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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-mattsson-tls-super-jumbo-record-limit-00" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="Super Jumbo TLS Records">Super Jumbo Record Size Limit Extension for TLS 1.3</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-mattsson-tls-super-jumbo-record-limit-00"/>
    <author initials="J." surname="Preuß Mattsson" fullname="John Preuß Mattsson">
      <organization>Ericsson</organization>
      <address>
        <email>john.mattsson@ericsson.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="H." surname="Tschofenig" fullname="Hannes Tschofenig">
      <organization/>
      <address>
        <email>Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2023" month="October" day="23"/>
    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>Transport Layer Security</workgroup>
    <keyword>next generation</keyword>
    <keyword>unicorn</keyword>
    <keyword>sparkling distributed ledger</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 55?>

<t>An extension "super_jumbo_record_size_limit" to (Datagram) Transport Layer Security (TLS) is defined that allows endpoints to negotiate a 2<sup>16</sup> bytes maximum size of protected records. This is larger than the default limit of around 2<sup>14</sup> bytes.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        The latest revision of this draft can be found at <eref target="https://emanjon.github.io/draft-mattsson-tls-super-jumbo-record-limit.html"/>.
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mattsson-tls-super-jumbo-record-limit/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        Transport Layer Security Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:tls@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/emanjon/draft-mattsson-tls-compact-ecc"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 59?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>The records in all version of TLS records has an uint16 length field that could theoretically allow records 65536 octets in size. TLS does however have a lower protocol-defined limit for maximum plaintext record size. For TLS 1.2 <xref target="RFC5246"/>, that limit is 2<sup>14</sup> = 16384 octets. TLS 1.3 <xref target="RFC8446"/> uses a limit of 2<sup>14</sup> + 1 = 16385 octets. In addition, TLS 1.2 allow expansion from compression and protection up to 2048 octets (though typically this expansion is only 16 octets). TLS 1.3 reduces the allowance for expansion to 256 octets.</t>
      <t>The "record_size_limit" extension <xref target="RFC8449"/> enables endpoints to negotiate a lower limit for the maximum plaintext record size, but does not allow endpoints to increase the limits enforced by TLS 1.3 <xref target="RFC8446"/>, TLS 1.2 <xref target="RFC5246"/>, DTLS 1.3 <xref target="RFC9147"/>, and DTLS 1.2 <xref target="RFC6347"/>.</t>
      <t>In some use cases such as DTLS over SCTP <xref target="RFC6083"/> the 2<sup>14</sup> bytes limit is a severe limitation.</t>
      <t>This document defines a "super_jumbo_record_size_limit" extension (<xref target="ex"/>). The extension allows endpoints to negotiate a 2<sup>16</sup> bytes maximum size of protected records, which is larger than the default limit of 2<sup>14</sup> bytes. This extension is defined for version 1.3 of TLS and DTLS.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="terminology">
      <name>Terminology</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      <?line -18?>

