Composite Signatures For Use In Internet PKI

Composite Signatures For Use In Internet PKI Entrust Limited

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Security LAMPS Internet-Draft The migration to post-quantum cryptography is unique in the history of modern digital cryptography in that neither the old outgoing nor the new incoming algorithms are fully trusted to protect data for the required data lifetimes. The outgoing algorithms, such as RSA and elliptic curve, may fall to quantum cryptanalysis, while the incoming post-quantum algorithms face uncertainty about both the underlying mathematics as well as hardware and software implementations that have not had sufficient maturing time to rule out classical cryptanalytic attacks and implementation bugs. Cautious implementers may wish to layer cryptographic algorithms such that an attacker would need to break all of them in order to compromise the data being protected using either a Post-Quantum / Traditional Hybrid, Post-Quantum / Post-Quantum Hybrid, or combinations thereof. This document, and its companions, defines a specific instantiation of hybrid paradigm called "composite" where multiple cryptographic algorithms are combined to form a single key or signature such that they can be treated as a single atomic object at the protocol level. This document defines the structures CompositeSignaturePublicKey, CompositeSignaturePrivateKey and CompositeSignatureValue, which are sequences of the respective structure for each component algorithm. Composite signature algorithm identifiers are specified in this document which represent the explicit combinations of the underlying component algorithms.

Changes in version -10 Changes affecting interoperability: Changed all SEQUENCE OF SIZE (2..MAX) to SEQUENCE OF SIZE (2). Removed CompositeSignatureParams since all params are now explicit in the Object IDs Made RSA keys fixed-length at 3072 Removee redundency of subject public key overhead since OID fully specifies the keytype and parameters Re-worked wire format of the composite signature by prehashing and concatenating the OID to each component signature. This is believed to give the binding between the two component algorithms a stronger non-separability property. Editorial changes: Made this document standalone by folding in the minimum necessary content from composite-keys Added a paragraph describing how to reconstitute component Subject Public Key Infos Added a section showing the HEX encoding of the String Algorithm Names Added a section on pre-hashing Rename Dilithium to ML-DSA and Falcon to FN-DSA Added an Implementation Consideration about FIPS validation where only one component algorithm is FIPS-approved. Added a section on Signature APIs (Keygen, Sign, Verify) in introduction Added reference to draft-vaira-pquip-pqc-use-cases-00 TODO Refactored to use MartinThomson github template

Introduction During the transition to post-quantum cryptography, there will be uncertainty as to the strength of cryptographic algorithms; we will no longer fully trust traditional cryptography such as RSA, Diffie-Hellman, DSA and their elliptic curve variants, but we will also not fully trust their post-quantum replacements until they have had sufficient scrutiny and time to discover and fix implementation bugs. Unlike previous cryptographic algorithm migrations, the choice of when to migrate and which algorithms to migrate to, is not so clear. Even after the migration period, it may be advantageous for an entity's cryptographic identity to be composed of multiple public-key algorithms. Cautious implementers may wish to combine cryptographic algorithms such that an attacker would need to break all of them in order to compromise the data being protected. Such mechanisms are referred to as Post-Quantum / Traditional Hybrids . PQ/T Hybrid cryptography can, in general, provide solutions to two migration problems: Algorithm strength uncertainty: During the transition period, some post-quantum signature and encryption algorithms will not be fully trusted, while also the trust in legacy public key algorithms will start to erode. A relying party may learn some time after deployment that a public key algorithm has become untrustworthy, but in the interim, they may not know which algorithm an adversary has compromised. Ease-of-migration: During the transition period, systems will require mechanisms that allow for staged migrations from fully classical to fully post-quantum-aware cryptography. Safeguard against faulty algorithm implementations and compromised keys: Even for long known algorithms there is a non-negligible risk of severe implementation faults. Latest examples are the ROCA attack and ECDSA psychic signatures. Using more than one algorithms will mitigate these risks. This document defines a specific instantiation of the PQ/T Hybrid paradigm called "composite" where multiple cryptographic algorithms are combined to form a single signature such that it can be treated as a single atomic algorithm at the protocol level. Composite algorithms address algorithm strength uncertainty because the composite algorithm remains strong so long as one of its components remains strong. Concrete instantiations of composite signature algorithms are provided based on ML-DSA, Falcon, RSA and ECDSA. Backwards compatibility is not directly covered in this document, but is the subject of . This document is intended for general applicability anywhere that digital signatures are used within PKIX and CMS structures. For a more detailed use-case discussion for composite signatures, the reader is encouraged to look at

Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. The following terms are used in this document: ALGORITHM: A standardized cryptographic primitive, as well as any ASN.1 structures needed for encoding data and metadata needed to use the algorithm. This document is primarily concerned with algorithms for producing digital signatures. BER: Basic Encoding Rules (BER) as defined in . CLIENT: Any software that is making use of a cryptographic key. This includes a signer, verifier, encrypter, decrypter. COMPONENT ALGORITHM: A single basic algorithm which is contained within a composite algorithm. COMPOSITE ALGORITHM: An algorithm which is a sequence of two or more component algorithms, as defined in . DER: Distinguished Encoding Rules as defined in . LEGACY: For the purposes of this document, a legacy algorithm is any cryptographic algorithm currently is use which is not believe to be resistant to quantum cryptanalysis. PKI: Public Key Infrastructure, as defined in . POST-QUANTUM ALGORITHM: Any cryptographic algorithm which is believed to be resistant to classical and quantum cryptanalysis, such as the algorithms being considered for standardization by NIST. PUBLIC / PRIVATE KEY: The public and private portion of an asymmetric cryptographic key, making no assumptions about which algorithm. SIGNATURE: A digital cryptographic signature, making no assumptions about which algorithm. STRIPPING ATTACK: An attack in which the attacker is able to downgrade the cryptographic object to an attacker-chosen subset of original set of component algorithms in such a way that it is not detectable by the receiver. For example, substituting a composite public key or signature for a version with fewer components.

Composite Design Philosophy defines composites as:

Composite Cryptographic Element: A cryptographic element that incorporates multiple component cryptographic elements of the same type in a multi-algorithm scheme.

Composite keys as defined here follow this definition and should be regarded as a single key that performs a single cryptographic operation such key generation, signing, verifying, encapsulating, or decapsulating -- using its internal sequence of component keys as if they form a single key. This generally means that the complexity of combining algorithms can and should be handled by the cryptographic library or cryptographic module, and the single composite public key, private key, and ciphertext can be carried in existing fields in protocols such as PKCS#10 , CMP , X.509 , CMS , and the Trust Anchor Format [RFC5914]. In this way, composites achieve "protocol backwards-compatibility" in that they will drop cleanly into any protocol that accepts KEM algorithms without requiring any modification of the protocol to handle multiple keys.

Composite Signatures Here we define the signature mechanism in which a signature is a cryptographic primitive that consists of three algorithms: KeyGen() -> (pk, sk): A probabilistic key generation algorithm, which generates a public key pk and a secret key sk. Sign(sk, Message) -> (signature): A signing algorithm which takes as input a secret key sk and a Message, and outputs a signature Verify(pk, Message, signature) -> true or false: A verification algorithm which takes as input a public key, a Message and signature and outputs true if the signature and public key can be used to verify the message. Thus it proves the Message was signed with the secret key associated with the public key and verifies the integrity of the Message. If the signature and public key cannot verify the Message, it returns false. A composite signature allows two or more underlying signature algorithms to be combined into a single cryptographic signature operation and can be used for applications that require signatures.

Composite KeyGen The KeyGen() -> (pk, sk) of a composite signature algorithm will perform the KeyGen() of the respective component signature algorithms and it produces a composite public key pk as per and a composite secret key sk is per .

Composite Sign Generation of a composite signature involves applying each component algorithm's signature process to the input message according to its specification, and then placing each component signature value into the CompositeSignatureValue structure defined in . The following process is used to generate composite signature values.

(signature) Input: K1, K2 Signing private keys for each component. See note below on composite inputs. A1, A2 Component signature algorithms. See note below on composite inputs. Message The Message to be signed, an octet string HASH The Message Digest Algorithm used for pre-hashing. See section on pre-hashing below. OID The Composite Signature String Algorithm Name converted from ASCII to bytes. See section on OID concatenation below. Output: signature The composite signature, a CompositeSignatureValue Signature Generation Process: 1. Compute a Hash of the Message M' = HASH(Message) 2. Generate the n component signatures independently, according to their algorithm specifications. S1 := Sign( K1, A1, OID || M' ) S2 := Sign( K2, A2, OID || M' ) 3. Encode each component signature S1 and S2 into a BIT STRING according to its algorithm specification. signature ::= Sequence { S1, S2 } 4. Output signature ]]> Note on composite inputs: the method of providing the list of component keys and algorithms is flexible and beyond the scope of this pseudo-code. When passed to the Composite Sign(sk, Message) API the sk is a CompositePrivateKey. It is possible to construct a CompositePrivateKey from component keys stored in separate software or hardware keystores. Variations in the process to accommodate particular private key storage mechanisms are considered to be conformant to this document so long as it produces the same output as the process sketched above. Since recursive composite public keys are disallowed, no component signature may itself be a composite; ie the signature generation process MUST fail if one of the private keys K1 or K2 is a composite. A composite signature MUST produce, and include in the output, a signature value for every component key in the corresponding CompositePublicKey, and they MUST be in the same order; ie in the output, S1 MUST correspond to K1, S2 to K2.

