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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" docName="draft-irtf-cfrg-aead-properties-00"  ipr="trust200902" obsoletes="" updates="" submissionType="IETF" category="info"
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="Properties of AEAD algorithms">
      Properties of AEAD algorithms
    </title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-irtf-cfrg-aead-properties-00"/>
    <author fullname="Andrey Bozhko" initials="A.A." role="editor" surname="Bozhko">
      <organization>CryptoPro</organization>
      <address>
        <email>andbogc@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2022"/>
    <area>General</area>
    <workgroup>Network Working Group </workgroup>
    <keyword>authenticated encryption, mode of operation, AEAD, properties</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <t>
        Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms provide confidentiality and integrity of data. The extensive use of AEAD algorithms
        in various high-level applications has caused the need for AEAD algorithms with additional properties and motivated research in the area. This document gives definitions
        for the most common of those properties intending to improve consistency in the field.
      </t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <section anchor="Introduction" numbered="true" toc="default">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>
        An Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm is an extension of authenticated encryption, which provides confidentiality for the plaintext to be encrypted
        and integrity for the plaintext and some Associated Data (sometimes called Header). AEAD algorithms are used in numerous applications and have become an important field in cryptographic research.
      </t>

      <section anchor="IntBack" numbered="true" toc="default">
        <name>Background</name>
        <t>
          AEAD algorithms are formally defined in <xref target="RFC5116" format="default"/>. The main benefit of AEAD algorithms is that they provide both data confidentiality and data integrity
          and have a simple unified interface. 
        </t>
        <t>
          The importance of the AEAD algorithms is mainly explained by their exploitation simplicity: they have a unified interface, easy-to-understand security guarantees, and are much easier to implement
          properly than MAC and encryption schemes separately. Therefore, their embedding into high-level schemes and protocols is highly transparent since, for example, there is no need for additional key
          derivation procedures. Apart from that, when using the AEAD algorithm, it is possible to reduce the key and state sizes and improve the data processing speed. For instance, such algorithms are mandatory
          for TLS 1.3 <xref target="RFC8446" format="default"/>, IPsec ESP <xref target="RFC4303" format="default"/> <xref target="RFC8221" format="default"/>, and QUIC <xref target="RFC9000" format="default"/>. 
          Hence, the research and standardization efforts in the field are extremely active. Most AEAD algorithms usually come with security guarantees, formal proofs, usage guidelines, and reference implementations.
        </t>
        <t>
         Even though providing core properties of AEAD algorithms is enough for use in many applications, some environments require other unusual cryptographic properties, which commonly require additional analysis
         and research. With the growing number of such properties and research papers, misunderstanding and confusion inevitably appear. Some properties might be understood in different ways, for some only non-trivial
         formal security notions are provided, others require modification or extension of the standard AEAD interface to support additional functionality. Therefore, the risk of misuse of AEAD algorithms increases which
         can lead to security issues.
        </t>
      </section>
      
      <section anchor="IntScope" numbered="true" toc="default">
        <name>Scope</name>
        <t>
          In the following document, we provide a short overview of the most common properties of AEAD algorithms, by giving high-level definitions of these properties
          in <xref target="Properties" format="default"/>. The document aims to improve clarity and establish a common language in the field.
        </t>

      </section>
    </section>
    <section numbered="true" toc="default">
      <name>Conventions Used in This Document</name>
      <t>
        The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
        "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted
        as described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119" format="default"/> <xref target="RFC8174" format="default"/> when, and only when,
        they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
      </t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="Properties" numbered="true" toc="default">
      <name>AEAD properties</name>
      <section anchor="SecurityProp" numbered="true" toc="default">
        <name>Security properties</name>

        <section anchor="Conf" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>Confidentiality</name>
          <t>
            Definition. An AEAD algorithm guarantees that data is available only to those authorized to obtain it. That property is required for the AEAD
            algorithm to be called secure.
          </t>
          <t>
            Synonyms. Privacy.
          </t>
          <t>
            Further reading. <xref target="R2002" format="default"/>, <xref target="BN2000" format="default"/>
          </t>
        </section>

