]> Zhongguancun Laboratory

Beijing China jiangshl@zgclab.edu.cn

Tsinghua University

Beijing China xuke@tsinghua.edu.cn

Tsinghua University

Beijing China qli01@tsinghua.edu.cn

Tsinghua University & Zhongguancun Laboratory

Beijing China shixg@cernet.edu.cn

Tsinghua University

Beijing China zhuotaoliu@tsinghua.edu.cn

SIDROPS Prefix hijacking, i.e., unauthorized announcement of a prefix, has emerged as a major security threat in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), garnering widespread attention. To migrate such attacks while supporting legitimate Multiple Origin ASes (MOAS), higher requirements are placed on the route origin registry system. This document serves to outline the problem statement for current route origin registry system.

Introduction The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is ubiquitously used for inter-domain routing. However, it lacks built-in security validation on whether its UPDATE information is legitimate . This poses concerns regarding prefix hijacking, where unauthorized announcements of prefixes can occur, simulating legitimate Multiple Origin ASes (MOAS). Unfortunately, the current route origin registry system, such as Internet Routing Registry (IRR) and Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) , are not effective in distinguishing between legitimate MOAS and prefix hijacking. There is a pressing need for an verifiable route origin registry system that can support registration and protection of legitimate MOAS, thereby mitigating the threats posed by prefix hijacking to the routing system. This document will primarily analyze the various scenarios of MOAS and highlight the limitations of the current route origin registry system. By examining these issues, our primary objective is to offer valuable insights to network operators, researchers, and policymakers for improving the security and robustness of the global routing system.

Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Working Definition of Route Origin Registry Route origin registry refers to a system that records the mapping of IP prefixes to the ASes authorised to announce them. Resource holders can register route origin mapping relationships in route origin registry by themselves or delegate to others. IRR and RPKI currently offer functionalities related to route origin registry. IRRs, which have been in operation since 1995, serve as a globally distributed database for routing information. They record the binding relationship between IPs and Autonomous Systems (ASes) via Route(6) objects, which are defined by the Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL). On the other hand, the RPKI system, which was developed starting in 2008, provides a formally verifiable framework. The RPKI system is based on resource certificates that extend the X.509 standard. It records the mapping between IP prefixes and their authorised ASes via Route Origin Authorization (ROA) objects. These ROA objects contain essential information such as the prefix, origin ASN, and MaxLength.

Prefix Hijacking and Legitimate MOAS suggests that a prefix should typically have a single Autonomous System (AS) as its origin, with a few exceptions. However, CAIDA's analysis on BGP routing data reveals that MOAS have become a common phenomenon. There are various reasons that contribute to the emergence of MOAS prefixes:

• Aggregation. According to , aggregation could result in prefix originated from multiple possible ASes. For example, if the "Prefix 0/24" originates from ASx and the "Prefix 1/24" originates from ASy, aggregating them into "Prefix 0/23" with the originates from [ASx, ASy] may result in the loss of the specific origin AS information if the ATOMIC_AGGREGATE attributes of the aggregation announcements are not specific.
• Business consideration. Companies often choose providers that offer high-speed and reliable data services to host their servers. For efficient resource allocation, a parent organization that owns a large chunk of IP addresses may divide its address space among one or more child organizations, which choose different providers and ask them to announce the same prefix. For example, a multi-national company may advertise its prefix from multiple locations where it has offices.
• Multi-homing. When multi-homing occur without the use of BGP, it can result in MOAS conflicts. Assuming ASx is connected to two providers, ISP1 and ISP2. ISP1 is connected to ASx using BGP, while ISP2 is connected to ASx through static routes or Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP). Both ISP1 and ISP2 advertise prefixes that belong to ASx.
• Internet eXchanges. When a prefix is associated with an exchange point, it becomes directly accessible from all the ASes connected to that exchange point. Each AS at the exchange point has the capability to advertise the prefix as if it originates directly from their own AS.
• Anycast. Anycast is often employed by content distribution networks (CDNs) to direct the requests of their customers to the nearest servers, ensuring speedy data delivery to their customers.
• Prefix hijacking and misconfigurations. A malicious AS may advertise prefixes belonging to another organization to attract its traffic. An AS may also make such annoucements unintentionally due to misconfiguration.

