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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-wimse-identifier-01" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="Workload Identifier">Workload Identifier</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-wimse-identifier-01"/>
    <author initials="Y." surname="Rosomakho" fullname="Yaroslav Rosomakho">
      <organization>Zscaler</organization>
      <address>
        <email>yaroslavros@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="J." surname="Salowey" fullname="Joe Salowey">
      <organization>CyberArk</organization>
      <address>
        <email>joe@salowey.net</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2025" month="December" day="29"/>
    <area/>
    <workgroup>Workload Identity in Multi System Environments</workgroup>
    <keyword>workload</keyword>
    <keyword>identifier</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 46?>

<t>This document defines a canonical identifier for workloads, referred to as the Workload Identifier. A Workload Identifier is a URI that uniquely identifies a workload within the context of a specific trust domain. This identifier can be embedded in digital credentials, including X.509 certificates and security tokens, to support authentication, authorization, and policy enforcement across diverse systems. The Workload Identifier format ensures interoperability, facilitates secure identity federation, and enables consistent identity semantics.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        The latest revision of this draft can be found at <eref target="https://ietf-wg-wimse.github.io/draft-ietf-wimse-identifier/draft-ietf-wimse-identifier.html"/>.
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-wimse-identifier/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        Workload Identity in Multi System Environments  mailing list (<eref target="mailto:wimse@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/wimse/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/wimse/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/ietf-wg-wimse/draft-ietf-wimse-identifier"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 51?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>In modern distributed systems, workloads such as services, applications, or containerised tasks require cryptographically verifiable identities to support secure communication, access control, and auditability. As systems scale across trust domains, administrative boundaries, and heterogeneous platforms, the need for a consistent and interoperable identifier format becomes critical.</t>
      <t>This document defines the Workload Identifier, a URI-based <xref target="URI"/> identifier intended to uniquely represent a workload within the context of an issuing authority. The identifier is designed to be stable, globally unique within a given trust domain, and suitable for use in digital credentials such as X.509 certificates , JSON Web Tokens (JWTs, <xref target="JWT"/>), and other security artifacts.</t>
      <t>The Workload Identifier format is simple yet expressive. It enables organisations to define trust boundaries, delegate identity management, and reason about workloads in a uniform way across service meshes, cloud environments, and on-premises infrastructure. This specification is intended to be generic and reusable beyond the context of any single system or architecture, including but not limited to the Workload Identity in Multi-System Environments (WIMSE) architecture <xref target="ARCH"/>.</t>
      <t>The primary goals of this specification are:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>To define the syntax and semantics of a Workload Identifier.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>To establish requirements for issuers and consumers of such identifiers.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>To promote interoperability across different identity systems and domains.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>This document does not prescribe how identifiers are issued or verified. Instead, it focuses on the identifier’s format, uniqueness guarantees, and its relationship to trust domains.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions">
      <name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      <?line -18?>

</section>
    <section anchor="terminology">
      <name>Terminology</name>
      <t>The following terms are used throughout this document:</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>Workload:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>An independently addressable and executable software entity. This may include microservices, containers, virtual machines, serverless functions, or similar components that initiate or receive network communications.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Workload Identifier:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A URI-based identifier that uniquely represents a workload within a specific trust domain. It is intended to be included in security credentials and interpreted within the scope of an issuing authority.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Trust Domain:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A security boundary defined and controlled by a single administrative authority. A trust domain establishes its own rules for identity issuance, validation, and policy enforcement.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Issuer:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>An entity responsible for assigning and validating Workload Identifiers.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Consumer:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>An entity that evaluates, verifies or uses a Workload Identifier, typically as part of authentication or authorisation decisions. This includes relying parties, verifiers, and policy enforcement points.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="workload-identifier-specification">
      <name>Workload Identifier Specification</name>
