<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
<!DOCTYPE rfc [
  <!ENTITY nbsp    "&#160;">
  <!ENTITY zwsp   "&#8203;">
  <!ENTITY nbhy   "&#8209;">
  <!ENTITY wj     "&#8288;">
]>
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="rfc2629.xslt" ?>
<!-- generated by https://github.com/cabo/kramdown-rfc version 1.7.30 (Ruby 4.0.0) -->
<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-jholland-quic-multicast-08" category="exp" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
  <!-- xml2rfc v2v3 conversion 3.31.0 -->
  <front>
    <title abbrev="Multicast QUIC">Multicast Extension for QUIC</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-jholland-quic-multicast-08"/>
    <author initials="J." surname="Holland" fullname="Jake Holland">
      <organization>Akamai Technologies, Inc.</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>150 Broadway</street>
          <city>Cambridge, MA 02144</city>
          <country>United States of America</country>
        </postal>
        <email>jakeholland.net@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Lucas Pardue">
      <organization/>
      <address>
        <email>lucaspardue.24.7@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="M." surname="Franke" fullname="Max Franke">
      <organization>TU Berlin</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <country>Germany</country>
        </postal>
        <email>mfranke@inet.tu-berlin.de</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="K." surname="Rose" fullname="Kyle Rose">
      <organization>Akamai Technologies, Inc.</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>145 Broadway</street>
          <city>Cambridge, MA 02144</city>
          <country>United States of America</country>
        </postal>
        <email>krose@krose.org</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="January" day="02"/>
    <area>TSV</area>
    <workgroup>QUIC Working Group</workgroup>
    <keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 81?>

<t>This document defines a multicast extension to QUIC to enable the efficient use of multicast-capable networks to send identical data streams to many clients at once, coordinated through individual unicast QUIC connections.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        The latest revision of this draft can be found at <eref target="https://GrumpyOldTroll.github.io/draft-jholland-quic-multicast/draft-jholland-quic-multicast.html"/>.
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jholland-quic-multicast/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        QUIC Individual Draft mailing list (<eref target="mailto:quic@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/quic/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/quic/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/GrumpyOldTroll/draft-jholland-quic-multicast"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 85?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>This document specifies an extension to QUIC version 1 <xref target="RFC9000"/> to enable the use of multicast IP transport of identical packets for use in many individual QUIC connections.</t>
      <t>The multicast data can only be consumed in conjunction with a unicast QUIC connection.
When the client has support for multicast as described in <xref target="transport-parameter"/>, the server can tell the client about multicast channels and ask the client to join and leave them as described in <xref target="channel-management"/>.</t>
      <t>The client reports its joins and leaves to the server and acknowledges the packets received via multicast after verifying their integrity.</t>
      <t>The purpose of this multicast extension is to realize the large scalability benefits for popular traffic over multicast-capable networks without compromising on security, network safety, or implementation reliability.
Thus, this specification has several design goals:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Re-use as much as possible the mechanisms and packet formats of QUIC version 1</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Provide flow control and congestion control mechanisms that work with multicast traffic</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Maintain the confidentiality, integrity, and authentication guarantees of QUIC as appropriate for multicast traffic, fully meeting the security goals described in <xref target="I-D.draft-krose-multicast-security"/></t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Leverage the scalability of multicast IP for data that is transmitted identically to many clients</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>This document does not define any multicast transport except server to client and only includes semantics for source-specific multicast.</t>
      <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions">
        <name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
        <t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED",
"MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.
<?line -6?>
        </t>
        <t>Commonly used terms in this document are described below.</t>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Term</th>
              <th align="left">Definition</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">SSM</td>
              <td align="left">Source-specific multicast, as described in <xref target="RFC4607"/></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">ASM</td>
              <td align="left">Any-source multicast, as distinguished from SSM in <xref target="RFC4607"/></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">(S,G)</td>
              <td align="left">A tuple of IP addresses (Source IP, Group IP) identifying a source-specific multicast channel as described in <xref target="RFC4607"/></td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="multicast-channel">
      <name>Multicast Channel</name>
      <t>A QUIC multicast channel (or just channel) is a one-way network path that a server can use as an alternate path to send QUIC connection data to a client.</t>
      <t>Multicast channels are designed to leverage multicast IP and to be shared by many different connections simultaneously for unidirectional server-initiated data.</t>
      <t>One or more servers can use the same QUIC multicast channel to send the same data to many clients, as a supplement to the individual QUIC connections between those servers and clients.
(Note that QUIC connections are defined in <xref section="5" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9000"/> and are not changed in this document; each connection is a shared state between a client and a server.)</t>
      <t>Each QUIC multicast channel has exactly one associated (S,G) that is used for the delivery of the multicast packets on the IP layer. Channels only support source-specific multicast (SSM) and do not support any-source multicast (ASM) semantics.</t>
      <t>Channels carry only 1-RTT packets.
Packets associated with a channel contain a Channel ID in place of a Destination Connection ID.
(A Channel ID cannot be zero length.)
This adds a layer of indirection to the process described in <xref section="5.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9000"/> for matching packets to connections upon receipt.
Incoming packets received on the network path associated with a channel use the Channel ID to associate the packet with a joined channel.</t>
      <t>A client with a matching joined channel always has at least one connection associated with the channel.
If a client has no matching joined channel, the packet is discarded.</t>
      <t>Each channel has an independent packet number space. To enable clients to detect lost packets, packet numbers in channels MUST be continuous.
Since the network path for a channel is unidirectional and uses a different packet number space than the unicast part of the connection, packets associated with a channel are acknowledged with MC_ACK frames <xref target="channel-ack-frame"/> instead of ACK frames.</t>
      <t>The use of any particular channel is OPTIONAL for both the server and the client.
It is recommended that applications designed to leverage the multicast capabilities of this extension also provide graceful degradation for endpoints that do not or cannot make use of the multicast functionality (see <xref target="graceful-degradation"/>).</t>
      <t>The server has access to all data transmitted on any multicast channel it uses, and could optionally send this data with unicast instead.</t>
      <t>No special handling of the data is required in a client application that has enabled multicast.
A datagram or any particular bytes from a server-initiated unidirectional stream can be delivered over the unicast connection or a multicast channel transparently to a client application consuming the stream or datagram.</t>
      <t>Client applications should have a mechanism that disables the use of multicast on connections with enhanced privacy requirements for the privacy-related reasons covered in <xref target="I-D.draft-krose-multicast-security"/>.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="transport-parameter">
      <name>Transport Parameters</name>
      <t>Support for multicast extensions in a client is advertised by means of QUIC transport parameters:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>name: multicast_server_support (TBD - experiments use 0xff3e808)</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>name: multicast_client_params (TBD - experiments use 0xff3e800)</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>If a multicast_server_support transport parameter is not included, clients MUST NOT send any frames defined in this document.</t>
      <t>If a multicast_client_params transport parameter is not included, servers MUST NOT send any frames defined in this document.</t>
      <t>The multicast_server_support parameter is a 0-length value.
Presence indicates that multicast-capable clients MAY send frames defined in this document, and SHOULD send MC_LIMITS (<xref target="client-limits-frame"/>) frames as appropriate when their capabilities or client-side limitations change.</t>
      <t>The multicast_client_params parameter has the structure shown below in <xref target="fig-transport-parameter-format"/>.</t>
      <figure anchor="fig-transport-parameter-format">
        <name>multicast_client_params Format</name>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
multicast_client_params {
  Reserved (6),
  IPv6 Channels Allowed (1),
  IPv4 Channels Allowed (1),
  Max Aggregate Rate (i),
  Max Channel IDs (i),
  Hash Algorithms Supported (i),
  Encryption Algorithms Supported (i),
  Hash Algorithms List (16 * Hash Algorithms Supported),
  Encryption Algorithms List (16 * Encryption Algorithms Supported)
}
]]></artwork>
      </figure>
      <t>The Reserved, IPv6 Channels Allowed, IPv4 Channels Allowed, Max Aggregate Rate, and Max Channel ID fields are identical to their analogous fields in the MC_LIMITS frame (<xref target="client-limits-frame"/>) and hold the initial values.</t>
      <t>A server MUST NOT send MC_ANNOUNCE (<xref target="channel-announce-frame"/>) frames with addresses using an IP Family that is not allowed according to the IPv4 and IPv6 Channels Allowed fields in the multicast_client_params, unless and until a later MC_LIMITS (<xref target="client-limits-frame"/>) frame adds permission for a different address family.</t>
      <t>The Encryption Algorithms List field is in order of preference (most preferred occurring first) using values from the TLS Cipher Suite registry (<eref target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-4">https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-4</eref>). It lists the algorithms the client is willing to use to decrypt data in multicast channels, and the server MUST NOT send an MC_ANNOUNCE to this client for any channels using unsupported algorithms.
If the server does send an MC_ANNOUNCE with an unsupported cipher suite, the client SHOULD treat it as a connection error of type MC_EXTENSION_ERROR.</t>
      <t>The Hash Algorithms List field is in order of preference (most preferred occurring first) using values from the registry below. It lists the algorithms the client is willing to use to check integrity of data in multicast channels, and the server MUST NOT send an MC_ANNOUNCE to this client for any channels using unsupported algorithms, or the client SHOULD treat it as a connection error of type MC_EXTENSION_ERROR:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><eref target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/named-information/named-information.xhtml#hash-alg">https://www.iana.org/assignments/named-information/named-information.xhtml#hash-alg</eref></t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section anchor="extension-overview">
      <name>Extension Overview</name>
      <t>A client has the option of refusal and the power to impose upper bound maxima on several resources (see <xref target="flow-control"/>), but otherwise its join status for all multicast channels is entirely managed by the server.</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>A client MUST NOT join a channel without receiving instructions from a server to do so.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A client MUST leave joined channels when instructed by the server to do so.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A client MAY leave channels or refuse to join channels, regardless of instructions from the server.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <section anchor="channel-management">
        <name>Channel Management</name>
        <t>The client tells its server about some restrictions on resources that it is capable of processing with the initial values in the multicast_client_params transport parameter (<xref target="transport-parameter"/>) and later can update these limits with MC_LIMITS <xref target="client-limits-frame"/> frames. Servers ensure the set of channels the client is currently requested to join remains within these advertised client limits as covered in <xref target="flow-control"/>.</t>
        <t>The server asks the client to join channels with MC_JOIN (<xref target="channel-join-frame"/>) frames and to leave channels with MC_LEAVE (<xref target="channel-leave-frame"/>) frames.</t>
        <t>The server uses the MC_ANNOUNCE (<xref target="channel-announce-frame"/>) frame before any join or leave frames for the channel to describe the channel properties to the client, including values the client can use to ensure the server's requests remain within the limits it has sent to the server, as well as the secrets necessary to decode the headers of packets in the channel.
Sending an MC_ANNOUNCE before an MC_JOIN ensures the client can establish the necessary state required to join and retire any connection IDs that might collide with channel IDs.
MC_KEY frames provide the secrets necessary to decode the payload of packets in the channel.
<xref target="fig-client-channel-states"/> shows the states a channel has from the clients point of view.</t>
        <t>Joining a channel after receiving an MC_JOIN frame is OPTIONAL for clients. If a client decides not to join after being asked to do so, it can indicate this decision by sending an MC_STATE (<xref target="client-channel-state-frame"/>) frame with state DECLINED_JOIN and an appropriate reason.</t>
        <t>The server ensures that in aggregate, all channels that the client has currently been asked to join and that the client has not left or declined to join fit within the limits indicated by the initial values in the transport parameter or last MC_LIMITS (<xref target="client-limits-frame"/>) frame the server received.</t>
        <figure anchor="fig-client-channel-states">
          <name>States a channel from the clients point of view.</name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
                            o
                            |
----------------------->|   | Receive MC_ANNOUNCE and/or MC_KEY
^                       |   |
|                       |   |
|  Receive MC_JOIN (and v   v
|     unable to join) +----------+
|<--------------------*          |
                      | unjoined | Receive MC_RETIRE
--------------------->|          *------------------------>|
^                     +----*-----+                         |
|                          | Receive MC_JOIN               |
|                          |   (and able to join)          |
|                          |                               |
|                          v                               v
|                     +----------+                    +---------+
|    Receive MC_LEAVE |          |                    |         |
|     (or error case) |  joined  | Receive MC_RETIRE  | retired |
|<--------------------*          *------------------->|         |
                      +----------+                    +---------+

