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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-pauly-ohai-svcb-config-02" category="info" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="Oblivious Services in SVCB">Discovery of Oblivious Services via Service Binding Records</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-pauly-ohai-svcb-config-02"/>
    <author initials="T." surname="Pauly" fullname="Tommy Pauly">
      <organization>Apple Inc.</organization>
      <address>
        <email>tpauly@apple.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="T." surname="Reddy" fullname="Tirumaleswar Reddy">
      <organization>Akamai</organization>
      <address>
        <email>kondtir@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2022" month="July" day="05"/>
    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>Oblivious HTTP Application Intermediation</workgroup>
    <keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document defines a parameter that can be included in SVCB and HTTPS
DNS resource records to denote that a service is accessible using Oblivious
HTTP, with an indication of which Oblivious Gateway Resource to use to access
the service (as an Oblivious Target Resource). This document also defines
a mechanism to learn the key configuration of the related Oblivious Gateway Resource.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-pauly-ohai-svcb-config/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        Oblivious HTTP Application Intermediation Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:ohai@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ohai/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/tfpauly/draft-ohai-svcb-config"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>Oblivious HTTP <xref target="OHTTP"/> allows clients to encrypt
messages exchanged with an Oblivious Target Resource (target). The messages
are encapsulated in encrypted messages to an Oblivious Gateway Resource
(gateway), which gates access to the target. The gateway is access via an
Oblivious Relay Resource (relay), which proxies the encapsulated messages
to hide the identity of the client. Overall, this architecture is designed
in such a way that the relay cannot inspect the contents of messages, and
the gateway and target cannot discover the client's identity.</t>
      <t>Since Oblivious HTTP deployments will often involve very specific coordination
between clients, relays, and gateways, the key configuration can often be
shared in a bespoke fashion. However, some deployments involve clients
discovering oblivious targets and their assoicated gateways more dynamically.
For example, a network may want to advertise a DNS resolver that is accessible
over Oblivious HTTP and applies local network resolution policies via mechanisms
like Discovery of Designated Resolvers (<xref target="DDR"/>. Clients
can work with trusted relays to access these gateways.</t>
      <t>This document defines a mechanism to advertise that an HTTP service supports
Oblivious HTTP using DNS records, as a parameter that can be included in SVCB
and HTTPS DNS resource records <xref target="SVCB"/>.
The presence of this parameter indicates that a service can act as an oblivious
target, and indicates an oblivious gateway that can provide access to the target.</t>
      <t>This document also defines a way to fetch an oblivious gateway's key configuration
by sending a request to the gateway (<xref target="config-fetch"/>).</t>
      <t>This mechanism does not aid in the discovery of oblivious relays;
relay configuration is out of scope for this document.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions">
      <name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="the-oblivious-gateway-svcparamkey">
      <name>The oblivious-gateway SvcParamKey</name>
      <t>The "oblivious-gateway" SvcParamKey (<xref target="iana"/>) is used to indicate that a
service described in an SVCB record can be accessed as an oblivious target
using the specified gateway. The service that is queried by the client hosts
one or more target resources. The gateway is a separate resource that is indicated
by the SVCB record parameter, which allows oblivious access to any target resource
hosted by the service described in the SVCB record.</t>
      <t>In order to access the service's target resources obliviously, the client
needs to send encapsulated messages to the gateway resource using the gateway's
key configuration (which can be retrieved using the method described in
<xref target="config-fetch"/>).</t>
      <t>The presentation format of the "oblivious-gateway" parameter is a
comma-separated list of one or more gateway URIs. URIs <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be encoded