      <t>A Workload Identifier is a URI <xref target="URI"/> that uniquely identifies a workload. It encodes both the trust domain and a workload-specific path, enabling unambiguous identification of workloads across administrative and organisational boundaries.</t>
      <t>The identifier is designed to be stable and suitable for inclusion in digital credentials such as X.509 certificates and security tokens. This section defines the format, structure, and associated requirements for Workload Identifiers.</t>
      <section anchor="uri-requirements">
        <name> URI Requirements</name>
        <t>A Workload Identifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be an absolute URI, as defined in <xref section="4.3" sectionFormat="of" target="URI"/>. In addition the URI <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include a non-empty authority component that identifies the trust domain within which the identifier is scoped.</t>
        <t>The scheme and scheme-specific syntax are not defined by this specification. The URI format allows different schemes (e.g., <tt>spiffe</tt> as defined in <xref target="SPIFFE-ID"/>, <tt>wimse</tt>) depending on deployment requirements.  Example identifiers:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
spiffe://incubation.example.org/ns/experimental/analytics/ingest
wimse://trust.corp.example.com/workload/af3e86cb-7013-4e33-b717-11c4edd25679
]]></artwork>
        <t>A Workload Identifier URI <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> contain a query component, a fragment component, user information, or a port component.</t>
        <t>Implementations that generate, parse, or otherwise process Workload Identifiers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support identifiers with a total length of at least 2048 bytes. Workload Identifiers <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> exceed 2048 bytes in length.</t>
        <t>Individual Workload Identifier schemes <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> define additional syntax or processing requirements, provided they do not conflict with the requirements defined in this document.</t>
        <t>(Note that the wimse scheme is used as an example and is not defined in this document).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="scheme-specific-portion">
        <name>Scheme Specific Portion</name>
        <t>The format and semantics scheme specific part of the URI that follows the identity is determined by the issuer in the trust domain. What the identity refers to is also determined by the issuer. For example a workload identity may refer to a specific instance of a running piece of software or it may refer just to a specific software version running in a particular environment, or it may refer to the role that the software performs within the system.  The scheme specific part of the URI may just be an opaque unique identifier used to look up the additional identity information in another system. Some examples of these concepts are given below:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Opaque identifier</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
spiffe://prod.trust.domain/89a6ec51-f877-44c0-9501-b213597f2d1d
]]></artwork>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Application role</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
spiffe://prod.trust.domain/ns/prod-01/sa/foo-service
]]></artwork>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Specific instance of application role</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
spiffe://prod.trust.domain/ns/prod-01/sa/foo-service/iid-1f814646-87b5-4e26-bb55-1d13caccdd8d
]]></artwork>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Specific code for an application role</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
spiffe://prod.trust.domain/foo-service/sha256/c4dbb1a06030e142cb0ed4be61421967618289a19c0c7760bdd745ac67779ca7
]]></artwork>
        <t>Other concepts may be defined within the trust domain depending on what is important in the system and what information is available when the identity is issued. A trust domain should define the scheme specific portion of the URI to meet their auditing and authorization needs.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="trust-domain-association">
        <name>Trust Domain Association</name>
        <t>The authority component of the URI defines the trust domain which is responsible for issuing, validating, and managing Workload Identifiers within its scope.  The trust domain <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be a fully qualified domain name belonging to the organization defining the trust domain to help provide uniqueness for the trust domain identifier. While IP addresses are allowed as host names in the URI encoding rules, they <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used to represent trust domains except in the case where they are needed for compatibility with legacy naming schemes.</t>
        <t>Workload Identifiers are interpreted in the context of the trust domain that issued the credential. Identifiers with identical path components but different trust domains represent different workloads.</t>
        <t>Issuers within a trust domain <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ensure uniqueness of all Workload Identifiers they assign.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="stability-and-uniqueness">
        <name>Stability and Uniqueness</name>
        <t>Workload Identifiers are intended to be stable over time. An identifier assigned to a specific workload should not be reassigned to a different workload unless explicitly intended by the policies of the trust domain.</t>
        <t>Workload Identifiers are globally unique when the trust domain is globally unique. This is typically achieved by using a fully qualified domain name (FQDN) under organisational control.</t>
        <t>For example, the following contains identifiers of two distinct globally unique Workload Identifiers</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
spiffe://dev.example.com/ns/default/database/backend