        <section anchor="Int" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>Data integrity</name>
          <t>
            Definition. An AEAD algorithm guarantees that data has not been changed or forged by those who are not authorized to.
            That property is required for the AEAD algorithm to be called secure.
          </t>
          <t>
            Synonyms. Message authentication.
          </t>
          <t>
            Further reading. <xref target="R2002" format="default"/>, <xref target="BN2000" format="default"/>
          </t>
        </section>

        <section anchor="BWsec" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>Blockwise security</name>
          <t>
            Definition. An AEAD algorithm provides security even if an adversary can adaptively choose the next block of the plaintext (ciphertext)
            depending on already computed blocks of the ciphertext (plaintext) during an encryption (decryption) operation.
          </t>
          <t>
            Further reading. <xref target="JMV2002" format="default"/>, <xref target="FJMV2004" format="default"/>
          </t>
        </section>

        <section anchor="KDM" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>Key Dependent Messages (KDM) security</name>
          <t>
            Definition. An AEAD algorithm provides security even when key-dependent plaintexts are encrypted.
          </t>
          <t>
            Notes. KDM-security is achievable only if nonces are chosen randomly and associated data is key-independent.
          </t>
          <t>
            Further reading.
            <xref target="BK2011" format="default"/>
          </t>
        </section>

        <section anchor="KeyComm" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>Key commitment</name>
          <t>
            Definition. An AEAD algorithm guarantees that it is difficult to find a tuple of the nonce, associated data, and ciphertext such that
            it can be decrypted correctly with more than one key.
          </t>
          <t>
            Synonyms. Key-robustness,  key collision resistance.
          </t>
          <t>
            Further reading. <xref target="FOR17" format="default"/>, <xref target="LGR21" format="default"/>, <xref target="GLR17" format="default"/>
          </t>
        </section>

        <section anchor="Leakage" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>Leakage resistance</name>
          <t>
            Definition. An AEAD algorithm provides security even if some additional information about computations of an encryption (and possibly decryption)
            operation is obtained via side-channel leakages.
          </t>
          <t>
            Further reading. <xref target="GPPS19" format="default"/>, <xref target="B20" format="default"/>
          </t>
        </section>

        <section anchor="Mu-sec" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>Multi-user security</name>
          <t>
            Definition. An AEAD algorithm security level degrades sublinearly in the number of users. Here the level of security is understood in the sense of Authenticated Encryption Advantage (AEA)
            as given in <xref target="I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits" format="default"/>. 
          </t>
          <t>
            Further reading. <xref target="BT16" format="default"/>
          </t>
        </section>

        <section anchor="NM" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>Nonce misuse</name>
          <t>
            Definition. An AEAD algorithm provides security (resilience or resistance) even if an adversary can repeat nonces in its encryption queries.
          </t>
          
          <section anchor="NM1" numbered="true" toc="default">
            <name>Nonce misuse resilience</name>
            <t>
              Definition. Security is provided only for messages encrypted with unique nonces.
            </t>
            <t>
              Further reading. <xref target="ADL17" format="default"/>, <xref target="RS06" format="default"/>
            </t>
          </section>

          <section anchor="NM2" numbered="true" toc="default">
            <name>Nonce misuse resistance</name>
            <t>
              Definition. Security is provided for all messages.
            </t>
            <t>
              Further reading. <xref target="RS06" format="default"/>
            </t>
          </section>

        </section>

        <section anchor="Reforg" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>Reforgeability resilience</name>
          <t>
            Definition. An AEAD algorithm guarantees that once a successful forgery for the algorithm has been found, it is still hard to find any subsequent forgery.
          </t>
          <t>
            Further reading. <xref target="BC09" format="default"/>, <xref target="FLLW17" format="default"/>
          </t>
        </section>

        <section anchor="RUP" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>Release of unverified plaintext (RUP) security</name>
          <t>
            Definition. An AEAD algorithm provides security even if the plaintext is released for every ciphertext, including those with failed integrity verification.
          </t>
          <t>
            Further reading.
            <xref target="A14" format="default"/>
          </t>
        </section>
      </section>

      <section anchor="ImpProp" numbered="true" toc="default">
        <name>Implementation properties</name>

        <section anchor="Inverse" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>Inverse-free</name>
          <t>
            Definition. A block cipher-based AEAD algorithm can be securely implemented without evaluating the block cipher inverse.
          </t>
        </section>

