<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
<!DOCTYPE rfc SYSTEM "rfc2629-xhtml.ent">
<?rfc sortrefs="yes"?>
<?rfc subcompact="no"?>
<?rfc symrefs="yes"?>
<?rfc toc="yes"?>
<?rfc tocdepth="3"?>
<?rfc compact="yes"?>
<?rfc subcompact="no"?>
<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" category="std" docName="draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-ccr-00" ipr="trust200902" xml:lang="en" sortRefs="true" submissionType="IETF" consensus="true" version="3">
  <front>
    <title abbrev="RPKI Canonical Cache Representation">
      A Profile for Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Canonical Cache Representation (CCR)
    </title>
    <author fullname="Job Snijders" initials="J." surname="Snijders">
      <organization/>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street/>
          <code/>
          <city>Amsterdam</city>
          <country>Netherlands</country>
        </postal>
        <email>job@sobornost.net</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Bart Bakker" initials="B." surname="Bakker">
      <organization>RIPE NCC</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <country>Netherlands</country>
        </postal>
        <email>bbakker@ripe.net</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Tim Bruijnzeels" initials="T." surname="Bruijnzeels">
      <organization>RIPE NCC</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <country>Netherlands</country>
        </postal>
        <email>tbruijnzeels@ripe.net</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date/>
    <area>ops</area>
    <workgroup>SIDROPS</workgroup>
    <keyword>security</keyword>
    <keyword>cryptography</keyword>
    <keyword>X.509</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <t>
        This document specifies a Canonical Cache Representation (CCR) content type for use with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).
        CCR is a DER-encoded data interchange format which can be used to represent various aspects of the state of a validated cache at a particular point in time.
        The CCR profile is a compact and versatile format well-suited for a diverse set of applications such as audit trail keeping, validated payload dissemination, and analytics pipelines.
      </t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <section anchor="intro">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>
        This document specifies a Canonical Cache Representation (CCR) content type for use with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).
        A validated cache contains all RPKI objects that the Relying Party (RP) has verified to be valid according to the rules for validation (see <xref target="RFC6487"/>, <xref target="RFC6488"/>, <xref target="RFC9286"/>).
        CCR is a data interchange format using Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER, <xref target="X.690"/>) which can be used to represent various aspects of the state of a validated cache at a particular point in time.
        The CCR profile is a compact and versatile format well-suited for a diverse set of applications such as audit record keeping, validated payload dissemination, and analytics pipelines.
      </t>
      <t>
         The format was primarily designed to support comparative analysis of uniformities and differences among multiple RP instances using different RPKI transport protocols (such as <xref target="RFC5781"/>, <xref target="RFC8182"/>, and <xref target="I-D.spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-erik-protocol"/>).
      </t>
      <section anchor="requirements">
        <name>Requirements Language</name>
        <t>
          The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP&nbsp;14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
        </t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section>
      <name>The Canonical Cache Representation content type</name>
      <t>
        The <tt>contentType</tt> for a CCR currently is defined as <tt>id-ct-rpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation</tt>, with Object Identifier (OID) <tt>1.3.6.1.4.1.41948.825</tt>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Note: as part of the standardization process, the aforementioned contentType value should be changed from its current Private Enterprise Number (<xref target="RFC9371"/>) to an OID assigned by <xref target="iana">IANA</xref>.
      </t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="content">
      <name>The Canonical Cache Representation content</name>
      <t>
        The content of a Canonical Cache Representation is formally defined as follows:
      </t>
      <sourcecode anchor="ASN.1" type="asn.1" originalSrc="CCR-2025.asn">RpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation-2025
  { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
    pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0) id-mod-rpkiCCR-2025(TBD) }

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN

IMPORTS
  CONTENT-TYPE, Digest, DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, SubjectKeyIdentifier
  FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- in [RFC6268]
    { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
      pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) }

  -- in [draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-erik-protocol-01]
  ManifestRef
  FROM RpkiErikPartition-2025
    { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
      pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0) id-mod-rpkiErikPartition-2025(TBD) }

  ASID, ROAIPAddressFamily
  FROM RPKI-ROA-2023 -- in [RFC9582]
    { so(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
      pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0) id-mod-rpkiROA-2023(75) }
  ;

ct-rpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation CONTENT-TYPE ::=
  { TYPE RpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation
    IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-rpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation }

id-ct-rpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
  { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) private(4)
    enterprise(1) snijders(41948) ccr(825) }

RpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation ::= SEQUENCE {
  version     [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
  hashAlg         DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
  producedAt      GeneralizedTime,
  mfts        [1] ManifestState OPTIONAL,
  vrps        [2] ROAPayloadState OPTIONAL,
  vaps        [3] ASPAPayloadState OPTIONAL,
  tas         [4] TrustAnchorState OPTIONAL,
  ... }
  -- at least one of mfts, vrps, vaps, or tas MUST be present
  ( WITH COMPONENTS { ..., mfts PRESENT } |
    WITH COMPONENTS { ..., vrps PRESENT } |
    WITH COMPONENTS { ..., vaps PRESENT } |
    WITH COMPONENTS { ..., tas PRESENT } )

ManifestState ::= SEQUENCE {
  mftrefs           SEQUENCE OF ManifestRef,
  mostRecentUpdate  GeneralizedTime,
  hash              Digest }

ROAPayloadState ::= SEQUENCE {
  rps               SEQUENCE OF ROAPayloadSet,
  hash              Digest }

ROAPayloadSet ::= SEQUENCE {
  asID              ASID,
  ipAddrBlocks      SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..2)) OF ROAIPAddressFamily }

ASPAPayloadState ::= SEQUENCE {
  aps               SEQUENCE OF ASPAPayloadSet,
  hash              Digest }

ASPAPayloadSet ::= SEQUENCE {
  customerASID      ASID
  providers         SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ASID }

TrustAnchorState ::= SEQUENCE {
  skis              SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF SubjectKeyIdentifier,
  hash              Digest }