Composite Verify Verification of a composite signature involves applying each component algorithm's verification process according to its specification. In the absence of an application profile specifying otherwise, compliant applications MUST output "Valid signature" (true) if and only if all component signatures were successfully validated, and "Invalid signature" (false) otherwise. The following process is used to perform this verification.

Note on composite inputs: the method of providing the list of component keys and algorithms is flexible and beyond the scope of this pseudo-code. When passed to the Composite Verify(pk, Message, signature) API the pk is a CompositePublicKey. It is possible to construct a CompositePublicKey from component keys stored in separate software or hardware keystores. Variations in the process to accommodate particular private key storage mechanisms are considered to be conformant to this document so long as it produces the same output as the process sketched above. Since recursive composite public keys are disallowed, no component signature may itself be a composite; ie the signature generation process MUST fail if one of the private keys K1 or K2 is a composite.

OID Concatenation As mentioned above, the OID input value for the Composite Signature Generation and verification process is the String representation of the OID converted from ASCII to bytes. The following table shows the HEX encoding of the ASCII String representation for each Signature AlgorithmID Composite Signature AlgorithmID HEX Encoding to be prepended to each Message id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256 69642D4D4C44534134342D525341323034382D5053532D534841323536 id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256 69642D4D4C44534134342D525341323034382D504B435331352D534841323536 id-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512 69642D4D4C44534134342D456432353531392D534841353132 id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 69642D4D4C44534134342D45434453412D503235362D534841323536 id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256 69642D4D4C44534134342D45434453412D627261696E706F6F6C5032353672312D534841323536 id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA256 69642D4D4C44534136352D525341333037322D5053532D534841323536 id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA256 69642D4D4C44534136352D525341333037322D504B435331352D534841323536 id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 69642D4D4C44534136352D45434453412D503235362D534841323536 id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256 69642D4D4C44534136352D45434453412D627261696E706F6F6C5032353672312D534841323536 id-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512 69642D4D4C44534136352D456432353531392D534841353132 id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA384 69642D4D4C44534138372D45434453412D503338342D534841333834 id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA384 69642D4D4C44534138372D45434453412D627261696E706F6F6C5033383472312D534841333834 id-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256 69642D4D4C44534138372D45643434382D5348414B45323536 id-Falon512-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 69642D46616C6F6E3531322D45434453412D503235362D534841323536 id-Falcon512-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256 69642D46616C636F6E3531322D45434453412D627261696E706F6F6C5032353672312D534841323536 id-Falcon512-Ed25519-SHA512 69642D46616C636F6E3531322D456432353531392D534841353132

PreHashing the Message As noted in the composite signature generation process and composite signature verification process, the Message should be pre-hashed into M' with the digest algorithm specified in the composite signature algorithm identifier. The choice of the digest algorithm was chosen with the following criteria: For composites paired with RSA or ECDSA, the hashing algorithm SHA256 or SHA384 is used as part of the RSA or ECDSA signature algorithm and is therefore also used as the composite prehashing algorithm. For Dilithium signing a digest of the message is allowed as long as the hash function provides at least y bits of classical security strength against both collision and second preimage attacks. For MLDSA44 y is 128 bits, MLDSA65 y is 192 bits and for MLDSA87 y is 256 bits. Therefore SHA256 paired with RSA and SHA256 and SHA384 paired with ECDSA match the appropriate security strength. Ed25519 uses SHA512 internally, therefore SHA512 is used to pre-hash the message when Ed25519 is a component algorithm. Ed448 uses SHAKE256 internally, therefore SHA256 with an output length of 512 bits is used to pre-hash the message when Ed448 is a component algorithm. This is denoted in the table in as SHAKE256/512. TODO: For Falcon signing it is expected prehashing digest accomodations will be allowed.

Algorithm Selection Criteria The composite algorithm combinations defined in this document were chosen according to the following guidelines: A single RSA combination is provided at a key size of 3072 bits, matched with NIST PQC Level 3 algorithms. Elliptic curve algorithms are provided with combinations on each of the NIST , Brainpool , and Edwards curves. NIST PQC Levels 1 - 3 algorithms are matched with 256-bit curves, while NIST levels 4 - 5 are matched with 384-bit elliptic curves. This provides a balance between matching classical security levels of post-quantum and traditional algorithms, and also selecting elliptic curves which already have wide adoption. NIST level 1 candidates are provided, matched with 256-bit elliptic curves, intended for constrained use cases. If other combinations are needed, a separate specification should be submitted to the IETF LAMPS working group. To ease implementation, these specifications are encouraged to follow the construction pattern of the algorithms specified in this document. The composite structures defined in this specification allow only for pairs of algorithms. This also does not preclude future specification from extending these structures to define combinations with three or more components.

