<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
<!DOCTYPE rfc [
  <!ENTITY nbsp    "&#160;">
  <!ENTITY zwsp   "&#8203;">
  <!ENTITY nbhy   "&#8209;">
  <!ENTITY wj     "&#8288;">
]>
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="rfc2629.xslt" ?>
<!-- generated by https://github.com/cabo/kramdown-rfc version 1.7.17 (Ruby 3.0.2) -->
<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-li-savnet-source-prefix-advertisement-00" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" version="3">
  <!-- xml2rfc v2v3 conversion 3.22.0 -->
  <front>
    <title abbrev="SPA-based SAVNET">Source Prefix Advertisement for Intra-domain SAVNET</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-li-savnet-source-prefix-advertisement-00"/>
    <author initials="D." surname="Li" fullname="Dan Li">
      <organization>Tsinghua University</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <city>Beijing</city>
          <country>China</country>
        </postal>
        <email>tolidan@tsinghua.edu.cn</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="N." surname="Geng" fullname="Nan Geng">
      <organization>Huawei</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <city>Beijing</city>
          <country>China</country>
        </postal>
        <email>gengnan@huawei.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="L." surname="Qin" fullname="Lancheng Qin">
      <organization>Zhongguancun Laboratory</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <city>Beijing</city>
          <country>China</country>
        </postal>
        <email>qinlc@mail.zgclab.edu.cn</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2024" month="July" day="08"/>
    <area>Routing</area>
    <workgroup>SAVNET</workgroup>
    <keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 49?>

<t>This document proposes the Source Prefix Advertisement (SPA) technology for intra-domain SAVNET, called SPA-based SAVNET. SPA-based SAVNET allows routers in an intra-domain network to exchange SAV-specific information through SPA messages. By using SAV-specific information carried in SPA messages, routers can generate more accurate and robust SAV rules in an automatic way. This document introduces the content of SPA messages and the process of generating SAV rules using SPA messages. SPA messages can be transmitted by a new protocol or an extension to an existing protocol. Protocol designs and extensions are not in the scope of this document.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 53?>

<section anchor="sec-intro">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>The purpose of intra-domain source address validation (SAV) is to prevent outgoing data packets from an intra-domain subnet (e.g., a host network or a customer network) from forging source addresses of other intra-domain subnets or other ASes, and to prevent incoming data packets from external ASes from forging source addresses of the local AS. To this end, intra-domain SAV should focus on SAV at edge routers (i.e., host-facing routers or customer-facing routers), and AS border routers (see <xref target="I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-architecture"/>). Specifically, edge routers should block data packets from the connected host network or customer network with a spoofed source IP address not belonging to that network. AS border routers should block data packets from other ASes with a spoofed source IP address belonging to the local AS.</t>
      <t>Existing intra-domain SAV solutions (e.g., BCP38 <xref target="RFC2827"/> and BCP84 <xref target="RFC3704"/>) have problems of high operational overhead or inaccurate validation (see <xref target="I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement"/>). Specifically, ACL-based ingress filtering (BCP38 <xref target="RFC2827"/>) requires manual operations to configure and update the SAV rules, while uRPF-based solutions (BCP84 <xref target="RFC3704"/>) may improperly block legitimate data packets in the scenario of routing asymmetry. To improve the accuracy upon existing intra-domain SAV solutions and enable automatic update, intra-domain SAVNET architecture requires SAVNET routers to automatically generate SAV rules by using SAV-specific information <xref target="I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-architecture"/>.</t>
      <t>This document proposes the Source Prefix Advertisement (SPA) technology for intra-domain SAVNET, called SPA-based SAVNET. Following the intra-domain SAVNET architecture, SPA-based SAVNET focuses on SAV at edge routers and AS border routers in an intra-domain network. It allows SAVNET routers within an intra-domain network to communicate SAV-specific information through SPA messages. SAVNET routers will not communicate SAV-specific information with routers/devices in intra-domain subnets and other ASes. By using SAV-specific information, SAVNET routers can generate more accurate and robust SAV rules in an automatic way.</t>