        <section anchor="Lightweight" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>Lightweight</name>
          <t>
            Definition. An AEAD algorithm can be efficiently and securely implemented on resource-constrained devices. In particular, it meets the criteria required in the NIST
            Lightweight Cryptography competition <xref target="MBTM17" format="default"/>.
          </t>
          <t>
            Further reading. <xref target="MBTM17" format="default"/>
          </t>
        </section>

        <section anchor="Online" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>Online</name>
          <t>
            Definition. An AEAD algorithm encryption (decryption) operation can be implemented with a constant memory and a single one-direction pass over the plaintext (ciphertext),
            writing out the result during that pass.
          </t>
          <t>
            Further reading.
            <xref target="HRRV15" format="default"/>
            <xref target="FJMV2004" format="default"/>
          </t>
        </section>

        <section anchor="Parallelizable" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>Parallelizable</name>
          <t>
            Definition. An AEAD algorithm can fully exploit the parallel computation infrastructure.
          </t>
          <t>
            Further reading. <xref target="C20" format="default"/>
          </t>
        </section>

        <section anchor="SinglePass" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>Single pass</name>
          <t>
            Definition. An AEAD algorithm encryption (decryption) operation can be implemented with a single pass over the plaintext (ciphertext).
          </t>
        </section>
        
        <section anchor="StaticAD" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>Static Associated Data</name>
          <t>
            Definition. An AEAD algorithm allows pre-computation for static (or repeating) associated data so that static AD doesn't significantly contribute to the computational
            cost of encryption.
          </t>
        </section>

        <section anchor="ZK" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>ZK-friendly</name>
          <t>
            Definition. An AEAD algorithm operates on binary and prime fields with a low number of non-linear operations (often called multiplicative complexity). Thus, it allows efficient
            implementation using a domain-specific language (DSL) for writing zk-SNARKs circuits.
          </t>
          <t>
            Synonyms. ZK-focused, Arithmetization-oriented, Low Multiplicative Complexity
          </t>
          <t>
            Further reading.
            <xref target="DGGK21" format="default"/>
          </t>
        </section>
      </section>

      <section anchor="AddProp" numbered="true" toc="default">
        <name>Additional functionality properties</name>

        <section anchor="Incremental" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>Incremental</name>
          <t>
            Definition. An AEAD algorithm allows encrypting a message, which only partly differs from some other previously encrypted message, faster than processing it from scratch.
          </t>
          <t>
            Further reading. <xref target="SY16" format="default"/>, <xref target="BKY02" format="default"/>
          </t>
        </section>


        <section anchor="NonceHiding" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>Nonce-hiding</name>
          <t>
            Definition. An AEAD algorithm decryption operation doesn't need the nonce value to perform the decryption. Thus, the algorithm provides privacy for the nonce value.
          </t>
          <t>
            Further reading.
            <xref target="BNT19" format="default"/>
          </t>
        </section>

        <section anchor="RemotelyKeyed" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>Remotely-keyed</name>
          <t>
            Definition. An AEAD algorithm can be securely implemented with most of the operations in encryption/decryption performed by an insecure (i.e., it leaks all intermediate values) device, 
            which has no access to the key, while another secure device performs operations involving the key.
          </t>
          <t>
            Further reading. <xref target="BFN98" format="default"/>, <xref target="DA03" format="default"/>
          </t>
        </section>
      
        <section anchor="Robust" numbered="true" toc="default">
          <name>Robust</name>
          <t>
            Definition. An AEAD algorithm allows the user to choose an arbitrary value l >= 0 for every plaintext and then encrypts it into a ciphertext, which is l bits longer. 
          </t>
          <t>
            Further reading. <xref target="HKR2015" format="default"/>
          </t>
        </section>
          
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="Security" numbered="true" toc="default">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>
        This document defines the properties of AEAD algorithms. However, the document does not describe any concrete mechanisms providing these properties, neither it describes how
        to achieve them. In fact, one can claim that an AEAD algorithm provides any of the defined properties only if its analysis in the relevant models was carried out.
      </t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="IANACON" numbered="true" toc="default">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>
        This document has no IANA actions.
      </t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references>
      <name>References</name>
      <references>
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5116.xml"/>
      </references>
      <references>
        <name>Informative References</name>

        <xi:include href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bibxml3/draft-irtf-cfrg-aead-limits.xml"/>
        