*: Each transition except the initial receiving of MC_ANNOUNCE
   and MC_KEY frames causes the client to send an MC_STATE frame
   describing the state transition (for LEFT or DECLINED_JOIN, this
   includes a reason for the transition).

"able to join" means:
- Both MC_KEY and MC_ANNOUNCE have been received
- Result will be within latest advertised client limits
- Nothing preventing a join is active (e.g. a hold-down timer,
  administrative blocking, etc.)
]]></artwork>
        </figure>
        <t>When the server has asked the client to join a channel and has not received any MC_STATE frames <xref target="client-channel-state-frame"/> with state DECLINED_JOIN or LEFT, it also sends MC_INTEGRITY frames (<xref target="channel-integrity-frame"/>) to enable the client to verify packet integrity before processing the packet.
A client MUST NOT decode packets for a channel for which it has not received an applicable MC_ANNOUNCE (<xref target="channel-announce-frame"/>), or for which it has not received a matching packet hash in an MC_INTEGRITY (<xref target="channel-integrity-frame"/>) frame, or for which it has not received an applicable MC_KEY frame <xref target="channel-key-frame"/>.</t>
        <t><xref target="fig-frame-exchange"/> shows the frames that are being exchanged about and over a channel during the lifetime of an example channel.</t>
        <figure anchor="fig-frame-exchange">
          <name>Example flow of frames for a channel. Frames in square brackets are sent over multicast.</name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
Client                                        Server

MC_LIMITS/initial_limits  --->

                                              MC_ANNOUNCE
                                              MC_KEY
                                       <----  MC_JOIN

MC_STATE(JOINED)  --->

                                              MC_INTEGRITY
                                       <----  [STREAM(...)]
MC_ACK  --->                                  ...
...                                    <----  MC_KEY
...
MC_LIMITS  --->

                                       <----  MC_LEAVE

MC_STATE(LEFT)  --->

                                       <----  MC_JOIN

MC_STATE(JOINED)  --->

                                              MC_INTEGRITY
                                       <----  [STREAM(...)]
MC_ACK  --->                                  ...
...

