected from disclosure to attackers. However, there are still many ways that an attacker might infer the SNI. Even in an idealized deployment, ECH's protection is limited to an anonymity set consisting of all the ECH-enabled server domains supported by a given client-facing server that share an ECH configuration. An attacker who can enumerate this set can always guess the encrypted SNI with probability at least 1/K, where K is the number of domains in the set. Some attackers may achieve much greater accuracy using traffic analysis, popularity weighting, and other mechanisms (see e.g., ). ECH ensures that TLS does not disclose the SNI, but the same information is also present in the DNS queries used to resolve the server's hostname. This specification does not conceal the server name from the DNS resolver. If DNS messages are sent between the client and resolver without authenticated encryption, an attacker on this path can also learn the destination server name. A similar attack applies if the client can be linked to a request from the resolver to a DNS authority. An attacker who can prevent SVCB resolution can deny clients any associated security benefits. A hostile recursive resolver can always deny service to SVCB queries, but network intermediaries can often prevent resolution as well, even when the client and recursive resolver validate DNSSEC and use a secure transport. These downgrade attacks can prevent a client from being aware that "ech" is configured which could result in the client sending the ClientHello in cleartext. To prevent downgrades, recommends that clients abandon the connection attempt when such an attack is detected.

IANA Considerations IANA is instructed to modify the Service Parameter Keys Registry entry for "ech" as follows:

Number	Name	Meaning	Format Reference	Change Controller
5	ech	TLS Encrypted ClientHello Config	(This document)	IETF