</section>
    <section anchor="ex">
      <name>The "super_jumbo_record_size_limit" Extension</name>
      <t>The "super_jumbo_record_size_limit" extension does not have any ExtensionData. When the "super_jumbo_record_size_limit" extension is negotiated, an endpoint <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be prepared to accept protected records with ciphertexts of length 2<sup>16</sup> bytes and protected record with plaintext of length 2<sup>16</sup> - the allowed expansion. The maximum length of a protected record plaintext is therefore 2<sup>16</sup> - 2<sup>11</sup> = 63488 octets in TLS 1.2 and 2<sup>16</sup> - 2<sup>8</sup> = 65280 octets in TLS 1.3. Unprotected messages are still subject to the lower default limits in TLS/DTLS 1.3.</t>
      <t>The "super_jumbo_record_size_limit" extension <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be negotiated together with the "record_size_limit" extension or the "max_fragment_length" extension. A client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat receipt
of "super_jumbo_record_size_limit" together with "record_size_limit" or "max_fragment_length" as a fatal error, and it <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> generate an "illegal_parameter" alert.</t>
      <t>In TLS 1.3, the server sends the "super_jumbo_record_size_limit" extension in the EncryptedExtensions message.</t>
      <t>During renegotiation or resumption, the record size limit is renegotiated.  Records are subject to the limits that were set in the handshake that produces the keys that are used to protect those records.  This admits the possibility that the extension might not be negotiated when a connection is renegotiated or resumed.</t>
      <t>For DTLS 1.3 <xref target="RFC9147"/> over UDP or DCCP, the Path Maximum Transmission Unit (PMTU) also limits the size of records.  The record size limit does not affect PMTU discovery and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be set independently. The record size limit is fixed during the handshake and so should be set based on constraints at the endpoint and not based on the current network environment. In comparison, the PMTU is determined by the network path and can change dynamically over time. See PMTU <xref target="RFC8201"/> and Section 4.1 of DTLS 1.3 <xref target="RFC9147"/> for more detail on PMTU discovery. For DTLS over TCP or SCTP, which automatically fragments and reassembles datagrams, there is no PMTU limitation.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="aead-limits">
      <name>AEAD Limits</name>
      <t>The maximum record size limit is an input to the AEAD limits calculations in TLS 1.3 <xref target="RFC8446"/> and DTLS 1.3 <xref target="RFC9147"/>. Increasing the maximum record size to 2<sup>16</sup> bytes while keeping the same confidentiality and integrity advantage therefore requires lower AEAD limits. When the "super_jumbo_record_size_limit" has been negotiated, existing AEAD limits shall be decreased by a factor of 4. For example, when AES-CGM is used in TLS 1.3 <xref target="RFC8446"/> with a 64 kB record limit, only 2<sup>22.5</sup> records (about 6 million) may be encrypted on a given connection.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>Large record sizes might require more memory allocation for senders and receivers. Large record sizes also means that more processing is done before verification of non-authentic records fails.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document registers the "super_jumbo_record_size_limit" extension in the "TLS ExtensionType Values" registry established in <xref target="RFC5246"/>. The "super_jumbo_record_size_limit" extension has been assigned a code point of TBD. The IANA registry <xref target="RFC8447"/> [[will list|lists]] this extension as "Recommended" (i.e., "Y") and indicates that it may appear in the ClientHello (CH) or EncryptedExtensions (EE) messages in TLS 1.3 <xref target="RFC8446"/>.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references>
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8446">
          <front>
            <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
            <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
            <date month="August" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.</t>
              <t>This document updates RFCs 5705 and 6066, and obsoletes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8446"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8446"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8447">
          <front>
            <title>IANA Registry Updates for TLS and DTLS</title>
            <author fullname="J. Salowey" initials="J." surname="Salowey"/>
            <author fullname="S. Turner" initials="S." surname="Turner"/>
            <date month="August" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a number of changes to TLS and DTLS IANA registries that range from adding notes to the registry all the way to changing the registration policy. These changes were mostly motivated by WG review of the TLS- and DTLS-related registries undertaken as part of the TLS 1.3 development process.</t>
              <t>This document updates the following RFCs: 3749, 5077, 4680, 5246, 5705, 5878, 6520, and 7301.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8447"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8447"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8449">
          <front>
            <title>Record Size Limit Extension for TLS</title>
            <author fullname="M. Thomson" initials="M." surname="Thomson"/>
            <date month="August" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>An extension to Transport Layer Security (TLS) is defined that allows endpoints to negotiate the maximum size of protected records that each will send the other.</t>
              <t>This replaces the maximum fragment length extension defined in RFC 6066.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8449"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8449"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC6083">
          <front>
            <title>Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Tuexen" initials="M." surname="Tuexen"/>
            <author fullname="R. Seggelmann" initials="R." surname="Seggelmann"/>
            <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
            <date month="January" year="2011"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes the usage of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol over the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP).</t>
              <t>DTLS over SCTP provides communications privacy for applications that use SCTP as their transport protocol and allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping and detect tampering or message forgery.</t>
              <t>Applications using DTLS over SCTP can use almost all transport features provided by SCTP and its extensions. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6083"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6083"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6347">
          <front>
            <title>Datagram Transport Layer Security Version 1.2</title>
            <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
            <author fullname="N. Modadugu" initials="N." surname="Modadugu"/>
            <date month="January" year="2012"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies version 1.2 of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. The DTLS protocol provides communications privacy for datagram protocols. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. The DTLS protocol is based on the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol and provides equivalent security guarantees. Datagram semantics of the underlying transport are preserved by the DTLS protocol. This document updates DTLS 1.0 to work with TLS version 1.2. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6347"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6347"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8201">
          <front>
            <title>Path MTU Discovery for IP version 6</title>
            <author fullname="J. McCann" initials="J." surname="McCann"/>
            <author fullname="S. Deering" initials="S." surname="Deering"/>
            <author fullname="J. Mogul" initials="J." surname="Mogul"/>
            <author fullname="R. Hinden" initials="R." role="editor" surname="Hinden"/>
            <date month="July" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes Path MTU Discovery (PMTUD) for IP version 6. It is largely derived from RFC 1191, which describes Path MTU Discovery for IP version 4. It obsoletes RFC 1981.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="87"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8201"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8201"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9147">
          <front>
            <title>The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
            <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
            <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
            <author fullname="N. Modadugu" initials="N." surname="Modadugu"/>
            <date month="April" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies version 1.3 of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. DTLS 1.3 allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.</t>
              <t>The DTLS 1.3 protocol is based on the Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3 protocol and provides equivalent security guarantees with the exception of order protection / non-replayability. Datagram semantics of the underlying transport are preserved by the DTLS protocol.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 6347.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9147"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9147"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5246">
          <front>
            <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2</title>
            <author fullname="T. Dierks" initials="T." surname="Dierks"/>
            <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
            <date month="August" year="2008"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies Version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications security over the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5246"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5246"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 118?>

<section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>Add your name here.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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