as escaped items if they include "," or "", replacing these with "\,"
and "\", respectively.</t>
      <t>The wire format consists of one or more URIs encoded in UTF-8 <xref target="RFC3629"/>,
each prefixed by its length as a single octet, with these length-value pairs
concatenated to form the SvcParamValue. These pairs <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> exactly fill the
SvcParamValue; otherwise, the SvcParamValue is malformed.</t>
      <t>The "oblivious-gateway" parameter can be included in the mandatory parameter
list to ensure that clients that do not support oblivious access
do not try to use the service. Services that mark the oblivious-gateway
parameter as mandatory can, therefore, indicate that the service might
not be accessible in a non-oblivious fashion. Services that are
intended to be accessed either with an oblivious gateway or directly
<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> mark the "oblivious-gateway" parameter as mandatory. Note that since
multiple SVCB responses can be provided for a single query, the oblivious
and non-oblivious versions of a single service can have different SVCB
records to support different names or properties.</t>
      <t>The media type to use for encapsulated requests made to a target service
depends on the scheme of the SVCB record. This document defines the
interpretation for the "https" <xref target="SVCB"/> and "dns" <xref target="DNS-SVCB"/>
schemes. Other schemes that want to use this parameter <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> define the
interpretation and meaning of the configuration.</t>
      <section anchor="use-in-https-service-records">
        <name>Use in HTTPS service records</name>
        <t>For the "https" scheme, which uses the HTTPS RR type instead of SVCB,
the presence of the "oblivious-gateway" parameter means that the target
being described is an Oblivious HTTP service that uses the default
"message/bhttp" media type <xref target="OHTTP"/>
          <xref target="BINARY-HTTP"/>.</t>
        <t>For example, an HTTPS service record for svc.example.com that supports
an oblivious gateway could look like this:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
svc.example.com. 7200  IN HTTPS 1 . (
     alpn=h2 oblivious-gateway=https://osvc.example.com/gateway )
]]></artwork>
        <t>A similar record for a service that only support oblivious connectivity
could look like this:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
svc.example.com. 7200  IN HTTPS 1 . (
    mandatory=oblivious-gateway
    oblivious-gateway=https://osvc.example.com/gateway )
]]></artwork>
      </section>
      <section anchor="use-in-dns-server-svcb-records">
        <name>Use in DNS server SVCB records</name>
        <t>For the "dns" scheme, as defined in <xref target="DNS-SVCB"/>, the presence of
the "oblivious-gateway" parameter means that the DNS server being
described is an Oblivious DNS over HTTP (DoH) service. The default
media type expected for use in Oblivious HTTP to DNS resolvers
is "application/dns-message" <xref target="DOH"/>.</t>
        <t>In order for DNS servers to function as oblivious targets, their
associated gateways need to be accessible via an oblivious relay.
Encrypted DNS servers used with the discovery mechanisms described
in this section can either be publicly accessible, or specific to a
network. In general, only publicly accessible DNS servers will work
as oblivious DNS servers, unless there is a coordinated deployment
with an oblivious relay that is also hosted within a network.</t>
        <section anchor="ddr">
          <name>Use with DDR</name>
          <t>Clients can discover an oblivious DNS server configuration using
DDR, by either querying _dns.resolver.arpa to a locally configured
resolver or querying using the name of a resolver <xref target="DDR"/>.</t>
          <t>For example, a DoH service advertised over DDR can be annotated
as supporting oblivious resolution using the following record:</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
_dns.resolver.arpa  7200  IN SVCB 1 doh.example.net (
     alpn=h2 dohpath=/dns-query{?dns}
     oblivious-gateway=https://odoh.example.net/gateway  )
]]></artwork>
          <t>Clients still need to perform some verification of oblivious DNS servers,
such as the TLS certificate check described in <xref target="DDR"/>. This certificate
check can be done when looking up the configuration on the gateway
as described in <xref target="config-fetch"/>, which can either be done directly,
or via the relay or another proxy to avoid exposing client IP addresses.</t>
          <t>Clients also need to ensure that they are not being targeted with unique