      <t>This document introduces the content of SPA messages and the process of generating SAV rules using SPA messages. SPA messages can be transmitted by a new protocol or an extension to an existing protocol. Protocol designs and extensions are not in the scope of this document.</t>
      <section anchor="terminology">
        <name>Terminology</name>
        <t>SAV Rule: The rule in a router that describes the mapping relationship between a source address (prefix) and the valid incoming interface(s). It is used by a router to make SAV decisions and is inferred from the SAV Information Base.</t>
        <t>Host-facing Router: An intra-domain router of an AS which is connected to an intra-domain host network (i.e., a layer-2 network).</t>
        <t>Customer-facing Router: An intra-domain router of an AS which is connected to an intra-domain customer network running the routing protocol (i.e., a layer-3 network).</t>
        <t>Edge router: A host-facing router or a customer-facing router.</t>
        <t>AS Border Router: An intra-domain router of an AS which is connected to other ASes.</t>
        <t>Subnet: An intra-domain host network or an intra-domain customer network.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="requirements-language">
        <name>Requirements Language</name>
        <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
        <?line -18?>

</section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="goal-of-spa-based-savnet">
      <name>Goal of SPA-based SAVNET</name>
      <t><xref target="fig-intra-savnet"/> shows an intra-domain network that adopts SPA-based SAVNET. Router 1 and Router 2 are edge routers that enable SAV at the interfaces facing to a subnet. Router 3 is an AS border router that enables SAV at the interfaces facing to an AS.</t>
      <t>This document defines four types of interfaces that should enable SPA-based SAVNET:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Single-homing interface. The interface of an edge router that faces to a singled-homed subnet. For example, Intf.1 in <xref target="fig-intra-savnet"/> is a "Single-homing interface".</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Complete multi-homing interface. For an edge router facing to a multi-homed subnet, if all routers facing to the multi-homed subnet are in the same AS, the interface facing to this subnet is "Complete multi-homing interface". In this case, the multi-homed subnet is called complete multi-homed subnet. For example, Intf.2 and Intf.3 in <xref target="fig-intra-savnet"/> are "Complete multi-homing interfaces".</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Incomplete multi-homing interface. For an edge router facing to a multi-homed subnet, if some other routers facing to the multi-homed subnet are in other ASes, the interface facing to this subnet is "Incomplete multi-homing interface". In this case, the multi-homed subnet is called incomplete multi-homed subnet. For example, Intf.4 in <xref target="fig-intra-savnet"/> is "Incomplete multi-homing interface".</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Internet interface. The interface of an AS border router that faces to another AS. Generally, a network usually has multiple "Internet interfaces" for load balancing or backup. For example, Intf.5 and Intf.6 in <xref target="fig-intra-savnet"/> are "Internet interfaces".</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <figure anchor="fig-intra-savnet">
        <name>An intra-domain network that adopts SPA-based SAVNET</name>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
+-----------------------------------------+
|               Other ASes                |
+-----------------------------------------+
              |      |                |
              |      |                |
+-------------|------|----------------|---+
| AS          |      |                |   |
|       Intf.5|      |Intf.6          |   |
|           +-*------*-+              |   |
|           | Router 3 |              |   |
|           +----------+              |   |
|              /     \                |   |
|             /       \               |   |
|            /         \              |   |
|   +----------+     +----------+     |   |
|   | Router 1 |     | Router 2 |     |   |
|   +--#-----#-+     +-#-----*--+     |   |
|Intf.1|      \Intf.2 /Intf.3 \Intf.4 |   |
|      |       \     /         \      |   |
|      |        \   /           \     |   |
|   Subnet1    Subnet2           Subnet3  |
|    (P1)      (P2, P3)          (P4,P5)  |
+-----------------------------------------+

Routers 1 and 2 are edge routers
Router 3 is an AS border router
Intf '#' enables prefix allowlist
Intf '*' enables prefix blocklist
]]></artwork>
      </figure>