        <reference anchor="R2002">
          <front>
            <title>
              Authenticated-encryption with associated-data.
            </title>
            <author initials='P.' surname='Rogaway' fullname='Phillip Rogaway'/>
            <date year="2002"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1145/586110.586125"/>
          <refcontent>Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security (CCS '02)</refcontent>
          <refcontent>Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 98–107</refcontent>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="BN2000">
          <front>
            <title>
              Authenticated Encryption: Relations among Notions and Analysis of the Generic Composition Paradigm
            </title>
            <author initials='M.' surname='Bellare' fullname='Mihir Bellare'/>
            <author initials='C.' surname='Namprempre' fullname='Chanathip Namprempre'/>
            <date year="2000"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1007/s00145-008-9026-x"/>
          <refcontent>Proceedings of ASIACRYPT 2000, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1976, pp. 531-545</refcontent>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="JMV2002">
          <front>
            <title>
              Blockwise-Adaptive Attackers Revisiting the (In)Security of Some Provably Secure Encryption Modes: CBC, GEM, IACBC
            </title>
            <author initials='A.' surname='Joux' fullname='Antoine Joux'/>
            <author initials='G.' surname='Martinet' fullname='Gwenaelle Martinet'/>
            <author initials='F.' surname='Valette' fullname='Frederic Valette'/>
            <date year="2002"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1007/3-540-45708-9_2"/>
          <refcontent>Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO 2002. CRYPTO 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2442. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg</refcontent>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="FJMV2004">
          <front>
            <title>
              Authenticated On-Line Encryption
            </title>
            <author initials='PA.' surname='Valette' fullname='Pierre-Alain Fouque'/>
            <author initials='A.' surname='Joux' fullname='Antoine Joux'/>
            <author initials='G.' surname='Martinet' fullname='Gwenaelle Martinet'/>
            <author initials='F.' surname='Valette' fullname='Frederic Valette'/>
            <date year="2004"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1007/978-3-540-24654-1_11"/>
          <refcontent>Selected Areas in Cryptography. SAC 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3006. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. </refcontent>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="BK2011">
          <front>
            <title>
              Authenticated and Misuse-Resistant Encryption of Key-Dependent Data
            </title>
            <author initials='M.' surname='Bellare' fullname='Mihir Bellare'/>
            <author initials='S.' surname='Keelveedhi' fullname='Sriram Keelveedhi'/>
            <date year="2011"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1007/978-3-642-22792-9_35"/>
          <refcontent>Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2011. CRYPTO 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6841. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.</refcontent>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="FOR17">
          <front>
            <title>
              Authenticated and Misuse-Resistant Encryption of Key-Dependent DataSecurity of Symmetric Primitives under Incorrect Usage of Keys
            </title>
            <author initials='P.' surname='Farshim' fullname='Pooya Farshim'/>
            <author initials='C.' surname='Orlandi' fullname='Claudio Orlandi'/>
            <author initials='R.' surname='Rosie' fullname='Razvan Rosie'/>
            <date year="2017"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.13154/tosc.v2017.i1.449-473"/>
          <refcontent>IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology, 2017(1), 449–473.</refcontent>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="LGR21">
          <front>
            <title>
              Partitioning Oracle Attacks
            </title>
            <author initials='J.' surname='Len' fullname='Julia Len'/>
            <author initials='P.' surname='Grubbs' fullname='Paul Grubbs'/>
            <author initials='T.' surname='Ristenpart' fullname='Thomas Ristenpart'/>
            <date year="2021"/>
          </front>
          <refcontent>30th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 21), 195--212</refcontent>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="GLR17">
          <front>
            <title>
              Message Franking via Committing Authenticated Encryption.
            </title>
            <author initials='P.' surname='Grubbs' fullname='Paul Grubbs'/>
            <author initials='J.' surname='Lu' fullname='Jiahui Lu'/>
            <author initials='T.' surname='Ristenpart' fullname='Thomas Ristenpart'/>
            <date year="2017"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1007/978-3-319-63697-9_3"/>
          <refcontent>Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2017. CRYPTO 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 10403. Springer, Cham</refcontent>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="B20">
          <front>
            <title>
              Mode-Level vs. Implementation-Level Physical Security in Symmetric Cryptography: A Practical Guide Through the Leakage-Resistance Jungle
            </title>
            <author initials='D.' surname='Bellizia' fullname='Davide Bellizia'/>