Composite Signature Structures In order for signatures to be composed of multiple algorithms, we define encodings consisting of a sequence of signature primitives (aka "component algorithms") such that these structures can be used as a drop-in replacement for existing signature fields such as those found in PKCS#10 , CMP , X.509 , CMS .

pk-CompositeSignature The following ASN.1 Information Object Class is a template to be used in defining all composite Signature public key types.

As an example, the public key type pk-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 is defined as:

The full set of key types defined by this specification can be found in the ASN.1 Module in .

CompositeSignaturePublicKey Composite public key data is represented by the following structure:

A composite key MUST contain two component public keys. The order of the component keys is determined by the definition of the corresponding algorithm identifier as defined in section . Some applications may need to reconstruct the SubjectPublicKeyInfo objects corresponding to each component public key. in provides the necessary mapping between composite and their component algorithms for doing this reconstruction. This also motivates the design choice of SEQUENCE OF BIT STRING instead of SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING; using BIT STRING allows for easier transcription between CompositeSignaturePublicKey and SubjectPublicKeyInfo. When the CompositeSignaturePublicKey must be provided in octet string or bit string format, the data structure is encoded as specified in .

CompositeSignaturePrivateKey Usecases that require an interoperable encoding for composite private keys, such as when private keys are carried in PKCS #12 , CMP or CRMF MUST use the following structure.

Each element is a OneAsymmetricKey` object for a component private key. The parameters field MUST be absent. The order of the component keys is the same as the order defined in for the components of CompositeSignaturePublicKey. When a CompositePrivateKey is conveyed inside a OneAsymmetricKey structure (version 1 of which is also known as PrivateKeyInfo) , the privateKeyAlgorithm field SHALL be set to the corresponding composite algorithm identifier defined according to , the privateKey field SHALL contain the CompositeSignaturePrivateKey, and the publicKey field MUST NOT be present. Associated public key material MAY be present in the CompositeSignaturePrivateKey. In some usecases the private keys that comprise a composite key may not be represented in a single structure or even be contained in a single cryptographic module; for example if one component is within the FIPS boundary of a cryptographic module and the other is not; see {sec-fips} for more discussion. The establishment of correspondence between public keys in a CompositeSignaturePublicKey and private keys not represented in a single composite structure is beyond the scope of this document.

Encoding Rules Many protocol specifications will require that the composite public key and composite private key data structures be represented by an octet string or bit string. When an octet string is required, the DER encoding of the composite data structure SHALL be used directly.

When a bit string is required, the octets of the DER encoded composite data structure SHALL be used as the bits of the bit string, with the most significant bit of the first octet becoming the first bit, and so on, ending with the least significant bit of the last octet becoming the last bit of the bit string.

In the interests of simplicity and avoiding compatibility issues, implementations that parse these structures MAY accept both BER and DER.

Key Usage Bits For protocols such as X.509 that specify key usage along with the public key, then the composite public key associated with a composite signature MUST have a signing-type key usage. If the keyUsage extension is present in a Certification Authority (CA) certificate that indicates a composite key, then any combination of the following values MAY be present:

If the keyUsage extension is present in an End Entity (EE) certificate that indicates a composite key, then any combination of the following values MAY be present:

Composite Signature Structures

sa-CompositeSignature The ASN.1 algorithm object for a composite signature is:

The following is an explanation how SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM elements are used to create Composite Signatures: SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM element Definition IDENTIFIER The Object ID used to identify the composite Signature Algorithm VALUE The Sequence of BIT STRINGS for each component signature value PARAMS Parameters are absent PUBLIC-KEYS The composite key required to produce the composite signature

CompositeSignatureValue The output of the composite signature algorithm is the DER encoding of the following structure:

Where each BIT STRING within the SEQUENCE is a signature value produced by one of the component keys. It MUST contain one signature value produced by each component algorithm, and in the same order as specified in the object identifier. The choice of SEQUENCE SIZE (2) OF BIT STRING, rather than for example a single BIT STRING containing the concatenated signature values, is to gracefully handle variable-length signature values by taking advantage of ASN.1's built-in length fields.