      <t>The goal of SPA-based SAVNET is to automatically generate prefix allowlist or blocklist for the four types of interfaces:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Single-homing interface. SPA-based SAVNET generates a prefix allowlist (i.e., "Interface-based prefix allowlist" mode in <xref target="I-D.huang-savnet-sav-table"/>) at each "Single-homing interface". The prefix allowlist should contain all source prefixes of the connected subnet and blocks data packets from that subnet with source addresses not belonging to these source prefixes. In <xref target="fig-intra-savnet"/>, the prefix allowlist for Intf. 1 should contain the source prefix of Subnet1 (i.e., prefix P1).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Complete multi-homing interface. Same as "Single-homing interface", SPA-based SAVNET generates a prefix allowlist at each "Complete multi-homing interface", containing all source prefixes of the connected subnet. In <xref target="fig-intra-savnet"/>, the prefix allowlists for Intf. 2 or Intf. 3 should include the source prefixes of Subnet2 (i.e., prefixes P2 and P3). By using the prefix allowlist, Routers 1 and 2 can accurately block spoofing data packets from Subnet2 using source IP addresses not in prefixes P2 and P3.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Incomplete multi-homing interface. For an "Incomplete multi-homing interface", if there is a asymmetric routing among the connected subnet and its multiple provider networks, it is hard to identify all source prefixes of the subnet without communication between the multiple provider networks. Therefore, SPA-based SAVNET generates a prefix blocklist (i.e., "Interface-based prefix blocklist" mode in <xref target="I-D.huang-savnet-sav-table"/>) at each "Incomplete multi-homing interface". The prefix blocklist should include all source prefixes belonging to the subnets connected to "Single-homing interfaces" and "Complete multi-homing interfaces". In <xref target="fig-intra-savnet"/>, the prefix blocklist of Intf. 4 should contain the source prefixes of Subnet1 and Subnet2 (i.e., prefixes P1, P2, and P3).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Internet interface. Same as "Incomplete multi-homing interface", SPA-based SAVNET generates a prefix blocklist at each "Internet interface", containing all source prefixes belonging to the subnets connected to "Single-homing interfaces" and "Complete multi-homing interfaces". In <xref target="fig-intra-savnet"/>, the prefix blocklist of Intf. 5 and Intf. 6 should contain the source prefixes of Subnet1 and Subnet2 (i.e., prefixes P1, P2, and P3).</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section anchor="source-prefix-advertisement-procedure">
      <name>Source Prefix Advertisement Procedure</name>
      <t>Source Prefix Advertisement (SPA) procedure includes three main steps: SPA message generation, SPA message communication, and SAV rule generation.</t>
      <section anchor="spa-message-generation">
        <name>SPA Message Generation</name>
        <t>An edge router with a "Single-homing interface" or "Complete multi-homing interface" will generate SPA messages containing four main types of information:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Source Prefix: This information contains source prefixes of its single-homed subnet or complete multi-homed subnet that are learned through the router's local routes to that subnet. Specifically, each Dest Prefix in RIB that records the interface facing to the subnet as an outgoing interface will be considered as a source prefix of the subnet. For each source prefix, SPA message records three indicators which are introduced in the following.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Multi-homing Interface Group Type (MIIG-Type): This indicates the type of the interface that learns the prefix. MIIG-Type <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be one of the four types mentioned above.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Multi-homing Interface Group Tag (MIIG-Tag): This is used to identify the subnet that owns the prefix. The prefixes belonging to the same subnet <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have the identical MIIG-Tag value. Different subnets <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have different MIIG-tag values.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>(Only) Source Flag: This indicates whether the prefix is owned by one subnet. By default, the flag is set because source IP addresses used in data packets originated from a subnet should belong to the subnet in most cases. However, for anycast addresses/prefixes or direct server return (DSR) addresses/prefixes, the flag should be unset (possibly manually).</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="spa-message-communication">
        <name>SPA Message Communication</name>
        <t>After generating SPA messages, the edge router will send its SPA messages to other edge routers and AS border routers. SPA messages can be transmitted by a new protocol or an extension to an existing protocol. Protocol designs and extensions are not in the scope of this document.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sec-rule">
        <name>SAV Rule Generation</name>