            <author initials='O.' surname='Bronchain' fullname='Olivier Bronchain'/>
            <author initials='G.' surname='Cassiers' fullname='Gaëtan Cassiers'/>
            <author initials='V.' surname='Grosso' fullname='Vincent Grosso'/>
            <author initials='C.' surname='Guo' fullname='Chun Guo'/>
            <author initials='C.' surname='Momin' fullname='Charles Momin'/>
            <author initials='O.' surname='Pereira' fullname='Olivier Pereira'/>
            <author initials='T.' surname='Peters' fullname='Thomas Peters'/>
            <author initials='FX.' surname='Standaert' fullname='François-Xavier Standaert'/>
            <date year="2020"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1007/978-3-030-56784-2_13"/>
          <refcontent>Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2020. CRYPTO 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 12170. Springer, Cham</refcontent>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="GPPS19">
          <front>
            <title>
              Authenticated Encryption with Nonce Misuse and Physical Leakages: Definitions, Separation Results and Leveled Constructions
            </title>
            <author initials='C.' surname='Guo' fullname='Chun Guo'/>
            <author initials='O.' surname='Pereira' fullname='Olivier Pereira'/>
            <author initials='T.' surname='Peters' fullname='Thomas Peters'/>
            <author initials='FX.' surname='Standaert' fullname='François-Xavier Standaert'/>
            <date year="2019"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1007/978-3-030-30530-7_8"/>
          <refcontent>Progress in Cryptology – LATINCRYPT 2019. LATINCRYPT 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 11774. Springer, Cham</refcontent>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="BT16">
          <front>
            <title>
              The Multi-User Security of Authenticated Encryption: AES-GCM in TLS 1.3
            </title>
            <author initials='M.' surname='Bellare' fullname='Mihir Bellare'/>
            <author initials='B.' surname='Tackmann' fullname='Björn Tackmann'/>
            <date year="2016"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1007/978-3-662-53018-4_10"/>
          <refcontent>Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2016. CRYPTO 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 9814. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg</refcontent>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="RS06">
          <front>
            <title>
              A Provable-Security Treatment of the Key-Wrap Problem
            </title>
            <author initials='R.' surname='Rogaway' fullname='Phillip Rogaway'/>
            <author initials='T.' surname='Shrimpton' fullname='Thomas Shrimpton'/>
            <date year="2016"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1007/11761679_23"/>
          <refcontent>Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2006. EUROCRYPT 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4004. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg</refcontent>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="ADL17">
          <front>
            <title>
              Boosting Authenticated Encryption Robustness with Minimal Modifications
            </title>
            <author initials='T.' surname='Ashur' fullname='Tomer Ashur'/>
            <author initials='O.' surname='Dunkelman' fullname='Orr Dunkelman'/>
            <author initials='A.' surname='Luykx' fullname='Atul Luykx'/>
            <date year="2017"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1007/978-3-319-63697-9_1"/>
          <refcontent>Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2017. CRYPTO 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 10403. Springer, Cham</refcontent>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="FLLW17">
          <front>
            <title>
              Reforgeability of Authenticated Encryption Schemes
            </title>
            <author initials='C.' surname='Forler' fullname='Christian Forler'/>
            <author initials='E.' surname='List' fullname='Eik List'/>
            <author initials='S.' surname='Lucks' fullname='Stefan Lucks'/>
            <author initials='J.' surname='Wenzel' fullname='Jakob Wenzel'/>
            <date year="2017"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1007/978-3-319-59870-3_2"/>
          <refcontent>Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 10343. Springer, Cham</refcontent>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="BC09">
          <front>
            <title>
              MAC Reforgeability
            </title>
            <author initials='C.' surname='Forler' fullname='John Black'/>
            <author initials='E.' surname='List' fullname='Martin Cochran'/>
            <date year="2009"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1007/978-3-642-03317-9_21"/>
          <refcontent>Fast Software Encryption. FSE 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5665. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg</refcontent>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="A14">
          <front>
            <title>
              How to Securely Release Unverified Plaintext in Authenticated Encryption
            </title>
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        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4303.xml"/>

        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8221.xml"/>

        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9000.xml"/>

      </references>
    </references>
    <section anchor="contributors" numbered="true" toc="default">
      <name>Contributors</name>
    </section>
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