Algorithm Identifiers This section defines the algorithm identifiers for explicit combinations. For simplicity and prototyping purposes, the signature algorithm object identifiers specified in this document are the same as the composite key object Identifiers. A proper implementation should not presume that the object ID of a composite key will be the same as its composite signature algorithm. This section is not intended to be exhaustive and other authors may define others composite signature algorithms so long as they are compatible with the structures and processes defined in this and companion public and private key documents. Some use-cases desire the flexibility for clients to use any combination of supported algorithms, while others desire the rigidity of explicitly-specified combinations of algorithms. The following table summarizes the details for each explicit composite signature algorithms: The OID referenced are TBD for prototyping only, and the following prefix is used for each: replace <CompSig> with the String "2.16.840.1.114027.80.7.1" Therefore <CompSig>.1 is equal to 2.16.840.1.114027.80.7.1.1 Signature public key types: Composite Signature AlgorithmID OID First Algorithm Second Algorithm Pre-Hash id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256 <CompSig>.1 MLDSA44 SHA256WithRSAEncryption SHA256 id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256 <CompSig>.2 MLDSA44 SHA256WithRSAEncryption SHA256 id-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512 <CompSig>.3 MLDSA44 Ed25519 SHA512 id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 <CompSig>.4 MLDSA44 SHA256withECDSA SHA256 id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256 <CompSig>.5 MLDSA44 SHA256withECDSA SHA256 id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA256 <CompSig>.6 MLDSA65 SHA256WithRSAPSS SHA256 id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA256 <CompSig>.7 MLDSA65 SHA256WithRSAEncryption SHA256 id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 <CompSig>.8 MLDSA65 SHA256withECDSA SHA256 id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256 <CompSig>.9 MLDSA65 SHA256withECDSA SHA256 id-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512 <CompSig>.10 MLDSA65 Ed25519 SHA512 id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA384 <CompSig>.11 MLDSA87 SHA384withECDSA SHA384 id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA384 <CompSig>.12 MLDSA87 SHA384withECDSA SHA384 id-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256 <CompSig>.13 MLDSA87 Ed448 SHAKE256/512 id-Falon512-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 <CompSig>.14 Falcon512 SHA256withECDSA SHA256 id-Falcon512-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256 <CompSig>.15 Falcon512 SHA256withECDSA SHA256 id-Falcon512-Ed25519-SHA512 <CompSig>.16 Falcon512 Ed25519 SHA512 The table above contains everything needed to implement the listed explicit composite algorithms. See the ASN.1 module in section for the explicit definitions of the above Composite signature algorithms. Full specifications for the referenced algorithms can be found as follows: MLDSA: and [FIPS.204-ipd] ECDSA: Ed25519 / Ed448: Falcon: TBD RSAES-PKCS-v1_5: RSASSA-PSS:

Notes on id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256 and id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA256 Use of RSA-PSS deserves a special explanation. The RSA component keys MUST be generated at the 2048-bit security level in order to match security level with ML-DSA-44 or at 3072-bits to match ML-DSA-65. As with the other composite signature algorithms, when id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256 or id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA256 is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the parameters MUST be absent. id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256 and id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA256 SHALL instantiate RSA-PSS with the following parameters: RSA-PSS Parameter Value Mask Generation Function mgf1 Mask Generation params SHA-256 Message Digest Algorithm SHA-256 where: Mask Generation Function (mgf1) is defined in SHA-256 is defined in .