Distinguishing between prefix hijacking, misconfiguration, and legitimate MOAS can be a complex task. The challenge arises from the resemblance of these behaviors, as they often display similar characteristics. Moreover, accurately identifying and classifying these situations necessitates a route origin registry with high coverage and accuracy.

Problems in Current Route Origin Registry

Security Risks from Partial Adoption As the adoption of RPKI continues to grow, the number of address prefixes registered within RPKI is gradually increasing. However, recent reports from the Number Resource Organization (NRO) indicate that the coverage of IP prefixes within ROAs is still relatively low, and the adoption rate of route origin validation (ROV), as measured by Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security (MANRS) , is even significantly lower than the coverage of ROAs. Similarly, also notes a decreasing trend in IP Prefix coverage in certain IRRs. On the other hand, it becomes evident that currently active IRRs and RPKI offer limited coverage for MOAS, particularly in the case of IPv6. They typically only allow registration of address blocks for self-managed purposes, posing a significant obstacle in supporting many legitimate MOAS prefixes. Limited IP prefix coverage within the current route origin registry, especially for MOAS prefixes, hinders the complete validation of route announcements, significantly limiting the motivation for network operators to utilize route origin registry system.

Inconsistency between Different Route Origin Registries Based on the analysis presented in the previous sections, it is evident that relying solely on a single source of route origin registry is insufficient in route origin validation. To address this issue effectively, it is recommended to integrate the RPKI and multiple active IRRs. However, it is important to note that this fusion approach may encounter several limitations. As highlighted in , inconsistencies exist among the Route(6) objects across different IRRs. This inconsistency can be attributed to the chronic neglect by IRR customers. For instance, some companies may register Route(6) objects in some IRRs but fail to update them in all the route origin registries, resulting in outdated and stale Route(6) objects. Furthermore, it is observed that a higher number of IRRs exhibit lower consistency with RPKI. In practice, different networks often use different data and methodologies to perform route validation and filtering, resulting in disparate outcome, especially when ROA and IRR data conflict with each other. As a result, while integrating the RPKI and multiple active IRRs can improve the effectiveness of route origin validation, it is essential to address the issues of inconsistencies between different route origin registries.

Insufficiency of Resource Certification As mentioned in , the lack of certification and incentives for maintaining up-to-date data within IRRs leads to low accuracy of the information. Recent measurement reveals that IRRs with low update activity exhibit lower overlap with BGP announcements than those with high update activity. This indicates that IRRs with lower activity may contain a higher proportion of outdated and stale Route(6) objects, thereby impacting the reliability of the route origin registry. RPKI is a hierarchical Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that binds Internet Number Resources (INRs) such as Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) and IP addresses to public keys via certificates. However, there is a risk of conflicts in INRs ownership when misconfiguration or malicious operations occur at the upper tier, resulting in multiple lower tiers being allocated the same INRs. Additionally, the existence of legitimate MOAS necessitates the authorization of binding between a prefix with multiple ASes, further complicating the issue. Balancing the protection of legitimate MOAS while minimizing risks in INRs certificates presents a challenging problem that requires innovative solutions. Furthermore, it is worth noting that RPKI Relying Parties (RPs) have not yet standardized the process of constructing certificate chains and handling exceptions such as Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) and Manifests. This lack of standardization has resulted in different views on the RPKI records by RPs who adopt different implementations. Consequently, ASes served by different RPs may have varying validation results for the same route announcement. Consequently, the absence of data validation and standardization in operations within the IRR or RPKI framework means that there is no guarantee of the accuracy of the data registered in any route origin registry.

Synchronization and Management The current practice in IRRs involves the use of the Near-Real-Time Mirroring (NRTM) protocol to replicate and synchronize Route(6) object from other IRRs. Similarly, the RPKI system relies on the RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP) to synchronize and update data. However, these network protocols exhibit several weaknesses that need to be addressed.

• The absence of a mechanism to notify other mirrors when updates occur results in synchronization delays and data inconsistency issues. This can be problematic when timeliness and accuracy are crucial.
• The absence of validation for replicated data from mirrored sources in both IRRs and RPKI is a legitimate concern. This situation creates a considerable risk for inconsistencies and conflicts with the current data.
• The absence of application security mechanisms within these protocols is another area of vulnerability. This lack of security measures exposes the system to unauthorized access and compromise on data integrity.