END
</sourcecode>
      <section>
        <name>version</name>
        <t>
          The <tt>version</tt> field contains the format version for the <tt>RpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation</tt> structure, in this version of the specification it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be 0.
        </t>
      </section>
      <section>
        <name>hashAlg</name>
        <t>
          The <tt>hashAlg</tt> field specifies the algorithm used to construct the message digests.
          This profile uses SHA-256 <xref target="SHS"/>, therefore the OID <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be <tt>2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1</tt>.
        </t>
      </section>
      <section>
        <name>producedAt</name>
        <t>
          The <tt>producedAt</tt> field contains a <tt>GeneralizedTime</tt> and indicates the moment in time the CCR was generated.
        </t>
      </section>
      <section>
        <name>State aspect fields</name>
        <t>
          Each CCR contains one or more fields representing particular aspects of the cache's state.
          Implementers should note the ellipsis extension marker in the <tt>RpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation</tt> ASN.1 notation and anticipate future changes as new signed object types are standardized.
        </t>
        <t>
          Each state aspect generally consists of a sequence of details extracted from RPKI Objects of a specific type, along with a digest computed by hashing the aforementioned DER-encoded sequence, optionally including some metadata.
        </t>
        <section>
          <name>ManifestState</name>
          <t>
            An instance of <tt>ManifestState</tt> represents the set of valid, current Manifests (<xref target="RFC9286"/>) in the cache.
            It contains three fields:
          </t>
          <t>
            The <tt>mftrefs</tt> field contains a SEQUENCE of <tt>ManifestRef</tt> structures (see <xref target="I-D.spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-erik-protocol" section="3"/>) sorted in ascending order by hash value.
            The <tt>hash</tt> value in each instance of <tt>ManifestRef</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be unique with respect to the other instances of <tt>ManifestRef</tt>.
          </t>
          <t>
            The <tt>mostRecentUpdate</tt> is a metadata field which contains the most recent <tt>thisUpdate</tt> amongst all Manifests.
            If the <tt>mftrefs</tt> field contains an empty sequence, the <tt>mostRecentUpdate</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be set to the POSIX Epoch ("19700101000000Z").
          </t>
          <t>
            The <tt>hash</tt> field contains a message digest computed using the <tt>mftrefs</tt> value (encoded in DER format) as input message.
          </t>
        </section>
        <section>
          <name>ROAPayloadState</name>
          <t>
            An instance of <tt>ROAPayloadState</tt> contains a field named <tt>rps</tt> which represents the current set of Validated ROA Payloads (<xref target="RFC6811" section="2"/>) encoded as a SEQUENCE of <tt>ROAPayloadSet</tt> instances.
          </t>
          <t>
            The <tt>ROAPayloadSet</tt> structure is modeled after the <tt>RouteOriginAttestation</tt> (<xref target="RFC9582" section="4"/>).
            The <tt>asID</tt> value in each instance of <tt>ROAPayloadSet</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be unique with respect to other instances of <tt>ROAPayloadSet</tt>.
            The contents of the <tt>ipAddrBlocks</tt> field <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> appear in canonical form and ordered as defined in <xref target="RFC9582" section="4.3.3"/>.
          </t>
          <t>
            The <tt>hash</tt> field contains a message digest computed using the <tt>rps</tt> value (encoded in DER format) as input message.
          </t>
        </section>
        <section>
          <name>ASPAPayloadState</name>
          <t>
            An instance of <tt>ASPAPayloadState</tt> contains an <tt>aps</tt> field which represents the current set of deduplicated and merged ASPA payloads (<xref target="I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile"/>) ordered by ascending <tt>customerASID</tt> value encoded as a SEQUENCE of <tt>ASPAPayloadSet</tt> instances.
            The <tt>customerASID</tt> value in each instance of <tt>ASPAPayloadSet</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be unique with respect to other instances of <tt>ASPAPayloadSet</tt>.
          </t>
          <t>
            The <tt>ASPAPayloadSet</tt> structure is modeled after the <tt>ProviderASSet</tt> (<xref target="I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile" section="3.3"/>).
          </t>
          <t>
            The <tt>hash</tt> field contains a message digest computed using the <tt>aps</tt> value (encoded in DER format) as input message.
          </t>
        </section>
        <section>
          <name>TrustAnchorState</name>
          <t>
            An instance of <tt>TrustAnchorState</tt> represents the set of valid Trust Anchor (TA) Certification Authority (CA) resource certificates used by the relying party when producing the CCR.
          </t>
          <t>
            The <tt>skis</tt> field contains a sequence of Subject Key Identifiers (SKI) sorted in ascending order.
            Each <tt>SubjectKeyIdentifier</tt> is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the TA's Subject Public Key, as described in <xref target="RFC6487" section="4.8.2"/>.
          </t>
          <t>
            The <tt>hash</tt> field contains a message digest computed using the <tt>skis</tt> value (encoded in DER format) as input message.
          </t>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section>
      <name>Operational Considerations</name>
      <t>
        Comparing the ManifestState <tt>mostRecentUpdate</tt> timestamp value with the <tt>producedAt</tt> timestamp might help offer insight into the timing and propagation delays of the RPKI supply chain.
      </t>
      <t>
        Given the absence of public keys and fairly repetitive content in RPKI AccessDescription instances, it should be noted CCR content compresses well.