spiffe://prod.example.com/ns/default/database/backend
]]></artwork>
      </section>
      <section anchor="workload-identifier-scope">
        <name>Workload Identifier Scope</name>
        <t>A Workload Identifier Scope is a specification of a namespace under which a Workload Identifier is meaningful for a given use case. A scope consists of the URI scheme and trust domain components of a Workload Identifier, omitting the path component.</t>
        <t>Workload Identifier Scopes serve as hints about the set of identifiers an entity may present in a particular protocol instance or usage context without revealing specific identifier.</t>
        <t>Examples of Workload Identifier Scopes:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
spiffe://prod.trust.domain
wimse://trust.corp.example.com
]]></artwork>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="usage-in-credentials-and-tokens">
      <name>Usage in Credentials and Tokens</name>
      <t>Workload Identifiers are designed to be embedded in cryptographic credentials and security tokens that are used to assert the identity of workloads during authentication, authorisation, and auditing. Representation of workload identifier in commonly used formats is defined in <xref target="WIMSE-CREDENTIALS"/>.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>The Workload Identifier is intended to be used as a stable, verifiable identity for workloads. Its use in cryptographic credentials means it must be protected against spoofing, ambiguity, and misinterpretation. This section outlines security considerations for issuers, consumers, and system designers.</t>
      <section anchor="uri-parsing-and-processing-considerations">
        <name>URI Parsing and Processing Considerations</name>
        <t>Workload Identifiers are encoded as URIs and therefore rely on correct and secure URI parsing. Implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> apply a standards-compliant URI parser.</t>
        <t>Incorrect URI parsing can result in misinterpretation of identifier components, security policy bypass, or inconsistent trust domain evaluation across implementations.</t>
        <t>Implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> enforce the URI requirements defined in this document, including the absence of query, fragment, user information, and port components. Failure to validate these constraints may allow identifiers to carry unintended or ambiguous semantics.</t>
        <t>Implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> also take care to handle Workload Identifiers of the maximum supported length without causing excessive memory allocation, resource exhaustion, or denial-of-service conditions. Parsers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> impose reasonable internal limits and reject identifiers that exceed implementation-defined constraints, consistent with the length requirements in this document.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="identifier-authenticity">
        <name>Identifier Authenticity</name>
        <t>Workload Identifiers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> only be considered valid when presented in a credential or token that has been cryptographically verified. An identifier received outside such a context, such as a plaintext string in a request, <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be treated as authenticated.</t>
        <t>Consumers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify the signature, issuer, and validity of the credential or token before considering Workload Identifier as authenticated.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="trust-domain-validation">
        <name>Trust Domain Validation</name>
        <t>Consumers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> validate that the trust domain in the Workload Identifier matches an expected or explicitly trusted domain. Failure to do so may allow identifiers from unauthorised domains to be accepted as legitimate.</t>
        <t>Where appropriate, consumers should maintain an allowlist of trusted domains or trusted issuing authorities.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="identifier-reuse-and-collision">
        <name>Identifier Reuse and Collision</name>
        <t>Issuers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> ensure that Workload Identifiers are not reused across different workloads unless such reuse is intentional and well-scoped. Reassignment of identifiers to unrelated entities can result in privilege escalation or confusion in audit trails.</t>
        <t>Consumers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> assume that identifiers are permanent within their domain of interpretation and treat unexpected reuse with suspicion.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="information-disclosure">
        <name>Information Disclosure</name>
        <t>Because Workload Identifiers may encode topological or semantic information, they may inadvertently reveal deployment details. Issuers and system designers should take care not to expose sensitive naming conventions in externally visible identifiers.</t>
        <t>Where possible, identifier paths <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be minimally descriptive and avoid exposing internal implementation details unless necessary for interoperation.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="wildcard-and-prefix-matching">
        <name>Wildcard and Prefix Matching</name>
        <t>Consumers <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> interpret Workload Identifiers using wildcard or prefix matching unless explicitly specified by policy. For example, treating all identifiers under prefix of <tt>spiffe://example.org/ns/db/</tt> as equivalent may lead to incorrect authorisation.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document has no IANA actions.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="URI">
          <front>
            <title>Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax</title>