key configurations that would reveal their identity. See <xref target="security"/> for
more discussion.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="dnr">
          <name>Use with DNR</name>
          <t>The SvcParamKeys defined in this document also can be used with Discovery
of Network-designated Resolvers (DNR) <xref target="DNR"/>. In this
case, the oblivious configuration and path parameters can be included
in DHCP and Router Advertisement messages.</t>
          <t>While DNR does not require the same kind of verification as DDR, clients
still need to ensure that they are not being targeted with unique
key configurations that would reveal their identity. See <xref target="security"/> for
more discussion.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="config-fetch">
      <name>Key Configuration Fetching</name>
      <t>Clients that know a service is available as an oblivious target
via discovery through the "oblivious-gateway" parameter in a SVCB or HTTPS
record need to know the key configuration of the gateway before sending
oblivious requests.</t>
      <t>In order to fetch the key configuration of an oblivious gateway discovered
in this manner, the client issues a GET request to the URI of the gateway
specifying the "application/ohttp-keys" (<xref target="OHTTP"/>) media type in the Accept
header.</t>
      <t>For example, if the client receives the following record:</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
svc.example.com. 7200  IN HTTPS 1 . (
     alpn=h2 oblivious-gateway=https://osvc.example.com/gateway )
]]></artwork>
      <t>It could fetch the key configuration with the following request:</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
GET /gateway HTTP/1.1
Host: osvc.example.com
Accept: application/ohttp-keys
]]></artwork>
      <t>Oblivious gateways that coordinate with targets that advertise oblivious
support <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> support GET requests for their key configuration in this
manner, unless there is another out-of-band configuration model that is
usable by clients. Gateways respond with their key configuration in the
response body, with a content type of "application/ohttp-keys".</t>
      <t>Clients can either fetch this key configuration directly, or do so via
a proxy in order to avoid the server discovering information about the
client's identity. See <xref target="security"/> for more discussion of avoiding key
targeting attacks.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security">
      <name>Security and Privacy Considerations</name>
      <t>Attackers on a network can remove SVCB information from cleartext DNS
answers that are not protected by DNSSEC <xref target="DNSSEC"/>. This
can effectively downgrade clients. However, since SVCB indications
for oblivious support are just hints, a client can mitigate this by
always checking for oblivious gateway information. Use of encrypted DNS
along with DNSSEC can be used as a mitigation.</t>
      <t>When discovering designated oblivious DNS servers using this mechanism,
clients need to ensure that the designation is trusted in lieu of
being able to directly check the contents of the gateway server's TLS
certificate. See <xref target="ddr"/> for more discussion, as well as the Security
Considerations of <xref target="I-D.ietf-add-svcb-dns"/>.</t>
      <t>As discussed in <xref target="OHTTP"/>, client requests using Oblivious HTTP
can only be linked by recognizing the key configuration. In order to
prevent unwanted linkability and tracking, clients using any key
configuration discovery mechanism need to be concerned with attacks
that target a specific user or population with a unique key configuration.</t>
      <t>There are several approaches clients can use to mitigate key targeting
attacks. <xref target="CONSISTENCY"/> provides an analysis
of the options for ensuring the key configurations are consistent between
different clients. Clients <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> employ some technique to mitigate key
targeting attack. Oblivious gateways that are detected to use targeted
key configurations per-client <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used.</t>
      <t>When clients fetch a gateway's configuration (<xref target="config-fetch"/>),
they can expose their identity in the form of an IP address if they do not
connect via a proxy or some other IP-hiding mechanism. In some circumstances,
this might not be a privacy concern, since revealing that a particular
client IP address is preparing to use an Oblivious HTTP service can be
expected. However, if a client is otherwise trying to obfuscate its IP
address or location (and not merely decouple its specific requests from its