                                       <----  MC_LEAVE

MC_STATE(LEFT)  --->

                                       <----  MC_RETIRE

MC_STATE(RETIRED)  --->
]]></artwork>
        </figure>
        <t>TODO: incorporate server-side state diagram and explanation, latest proposed sketch at <eref target="https://github.com/GrumpyOldTroll/draft-jholland-quic-multicast/issues/62">https://github.com/GrumpyOldTroll/draft-jholland-quic-multicast/issues/62</eref></t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="client-response">
        <name>Client Response</name>
        <t>The client sends back information about how it has responded to the server's requests to join and leave channels in MC_STATE (<xref target="client-channel-state-frame"/>) frames.
MC_STATE frames are only sent for channels after the server has requested the client to join the channel, and are thereafter sent any time the state changes.</t>
        <t>Clients that receive and decode data on a multicast channel send acknowledgements for the data on the unicast connection using MC_ACK (<xref target="channel-ack-frame"/>) frames.</t>
        <t>A server can determine if a client receives packets for a multicast channel if it receives MC_ACK frames associated with that channel.
As such, it is in general up to the server to decide on the time after which it deems a client to be unable to receive packets on a given channel and take appropriate steps, e.g. sending an MC_LEAVE frame to the client.
Note that clients willing to join a channel SHOULD remain joined to the channel even if they receive no channel data for an extended period, to enable multicast-capable networks to perform popularity-based admission control for multicast channels.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="data-carried-in-channels">
        <name>Data Carried in Channels</name>
        <t>Data transmitted in a multicast channel is encrypted with symmetric keys so that on-path observers without access to these keys cannot decode the data.
However, since potentially many receivers receive identical packets and identical keys for the multicast channel and some receivers might be malicious, the packets are also protected by MC_INTEGRITY (<xref target="channel-integrity-frame"/>) frames transmitted over a separate integrity-protected path.</t>
        <t>A client MUST NOT decode packets on a multicast channel for which it has not received a matching hash in an MC_INTEGRITY frame over a different integrity-protected communication path.
The different path can be either the unicast connection or another multicast channel with packets that were verified with an earlier MC_INTEGRITY frame.</t>
        <t>Note that MC_INTEGRITY frames MAY be carried in packets on multicast channels, however such packets will not be accepted unless another accepted MC_INTEGRITY frame contains its packet hash.
Hashes of packets containing hashes of other packets can thus form a Merkle tree <xref target="MERKLE"/> with a root that is carried in the unicast connection.</t>
        <t>See <xref target="data-integrity"/> for a more complete overview of the security issues involved here.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="stream-processing">
        <name>Stream Processing</name>
        <t>Stream IDs in channels are restricted to unidirectional server initiated streams, or those with the least significant 2 bits of the stream ID equal to 3 (see <xref section="2.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9000"/>).</t>
        <t>When a channel contains streams with IDs above the client's unidirectional MAX_STREAMS, the server MUST NOT instruct the client to join that channel and SHOULD send a STREAMS_BLOCKED frame, as described in Sections <xref target="RFC9000" section="4.6" sectionFormat="bare"/> and <xref target="RFC9000" section="19.14" sectionFormat="bare"/> of <xref target="RFC9000"/>.</t>
        <t>If the client is already joined to a channel that carries streams that exceed or will soon exceed the client's unidirectional MAX_STREAMS, the server SHOULD send an MC_LEAVE frame.</t>
        <t>If a client receives a STREAM frame with an ID above its MAX_STREAMS on a channel, the client MAY increase its unidirectional MAX_STREAMS to a value greater than the new ID and send an update to the server, otherwise it MUST drop the packet and leave the channel with reason "MAX_STREAMS_EXCEEDED".</t>
        <t>Since clients can join later than a channel began, it is RECOMMENDED that clients supporting the multicast extensions to QUIC be prepared to handle stream IDs that do not begin at early values, since by the time a client joins a channel in progress the stream ID count might have been increasing for a long time.
Clients should therefore begin with a high initial_max_streams_uni or send an early MAX_STREAMS type 0x13 value (see <xref section="19.11" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9000"/>) with a high limit.
Clients MAY use the maximum 2^60 for this high initial limit, but the specific choice is implementation-dependent.</t>
        <t>The same stream ID may be used in both one or more multicast channels and the unicast connection.  As described in <xref section="2.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9000"/>, stream data received multiple times for the same offset MUST be identical, even across different network paths; if it's not identical it MAY be treated as a connection error of type MC_EXTENSION_ERROR.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="flow-control">
      <name>Flow Control</name>
      <t>The values used for unicast flow control cannot be used to limit the transmission rate of a multicast channel because a single client with a low MAX_STREAM_DATA or MAX_DATA value that did not acknowledge receipt could block many other receivers if the servers had to ensure that channels responded to each client's limits.</t>
      <t>Instead, clients advertise resource limits via MC_LIMITS (<xref target="client-limits-frame"/>) frames and their initial values from the transport parameter (<xref target="transport-parameter"/>).
The server is responsible for keeping the client within its advertised limits, by ensuring via MC_JOIN and MC_LEAVE frames that the set of channels the client is asked to be joined to will not, in aggregate, exceed the client's advertised limits.
The server also advertises the expected maxima of the values that can contribute toward client resource limits within a channel in an MC_ANNOUNCE (<xref target="channel-announce-frame"/>) frame, and the client also ensures that the set of channels it's joined to does not exceed its limits, according to the advertised values.
The client also monitors the packets received to ensure that channels don't exceed their advertised values, and leaves channels that do.</t>
      <t>If the server asks the client to join a channel that would exceed the client's limits with an up-to-date Client Limit Sequence Number, the client should send back an MC_STATE frame (<xref target="client-channel-state-frame"/>) with "DECLINED_JOIN" and reason "PROPERTY_VIOLATION".
If the server asks the client to join a channel that would exceed the client's limits with an out-of-date Client Limit Sequence Number or a Channel Key Sequence Number that the client has not yet seen, the client should instead send back a "DECLINED_JOIN" with "UNSYNCHRONIZED_PROPERTIES".
If the actual contents sent in the channel exceed the advertised limits from the MC_ANNOUNCE, clients SHOULD leave the stream and send an MC_STATE(LEFT) frame, using the Limit Violated reason.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="congestion-control">
      <name>Congestion Control</name>
      <t>Both the server and the client perform congestion control operations, so that according to the guidelines in <xref section="4.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8085"/>, mechanisms for both feedback-based and receiver-driven styles of congestion control are present and operational.</t>
      <t>The server maintains a full view of the traffic received by the client via the MC_ACK (<xref target="channel-ack-frame"/>) frames and ACK frames it receives, and can detect loss experienced by the client.
Under sustained persistent loss that exceeds server-configured thresholds, the server SHOULD instruct the client to leave channels as appropriate to avoid having the client continue to see sustained persistent loss.</t>
      <t>Under sustained persistent loss that exceeds client-configured thresholds, the client SHOULD reduce its Max Rate and tell the server via MC_LIMITS frames, which also will result in the server instructing the client to leave channels until the clients aggregate rate is below its advertised Max Rate.
Under a higher threshold of sustained persistent loss, the client also SHOULD leave channels, using an MC_STATE(LEFT) frame with the "HIGH_LOSS" reason, as well as reducing the Max Rate in MC_LIMITS.</t>
      <t>The unicast connection's congestion control is unaffected.
However a few potential interactions with the unicast connection are worth highlighting:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>if the client notices high loss on the unicast connection while multicast channel packets are arriving, the client MAY leave channels with reason "HIGH_LOSS".</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>if the client notices congestion from unicast this MAY also drive reductions in the client's Max Rate, and a lack of unicast congestion under unicast load MAY also drive increases to the client's Max Rate (along with an updated MC_LIMITS frame).</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Hybrid multicast-unicast congestion control is still an experimental research topic.
Implementations SHOULD follow the guidelines given in <xref section="4.1.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8085"/> under the assumption that applications using QUIC multicast will operate as Bulk-Transfer applications.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="data-integrity">
      <name>Data Integrity</name>
      <t>TODO: import the <xref target="I-D.draft-krose-multicast-security"/> explanation for why extra integrity protection is necessary (many client have the shared key, so AEAD doesn't provide authentication against other valid clients on its own, since the same key is given to multiple clients and as the client count grows so does the chance that at least one client is controlled by an attacker.)</t>
      <section anchor="packet-hashes">
        <name>Packet Hashes</name>
        <t>TODO: explanation and example for how to calculate the packet hash.
Note that the hash is on the encrypted packet to avoid leaking data about the encrypted contents to those who can see a hash but not the key.
(This approach also may help make better use of <xref target="I-D.draft-ietf-mboned-ambi"/> by making it possible to generate the same hashes for use in both AMBI and QUIC MC_INTEGRITY frames.)</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="recovery">
      <name>Recovery</name>
      <t>TODO: Articulate key differences with <xref target="RFC9002"/>.
The main known difference is that servers might not be running on the same devices that are sending the channel packets, therefore the RTT for channel packets might use an estimated send time that can vary according to the clock synchronization among servers and the deployment and implementation details of how the servers find out the sending timestamps of channel packets.
Experience-based guidance on the recovery timing estimates is one anticipated outcome of experimenting with deployments of this experimental extension.</t>
      <t>All the new frames defined in this document except MC_ACK are ack-eliciting and are retransmitted until acknowledged to provide reliable, though possibly out of order, delivery.</t>
      <t>Note that recovery MAY be achieved either by retransmitting frame data that was lost and needs reliable transport either by sending the frame data on the unicast connection or by coordinating to cause an aggregated retransmission of widely dropped data on a multicast channel, at the server's discretion.
However, the server in each connection is responsible for ensuring that any necessary server-to-client frame data lost by a multicast channel packet loss ultimately arrives at the client.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="connection-termination">
      <name>Connection Termination</name>