Although some approaches attempt to optimise the quality of the route origin registry, e.g. RIPE NCC, IRRdv4 using RPKI to validate/filter IRR Route(6) objects, and proposing that RPs can customise route origin with local data, the problem of inconsistency persists due to the limited coverage of RPKI and the lack of effective mechanisms to resolve conflicting data between IRRs. It is crucial to establish a effective communication mechanism among multiple route origin registry, enabling negotiation and cross-validation of conflicting or special-purpose route origin information.

Summary The current route origin registry systems, namely IRRs and RPKI, are facing challenges as the increased occurrence of MOAS prefixes. These challenges mainly include low adoption rates, global inconsistency, insufficient resource certification, and incomplete multi-source collaboration mechanisms. To address these challenges, it is imperative to continue striving towards the development of a verifiable route origin registry system that can effectively discern between prefix hijacking and legitimate MOAS, while ensuring a globally unified perspective on route origin and maintaining a high level of resilience.

Security Considerations There is no security consideration in this draft.

IANA Considerations There is no IANA consideration in this draft.

References Normative References This document is an update to the original `ripe-81' proposal for representing and storing routing polices within the RIPE database. It incorporates several extensions proposed by Merit Inc. and gives details of a generalized IP routing policy representation to be used by all Internet routing registries. It acts as both tutorial and provides details of database objects and attributes that use and make up a routing registry. This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. In the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), Certificate Authorities (CAs) publish certificates, including end-entity certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs), and RPKI signed objects to repositories. Relying Parties retrieve the published information from those repositories. This document specifies a new RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP) for this purpose. RRDP was specifically designed for scaling. It relies on an Update Notification File which lists the current Snapshot and Delta Files that can be retrieved using HTTPS (HTTP over Transport Layer Security (TLS)), and it enables the use of Content Distribution Networks (CDNs) or other caching infrastructures for the retrieval of these files. This document describes an architecture for an infrastructure to support improved security of Internet routing. The foundation of this architecture is a Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) that represents the allocation hierarchy of IP address space and Autonomous System (AS) numbers; and a distributed repository system for storing and disseminating the data objects that comprise the RPKI, as well as other signed objects necessary for improved routing security. As an initial application of this architecture, the document describes how a legitimate holder of IP address space can explicitly and verifiably authorize one or more ASes to originate routes to that address space. Such verifiable authorizations could be used, for example, to more securely construct BGP route filters. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes. The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those resources. Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers (ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origin assertions. ISPs can also use the RPKI to validate the path of a BGP route. However, ISPs may want to establish a local view of exceptions to the RPKI data in the form of local filters and additions. The mechanisms described in this document provide a simple way to enable INR holders to establish a local, customized view of the RPKI, overriding global RPKI repository data as needed. In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. Informative References Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4), along with a host of other infrastructure protocols designed before the Internet environment became perilous, was originally designed with little consideration for protection of the information it carries. There are no mechanisms internal to BGP that protect against attacks that modify, delete, forge, or replay data, any of which has the potential to disrupt overall network routing behavior. This document discusses some of the security issues with BGP routing data dissemination. This document does not discuss security issues with forwarding of packets. This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo discusses when it is appropriate to register and utilize an Autonomous System (AS), and lists criteria for such. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. The purpose of this document is to catalog issues that influenced the efficacy of Internet Routing Registries (IRRs) for inter-domain routing policy specification and application in the global routing system over the past two decades. Additionally, it provides a discussion regarding which of these issues are still problematic in practice, and which are simply artifacts that are no longer applicable but continue to stifle inter-provider policy-based filtering adoption and IRR utility to this day. This document provides a single reference point for requirements for Relying Party (RP) software for use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). It cites requirements that appear in several RPKI RFCs, making it easier for implementers to become aware of these requirements. Over time, this RFC will be updated to reflect changes to the requirements and guidance specified in the RFCs discussed herein. Reliably Coded Fastly RIPE NCC AMS-IX This document specifies a one-way synchronization protocol for Internet Routing Registry (IRR) records. The protocol allows instances of IRR database servers to mirror IRR records, specified in the Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL), between each other.

Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank Yangfei Guo, Di Ma, Qi Li, Shuhe Wang, Xiaoliang Wang, Hui Wang, etc. for their valuable comments on this document.