      </t>
      <section>
        <name>Verifying CCR file integrity</name>
        <t>
          The integrity of a CCR object can be checked by confirming whether the hash values embedded inside state aspects match the computed hash value of the respective state aspect payload structure.
        </t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>
        CCR objects are not signed objects.
      </t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <section>
        <name>SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)</name>
        <t>
          <em>NOTE: unclear which registry this actually should go...</em>
        </t>
        <t>
          IANA is requested to allocate the following in the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry:
        </t>
        <table anchor="cms-content-type" align="center">
          <name/>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th rowspan="1" colspan="1">Decimal</th>
              <th rowspan="1" colspan="1">Description</th>
              <th rowspan="1" colspan="1">References</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td>TBD</td>
              <td>id-ct-rpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation</td>
              <td>draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-ccr</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
      </section>
      <section>
        <name>RPKI Repository Name Schemes</name>
        <t>
          IANA is requested to add the Canonical Cache Representation file extension to the "RPKI Repository Name Schemes" registry <xref target="RFC6481"/> as follows:
        </t>
        <table anchor="rpki-repository-name-schemes" align="center">
          <name/>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th rowspan="1" colspan="1">Filename Extension</th>
              <th rowspan="1" colspan="1">RPKI Object</th>
              <th rowspan="1" colspan="1">Reference</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td>.ccr</td>
              <td>Canonical Cache Representation</td>
              <td>draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-ccr</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
      </section>
      <section>
        <name>SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)</name>
        <t>
          IANA is requested to allocate the following in the "SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)" registry:
        </t>
        <table anchor="smi-security-identifier" align="center">
          <name/>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th rowspan="1" colspan="1">Decimal</th>
              <th rowspan="1" colspan="1">Description</th>
              <th rowspan="1" colspan="1">References</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td>TBD</td>
              <td>id-mod-rpkiCCR-2025</td>
              <td>draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-ccr</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
      </section>
      <section>
        <name>Media Types</name>
        <t>
          IANA is requested to register the media type "application/rpki-ccr" in the "Media Types" registry as follows:
        </t>
        <section>
          <name>Canonical Cache Representation Media Type</name>
          <dl spacing="compact">
            <dt>Type name:</dt>
            <dd>application</dd>
            <dt>Subtype name:</dt>
            <dd>rpki-ccr</dd>
            <dt>Required parameters:</dt>
            <dd>N/A</dd>
            <dt>Optional parameters:</dt>
            <dd>N/A</dd>
            <dt>Encoding considerations:</dt>
            <dd>binary</dd>
            <dt>Security considerations:</dt>
            <dd>This media type contains no active content.</dd>
            <dt>Interoperability considerations:</dt>
            <dd>N/A</dd>
            <dt>Published specification:</dt>
            <dd>draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-ccr</dd>
            <dt>Applications that use this media type:</dt>
            <dd>RPKI operators</dd>
            <dt>Fragment identifier considerations:</dt>
            <dd>N/A</dd>
            <dt>Additional information:</dt>
            <dd>
              <dl spacing="compact">
                <dt><br/></dt>
                <dd/>
                <dt>Content:</dt>
                <dd>This media type is a RPKI Canonical Cache Representation object, as defined in draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-ccr.</dd>
                <dt>Magic number(s):</dt>
                <dd>N/A</dd>
                <dt>File extension(s):</dt>
                <dd>.ccr</dd>
                <dt>Macintosh file type code(s):</dt>
                <dd>N/A</dd>
              </dl>
            </dd>
            <dt>Person &amp; email address to contact for further information:</dt>
            <dd>Job Snijders (job@sobornost.net)</dd>
            <dt>Intended usage:</dt>
            <dd>COMMON</dd>
            <dt>Restrictions on usage:</dt>
            <dd>N/A</dd>
            <dt>Author:</dt>
            <dd>Job Snijders (job@sobornost.net)</dd>
            <dt>Change controller:</dt>
            <dd>IETF</dd>
          </dl>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references>
      <name>References</name>
      <references>
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6481" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6481.xml">
          <front>
            <title>A Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure</title>
            <author fullname="G. Huston" initials="G." surname="Huston"/>
            <author fullname="R. Loomans" initials="R." surname="Loomans"/>
            <author fullname="G. Michaelson" initials="G." surname="Michaelson"/>
            <date month="February" year="2012"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines a profile for the structure of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) distributed repository. Each individual repository publication point is a directory that contains files that correspond to X.509/PKIX Resource Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists and signed objects. This profile defines the object (file) naming scheme, the contents of repository publication points (directories), and a suggested internal structure of a local repository cache that is intended to facilitate synchronization across a distributed collection of repository publication points and to facilitate certification path construction. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6481"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6481"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6487" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6487.xml">