      <t>Termination of the unicast connection behaves as described in <xref section="10" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9000"/>, with the following notable differences:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>On the client side, termination of the unicast connection means that it MUST leave all multicast channels and discard any state associated with them. Servers MAY stop sending to multicast channels if there are no unicast connections left that are associated with them.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>For determining the liveness of a connection, the client MUST only consider packets received on the unicast connection. Any packets received on a multicast channel MUST NOT be used to reset a timer checking if a potentially specified max_idle_timeout has been reached. If the unicast connection becomes idle, as described in <xref section="10.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9000"/>, the client MUST terminate the connection as described above.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <section anchor="stateless-reset">
        <name>Stateless Reset</name>
        <t>As clients can unilaterally stop the delivery of multicast packets by leaving the relevant (S,G), channels do not need stateless reset tokens.
Clients therefore do not share the stateless reset tokens of channels with the server. Instead, if an endpoint receives packets addressed to an (S,G) that it can not associate with any existing channel,
it MAY take the necessary steps to prevent the reception of further such packets, without the need to signal to the server that it should stop sending.</t>
        <t>If a server or client detect a stateless reset for a channel, they MUST ignore it.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="connection-migration">
        <name>Connection Migration</name>
        <t>If the unicast connection migrated, e.g. due to a change of the NAT binding or because the UE has changed to a different network, the client properties might change.
For example, the client might switch from a network that supports both IPv6 and IPv4 multicast to a network that only support IPv4. As such, it MUST immediately send an MC_LIMITS frame after it has noticed that it migrated.
The client MAY rejoin any previously joined channels, if its limits still allow it to. It MUST send MC_STATE(LEFT) frames with reason LIMIT_VIOLATION for any channels it does not rejoin.</t>
        <t>The server SHOULD take notice of migrating clients as the delay that is being caused by rejoining a multicast group can lead to exceeding the expected MAX_ACK_DELAY, which a server might interpret as a loss of multicast connectivity.
Instead, the server SHOULD treat all multicast channels of a client whose unicast connection just migrated as if it had just joined these channels initially and allow for ample time before expecting the first MC_ACK frames.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="new-frames">
      <name>New Frames</name>
      <section anchor="channel-announce-frame">
        <name>MC_ANNOUNCE</name>
        <t>Once a server learns that a client supports multicast through its transport parameters, it can send one or multiple MC_ANNOUNCE frames (type=TBD-11..TBD-12) to share information about available channels with the client.
The MC_ANNOUNCE frame contains the properties of a channel that do not change during its lifetime.</t>
        <t>MC_ANNOUNCE frames are formatted as shown in <xref target="fig-mc-channel-announce"/>.</t>
        <figure anchor="fig-mc-channel-announce">
          <name>MC_ANNOUNCE Frame Format</name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
MC_ANNOUNCE Frame {
  Type (i) = TBD-11..TBD-12 (experiments use 0xff3e811/0xff3e812),
  ID Length (8),
  Channel ID (8..160),
  Source IP (32..128),
  Group IP (32..128),
  UDP Port (16),
  Header Protection Algorithm (16),
  Header Secret Length (i),
  Header Secret (..),
  AEAD Algorithm (16),
  Integrity Hash Algorithm (16),
  Max Rate (i),
  Max ACK Delay (i)
}
]]></artwork>
        </figure>
        <t>Frames of type TBD-11 are used for IPv4 and both Source and Group address are 32 bits long. Frames of type TBD-12 are used for IPv6 and both Source and Group address are 128 bits long.</t>
        <t>MC_ANNOUNCE frames contain the following fields:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>ID Length: The length in bytes of the Channel ID field.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Channel ID: The channel ID of the channel that is getting announced.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Source IP: The IP Address of the source of the (S,G) for the channel.  Either a 32-bit IPv4 address or a 128-bit IPv6 address, as indicated by the frame type (TBD-11 indicates IPv4, TBD-12 indicates IPv6).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Group IP: The IP Address of the group of the (S,G) for the channel.  Either a 32-bit IPv4 address or a 128-bit IPv6 address, as indicated by the frame type (TBD-11 indicates IPv4, TBD-12 indicates IPv6).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>UDP Port: The 16-bit UDP Port of traffic for the channel.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Header Protection Algorithm: A value from the TLS Cipher Suite registry (<eref target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-4">https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-4</eref>), used to protect the header fields in the channel packets.  The value MUST match a value provided in the "AEAD Algorithms List" of the transport parameter (see <xref target="transport-parameter"/>).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Header Secret Length: Provides the length of the Secret field.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Header Secret: A secret for use with the Header Protection Algorithm for protecting the header fields of 1-RTT packets in the channel as described in <xref target="RFC9001"/>.  The Key and Initial Vector for the application data carried in the 1-RTT packet header fields are derived from this secret as described in <xref section="7.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8446"/>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>AEAD Algorithm: A value from the TLS Cipher Suite registry (<eref target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-4">https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-4</eref>), used to protect the payloads in the channel packets.  The value MUST match a value provided in the "AEAD Algorithms List" of the transport parameter (see <xref target="transport-parameter"/>).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Integrity Hash Algorithm: The hash algorithm used in integrity frames.
            </t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t><strong>Author's Note:</strong> Several candidate IANA registries, not sure which one to use?  Some have only text for some possibly useful values.  For now we use the first of these:
                </t>
                <ul spacing="normal">
                  <li>
                    <t><eref target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/named-information/named-information.xhtml#hash-alg">https://www.iana.org/assignments/named-information/named-information.xhtml#hash-alg</eref></t>
                  </li>
                  <li>
                    <t><eref target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-18">https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-18</eref></t>
                  </li>
                  <li>
                    <t>(text-only): <eref target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/hash-function-text-names/hash-function-text-names.xhtml">https://www.iana.org/assignments/hash-function-text-names/hash-function-text-names.xhtml</eref></t>
                  </li>
                </ul>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Max Rate: The maximum rate in Kibps of the payload data for this channel. Channel data MUST NOT exceed this rate over any 5s window, if it does clients SHOULD leave the channel with reason "MAX_RATE_EXCEEDED".</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Max ACK Delay: A value used similarly to max_ack_delay (<xref section="18.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9000"/>) that applies to traffic in this channel.  Clients SHOULD NOT intentionally add delay to MC_ACK frames for traffic in this channel beyond this value, in milliseconds, and SHOULD NOT add any delay to the first MC_ACK of data packets for a channel.  As long as they stay inside these limits, clients can improve efficiency and network load for the uplink by aggregating MC_ACK frames whenever possible.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>A client MUST NOT use the channel ID included in an MC_ANNOUNCE frame as a connection ID for the unicast connection. If it is already in use, the client should retire it as soon as possible.
As the server knows which connection IDs are in use by the client, it MUST wait with the sending of an MC_JOIN frame until the channel ID associated with it has been retired by the client.</t>
        <t>As all the properties in MC_ANNOUNCE frames are immutable during the lifetime of a channel, a server SHOULD NOT send an MC_ANNOUNCE frame for the same channel more than once to each client except as needed for recovery.</t>
        <t>A server SHOULD send an MC_ANNOUNCE frame for a channel before sending an MC_KEY and SHOULD send an MC_KEY frame for a channel before sending an MC_JOIN frame for it.
Each of these recommended orderings MAY occur within the same packet.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="channel-key-frame">
        <name>MC_KEY</name>
        <t>An MC_KEY frame (type=TBD-01) is sent from server to client, either with the unicast connection or in an existing joined multicast channel.
The MC_KEY frame contains an updated secret that is used to generate the keying material for the payload of 1-RTT packets received on the multicast channel.</t>
        <t>A server can send a new MC_KEY frame with a sequence number increased by one.
A server MUST generate continuous sequence numbers, and MAY start at a value higher than 0.
Note that while not joined, a client will not receive updates to channel secrets, and thus may see jumps in the Key Sequence Number values between MC_KEY frames.
However, while joined the Key Sequence Numbers in the MC_KEY frames MUST increment by 1 for each new secret.</t>
        <t>Secrets with even-valued Key Sequence Numbers have a Key Phase of 0 in the 1-RTT packet, and secrets with odd-valued Key Sequence Numbers have a Key Phase of 1 in the 1-RTT packet.
Secrets with a Key Phase indicating an unknown key SHOULD be discarded without attempting to decrypt them.
(An unknown key might happen after loss of the latest MC_KEY frame, so that packets on a channel have an updated Key Phase starting at a particular packet number, but the client does not yet know about the key change.)</t>
        <t>Should a client receive two different Keys with the same Key Sequence Number and Channel ID, e.g. one over the unicast connection and one over the multicast channel, it SHOULD close the connection with reason MC_EXTENSION_ERROR.</t>
        <t>It is RECOMMENDED that servers send regular secret updates.</t>
        <t>MC_KEY frames are formatted as shown in <xref target="fig-mc-channel-key-format"/>.</t>
        <figure anchor="fig-mc-channel-key-format">
          <name>MC_KEY Frame Format</name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
MC_KEY Frame {
  Type (i) = TBD-01 (experiments use 0xff3e801),
  ID Length (8),
  Channel ID (8..160),
  Key Sequence Number (i),
  From Packet Number (i),
  Secret Length (i),
  Secret (..)
}
]]></artwork>
        </figure>
        <t>MC_KEY frames contain the following fields:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>ID Length: The length in bytes of the Channel ID field.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Channel ID: The channel ID for the channel associated with this frame.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Key Sequence Number: Increases by 1 each time the secret for the channel is changed by the server.  If there is a gap in sequence numbers due to reordering or retransmission of packets, on receipt of the older MC_KEY frame, the client MUST apply the secret contained and the packet numbers on which it applies as if they arrived in order.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>From Packet Number: The values in this MC_KEY frame apply only to packets starting at From Packet Number and continuing until they are overwritten by a new MC_KEY frame with a higher From Packet Number.  The Packet Number MUST never decrease with an increased Key Sequence Number.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Secret Length: Provides the length of the secret field.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Secret: Used to protect the packet contents of 1-RTT packets for the channel as described in <xref target="RFC9001"/>.  The Key and Initial Vector for the application data carried in the 1-RTT packet payloads are derived from the secret as described in <xref section="7.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8446"/>.