        <t>The following describes how to generate SAV rules on the above four types of interfaces.</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>For a "Single-homing interface", the router can generate a prefix allowlist by using its own SPA messages without SPA messages from other routers. The prefix allowlist contains source prefixes of the single-homed subnet that are learned through the router's local routes to that subnet.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>For a "Complete multi-homing interface", the router generates the prefix allowlist by using both its own SPA messages and SPA messages from other routers facing to the same complete multi-homed subnet. All source prefixes in these SPA messages with the "MIIG-Tag" of the complete multi-homed subnet will be added into the prefix allowlist.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>For an "Incomplete multi-homing interface" or "Internet interface", the router generates a prefix blocklist. It processes its own SPA messages and SPA messages from other routers. Prefixes in these SPA messages with MIIG-Types of "Single-homing interface" or "Complete Multi-homing interface" and with Source Flag being set will be added into the prefix blocklist. Prefixes with Source Flag being unset will not be added into the blocklist because the prefix is multi-source and the "Incomplete multi-homing interface" or "Internet interface" may receive legitimate data packets using this prefix as source IP addresses.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Note that, SPA-based SAVNET can also work if the subnet is a stub AS. The source prefixes of the stub AS can be considered as the internal prefixes of the local AS when using SPA-based SAVNET.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="use-case">
      <name>Use Case</name>
      <t><xref target="fig-use-case"/> shows a use case of SPA-based SAVNET in an intra-domain network. Intf.1 of Router 1 is a "Single-homing interface" facing to Subnet1 which has prefix P1. Intf.2 of Router 1 and Intf.3 of Router 2 are "Complete multi-homing interfaces" facing to Subnet2 which has prefixes P2 and P3. Due to traffic engineering and load balance, Router 1 only learns the route to prefix P2 from Intf.2, while Router 2 only learns the route to prefix P3 from Intf.3. Intf.4 of Router 2 is an "Incomplete multi-homing interface" facing to Subnet 3 which has prefixes P4 and P5. Intf.5 and Intf.6 of Router 3 are "Internet interfaces" facing to other ASes.</t>
      <figure anchor="fig-use-case">
        <name>A use case of SPA-based SAVNET</name>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
+-------------------------------------------+
|               Other ASes                  |
+----------------+------+----------------+--+
                 |      |                |
                 |      |                |
+----------------|------|----------------|--+
|    AS          |      |                |  |
|          Intf.5+      +Intf.6          |  |
|             +-+*+----+*+-+             |  |
|             |  Router 3  |             |  |
| [P1,SI,     /\--------/\-+  [P1,SI,    |  |
| Sub1,SRC]   / /        \ \  Sub1,SRC]  |  |
| [P2,CI,    / /[P3,CI,   \ \ [P2,CI,    |  |
| Sub2,SRC] / /  Sub2,SRC] \ \ Sub2,SRC] |  |
|     +------\/----+   +-----\/-----+    |  |
|     |  Router 1  |   |  Router 2  |    |  |
|     +--+#+---+#+-+   +-+#+---+*+--+    |  |
|   Intf.1|      \Intf.2 /Intf.3 \Intf.4 |  |
|         |       \     /         \      |  |
|         |        \   /           \     |  |
|      Subnet1    Subnet2           Subnet3 |
|       (P1)      (P2, P3)          (P4,P5) |
+-------------------------------------------+

Routers 1 and 2 are edge routers
Router 3 is an AS border router
Intf '#' enables prefix allowlist
Intf '*' enables prefix blocklist
]]></artwork>
      </figure>
      <t>Router 1 generates SPA messages for source prefixes (i.e., prefixes P1 and P2) learned from its local routes to Subnet 1 and Subnet 2. For prefix P1, the MIIG-Type is "Single-homing interface", the MIIG-Tag is "Subnet1", and the Source Flag is set (i.e., [P1, SI, Sub1, SRC]). For prefix P2, the MIIG-Type is "Complete multi-homing interface", the MIIG-Tag is "Subnet2", and the Source Flag is set (i.e., [P2, CI, Sub2, SRC]). After generating SPA messages, Router 1 sends its SPA messages to Routers 2 and 3.</t>
      <t>Router 2 generates SPA messages for prefix P3. The MIIG-Type is "Complete multi-homing interface", the MIIG-Tag is "Subnet2", and the Source Flag is set (i.e., [P3, CI, Sub2, SRC]). After that, it sends its SPA messages to Routers 1 and 3.</t>
      <t>As described in <xref target="sec-rule"/>, Routers 1, 2, and 3 generate SAV rules after receiving SPA messages from other routers. For Router 1, it generates a prefix allowlist at Intf.1 containing prefix P1 by using its own SPA message [P1, SI, Sub1, SRC]. By using its own SPA message [P2, CI, Sub2, SRC] and Router 2's SPA messages [P3, CI, Sub2, SRC], it generates a prefix allowlist at Intf.2 containing prefixes P2 and P3. For Router 2, it generates a prefix allowlist at Intf.2 containing prefixes P2 and P3 by using its own SPA message [P3, CI, Sub2, SRC] and Router 1's SPA message [P2, CI, Sub2, SRC]. At Intf.4, Intf.5, or Intf.6, Router 2 or Router 3 generates a prefix blocklist containing prefixes P1, P2, and P3 by using all SPA messages of Router 1 and Router 2.</t>