          <front>
            <title>A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates</title>
            <author fullname="G. Huston" initials="G." surname="Huston"/>
            <author fullname="G. Michaelson" initials="G." surname="Michaelson"/>
            <author fullname="R. Loomans" initials="R." surname="Loomans"/>
            <date month="February" year="2012"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for the purpose of supporting validation of assertions of "right-of-use" of Internet Number Resources (INRs). The certificates issued under this profile are used to convey the issuer's authorization of the subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of-use" of the INRs that are described in the certificate. This document contains the normative specification of Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) syntax in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). This document also specifies profiles for the format of certificate requests and specifies the Relying Party RPKI certificate path validation procedure. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6487"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6487"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6488" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6488" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6488.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Signed Object Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Lepinski" initials="M." surname="Lepinski"/>
            <author fullname="A. Chi" initials="A." surname="Chi"/>
            <author fullname="S. Kent" initials="S." surname="Kent"/>
            <date month="February" year="2012"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines a generic profile for signed objects used in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). These RPKI signed objects make use of Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) as a standard encapsulation format. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6488"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6488"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6811" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6811.xml">
          <front>
            <title>BGP Prefix Origin Validation</title>
            <author fullname="P. Mohapatra" initials="P." surname="Mohapatra"/>
            <author fullname="J. Scudder" initials="J." surname="Scudder"/>
            <author fullname="D. Ward" initials="D." surname="Ward"/>
            <author fullname="R. Bush" initials="R." surname="Bush"/>
            <author fullname="R. Austein" initials="R." surname="Austein"/>
            <date month="January" year="2013"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>To help reduce well-known threats against BGP including prefix mis- announcing and monkey-in-the-middle attacks, one of the security requirements is the ability to validate the origination Autonomous System (AS) of BGP routes. More specifically, one needs to validate that the AS number claiming to originate an address prefix (as derived from the AS_PATH attribute of the BGP route) is in fact authorized by the prefix holder to do so. This document describes a simple validation mechanism to partially satisfy this requirement. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6811"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6811"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9286" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9286" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9286.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)</title>
            <author fullname="R. Austein" initials="R." surname="Austein"/>
            <author fullname="G. Huston" initials="G." surname="Huston"/>
            <author fullname="S. Kent" initials="S." surname="Kent"/>
            <author fullname="M. Lepinski" initials="M." surname="Lepinski"/>
            <date month="June" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines a "manifest" for use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). A manifest is a signed object (file) that contains a listing of all the signed objects (files) in the repository publication point (directory) associated with an authority responsible for publishing in the repository. For each certificate, Certificate Revocation List (CRL), or other type of signed objects issued by the authority that are published at this repository publication point, the manifest contains both the name of the file containing the object and a hash of the file content. Manifests are intended to enable a relying party (RP) to detect certain forms of attacks against a repository. Specifically, if an RP checks a manifest's contents against the signed objects retrieved from a repository publication point, then the RP can detect replay attacks, and unauthorized in-flight modification or deletion of signed objects. This document obsoletes RFC 6486.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9286"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9286"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9582" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9582" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9582.xml">
          <front>
            <title>A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)</title>
            <author fullname="J. Snijders" initials="J." surname="Snijders"/>
            <author fullname="B. Maddison" initials="B." surname="Maddison"/>
            <author fullname="M. Lepinski" initials="M." surname="Lepinski"/>
            <author fullname="D. Kong" initials="D." surname="Kong"/>
            <author fullname="S. Kent" initials="S." surname="Kent"/>