IP address), or revealing its IP address will increase the risk of a key
targeting attack (if a gateway service is trying to differentiate traffic
across client IP addresses), a proxy or similar mechanism can be used to fetch
the gateway's configuration.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="svcb-service-parameter">
        <name>SVCB Service Parameter</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to add the following entry to the SVCB Service Parameters
registry (<xref target="SVCB"/>).</t>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Number</th>
              <th align="left">Name</th>
              <th align="left">Meaning</th>
              <th align="left">Reference</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">TBD</td>
              <td align="left">oblivious-gateway</td>
              <td align="left">Defines an oblivious HTTP gateway to use to access this resource</td>
              <td align="left">(This document)</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
      </section>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references>
      <name>References</name>
      <references>
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="OHTTP">
          <front>
            <title>Oblivious HTTP</title>
            <author fullname="Martin Thomson">
              <organization>Mozilla</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Christopher A. Wood">
              <organization>Cloudflare</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="15" month="February" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document describes a system for the forwarding of encrypted HTTP
   messages.  This allows a client to make multiple requests of a server
   without the server being able to link those requests to the client or
   to identify the requests as having come from the same client.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-ohai-ohttp-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DDR">
          <front>
            <title>Discovery of Designated Resolvers</title>
            <author fullname="Tommy Pauly">
              <organization>Apple Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Eric Kinnear">
              <organization>Apple Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Christopher A. Wood">
              <organization>Cloudflare</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Patrick McManus">
              <organization>Fastly</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Tommy Jensen">
              <organization>Microsoft</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="5" month="July" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines Discovery of Designated Resolvers (DDR), a
   mechanism for DNS clients to use DNS records to discover a resolver's
   encrypted DNS configuration.  An encrypted resolver discovered in
   this manner is referred to as a "Designated Resolver".  This
   mechanism can be used to move from unencrypted DNS to encrypted DNS
   when only the IP address of a resolver is known.  This mechanism is
   designed to be limited to cases where unencrypted resolvers and their
   designated resolvers are operated by the same entity or cooperating
   entities.  It can also be used to discover support for encrypted DNS
   protocols when the name of an encrypted resolver is known.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-add-ddr-08"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SVCB">
          <front>
            <title>Service binding and parameter specification via the DNS (DNS SVCB and HTTPS RRs)</title>
            <author fullname="Ben Schwartz">
              <organization>Google</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Mike Bishop">
              <organization>Akamai Technologies</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Erik Nygren">
              <organization>Akamai Technologies</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="24" month="May" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document specifies the "SVCB" and "HTTPS" DNS resource record
   (RR) types to facilitate the lookup of information needed to make
   connections to network services, such as for HTTP origins.  SVCB
   records allow a service to be provided from multiple alternative
   endpoints, each with associated parameters (such as transport
   protocol configuration and keys for encrypting the TLS ClientHello).
   They also enable aliasing of apex domains, which is not possible with
   CNAME.  The HTTPS RR is a variation of SVCB for use with HTTP [HTTP].
   By providing more information to the client before it attempts to
   establish a connection, these records offer potential benefits to
   both performance and privacy.