      <t>By using prefix allowlist or blocklist at different interfaces, the intra-domain network can prevent data packets using spoofing source addresses from entering the network while avoiding improper block. Intf.1 will only accept data packets from Subnet 1 with source addresses in prefix P1. Intf.2 and Intf.3 will only accept data packets from Subnet 2 with source addresses in prefixes P2 and P3. Intf.4, Intf.5, and Intf.6 will block data packets from Subnet 3 or other ASes with source addresses in prefixes P1, P2, and P3.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-converge">
      <name>Convergence Considerations</name>
      <t>The propagation speed of SAV-specific is a key factor affecting the convergence. Consider that routing information and SAV-specific information can be originated and advertised through a similar way, SAV-specific information <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> at least have a similar propagation speed as routing information. When designing SPA message communication methods, routing protocol-based methods should be preferred.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-deploy">
      <name>Deployment Considerations</name>
      <t>SPA-based SAVNET can support incremental deployment by providing incremental benefits. In the scenario of incremental deployment, a router can only receive SPA messages from edge routers that deploy SPA-based SAVNET. For a router with a "Single-homing interface", it can generate accurate SAV rules at that interface without SPA messages from other routers. For a router with a "Complete multi-homing interface", it only needs SPA messages from other edge routers connected to the same subnet, but not from all edge routers. For a router with a "Incomplete multi-homing interface" or "Internet interface", if it only learns partial internal prefixes by processing SPA messages, the generated SAV rule can still prevent spoofing traffic using source addresses in those prefixes from entering the intra-domain network. In addition, the router can use routing information to learn more internal prefixes.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-security">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>The security considerations described in <xref target="I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement"/> and <xref target="I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-architecture"/> also applies to this document.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-iana">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document has no IANA actions.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references>
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement-03" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Source Address Validation in Intra-domain Networks Gap Analysis, Problem Statement, and Requirements</title>
            <author fullname="Dan Li" initials="D." surname="Li">
              <organization>Tsinghua University</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Jianping Wu" initials="J." surname="Wu">
              <organization>Tsinghua University</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Lancheng Qin" initials="L." surname="Qin">
              <organization>Tsinghua University</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Mingqing(Michael) Huang" initials="M." surname="Huang">
              <organization>Huawei</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Nan Geng" initials="N." surname="Geng">
              <organization>Huawei</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="13" month="February" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document provides the gap analysis of existing intra-domain source address validation mechanisms, describes the fundamental problems, and defines the requirements for technical improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-architecture" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-savnet-intra-domain-architecture-00" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-architecture.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Intra-domain Source Address Validation (SAVNET) Architecture</title>
            <author fullname="Dan Li" initials="D." surname="Li">
              <organization>Tsinghua University</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Jianping Wu" initials="J." surname="Wu">
              <organization>Tsinghua University</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Lancheng Qin" initials="L." surname="Qin">
              <organization>Tsinghua University</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Nan Geng" initials="N." surname="Geng">
              <organization>Huawei</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Li Chen" initials="L." surname="Chen">