            <date month="May" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines a standard profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs). A ROA is a digitally signed object that provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to one or more prefixes within the address block. This document obsoletes RFC 6482.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9582"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9582"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-20" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile.xml">
          <front>
            <title>A Profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization</title>
            <author fullname="Alexander Azimov" initials="A." surname="Azimov">
              <organization>Yandex</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Eugene Uskov" initials="E." surname="Uskov">
              <organization>JetLend</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Randy Bush" initials="R." surname="Bush">
              <organization>Internet Initiative Japan</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Job Snijders" initials="J." surname="Snijders"/>
            <author fullname="Russ Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley">
              <organization>Vigil Security, LLC</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Ben Maddison" initials="B." surname="Maddison">
              <organization>Workonline</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="18" month="August" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) protected content type for Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) objects for use with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). An ASPA is a digitally signed object through which the issuer (the holder of an Autonomous System identifier), can authorize one or more other Autonomous Systems (ASes) as its upstream providers. When validated, an ASPA's eContent can be used for detection and mitigation of route leaks.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-20"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-erik-protocol" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-erik-protocol-01" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-erik-protocol.xml">
          <front>
            <title>The Erik Synchronization Protocol for use with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)</title>
            <author fullname="Job Snijders"/>
            <author fullname="Tim Bruijnzeels"/>
            <author fullname="Tom Harrison"/>
            <author fullname="Wataru Ohgai"/>
            <date day="11" month="September" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies the Erik Synchronization Protocol for use
   with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).  Erik
   Synchronization can be characterized as a data replication system
   using Merkle trees, a content-addressable naming scheme, concurrency
   control using monotonically increasing sequence numbers, and HTTP
   transport.  Relying Parties can combine information retrieved via
   Erik Synchronization with other RPKI transport protocols.  The
   protocol's design is intended to be efficient, fast, and easy to
   implement.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-erik-protocol-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SHS" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-4/fips-180-4.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>Secure Hash Standard</title>
            <author>
              <organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology</organization>
            </author>
            <date month="March" year="2012"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="X.690" target="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690-202102-I/en">
          <front>
            <title>Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (B
ER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)</title>
            <author>
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true">ITU-T</organization>
            </author>
            <date month="February" year="2021"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="ITU-T Recommendation" value="X.690"/>
          <seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC" value="8825-1:2021"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references>
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC5781" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5781" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5781.xml">
          <front>
            <title>The rsync URI Scheme</title>
            <author fullname="S. Weiler" initials="S." surname="Weiler"/>
            <author fullname="D. Ward" initials="D." surname="Ward"/>
            <author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>
            <date month="February" year="2010"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies the rsync Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) scheme. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5781"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5781"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8182" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8182" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8182.xml">
          <front>
            <title>The RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP)</title>
            <author fullname="T. Bruijnzeels" initials="T." surname="Bruijnzeels"/>
            <author fullname="O. Muravskiy" initials="O." surname="Muravskiy"/>
            <author fullname="B. Weber" initials="B." surname="Weber"/>
            <author fullname="R. Austein" initials="R." surname="Austein"/>