To maintain forward secrecy and prevent malicious clients from decrypting packets long after they have left or were removed from the unicast connection, servers SHOULD periodically send key updates using only unicast.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Clients MUST delete old secrets and the keys derived from them after receiving new MC_KEY frames.
Deleting old keys prevents later compromise of a client from discovering an otherwise uncompromised key, thus improving the chances of achieving forward secrecy for data sent before a key rotation.</t>
        <t>Client implementations MAY institute a delay before deleting secrets to allow for decoding of packets for the channel that arrive shortly after a new MC_KEY frame.
For this experimental specification, it is RECOMMENDED that clients delete old keys 10 seconds after receiving a new key or after 3 seconds that elapse without receiving any new data to decode with the old key, whichever is shorter.
Clients MUST NOT delay more than 60 seconds before deleting the old keys.</t>
        <t>The delay values for this specification are somewhat arbitrary and allow for implementation-dependent experimentation.
One of the target discoveries for experimental evaluation is to determine good default delay values to use, and to understand whether there are use cases that would benefit from a negotiation between server and client to determine the delays to use dynamically.
(A poor delay choice results in either overhead from dropping packets instead of decoding them with old keys for too short a delay or in extra forward secrecy exposure time for too long a delay, and the purpose of the delays are to bound the forward secrecy exposure without inducing unreasonable overhead.)</t>
        <t>The From Packet Number is used to indicate the starting packet number (<xref section="17.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9000"/>) of the 1-RTT packets for which the secret contained in an MC_KEY frame is applicable.
This secret is applicable to all future packets until it is updated by a new MC_KEY frame.</t>
        <t>A server SHOULD NOT send MC_KEY frames for channels except those the client has joined or will be imminently asked to join.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="channel-join-frame">
        <name>MC_JOIN</name>
        <t>An MC_JOIN frame (type TBD-02) is sent from server to client and requests that a client join the given transport addresses and ports and process packets with the given Channel ID according to the corresponding MC_ANNOUNCE frame and the latest MC_KEY frame for the channel.</t>
        <t>A client cannot join a multicast channel without first receiving an MC_ANNOUNCE frame and an MC_KEY frame, which together set all the values necessary to process the channel.</t>
        <t>If a client receives an MC_JOIN for a channel for which it has not received both an MC_ANNOUNCE frame and an MC_KEY frame, it MUST respond with an MC_STATE with State "DECLINED_JOIN" and reason "Missing Properties". The server MAY send another MC_JOIN after receiving an acknowledgement indicating receipt of the MC_ANNOUNCE frame and the MC_KEY frame.</t>
        <t>MC_JOIN frames are formatted as shown in <xref target="fig-mc-channel-join-format"/>.</t>
        <figure anchor="fig-mc-channel-join-format">
          <name>MC_JOIN Frame Format</name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
MC_JOIN Frame {
  Type (i) = TBD-02 (experiments use 0xff3e802),
  ID Length (8),
  Channel ID (8..160),
  MC_LIMITS Sequence Number (i),
  MC_STATE Sequence Number (i),
  MC_KEY Sequence Number (i)
}
]]></artwork>
        </figure>
        <t>The sequence numbers are the most recently processed sequence number by the server from the respective frame type. They are present to allow the client to distinguish between a broken server that has performed an illegal action and an instruction that's based on updates that are out of sync (either one or more missing updates to MC_KEY not yet received by the client or one or more missing updates to MC_LIMITS or MC_STATE not yet received by the server).</t>
        <t>A client MAY perform the join if it has the sequence number of the corresponding channel properties and the client's limits will not be exceeded, even if the client sequence numbers are not up-to-date.</t>
        <t>If the client does not join, it MUST send an MC_STATE frame with "DECLINED_JOIN" and a reason.</t>
        <t>If the client does join, it MUST send an MC_STATE frame with "JOINED".</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="channel-leave-frame">
        <name>MC_LEAVE</name>
        <t>An MC_LEAVE frame (type=TBD-03) is sent from server to client, and requests that a client leave the given channel.</t>
        <t>If the client has already left or declined to join the channel, the MC_LEAVE is ignored.</t>
        <t>If an MC_JOIN or an MC_LEAVE with the same Channel ID and a higher MC_STATE Sequence number has previously been received, the MC_LEAVE is ignored.</t>
        <t>Otherwise, the client MUST leave the channel and send a new MC_STATE frame with reason LEFT as requested by server.</t>
        <t>MC_LEAVE frames are formatted as shown in <xref target="fig-mc-channel-leave-format"/>.</t>
        <figure anchor="fig-mc-channel-leave-format">
          <name>MC_LEAVE Frame Format</name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
MC_LEAVE Frame {
  Type (i) = TBD-03 (experiments use 0xff3e803),
  ID Length (8),
  Channel ID (8..160),
  MC_STATE Sequence Number (i),
  After Packet Number (i)
}
]]></artwork>
        </figure>
        <t>If After Packet Number is nonzero, wait until receiving that packet or a higher valued number before leaving.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="channel-integrity-frame">
        <name>MC_INTEGRITY</name>
        <t>MC_INTEGRITY frames are sent from server to client and are used to convey packet hashes for validating the integrity of packets received over the multicast channel as described in <xref target="packet-hashes"/>.</t>
        <t>MC_INTEGRITY frames are formatted as shown in <xref target="fig-mc-channel-integrity-format"/>.</t>
        <figure anchor="fig-mc-channel-integrity-format">
          <name>MC_INTEGRITY Frame Format</name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
MC_INTEGRITY Frame {
  Type (i) = TBD-04..TBD-05 (experiments use 0xff3e804/0xff3e805),
  ID Length (8),
  Channel ID (8..160),
  Packet Number Start (i),
  [Length (i)],
  Packet Hashes (..)
}
]]></artwork>
        </figure>
        <t>For type TBD-05, Length is present and is a count of packet hashes.  For TBD-04, Length is not present and the packet hashes extend to the end of the packet.</t>
        <t>The first hash in the Packet Hashes list is a hash of a 1-RTT packet with the Channel ID equal to the Channel ID in the MC_INTEGRITY frame and packet number equal to the Packet Number Start field.
Subsequent hashes refer to the packets for the channel with packet numbers increasing by 1.</t>
        <t>Packet hashes MUST have length with an integer multiple of the length indicated by the Hash Algorithm from the MC_ANNOUNCE frame.</t>
        <t>See <xref target="packet-hashes"/> for a description of the packet hash calculation.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="channel-ack-frame">
        <name>MC_ACK</name>
        <t>The MC_ACK frame (types TBD-06 and TBD-07; experiments use 0xff3e806..0xff3e807) is an extension of the ACK frame defined by <xref target="RFC9000"/>. It is used to acknowledge packets that were sent on multicast channels. If the frame type is TBD-07, MC_ACK frames also contain the sum of QUIC packets with associated ECN marks received on the connection up to this point.</t>
        <t>(TODO: Would there be value in reusing the multiple packet number space version of ACK_MP from <xref section="12.2" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.draft-ietf-quic-multipath"/>, defining channel ID as the packet number space?  at 2022-05 they're identical except the Channel ID and types.)</t>
        <t>MC_ACK frames are formatted as shown in <xref target="fig-mc-channel-ack-format"/>.</t>
        <figure anchor="fig-mc-channel-ack-format">
          <name>MC_ACK Frame Format</name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
MC_ACK Frame {
  Type (i) = TBD-06..TBD-07 (experiments use 0xff3e806, 0xff3e807),
  ID Length (8),
  Channel ID (8..160),
  Largest Acknowledged (i),
  ACK Delay (i),
  ACK Range Count (i),
  First ACK Range (i),
  ACK Range (..) ...,
  [ECN Counts (..)],
}
]]></artwork>
        </figure>
      </section>
      <section anchor="client-limits-frame">
        <name>MC_LIMITS</name>
        <t>MC_LIMITS frames are formatted as shown in <xref target="fig-mc-client-limits-format"/>.</t>
        <figure anchor="fig-mc-client-limits-format">
          <name>MC_LIMITS Frame Format</name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
MC_LIMITS Frame {
  Type (i) = TBD-09 (experiments use 0xff3e809),
  Client Limits Sequence Number (i),
  Reserved (6),
  IPv6 Channels Allowed (1),
  IPv4 Channels Allowed (1),
  Max Aggregate Rate (i),
  Max Channel IDs (i),
  Max Joined Count (i),
}
]]></artwork>
        </figure>
        <t>The sequence number is implicitly 0 before the first MC_LIMITS frame from the client, and increases by 1 each new frame that's sent.
Newer frames override older ones.</t>
        <t>The 6 Reserved bits MUST be set to 0 by the client and MUST be ignored by the server.
These are reserved to advertise future capabilities.</t>
        <t>IPv6 Channels Allowed is a 1-bit field set to 1 if IPv6 channels can be joined and 0 if IPv6 channels cannot be joined.</t>
        <t>IPv4 Channels Allowed is a 1-bit field set to 1 if IPv4 channels can be joined and 0 if IPv4 channels cannot be joined.</t>
        <t>Max Aggregate Rate allowed across all joined channels is in Kibps.</t>
        <t>Max Channel IDs is the count of channel IDs that can be announced to this client and have keys.  Retired Channel IDs don't count against this value.</t>
        <t>Max Joined Count is the count of channels that are allowed to be joined concurrently.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="channel-retire-frame">
        <name>MC_RETIRE</name>
        <t>MC_RETIRE frames are formatted as shown in <xref target="fig-mc-channel-retire-format"/>.</t>
        <figure anchor="fig-mc-channel-retire-format">
          <name>MC_RETIRE Frame Format</name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
MC_RETIRE Frame {
  Type (i) = TBD-0a (experiments use 0xff3e80a),
  ID Length (8),
  Channel ID (8..160),
  After Packet Number (i)
}
]]></artwork>
        </figure>
        <t>Retires a channel by ID, discarding any state associated with it.   (Author comment: We can't use RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID because we don't have a coherent sequence number.)
If After Packet Number is nonzero and the channel is joined and has received any data, the channel will be retired after receiving that packet or a higher valued number, otherwise it will be retired immediately.</t>
        <t>After receiving an MC_RETIRE and retiring a channel, the client MUST send a new MC_STATE frame with reason RETIRED to the server.</t>
        <t>If the client is still joined in the channel that is being retired, it MUST also leave it. If a channel is left this way, it does not need to send an additional MC_STATE frame with state LEFT, as state RETIRED also implies the channel was left.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="client-channel-state-frame">
        <name>MC_STATE</name>
        <t>MC_STATE frames (type=TBD-0b or TBD-0c) are sent from client to server to report changes in the client's channel state.
Each time the channel state changes, the Client Channel State Sequence number is increased by one.
It is a state change to the channel if the server requests that a client join a channel and the client declines the join, even though no join occurs on the network.</t>
        <t>Frames of type TBD-0b are used for cases in which the reason for the state change occur in the QUIC multicast layer while frames of type TBD-0c are used for reasons that are application specific.</t>
        <t>MC_STATE frames are formatted as shown in <xref target="fig-mc-client-channel-state-format"/>.</t>
        <figure anchor="fig-mc-client-channel-state-format">
          <name>MC_STATE Frame Format</name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