   TO BE REMOVED: This document is being collaborated on in Github at:
   https://github.com/MikeBishop/dns-alt-svc
   (https://github.com/MikeBishop/dns-alt-svc).  The most recent working
   version of the document, open issues, etc. should all be available
   there.  The authors (gratefully) accept pull requests.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-https-10"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification.  These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents.  This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol  specifications.  This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the  defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3629">
          <front>
            <title>UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646</title>
            <author fullname="F. Yergeau" initials="F." surname="Yergeau">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date month="November" year="2003"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>ISO/IEC 10646-1 defines a large character set called the Universal Character Set (UCS) which encompasses most of the world's writing systems.  The originally proposed encodings of the UCS, however, were not compatible with many current applications and protocols, and this has led to the development of UTF-8, the object of this memo.  UTF-8 has the characteristic of preserving the full US-ASCII range, providing compatibility with file systems, parsers and other software that rely on US-ASCII values but are transparent to other values.  This memo obsoletes and replaces RFC 2279.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="63"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3629"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3629"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DNS-SVCB">
          <front>
            <title>Service Binding Mapping for DNS Servers</title>
            <author fullname="Benjamin Schwartz">
              <organization>Google LLC</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="5" month="July" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The SVCB DNS resource record type expresses a bound collection of
   endpoint metadata, for use when establishing a connection to a named
   service.  DNS itself can be such a service, when the server is
   identified by a domain name.  This document provides the SVCB mapping
   for named DNS servers, allowing them to indicate support for
   encrypted transport protocols.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-add-svcb-dns-06"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="BINARY-HTTP">
          <front>
            <title>Binary Representation of HTTP Messages</title>
            <author fullname="Martin Thomson">
              <organization>Mozilla</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Christopher A. Wood">
              <organization>Cloudflare</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="9" month="June" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines a binary format for representing HTTP messages.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-httpbis-binary-message-05"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DOH">
          <front>
            <title>DNS Queries over HTTPS (DoH)</title>
            <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="P. McManus" initials="P." surname="McManus">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date month="October" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines a protocol for sending DNS queries and getting DNS responses over HTTPS.  Each DNS query-response pair is mapped into an HTTP exchange.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8484"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8484"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DNR">
          <front>
            <title>DHCP and Router Advertisement Options for the Discovery of Network-designated Resolvers (DNR)</title>
            <author fullname="Mohamed Boucadair">
              <organization>Orange</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Tirumaleswar Reddy">
              <organization>Akamai</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Dan Wing">
              <organization>Citrix Systems, Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Neil Cook">
              <organization>Open-Xchange</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Tommy Jensen">
              <organization>Microsoft</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="24" month="June" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The document specifies new DHCP and IPv6 Router Advertisement options
   to discover encrypted DNS resolvers (e.g., DNS-over-HTTPS, DNS-over-
   TLS, DNS-over-QUIC).  Particularly, it allows a host to learn an
   authentication domain name together with a list of IP addresses and a
   set of service parameters to reach such encrypted DNS resolvers.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-add-dnr-09"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references>
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="DNSSEC">
          <front>
            <title>DNS Security Introduction and Requirements</title>
            <author fullname="R. Arends" initials="R." surname="Arends">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="R. Austein" initials="R." surname="Austein">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="M. Larson" initials="M." surname="Larson">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="D. Massey" initials="D." surname="Massey">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="S. Rose" initials="S." surname="Rose">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date month="March" year="2005"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) add data origin authentication and data integrity to the Domain Name System.  This document introduces these extensions and describes their capabilities and limitations.  This document also discusses the services that the DNS security extensions do and do not provide.  Last, this document describes the interrelationships between the documents that collectively describe DNSSEC.  [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4033"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4033"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-add-svcb-dns">
          <front>
            <title>Service Binding Mapping for DNS Servers</title>
            <author fullname="Benjamin Schwartz">
              <organization>Google LLC</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="5" month="July" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The SVCB DNS resource record type expresses a bound collection of
   endpoint metadata, for use when establishing a connection to a named
   service.  DNS itself can be such a service, when the server is
   identified by a domain name.  This document provides the SVCB mapping
   for named DNS servers, allowing them to indicate support for
   encrypted transport protocols.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-add-svcb-dns-06"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CONSISTENCY">
          <front>
            <title>Key Consistency and Discovery</title>
            <author fullname="Alex Davidson">
              <organization>Brave Software</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Matthew Finkel">
              <organization>The Tor Project</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Martin Thomson">
              <organization>Mozilla</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Christopher A. Wood">
              <organization>Cloudflare</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="4" month="March" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document describes the key consistency and correctness
   requirements of protocols such as Privacy Pass, Oblivious DoH, and
   Oblivious HTTP for user privacy.  It discusses several mechanisms and
   proposals for enabling user privacy in varying threat models.  In
   concludes with discussion of open problems in this area.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-wood-key-consistency-02"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
  </back>
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