              <organization>Zhongguancun Laboratory</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="12" month="April" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document proposes the intra-domain SAVNET architecture, which achieves accurate source address validation (SAV) in an intra-domain network by an automatic way. Compared with uRPF-like SAV mechanisms that only depend on routers' local routing information, SAVNET routers generate SAV rules by using both local routing information and SAV-specific information exchanged among routers, resulting in more accurate SAV validation in asymmetric routing scenarios. Compared with ACL rules that require manual efforts to accommodate to network dynamics, SAVNET routers learn the SAV rules automatically in a distributed way.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-savnet-intra-domain-architecture-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2827" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2827" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2827.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address Spoofing</title>
            <author fullname="P. Ferguson" initials="P." surname="Ferguson"/>
            <author fullname="D. Senie" initials="D." surname="Senie"/>
            <date month="May" year="2000"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This paper discusses a simple, effective, and straightforward method for using ingress traffic filtering to prohibit DoS (Denial of Service) attacks which use forged IP addresses to be propagated from 'behind' an Internet Service Provider's (ISP) aggregation point. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="38"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2827"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2827"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3704" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3704" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3704.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Ingress Filtering for Multihomed Networks</title>
            <author fullname="F. Baker" initials="F." surname="Baker"/>
            <author fullname="P. Savola" initials="P." surname="Savola"/>
            <date month="March" year="2004"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>BCP 38, RFC 2827, is designed to limit the impact of distributed denial of service attacks, by denying traffic with spoofed addresses access to the network, and to help ensure that traffic is traceable to its correct source network. As a side effect of protecting the Internet against such attacks, the network implementing the solution also protects itself from this and other attacks, such as spoofed management access to networking equipment. There are cases when this may create problems, e.g., with multihoming. This document describes the current ingress filtering operational mechanisms, examines generic issues related to ingress filtering, and delves into the effects on multihoming in particular. This memo updates RFC 2827. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="84"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3704"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3704"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.huang-savnet-sav-table" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-huang-savnet-sav-table-05" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.huang-savnet-sav-table.xml">
          <front>
            <title>General Source Address Validation Capabilities</title>
            <author fullname="Mingqing(Michael) Huang" initials="M." surname="Huang"/>
            <author fullname="Weiqiang Cheng" initials="W." surname="Cheng">
              <organization>China Mobile</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Dan Li" initials="D." surname="Li">
              <organization>Tsinghua University</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Nan Geng" initials="N." surname="Geng">
              <organization>Huawei Technologies</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Mingxing Liu" initials="" surname="Liu">
              <organization>Huawei Technologies</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Li Chen" initials="L." surname="Chen">
              <organization>Zhongguancun Laboratory</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Changwang Lin" initials="C." surname="Lin">
              <organization>New H3C Technologies</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="3" month="March" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The SAV rules of existing source address validation (SAV) mechanisms, are derived from other core data structures, e.g., FIB-based uRPF, which are not dedicatedly designed for source filtering. Therefore there are some limitations related to deployable scenarios and traffic handling policies. To overcome these limitations, this document introduces the general SAV capabilities from data plane perspective. How to implement the capabilities and how to generate SAV rules are not in the scope of this document.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-huang-savnet-sav-table-05"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 250?>



  </back>
  <!-- ##markdown-source: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-->

</rfc>