MC_STATE Frame {
  Type (i) = TBD-0b..TBD-0c (experiments use 0xff3e80b and 0xff3e80c),
  ID Length (8),
  Channel ID (8..160),
  Client Channel State Sequence Number (i),
  State (8),
  Reason Code (i),
  Reason Phrase Length (i),
  Reason Phrase (..)
}
]]></artwork>
        </figure>
        <t>State has these defined values:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>0x1: LEFT</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>0x2: DECLINED_JOIN</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>0x3: JOINED</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>0x4: RETIRED</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>If a server receives an undefined value, it SHOULD close the connection with reason MC_EXTENSION_ERROR.</t>
        <t>If State is JOINED or RETIRED, the Reason Code MUST be REQUESTED_BY_SERVER (0x1).</t>
        <t>If State is LEFT or DECLINED_JOIN, for frames of type TBD-0b the Reason Code field is set to one of:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>0x0: UNSPECIFIED_OTHER</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>0x1: REQUESTED_BY_SERVER</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>0x2: ADMINISTRATIVE_BLOCK</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>0x3: PROTOCOL_ERROR</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>0x4: PROPERTY_VIOLATION</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>0x5: UNSYNCHRONIZED_PROPERTIES</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>0x6: ID_COLLISION</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>0x10: HELD_DOWN</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>0x12: MAX_RATE_EXCEEDED</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>0x13: HIGH_LOSS</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>0x14: EXCESSIVE_SPURIOUS_TRAFFIC</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>0x15: MAX_STREAMS_EXCEEDED</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>0x16: LIMIT_VIOLATION</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>(Author's note TODO: consider whether that these reasons should be added to the QUIC Transport Error Codes registry (<xref section="22.5" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9000"/>) instead of defining a new registry specific to multicast.)</t>
        <t>For frames of type TBD-0c, the Reason Code is left to the application, as described in <xref section="20.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9000"/></t>
        <t>The Reason Phrase field, in combination with the Reason Phrase Length field, can optionally be used to give further details for the state change.</t>
        <t>A client might receive multicast packets that it can not associate with any channel ID, or that cannot be verified as matching hashes from MC_INTEGRITY frames, or cannot be decrypted.
This traffic is presumed either to have been corrupted in transit or to have been sent by someone other than the legitimate sender of traffic for the channel, possibly by an attacker or a misconfigured sender.
If these packets are addressed to an (S,G) that is used for reception in one or more known channels, the client MAY leave these channels with reason "Excessive Spurious traffic".</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="frames-carried-in-channel-packets">
      <name>Frames Carried in Channel Packets</name>
      <t>Multicast channels will contain normal QUIC 1-RTT data packets (see <xref section="17.3.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9000"/>) except using the Channel ID instead of a Connection ID.  The packets are protected with the keys derived from the secrets in MC_KEY frames for the corresponding channel.</t>
      <t>Data packet hashes will also be sent in MC_INTEGRITY frames, as keys cannot be trusted for integrity due to giving them to too many receivers, as described in <xref target="I-D.draft-krose-multicast-security"/>.</t>
      <t>The 1-RTT packets in multicast channels will have a restricted set of frames.
Since the channel is strictly 1-way server to client, the general principle is that broadcastable shared server-&gt;client data frames can be sent, but frames that make sense only for individualized connections or that are sent client-to-server cannot.</t>
      <t>Should a not permitted frame arrive on a multicast channel, the connection MUST be closed with a connection error of type MC_EXTENSION_ERROR.</t>
      <t>Permitted:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>PADDING Frames (<xref section="19.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9000"/> )</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>PING Frames (<xref section="19.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9000"/> )</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>RESET_STREAM Frames (<xref section="19.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9000"/> )</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>STREAM Frames (<xref section="19.8" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9000"/> )</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>DATAGRAM Frames (both types) (<xref section="4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9221"/>)</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>MC_KEY</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>MC_LEAVE (however, join must come over unicast?)</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>MC_INTEGRITY (not for this channel, only for another)</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>MC_RETIRE</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Not permitted:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>19.3.  ACK Frames</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>19.6.  CRYPTO Frames (crypto handshake does not happen on mc channels)</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>19.7.  NEW_TOKEN Frames</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Flow control is different:
          </t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>19.5.  STOP_SENDING Frames</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>19.9.  MAX_DATA Frames  (flow control for mc channels is by rate)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>19.10. MAX_STREAM_DATA Frames</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>19.11. MAX_STREAMS Frames</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>19.12. DATA_BLOCKED Frames</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>19.13. STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED Frames</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>19.14. STREAMS_BLOCKED Frames</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Channel ID Migration can't use the "prior to" concept within a channel, not 0-starting
          </t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>19.15. NEW_CONNECTION_ID Frames</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>19.16. RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID Frames</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Channels don't have the same kind of path validation, as there's a unicast anchor with acks for the multicast packets:
          </t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>19.17. PATH_CHALLENGE Frames</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>19.18. PATH_RESPONSE Frames</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>19.19. CONNECTION_CLOSE Frames</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>19.20. HANDSHAKE_DONE Frames</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>MC_ANNOUNCE</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>MC_LIMITS</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>MC_STATE</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>MC_ACK</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section anchor="implementation-and-operational-considerations">
      <name>Implementation and Operational Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="constraints-on-stream-data">
        <name>Constraints on Stream Data</name>
        <t>Note that when a newly connected client joins a channel, the client will only be able to receive application data carried in stream frames delivered on that channel when they have received the stream data starting from offset 0 of the stream.</t>
        <t>This usually means that new streams must be started for application data carried in channel packets whenever there might be new clients that have joined since an earlier stream started. If the server deems it convenient, it could also send preceding data for that stream over the unicast connection to catch the client up.</t>
        <t>With broadcast video, this usually means a new stream is necessary for every video segment or group of video frames since new clients will join throughout the broadcast, whereas for video conferencing, it could be possible to start a new stream whenever new clients join the conference without needing a new stream per object.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="application-use-cases">
        <name>Application Use Cases</name>
        <t>There are several known applications that could benefit from using multicast QUIC, either with their own custom application-layer transport or with one of the transports discussed in <xref target="data-use-cases"/>.  A few examples include:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Existing multicast-capable applications that are modified to use QUIC datagrams instead of UDP payloads can potentially get improved encryption and congestion feedback, while keeping existing error recovery techniques (e.g. techniques based on the forward error correction (FEC) framework in <xref target="RFC6363"/>).
            </t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t>An external tunnel could supply this kind of encapsulation without modification to the sender or receiver for some applications, while retaining the benefits of multicast scalability</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>Using QUIC datagrams in place of UDP packets could usefully support existing implementations of file-transfer protocols like FLUTE <xref target="RFC6726"/> or FCAST <xref target="RFC6968"/> to enable file downloads such as operating system updates or popular game downloads, but adding encryption, packet-level authentication, and congestion control as provided by QUIC.</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Conferencing systems, especially within an enterprise that can deploy multicast network support, often can save significantly on server costs by using multicast</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The traditional multicast use case of broadcasting of live sports with a set-top box would benefit from an interoperable system such as these QUIC extensions that can fall back to unicast transparently as needed, for example if there are a few customers who installed a non-multicast-capable home router.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Smart TVs or other video playing in-home devices could interoperate with a standard sender using multicast QUIC, rather than requiring proprietary integrations with TV operators.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="data-use-cases">
        <name>Data Transport Use Cases</name>
        <t>This section outlines considerations for some known transport mechanisms that are worth highlighting as potentially useful with multicast QUIC.</t>
        <section anchor="server-push">
          <name>HTTP/3 Server Push</name>
          <t>HTTP/3 Server Push is defined in <xref section="4.6" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9114"/>.</t>
          <t>Server push is a good use case for multicast transport because the same data can be pushed to many different receivers on a multicast channel.
Applications designed to work well with server push can leverage multicast QUIC very effectively with only a few extra considerations.</t>
          <t>A QUIC connection using HTTP/3 can use multicast channels to deliver server-initiated streams that implement HTTP/3 Server Push.</t>
          <t>Applications expecting to use server push with multicast SHOULD use a high MAX_PUSH_ID in order to work with channels that have been active for a long time already when the connection is first established.
Servers SHOULD NOT allow clients to remain joined to channels if their MAX_PUSH_ID will be exceeded by push streams that are to be sent imminently.</t>
          <t>If a client receives data from a push ID that exceeds its MAX_PUSH_ID causing an H3_ID_ERROR on a multicast channel, it SHOULD leave the channel with reason 0x1000108 (computed by adding the H3_ID_ERROR value 0x0108 to the Application-defined Reason start value 0x1000000).