            <date month="July" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), Certificate Authorities (CAs) publish certificates, including end-entity certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs), and RPKI signed objects to repositories. Relying Parties retrieve the published information from those repositories. This document specifies a new RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP) for this purpose. RRDP was specifically designed for scaling. It relies on an Update Notification File which lists the current Snapshot and Delta Files that can be retrieved using HTTPS (HTTP over Transport Layer Security (TLS)), and it enables the use of Content Distribution Networks (CDNs) or other caching infrastructures for the retrieval of these files.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8182"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8182"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9371" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9371" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9371.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Registration Procedures for Private Enterprise Numbers (PENs)</title>
            <author fullname="A. Baber" initials="A." surname="Baber"/>
            <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
            <date month="March" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes how Private Enterprise Numbers (PENs) are registered by IANA. It shows how to request a new PEN and how to modify a current PEN. It also gives a brief overview of PEN uses.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9371"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9371"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="rpki-client" target="https://www.rpki-client.org/">
          <front>
            <title>rpki-client</title>
            <author fullname="Claudio Jeker"/>
            <author fullname="Kristaps Dzonsons"/>
            <author fullname="Theo Buehler"/>
            <author fullname="Job Snijders"/>
            <date month="August" year="2025"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <section anchor="acknowledgements">
      <name>Acknowledgements</name>
      <t>
        The authors wish to thank
        <contact fullname="Theo Buehler"/>
        for their generous feedback on this specification.
      </t>
    </section>
    <section title="Example CCR">
      <t>
        For a more elaborate example based on the global RPKI, see the URL in <xref target="implementation"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        The following Base64-encoded blob contains a CCR listing 7 Manifest references, 5 Trust Anchor key identifiers, 0 ROA payloadsets and 0 ASPA payloadsets.
        It decodes as following:
      </t>
      <artwork>
<![CDATA[
$ rpki-client -f rpki.ccr
File:                     rpki.ccr
Hash identifier:          j0NY9jKRKInopFJEpUywA4iZk0S6+9JF5H1XWKSrN1Y=
CCR produced at:          Wed 10 Sep 2025 08:16:33 +0000
Manifest state hash:      Q0RDRkNDODlGNzhBNjVBMjcwQUFEMUQyNzUzMDczNjM=
Manifest last update:     Tue 09 Sep 2025 06:40:28 +0000
Manifest references:
                          hash:NnnRzY/bqsyvIpxqd6J889SrjhhLPhvBJdsa3FAKsoY= size:1914 aki:13D4F24F9A9FCD98DB36F930631808C88F3974BC seqnum:010D0C9F4328584AE911B4F700712A87CD3AD281 sia:rsync://rpki.arin.net/repository/arin-rpki-ta/arin-rpki-ta.mft
                          hash:RhGpQlXRWlD8hqMOj8bw+OsTEb/LxvFCJafqAcRTWuw= size:2218 aki:946DAE8464E7C581E9BA5787F74CBDA9DCF6F8CD seqnum:0145 sia:rsync://repository.lacnic.net/rpki/lacnic/E5AA1B2C690D34DD3A42E0C0268C3218ED158E15D29FCBD0BAB66B4786D632E6/0/946DAE8464E7C581E9BA5787F74CBDA9DCF6F8CD.mft
                          hash:WCMf+nEY+28XN2sMvwb0IinMPbrncMV5xIgNeZDeVkY= size:2324 aki:98142C9D0B41A3B9FB603D769848236FD1F31924 seqnum:01DB sia:rsync://rpki.apnic.net/repository/980652E0B77E11E7A96A39521A4F4FB4/mBQsnQtBo7n7YD12mEgjb9HzGSQ.mft
                          hash:a97DWzqSw63IBAs/lYmBskSeSN7z3WqF6otf5QONtbg= size:2222 aki:EB680F38F5D6C71BB4B106B8BD06585012DA31B6 seqnum:C4 sia:rsync://rpki.afrinic.net/repository/04E8B0D80F4D11E0B657D8931367AE7D/62gPOPXWxxu0sQa4vQZYUBLaMbY.mft
                          hash:jYjg8nTVgVN0UZy/hD7e+HZakOP27uePHFO0WxONXLE= size:1959 aki:FC8A9CB3ED184E17D30EEA1E0FA7615CE4B1AF47 seqnum:19 sia:rsync://repository.lacnic.net/rpki/lacnic/FC8A9CB3ED184E17D30EEA1E0FA7615CE4B1AF47.mft
                          hash:wtBCe8WjLELuoatWY9WSsfwpx9TvFqsLXh1jHQOdzCE= size:1786 aki:E8552B1FD6D1A4F7E404C6D8E5680D1EBC163FC3 seqnum:54 sia:rsync://rpki.ripe.net/repository/ripe-ncc-ta.mft
                          hash:6bVWV9u2sQjBR0Qn8UBbNWNTnInl4eFumrqfAzm7pq0= size:1954 aki:0B9CCA90DD0D7A8A37666B19217FE0D84037B7A2 seqnum:D0 sia:rsync://rpki.apnic.net/repository/838DB214166511E2B3BC286172FD1FF2/C5zKkN0Neoo3ZmsZIX_g2EA3t6I.mft
ROA payload state hash:   RTRGNjBEMEFBNkQ3RjNEM0I2QTY0OTRCMUM4NjFCOTk=
ROA payload entries:
ASPA payload state hash:  RTRGNjBEMEFBNkQ3RjNEM0I2QTY0OTRCMUM4NjFCOTk=
ASPA payload entries:
Trust anchor state hash:  QjlCQTY2QjJCQ0Q1NEU0ODEyMjQ5RjYwRUQyREU5MzU=
Trust anchor keyids:      0B9CCA90DD0D7A8A37666B19217FE0D84037B7A2, 13D4F24F9A9FCD98DB36F930631808C88F3974BC, E8552B1FD6D1A4F7E404C6D8E5680D1EBC163FC3, EB680F38F5D6C71BB4B106B8BD06585012DA31B6, FC8A9CB3ED184E17D30EEA1E0FA7615CE4B1AF47
Validation:               N/A
]]>
</artwork>
      <artwork>
<![CDATA[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eW5jOi8vcmVwb3NpdG9yeS5sYWNuaWMubmV0L3Jwa2kvbGFjbmljL0ZDOEE5Q0IzRUQxODRF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]]>
</artwork>
    </section>
    <section removeInRFC="true" anchor="implementation">
      <name>Implementation status</name>
      <t>
        This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in RFC 7942.
        The description of implementations in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs.
        Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF.
        Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors.
        This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their features.
        Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist.
      </t>
      <t>
        According to RFC 7942, "this will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
        It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as they see fit".
      </t>
      <ul>
        <li>
          Example .ccr files were created by Job Snijders.
          A current example CCR (regenerated every few minutes) is available here:
<![CDATA[
https://console.rpki-client.org/rpki.ccr
]]>
        </li>
        <li>
          A CCR serializer and deserializer implementation based on <xref target="rpki-client"/> was provided by Job Snijders.
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
  </back>
</rfc>