ASN.1 Module

Composite-Signatures-2023 { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) entrust(114027) algorithm(80) id-composite-signatures-2023 (TBDMOD) } DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN EXPORTS ALL; IMPORTS PUBLIC-KEY, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, AlgorithmIdentifier{} FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 -- RFC 5912 [X509ASN1] { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) } SubjectPublicKeyInfo FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) } OneAsymmetricKey FROM AsymmetricKeyPackageModuleV1 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-asymmetricKeyPkgV1(50) } RSAPublicKey, ECPoint FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) } sa-rsaSSA-PSS FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs-02(54)} ; -- -- Object Identifiers -- -- Defined in ITU-T X.690 der OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-itu-t asn1(1) ber-derived(2) distinguished-encoding(1)} -- -- Signature Algorithm -- -- -- Composite Signature basic structures -- CompositeSignaturePublicKey ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (2) OF BIT STRING CompositeSignaturePublicKeyOs ::= OCTET STRING (CONTAINING CompositeSignaturePublicKey ENCODED BY der) CompositeSignaturePublicKeyBs ::= BIT STRING (CONTAINING CompositeSignaturePublicKey ENCODED BY der) CompositeSignaturePrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (2) OF OneAsymmetricKey CompositeSignatureValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (2) OF OCTET STRING -- Composite Signature Value is just a sequence of OCTET STRINGS -- CompositeSignaturePair{FirstSignatureValue, SecondSignatureValue} ::= -- SEQUENCE { -- signaturevalue1 FirstSignatureValue, -- signaturevalue2 SecondSignatureValue } -- An Explicit Compsite Signature is a set of Signatures which -- are composed of OCTET STRINGS -- ExplicitCompositeSignatureValue ::= CompositeSignaturePair { -- OCTET STRING,OCTET STRING} -- -- Information Object Classes -- pk-CompositeSignature { OBJECT IDENTIFIER:id, FirstPublicKeyType, SecondPublicKeyType} PUBLIC-KEY ::= { IDENTIFIER id KEY SEQUENCE { BIT STRING (CONTAINING FirstPublicKeyType) BIT STRING (CONTAINING SecondPublicKeyType) } PARAMS ARE absent CERT-KEY-USAGE { digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign } } sa-CompositeSignature{OBJECT IDENTIFIER:id, PUBLIC-KEY:publicKeyType } SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER id VALUE CompositeSignatureValue PARAMS ARE absent PUBLIC-KEYS {publicKeyType} } -- TODO: OID to be replaced by IANA id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) entrust(114027) algorithm(80) composite(7) signature(1) 1 } pk-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256 PUBLIC-KEY ::= pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256, OCTET STRING, RSAPublicKey} sa-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= sa-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256, pk-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256 } -- TODO: OID to be replaced by IANA id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) entrust(114027) algorithm(80) composite(7) signature(1) 2 } pk-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256 PUBLIC-KEY ::= pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256, OCTET STRING, RSAPublicKey} sa-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= sa-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256, pk-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256 } -- TODO: OID to be replaced by IANA id-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) entrust(114027) algorithm(80) composite(7) signature(1) 3 } pk-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::= pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512, OCTET STRING, ECPoint} sa-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= sa-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512, pk-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512 } -- TODO: OID to be replaced by IANA id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) entrust(114027) algorithm(80) composite(7) signature(1) 4 } pk-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 PUBLIC-KEY ::= pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256, OCTET STRING, ECPoint} sa-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= sa-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256, pk-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 } -- TODO: OID to be replaced by IANA id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) entrust(114027) algorithm(80) composite(7) signature(1) 5 } pk-MLDSA44-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256 PUBLIC-KEY ::= pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256, OCTET STRING, ECPoint} sa-MLDSA44-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= sa-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256, pk-MLDSA44-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256 } -- TODO: OID to be replaced by IANA id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) entrust(114027) algorithm(80) composite(7) signature(1) 6 } pk-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA256 PUBLIC-KEY ::= pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA256, OCTET STRING, RSAPublicKey} sa-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= sa-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA256, pk-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA256 } -- TODO: OID to be replaced by IANA id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) entrust(114027) algorithm(80) composite(7) signature(1) 7 } pk-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA256 PUBLIC-KEY ::= pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA256, OCTET STRING, RSAPublicKey} sa-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= sa-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA256, pk-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA256 } -- TODO: OID to be replaced by IANA id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) entrust(114027) algorithm(80) composite(7) signature(1) 8 } pk-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 PUBLIC-KEY ::= pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA256, OCTET STRING, ECPoint} sa-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= sa-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA256, pk-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 } -- TODO: OID to be replaced by IANA id-id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) entrust(114027) algorithm(80) composite(7) signature(1) 9 } pk-id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256 PUBLIC-KEY ::= pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256, OCTET STRING, ECPoint} sa-id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= sa-CompositeSignature{ id-id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256, pk-id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256 } -- TODO: OID to be replaced by IANA id-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) entrust(114027) algorithm(80) composite(7) signature(1) 10 } pk-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::= pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512, OCTET STRING, ECPoint} sa-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= sa-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512, pk-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512 } -- TODO: OID to be replaced by IANA id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) entrust(114027) algorithm(80) composite(7) signature(1) 11 } pk-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA384 PUBLIC-KEY ::= pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA384, OCTET STRING, ECPoint} sa-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA384 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= sa-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA384, pk-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA384 } -- TODO: OID to be replaced by IANA id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) entrust(114027) algorithm(80) composite(7) signature(1) 12 } pk-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA384 PUBLIC-KEY ::= pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA384, OCTET STRING, ECPoint} sa-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA384 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= sa-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA384, pk-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA384 } -- TODO: OID to be replaced by IANA id-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) entrust(114027) algorithm(80) composite(7) signature(1) 13 } pk-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256 PUBLIC-KEY ::= pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256, OCTET STRING, ECPoint} sa-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= sa-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256, pk-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256 } -- TODO: OID to be replaced by IANA id-Falon512-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) entrust(114027) algorithm(80) composite(7) signature(1) 14 } pk-Falon512-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 PUBLIC-KEY ::= pk-CompositeSignature{ id-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256, OCTET STRING, ECPoint} sa-Falon512-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= sa-CompositeSignature{ id-Falon512-ECDSA-P256-SHA256, pk-Falon512-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 } -- TODO: OID to be replaced by IANA id-Falcon512-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) entrust(114027) algorithm(80) composite(7) signature(1) 15 } pk-Falcon512-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256 PUBLIC-KEY ::= pk-CompositeSignature{ id-Falcon512-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256, OCTET STRING, ECPoint} sa-Falcon512-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= sa-CompositeSignature{ id-Falcon512-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256, pk-Falcon512-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256 } -- TODO: OID to be replaced by IANA id-Falcon512-Ed25519-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) entrust(114027) algorithm(80) composite(7) signature(1) 16 } pk-Falcon512-Ed25519-SHA512 PUBLIC-KEY ::= pk-CompositeSignature{ id-Falcon512-Ed25519-SHA512, OCTET STRING, ECPoint} sa-Falcon512-Ed25519-SHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= sa-CompositeSignature{ id-Falcon512-Ed25519-SHA512, pk-Falcon512-Ed25519-SHA512 } END

]]>


IANA Considerations

Object Identifier Allocations
EDNOTE to IANA: OIDs will need to be replaced in both the ASN.1 module and in .

