]>

Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net

Arm Limited

Simon.Frost@arm.com

Arm Limited

Mathias.Brossard@arm.com

HP Labs

adrianlshaw@acm.org

Linaro

thomas.fossati@linaro.org

Internet-Draft The Platform Security Architecture (PSA) is a set of hardware and firmware specifications, backed by reference implementations and a security certification program (PSA Certified). The security specifications have been published by Arm, while the certification program and reference implementations are the result of a collaborative effort by companies from multiple sectors, including evaluation laboratories, semiconductor IP and security consultancy. The main objective of the PSA initiative is to assist device manufacturers and chip makers in incorporating best-practice security measures into their products. Devices that are PSA compliant can produce attestation tokens as described in this memo, which are the basis for many different protocols, including secure provisioning and network access control. This document specifies the PSA attestation token structure and semantics. The PSA attestation token is a profiled Entity Attestation Token (EAT). This specification describes what claims are used in an attestation token generated by PSA compliant systems, how these claims get serialized to the wire, and how they are cryptographically protected. This document is produced through the Independent RFC Stream and was not subject to the IETF's approval process.

Introduction Trusted execution environments are now present in many devices, which provide a safe environment to place security sensitive code such as cryptography, secure boot, secure storage, and other essential security functions. These security functions are typically exposed through a narrow and well-defined interface, and can be used by operating system libraries and applications. Various APIs have been developed by Arm as part of the Platform Security Architecture framework. This document focuses on the output provided by PSA's Initial Attestation API . Since the tokens are also consumed by services outside the device, there is an actual need to ensure interoperability. Interoperability needs are addressed here by describing the exact syntax and semantics of the attestation claims, and defining the way these claims are encoded and cryptographically protected. Further details on concepts expressed below can be found in the PSA Security Model documentation .

Conventions and Definitions The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. The terms Attester, Relying Party, Verifier, Attestation Result, and Evidence are defined in . We use the term receiver to refer to Relying Parties and Verifiers. We use the terms Evidence, PSA attestation token, and PSA token interchangeably. The terms sender and Attester are used interchangeably. Likewise, we use the terms Verifier, and verification service interchangeably.

RoT:

Root of Trust, the minimal set of software, hardware and data that has to be implicitly trusted in the platform - there is no software or hardware at a deeper level that can verify that the Root of Trust is authentic and unmodified. An example of RoT is an initial bootloader in ROM, which contains cryptographic functions and credentials, running on a specific hardware platform.

SPE:

Secure Processing Environment, a platform's processing environment for software that provides confidentiality and integrity for its runtime state, from software and hardware, outside of the SPE. Contains trusted code and trusted hardware. (Equivalent to Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), or "secure world".)

NSPE:

Non Secure Processing Environment, the security domain outside of the SPE, the Application domain, typically containing the application firmware, operating systems, and general hardware. (Equivalent to Rich Execution Environment (REE), or "normal world".)

PSA Attester Model outlines the structure of the PSA Attester according to the conceptual model described in .

PSA Attester | Boot o-----+ Attestation | | | | | | | | State | | Service | | | | | '-----+------' '-----' '-------------' | | | '----------------------|----------------------------------------' | | .------------+--------------+---------------. | | .--------|-------------|--------------|----------------|--------. | | | | | | | | | | | .------o-----. .-----o-------. .----o--------. .-----o------. | | | | | Updateable | | Application | | Application | | PSA RoT | | | | | | PSA RoT | | RoT | | Loader | | Parameters | | | | | '------------' '-------------' '-------------' '------------' | | | | Target Environment | | | '---------------------------------------------------------------' | '-------------------------------------------------------------------' ]]>

The PSA Attester is a relatively straightforward embodiment of the RATS Attester with exactly one Attesting Environment and one or more Target Environments. The Attesting Environment is responsible for collecting the information to be represented in PSA claims and to assemble them into Evidence. It is made of two cooperating components:

• The Main Bootloader (executing at boot-time) measures the loaded software components, collects the relevant PSA RoT parameters, and stores the recorded information in secure memory (Main Boot State) from where the Initial Attestation Service will, when asked for claims about the platform, retrieve them.
• The Initial Attestation Service (executing at run-time in SPE) answers requests coming from NSPE via the PSA attestation API , collects and formats the claims from Main Boot State, and uses the Initial Attestation Key (IAK) to sign them and produce Evidence. The word "Initial" in "Initial Attestation Service" refers to a limited set of target environments, namely those representing the first, foundational stages establishing the chain of trust of a PSA device.