            <author fullname="T. Berners-Lee" initials="T." surname="Berners-Lee"/>
            <author fullname="R. Fielding" initials="R." surname="Fielding"/>
            <author fullname="L. Masinter" initials="L." surname="Masinter"/>
            <date month="January" year="2005"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>A Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) is a compact sequence of characters that identifies an abstract or physical resource. This specification defines the generic URI syntax and a process for resolving URI references that might be in relative form, along with guidelines and security considerations for the use of URIs on the Internet. The URI syntax defines a grammar that is a superset of all valid URIs, allowing an implementation to parse the common components of a URI reference without knowing the scheme-specific requirements of every possible identifier. This specification does not define a generative grammar for URIs; that task is performed by the individual specifications of each URI scheme. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="66"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3986"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3986"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="WIMSE-CREDENTIALS">
          <front>
            <title>WIMSE Workload Credentials</title>
            <author fullname="Brian Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell">
              <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Joseph A. Salowey" initials="J. A." surname="Salowey">
              <organization>CyberArk</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Arndt Schwenkschuster" initials="A." surname="Schwenkschuster">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yaron Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer">
              <organization>Intuit</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yaroslav Rosomakho" initials="Y." surname="Rosomakho">
              <organization>Zscaler</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="3" month="November" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The WIMSE architecture defines authentication and authorization for
   software workloads in a variety of runtime environments, from the
   most basic ones up to complex multi-service, multi-cloud, multi-
   tenant deployments.

   This document defines the credentials that workloads use to represent
   their identity.  They can be used in various protocols to
   authenticate workloads to each other.  To use these credentials,
   workloads must provide proof of possession of the associated private
   key material, which is covered in other documents.  This document
   focuses on the credentials alone, independent of the proof-of-
   possession mechanism.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds-00"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="SPIFFE-ID" target="https://github.com/spiffe/spiffe/blob/main/standards/SPIFFE-ID.md">
          <front>
            <title>The SPIFFE Identity and Verifiable Identity Document</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2025" month="January"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="JWT">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Token (JWT)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JSON Web Token (JWT) is a compact, URL-safe means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a JWT are encoded as a JSON object that is used as the payload of a JSON Web Signature (JWS) structure or as the plaintext of a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) structure, enabling the claims to be digitally signed or integrity protected with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) and/or encrypted.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7519"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7519"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ARCH">
          <front>
            <title>Workload Identity in a Multi System Environment (WIMSE) Architecture</title>
            <author fullname="Joseph A. Salowey" initials="J. A." surname="Salowey">
              <organization>CyberArk</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yaroslav Rosomakho" initials="Y." surname="Rosomakho">
              <organization>Zscaler</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Hannes Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig">
              <organization>University of Applied Sciences Bonn-Rhein-Sieg</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="September" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The increasing prevalence of cloud computing and micro service
   architectures has led to the rise of complex software functions being
   built and deployed as workloads, where a workload is defined as a
   running instance of software executing for a specific purpose.  This
   document discusses an architecture for designing and standardizing
   protocols and payloads for conveying workload identity and security
   context information.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-wimse-arch-06"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 256?>

<section anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>Authors would like to thank Evan Gilman for his review of the initial text of this document and his guidance.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="changelog">
      <name>Changelog</name>
      <t><strong>RFC Editor's Note:</strong>  Please remove this section prior to publication of a final version of this document.</t>
      <section anchor="since-draft-ietf-wimse-identifier-00">
        <name>since draft-ietf-wimse-identifier-00</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Defined Workload Identifier Scope</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Replaced specifics of usage in credentials and tokens with a reference to s2s-creds draft</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Added URI requirements</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
  </back>
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