Module Registration - SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier

  Decimal: IANA Assigned - Replace TBDMOD
  Description: Composite-Signatures-2023 - id-mod-composite-signatures
  References: This Document



Object Identifier Registrations - SMI Security for PKIX Algorithms


  id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256
  Decimal: IANA Assigned
  Description:  id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PSS-SHA256
  References: This Document
  id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256
  Decimal: IANA Assigned
  Description:  id-MLDSA44-RSA2048-PKCS15-SHA256
  References: This Document
  id-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512
  Decimal: IANA Assigned
  Description:  id-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512
  References: This Document
  id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256
  Decimal: IANA Assigned
  Description:  id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256
  References: This Document
  id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256
  Decimal: IANA Assigned
  Description:  id-MLDSA44-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256
  References: This Document
  id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA256
  Decimal: IANA Assigned
  Description:  id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PSS-SHA256
  References: This Document
  id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA256
  Decimal: IANA Assigned
  Description:  id-MLDSA65-RSA3072-PKCS15-SHA256
  References: This Document
  id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA256
  Decimal: IANA Assigned
  Description:  id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA256
  References: This Document
  id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256
  Decimal: IANA Assigned
  Description:  id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256
  References: This Document
  id-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512
  Decimal: IANA Assigned
  Description:  id-MLDSA65-Ed25519-SHA512
  References: This Document
  id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA384
  Decimal: IANA Assigned
  Description:  id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-P384-SHA384
  References: This Document
  id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA384
  Decimal: IANA Assigned
  Description:  id-MLDSA87-ECDSA-brainpoolP384r1-SHA384
  References: This Document
  id-MLDSA87-Ed448-SHAKE256
  Decimal: IANA Assigned
  Description:  id-MLDSA87-Ed448
  References: This Document
  id-Falon512-ECDSA-P256-SHA256
  Decimal: IANA Assigned
  Description:  id-Falon512-ECDSA-P256-SHA256
  References: This Document
  id-Falcon512-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256
  Decimal: IANA Assigned
  Description:  id-Falcon512-ECDSA-brainpoolP256r1-SHA256
  References: This Document
  id-Falcon512-Ed25519-SHA512
  Decimal: IANA Assigned
  Description:  id-Falcon512-Ed25519
  References: This Document







Security Considerations

Policy for Deprecated and Acceptable Algorithms

Traditionally, a public key, certificate, or signature contains a single cryptographic algorithm. If and when an algorithm becomes deprecated (for example, RSA-512, or SHA1), then clients performing signatures or verifications should be updated to adhere to appropriate policies.

In the composite model this is less obvious since implementers may decide that certain cryptographic algorithms have complementary security properties and are acceptable in combination even though one or both algorithms are deprecated for individual use. As such, a single composite public key or certificate may contain a mixture of deprecated and non-deprecated algorithms.

Since composite algorithms are registered independently of their component algorithms, their deprecation can be handled indpendently from that of their component algorithms. For example a cryptographic policy might continue to allow id-MLDSA65-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 even after ECDH-P256 is deprecated.



  


    

&RFC2119;
&RFC2986;
&RFC4210;
&RFC4211;
&RFC5280;
&RFC5480;
&RFC5639;
&RFC5652;
&RFC5958;
&RFC6090;
&RFC6234;
&RFC7748;
&RFC8032;
&RFC8174;
&RFC8410;
&RFC8411;

  
    Information technology - ASN.1 encoding Rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)
    
      ITU-T
    
    
  
  



    

    

&RFC3279;
&RFC7292;
&RFC7296;
&RFC8446;
&RFC8551;
&RFC8017;
&I-D.draft-ounsworth-pq-composite-kem-01;
&I-D.draft-becker-guthrie-noncomposite-hybrid-auth-00;
&I-D.draft-guthrie-ipsecme-ikev2-hybrid-auth-00;
&I-D.draft-pala-klaussner-composite-kofn-00;
&I-D.draft-driscoll-pqt-hybrid-terminology-01;
&I-D.draft-vaira-pquip-pqc-use-cases-00;
&I-D.draft-massimo-lamps-pq-sig-certificates-00;
&I-D.draft-ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates-01;

  
    Transitioning to a quantum-resistant public key infrastructure
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
  



    


Samples

Explicit Composite Signature Examples

MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256-SHA256 Public Key

-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----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-----END PUBLIC KEY-----


MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256 Private Key

-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END PRIVATE KEY-----


MLDSA44-ECDSA-P256 Self-Signed X509 Certificate

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-----END CERTIFICATE-----




Implementation Considerations

FIPS certification

One of the primary design goals of this specification is for the overall composite algorithm to be able to be considered FIPS-approved even when one of the component algorithms is not.