This SHOULD NOT cause a close of the whole connection but MAY cause a stream error and reset of the stream.</t>
          <t>TODO: flesh out this principle for application-level error code assignment in general for known error code values, and specifically all HTTP/3 ones? (Or is there a better approach?)</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="webtransport">
          <name>HTTP/3 WebTransport Streams</name>
          <t>WebTransport over HTTP/3 is defined in <xref target="I-D.draft-ietf-webtrans-http3"/>.</t>
          <t>Popular data that can be sent with server-initiated streams and carried over WebTransport is a good use cases for multicast transport because the same server-to-client data can be pushed to many different receivers on a multicast channel.</t>
          <t>A QUIC connection using HTTP/3 and WebTransport can use multicast channels to deliver WebTransport server-initiated streams.</t>
          <t>However, because the WebTransport Session ID is a client-specific value, the bytes that carry the WebTransport Session ID value within the stream would need to be carried over unicast, since it's not the same for different clients.</t>
          <t>For this situation, note that the Session ID is a variable length integer, and that a variable length integer can be encoded in any size that's big enough to hold it.  In particular, it's possible to use the largest size of any Session IDs of any of the WebTransport sessions of any clients (or 8 octets, the maximum size for a variable length integer), and that all clients receiving stream data on a channel will need to use the same size for the Session ID so that the rest of the stream data will be at the same offset for every client.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="datagrams">
          <name>Datagrams</name>
          <t>DATAGRAM frames (<xref target="RFC9221"/>) can be carried in multicast channels, and can be a good way to deliver popular content to receivers.
Doing so can align well with existing multicast UDP-based applications, since a datagram API in a QUIC application offers similar functionality to a UDP API for sending and receiving packets.</t>
          <t>However, at the time of this writing (version -05 of <xref target="I-D.draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram"/>) multicast channels generally cannot deliver HTTP/3 datagrams, including WebTransport datagrams (version -02 of <xref target="I-D.draft-ietf-webtrans-http3"/>), since the demuxing of WebTransport datagrams uses a Session ID based on a client-specific value (the HTTP/3 Session ID comes from the Stream ID of the client-initiated stream that issued the initial extended CONNECT request).</t>
          <t>It is therefore hoped that an extension or revision to WebTransport and HTTP/3 datagrams can be adopted in a future version of their specifications that make it possible to use a server-chosen Session ID value for demuxing WebTransport datagrams (and HTTP/3 datagrams in general).</t>
          <t>Such a value could for instance be sent in an HTTP/3 response header, and as long as it is unique within the connection and avoids collision with any client-initiated stream ID values, it could still be used to multiplex data associated with different HTTP/3 traffic and different WebTransport sessions carried on the same connection.
Then by choosing the same server-chosen session ID for all the connections, the server would be able to use the same channel to carry the identical complete datagrams, including the server-chosen Session ID, to multiple receivers that the server asks to join the same channel.
Such a change could either replace the current client-chosen definition for Session ID in server-to-client datagrams, or could add new HTTP/3 frame types that allow a server-chosen Session ID when the client has advertised support for this extended functionality.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="graceful-degradation">
        <name>Graceful Degradation</name>
        <t>Clients with multicast QUIC support can stop accepting multicast for a variety of reasons.</t>
        <t>Applications like live broadcast-scale video that rely on multicast QUIC may benefit from anticipating that clients might stop using multicast and providing data feeds with similar content that can scale even if many clients stop using multicast, for example by ensuring that a lower-bitrate rendition can still be delivered over unicast to all or most of the clients simultaneously, and ensuring that the server has a way to make the client start using the low-bitrate version when it switches to unicast.</t>
        <t>While some existing Adaptive Bitrate video players might have an easy way to provide this, other video players might need specialized logic to provide the server a way to control what bitrate individual clients consume.
Although under ideal conditions it may often be possible using features like server push (<xref target="server-push"/>) to use unmodified existing HTTP-based video players with multicast QUIC, in practice it may require extra development at the application level to make a player that robustly delivers a good user experience under variable network conditions, depending on the scalability gains that multicast transport is providing and the Adaptive Bitrate algorithms the player is using.</t>
        <section anchor="circuit-breakers">
          <name>Circuit Breakers</name>
          <t>Operators of multicast QUIC services should consider that some networks may implement circuit breakers such as the one described in <xref target="I-D.draft-ietf-mboned-cbacc"/>, or similar network-level safety features that might cut off previously operational multicast transport under certain conditions.</t>
          <t>The servers will notice the transport loss from the lack of MC_ACK frames from receivers in a network that cut off multicast transport, but it may be beneficial when possible in a transport cutoff event correlated across many clients to pace the recovery response according to aggregations of the affected clients so that a sudden unicast storm doesn't overload the network further.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="server-scalability">
        <name>Server Scalability</name>
        <t>Use of QUIC multicast channels can provide large scalability gains, but there still will be significant scaling requirements on server operators to support a large client footprint.</t>
        <t>Servers, possibly many of them, still will be required to maintain unicast connections with all the clients and provide for handling MC_ACK frames from the clients, delivering MC_INTEGRITY frames, managing the clients' channel join states, and providing recovery for lost packets.</t>
        <t>Further, the use of multicast channels likely requires increased coordination between the different servers, relative to services that operate completely independently.</t>
        <t>For large deployments, server implementations will often need to operate on separate devices from the ones generating the multicast channel packets, and will need to be designed accordingly.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="address-collisions">
        <name>Address Collisions</name>
        <t>Multicast channels at the network layer are addressed with a source IP, a destination group IP address, and a destination UDP port.</t>
        <t>These offers a number of potential address collision considerations that are worth mentioning:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>If properties change for the data being used in a channel (for example, new video encoding settings might result in a change to the expected max rate for a video feed), a server might reuse the same network addresses in a new QUIC multicast channel, and might send a join for the new channel and a leave for the old channel to clients that can support the new max rate.  If they arrive together, this could be handled by the client without making a change to the IGMP or MLD membership state, as an optimization that can prevent the need for some recovery, or even by reusing the same UDP socket.  Doing so does not change any requirements for the channel state management at the QUIC layer, and as long as the situation is transient, should not result in leaving due to Excessive Spurious Traffic even if some packets were reordered or may still be in flight.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>As described in <xref section="6" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC4607"/>, link-layer addresses can be linked to the low-order bits of multicast addresses, and may be the same for different group destinations.  Collisions in the link-layer addressing, even with traffic that comes from other sources, can cause congestion or receiver CPU load for colliding channels that might be different from that seen with other channels that were delivered with apparently the same network paths.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Even though multicast QUIC uses only source-specific multicast, older networks with devices that don't have IGMPv3 or MLDv2 support can propagate the joins as any-source multicast. If there are active senders sending to that destination, this can cause network congestion and CPU load due to discarding packets from the wrong source, even though at the application layer the UDP socket won't receive those packets from the wrong source.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>If different channels use the same (S,G) but different UDP ports, they will share the same multicast forwarding tree in an IP network. This is often useful when the data in the channels are linked, for example if MC_INTEGRITY frames are carried on one channel for packets carried on another channel, because it provides some fate-sharing for the linked data.  However, for data that is not so linked, it would generally be a disadvantage to share the (S,G) because the network link of any receiver joined to one of those channels but not the other would receive both packets and throw away the data for the un-joined port, causing extra congestion and CPU load for the receiving device.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>(Authors comment: Mostly incorporate <xref target="I-D.draft-krose-multicast-security"/>.  Anything else?</t>
      <t>e.g. if a different legitimate quic connection says someone
else's quic multicast stream is theirs, that's maybe a problem
worth protecting against.  Maybe we need a periodic asymmetric
challenge?  I'm thinking send a public key on the multicast
channel and in the unicast channels send an individualized MAC
signed with the private key and verify it with the public key,
so that in addition to validating that the unicast server knows
the contents of the multicast packets via the hashes it supplies,
the multicast stream provides a way for the client to validate
that the unicast stream is authorized to use it for data transport
via proof they know the private key corresponding to the public
key that arrived on the multicast channel.
Note this doesn't prevent unauthorized receipt of multicast
data packets, but does prevent a quic server from lying when
claiming a multicast data channel belongs to it, preventing
legit receivers from consuming it.</t>
      <t>alternatively, can the multicast channel just periodically say
what domain name is expected for the quic connection and get the
same crypto guarantee of a proper sender via the domain's cert,
which was already checked on the unicast channel?)</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>TODO: MC_EXTENSION_ERROR error code</t>
      <t>TODO: lots</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="I-D.draft-krose-multicast-security">
          <front>
            <title>Security and Privacy Considerations for Multicast Transports</title>
            <author fullname="Kyle Rose" initials="K." surname="Rose">
              <organization>Akamai Technologies, Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Max Franke" initials="M." surname="Franke">
              <organization>TU Berlin</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Jake Holland" initials="J." surname="Holland">
              <organization>Akamai Technologies, Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="7" month="May" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Interdomain multicast has unique potential to solve delivery
   scalability for popular content, but it carries a set of security and
   privacy issues that differ from those in unicast delivery.  This
   document analyzes the security threats unique to multicast-based
   delivery for Internet and Web traffic under the Internet and Web
   threat models.