Implementors seeking FIPS certification of a composite Signature algorithm where only one of the component algorithms has been FIPS-validated or FIPS-approved should credit the FIPS-validated component algorithm with full security strength, the non-FIPS-validated component algorith with zero security, and the overall composite should be considered full strength and thus FIPS-approved.

The authors wish to note that this gives composite algorithms great future utility both for future cryptographic migrations as well as bridging across jurisdictions; for example defining composite algorithms which combine FIPS cryptography with cryptography from a different national standards body.


Backwards Compatibility

The term "backwards compatibility" is used here to mean something more specific; that existing systems as they are deployed today can interoperate with the upgraded systems of the future.  This draft explicitly does not provide backwards compatibility, only upgraded systems will understand the OIDs defined in this document.

If backwards compatibility is required, then additional mechanisms will be needed.  Migration and interoperability concerns need to be thought about in the context of various types of protocols that make use of X.509 and PKIX with relation to digital signature objects, from online negotiated protocols such as TLS 1.3  and IKEv2 , to non-negotiated asynchronous protocols such as S/MIME signed email , document signing such as in the context of the European eIDAS regulations [eIDAS2014], and publicly trusted code signing [codeSigningBRsv2.8], as well as myriad other standardized and proprietary protocols and applications that leverage CMS  signed structures.  Composite simplifies the protocol design work because it can be implemented as a signature algorithm that fits into existing systems.

Parallel PKIs

We present the term "Parallel PKI" to refer to the setup where a PKI end entity possesses two or more distinct public keys or certificates for the same identity (name), but containing keys for different cryptographic algorithms. One could imagine a set of parallel PKIs where an existing PKI using legacy algorithms (RSA, ECC) is left operational during the post-quantum migration but is shadowed by one or more parallel PKIs using pure post quantum algorithms or composite algorithms (legacy and post-quantum).

Equipped with a set of parallel public keys in this way, a client would have the flexibility to choose which public key(s) or certificate(s) to use in a given signature operation.

For negotiated protocols, the client could choose which public key(s) or certificate(s) to use based on the negotiated algorithms, or could combine two of the public keys for example in a non-composite hybrid method such as  or . Note that it is possible to use the signature algorithms defined in  as a way to carry the multiple signature values generated by one of the non-composite public mechanism in protocols where it is easier to support the composite signature algorithms than to implement such a mechanism in the protocol itself. There is also nothing precluding a composite public key from being one of the components used within a non-composite authentication operation; this may lead to greater convenience in setting up parallel PKI hierarchies that need to service a range of clients implementing different styles of post-quantum migration strategies.

For non-negotiated protocols, the details for obtaining backwards compatibility will vary by protocol, but for example in CMS , the inclusion of multiple SignerInfo objects is often already treated as an OR relationship, so including one for each of the signer's parallel PKI public keys would, in many cases, have the desired effect of allowing the receiver to choose one they are compatible with and ignore the others, thus achieving full backwards compatibility.


Hybrid Extensions (Keys and Signatures)
The use of Composite Crypto provides the possibility to process multiple algorithms without changing the logic of applications, but updating the cryptographic libraries: one-time change across the whole system. However, when it is not possible to upgrade the crypto engines/libraries, it is possible to leverage X.509 extensions to encode the additional keys and signatures. When the custom extensions are not marked critical, although this approach provides the most
backward-compatible approach where clients can simply ignore the post-quantum (or extra) keys and signatures, it also requires
all applications to be updated for correctly processing multiple algorithms together.






Intellectual Property Considerations

The following IPR Disclosure relates to this draft:

https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/3588/


Contributors and Acknowledgements
This document incorporates contributions and comments from a large group of experts. The Editors would especially like to acknowledge the expertise and tireless dedication of the following people, who attended many long meetings and generated millions of bytes of electronic mail and VOIP traffic over the past year in pursuit of this document:

Serge Mister (Entrust),
Scott Fluhrer (Cisco Systems),
Panos Kampanakis (Cisco Systems),
Daniel Van Geest (ISARA),
Tim Hollebeek (Digicert), and
Francois Rousseau.

We are grateful to all, including any contributors who may have
been inadvertently omitted from this list.

This document borrows text from similar documents, including those referenced below. Thanks go to the authors of those
   documents.  "Copying always makes things easier and less error prone" - .

Making contributions

Additional contributions to this draft are welcome. Please see the working copy of this draft at, as well as open issues at:

https://github.com/EntrustCorporation/draft-ounsworth-composite-sigs