Discussion Venues

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/squarooticus/draft-krose-multicast-security.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-krose-multicast-security-07"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.draft-ietf-mboned-ambi">
          <front>
            <title>Asymmetric Manifest Based Integrity</title>
            <author fullname="Jake Holland" initials="J." surname="Holland">
              <organization>Akamai Technologies, Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Kyle Rose" initials="K." surname="Rose">
              <organization>Akamai Technologies, Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Max Franke" initials="M." surname="Franke">
              <organization>TU Berlin</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="17" month="October" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines Asymmetric Manifest-Based Integrity (AMBI).
   AMBI allows each receiver or forwarder of a stream of multicast
   packets to check the integrity of the contents of each packet in the
   data stream.  AMBI operates by passing cryptographically verifiable
   hashes of the data packets inside manifest messages, and sending the
   manifests over authenticated out-of-band communication channels.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-mboned-ambi-05"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.draft-ietf-mboned-cbacc">
          <front>
            <title>Circuit Breaker Assisted Congestion Control</title>
            <author fullname="Jake Holland" initials="J." surname="Holland">
              <organization>Akamai Technologies, Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Kyle Rose" initials="K." surname="Rose">
              <organization>Akamai Technologies, Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Max Franke" initials="M." surname="Franke">
              <organization>TU Berlin</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="17" month="October" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document specifies Circuit Breaker Assisted Congestion Control
   (CBACC).  CBACC enables fast-trip Circuit Breakers by publishing rate
   metadata about multicast channels from senders to intermediate
   network nodes or receivers.  The circuit breaker behavior is defined
   as a supplement to receiver driven congestion control systems, to
   preserve network health if misbehaving or malicious receiver
   applications subscribe to a volume of traffic that exceeds capacity
   policies or capability for a network or receiving device.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-mboned-cbacc-06"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.draft-ietf-quic-multipath">
          <front>
            <title>Managing multiple paths for a QUIC connection</title>
            <author fullname="Yanmei Liu" initials="Y." surname="Liu">
              <organization>Alibaba Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yunfei Ma" initials="Y." surname="Ma">
              <organization>Uber Technologies Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Quentin De Coninck" initials="Q." surname="De Coninck">
              <organization>University of Mons (UMONS)</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Olivier Bonaventure" initials="O." surname="Bonaventure">
              <organization>UCLouvain and Tessares</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Christian Huitema" initials="C." surname="Huitema">
              <organization>Private Octopus Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Mirja Kühlewind" initials="M." surname="Kühlewind">
              <organization>Ericsson</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="8" month="December" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document specifies a multipath extension for the QUIC protocol
   to enable the simultaneous usage of multiple paths for a single
   connection.  It proposes a standard way to create, delete, and manage
   paths using identifiers.  It does not specify address discovery or
   management, nor how applications using QUIC schedule traffic over
   multiple paths.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-quic-multipath-18"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8085">
          <front>
            <title>UDP Usage Guidelines</title>
            <author fullname="L. Eggert" initials="L." surname="Eggert"/>
            <author fullname="G. Fairhurst" initials="G." surname="Fairhurst"/>
            <author fullname="G. Shepherd" initials="G." surname="Shepherd"/>
            <date month="March" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The User Datagram Protocol (UDP) provides a minimal message-passing transport that has no inherent congestion control mechanisms. This document provides guidelines on the use of UDP for the designers of applications, tunnels, and other protocols that use UDP. Congestion control guidelines are a primary focus, but the document also provides guidance on other topics, including message sizes, reliability, checksums, middlebox traversal, the use of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN), Differentiated Services Code Points (DSCPs), and ports.</t>
              <t>Because congestion control is critical to the stable operation of the Internet, applications and other protocols that choose to use UDP as an Internet transport must employ mechanisms to prevent congestion collapse and to establish some degree of fairness with concurrent traffic. They may also need to implement additional mechanisms, depending on how they use UDP.</t>
              <t>Some guidance is also applicable to the design of other protocols (e.g., protocols layered directly on IP or via IP-based tunnels), especially when these protocols do not themselves provide congestion control.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 5405 and adds guidelines for multicast UDP usage.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="145"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8085"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8085"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8446">
          <front>
            <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
            <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
            <date month="August" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.</t>
              <t>This document updates RFCs 5705 and 6066, and obsoletes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8446"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8446"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9000">
          <front>
            <title>QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed and Secure Transport</title>
            <author fullname="J. Iyengar" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Iyengar"/>
            <author fullname="M. Thomson" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Thomson"/>
            <date month="May" year="2021"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines the core of the QUIC transport protocol. QUIC provides applications with flow-controlled streams for structured communication, low-latency connection establishment, and network path migration. QUIC includes security measures that ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability in a range of deployment circumstances. Accompanying documents describe the integration of TLS for key negotiation, loss detection, and an exemplary congestion control algorithm.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9000"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9000"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9001">
          <front>
            <title>Using TLS to Secure QUIC</title>
            <author fullname="M. Thomson" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Thomson"/>
            <author fullname="S. Turner" initials="S." role="editor" surname="Turner"/>
            <date month="May" year="2021"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes how Transport Layer Security (TLS) is used to secure QUIC.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9001"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9001"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9002">
          <front>
            <title>QUIC Loss Detection and Congestion Control</title>
            <author fullname="J. Iyengar" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Iyengar"/>
            <author fullname="I. Swett" initials="I." role="editor" surname="Swett"/>
            <date month="May" year="2021"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes loss detection and congestion control mechanisms for QUIC.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9002"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9002"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9221">
          <front>
            <title>An Unreliable Datagram Extension to QUIC</title>
            <author fullname="T. Pauly" initials="T." surname="Pauly"/>
            <author fullname="E. Kinnear" initials="E." surname="Kinnear"/>
            <author fullname="D. Schinazi" initials="D." surname="Schinazi"/>
            <date month="March" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines an extension to the QUIC transport protocol to add support for sending and receiving unreliable datagrams over a QUIC connection.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9221"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9221"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="I-D.draft-ietf-webtrans-http3">
          <front>
            <title>WebTransport over HTTP/3</title>
            <author fullname="Alan Frindell" initials="A." surname="Frindell">
              <organization>Facebook</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Eric Kinnear" initials="E." surname="Kinnear">
              <organization>Apple Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Victor Vasiliev" initials="V." surname="Vasiliev">
              <organization>Google</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="20" month="October" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   WebTransport [OVERVIEW] is a protocol framework that enables
   application clients constrained by the Web security model to
   communicate with a remote application server using a secure
   multiplexed transport.  This document describes a WebTransport
   protocol that is based on HTTP/3 [HTTP3] and provides support for
   unidirectional streams, bidirectional streams, and datagrams, all
   multiplexed within the same HTTP/3 connection.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-webtrans-http3-14"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram">
          <front>
            <title>HTTP Datagrams and the Capsule Protocol</title>
            <author fullname="David Schinazi" initials="D." surname="Schinazi">
              <organization>Google LLC</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Lucas Pardue" initials="L." surname="Pardue">
              <organization>Cloudflare</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="17" month="June" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes HTTP Datagrams, a convention for conveying multiplexed, potentially unreliable datagrams inside an HTTP connection.

 In HTTP/3, HTTP Datagrams can be sent unreliably using the QUIC DATAGRAM extension. When the QUIC DATAGRAM frame is unavailable or undesirable, HTTP Datagrams can be sent using the Capsule Protocol, which is a more general convention for conveying data in HTTP connections.

 HTTP Datagrams and the Capsule Protocol are intended for use by HTTP extensions, not applications.
              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-11"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4607">
          <front>
            <title>Source-Specific Multicast for IP</title>
            <author fullname="H. Holbrook" initials="H." surname="Holbrook"/>
            <author fullname="B. Cain" initials="B." surname="Cain"/>
            <date month="August" year="2006"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>IP version 4 (IPv4) addresses in the 232/8 (232.0.0.0 to 232.255.255.255) range are designated as source-specific multicast (SSM) destination addresses and are reserved for use by source-specific applications and protocols. For IP version 6 (IPv6), the address prefix FF3x::/32 is reserved for source-specific multicast use. This document defines an extension to the Internet network service that applies to datagrams sent to SSM addresses and defines the host and router requirements to support this extension. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4607"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4607"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6363">
          <front>
            <title>Forward Error Correction (FEC) Framework</title>
            <author fullname="M. Watson" initials="M." surname="Watson"/>
            <author fullname="A. Begen" initials="A." surname="Begen"/>
            <author fullname="V. Roca" initials="V." surname="Roca"/>
            <date month="October" year="2011"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a framework for using Forward Error Correction (FEC) codes with applications in public and private IP networks to provide protection against packet loss. The framework supports applying FEC to arbitrary packet flows over unreliable transport and is primarily intended for real-time, or streaming, media. This framework can be used to define Content Delivery Protocols that provide FEC for streaming media delivery or other packet flows. Content Delivery Protocols defined using this framework can support any FEC scheme (and associated FEC codes) that is compliant with various requirements defined in this document. Thus, Content Delivery Protocols can be defined that are not specific to a particular FEC scheme, and FEC schemes can be defined that are not specific to a particular Content Delivery Protocol. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6363"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6363"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6726">
          <front>
            <title>FLUTE - File Delivery over Unidirectional Transport</title>
            <author fullname="T. Paila" initials="T." surname="Paila"/>
            <author fullname="R. Walsh" initials="R." surname="Walsh"/>
            <author fullname="M. Luby" initials="M." surname="Luby"/>
            <author fullname="V. Roca" initials="V." surname="Roca"/>
            <author fullname="R. Lehtonen" initials="R." surname="Lehtonen"/>
            <date month="November" year="2012"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines File Delivery over Unidirectional Transport (FLUTE), a protocol for the unidirectional delivery of files over the Internet, which is particularly suited to multicast networks. The specification builds on Asynchronous Layered Coding, the base protocol designed for massively scalable multicast distribution. This document obsoletes RFC 3926. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6726"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6726"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6968">
          <front>
            <title>FCAST: Object Delivery for the Asynchronous Layered Coding (ALC) and NACK-Oriented Reliable Multicast (NORM) Protocols</title>
            <author fullname="V. Roca" initials="V." surname="Roca"/>
            <author fullname="B. Adamson" initials="B." surname="Adamson"/>
            <date month="July" year="2013"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document introduces the FCAST reliable object (e.g., file) delivery application. It is designed to operate either on top of the underlying Asynchronous Layered Coding (ALC) / Layered Coding Transport (LCT) reliable multicast transport protocol or the NACK-Oriented Reliable Multicast (NORM) transport protocol.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6968"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6968"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9114">
          <front>
            <title>HTTP/3</title>
            <author fullname="M. Bishop" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Bishop"/>
            <date month="June" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The QUIC transport protocol has several features that are desirable in a transport for HTTP, such as stream multiplexing, per-stream flow control, and low-latency connection establishment. This document describes a mapping of HTTP semantics over QUIC. This document also identifies HTTP/2 features that are subsumed by QUIC and describes how HTTP/2 extensions can be ported to HTTP/3.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9114"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9114"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="MERKLE">
          <front>
            <title>Secrecy, Authentication, and Public Key Systems</title>
            <author initials="R." surname="Merkle">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="1983"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Computer Science Series, UMI Research Press, ISBN: 9780835713849" value=""/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 944?>

<section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>Thanks to Louis Navarre on his comments and text contributions to the multipath and FEC sections.</t>
      <t>Thanks to Martin Duke, Sam Hurst, Kyle Rose, Michael Welzl and Momoka Yamamoto for their helpful reviews and comments.</t>
      <t>This work has been supported by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research of Germany in the programme of “Souverän. Digital. Vernetzt.” Joint project 6G-RIC, project identification number (PIN): FKZ 16KISK030</t>
      <t>TODO acknowledge.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
  <!-- ##markdown-source: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-->

</rfc>