The Target Environments can be of four types, some of which may or may not be present depending on the device architecture:

• (A subset of) the PSA RoT parameters, including Instance and Implementation IDs.
• The updateable PSA RoT, including the Secure Partition Manager and all PSA RoT services.
• The (optional) Application RoT, that is any application-defined security service, possibly making use of the PSA RoT services.
• The loader of the application software running in NSPE.

A reference implementation of the PSA Attester is provided by .

PSA Claims This section describes the claims to be used in a PSA attestation token. CDDL along with text descriptions is used to define each claim independent of encoding. The following CDDL type(s) are reused by different claims:

Caller Claims

Nonce The Nonce claim is used to carry the challenge provided by the caller to demonstrate freshness of the generated token. The EAT nonce (claim key 10) is used. The following constraints apply to the nonce-type:

• The length MUST be either 32, 48, or 64 bytes.
• Only a single nonce value is conveyed. The array notation MUST NOT be used for encoding the nonce value.

This claim MUST be present in a PSA attestation token. psa-hash-type ) ]]>

Client ID The Client ID claim represents the security domain of the caller. In PSA, a security domain is represented by a signed integer whereby negative values represent callers from the NSPE and where positive IDs represent callers from the SPE. The value 0 is not permitted. For an example definition of client IDs, see the PSA Firmware Framework . It is essential that this claim is checked in the verification process to ensure that a security domain, i.e., an attestation endpoint, cannot spoof a report from another security domain. This claim MUST be present in a PSA attestation token. psa-client-id-type ) ]]>

Target Identification Claims

 Instance ID The Instance ID claim represents the unique identifier of the Initial Attestation Key (IAK). The full definition is in . The EAT ueid (claim key 256) of type RAND is used. The following constraints apply to the ueid-type:

• The length MUST be 33 bytes.
• The first byte MUST be 0x01 (RAND) followed by the 32-bytes key hash.

This claim MUST be present in a PSA attestation token. psa-instance-id-type ) ]]>

Implementation ID The Implementation ID claim uniquely identifies the implementation of the immutable PSA RoT. A verification service uses this claim to locate the details of the PSA RoT implementation from an Endorser or manufacturer. Such details are used by a verification service to determine the security properties or certification status of the PSA RoT implementation. The value and format of the ID is decided by the manufacturer or a particular certification scheme. For example, the ID could take the form of a product serial number, database ID, or other appropriate identifier. This claim MUST be present in a PSA attestation token. Note that this identifies the PSA RoT implementation, not a particular instance. To uniquely identify an instance, see the Instance ID claim . psa-implementation-id-type ) ]]>

Certification Reference The Certification Reference claim is used to link the class of chip and PSA RoT of the attesting device to an associated entry in the PSA Certification database. It MUST be represented as a string made of nineteen numeric characters: a thirteen-digit , followed by a dash "-", followed by the five-digit versioning information described in . Linking to the PSA Certification entry can still be achieved if this claim is not present in the token by making an association at a Verifier between the reference value and other token claim values - for example, the Implementation ID. psa-certification-reference-type ) ]]>

Target State Claims

Security Lifecycle The Security Lifecycle claim represents the current lifecycle state of the PSA RoT. The state is represented by an integer that is divided to convey a major state and a minor state. A major state is mandatory and defined by . A minor state is optional and 'IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED'. The PSA security lifecycle state and implementation state are encoded as follows:

• version[15:8] - PSA security lifecycle state, and
• version[7:0] - IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED state.

The PSA lifecycle states are illustrated in . For PSA, a Verifier can only trust reports from the PSA RoT when it is in SECURED or NON_PSA_ROT_DEBUG major states. This claim MUST be present in a PSA attestation token.

PSA Lifecycle States | Decommissioned | '----------------' ]]>

psa-lifecycle-type ) ]]>

Boot Seed The Boot Seed claim represents a value created at system boot time that will allow differentiation of reports from different boot sessions. This claim MAY be present in a PSA attestation token. If present, it MUST be between 8 and 32 bytes. psa-boot-seed-type ) ]]>

Software Inventory Claims

Software Components The Software Components claim is a list of software components that includes all the software (both code and configuration) loaded by the PSA RoT. This claim MUST be included in attestation tokens produced by an implementation conformant with . Each entry in the Software Components list describes one software component using the attributes described in the following subsections. Unless explicitly stated, the presence of an attribute is OPTIONAL. Note that, as described in , a relying party will typically see the result of the verification process from the Verifier in form of an attestation result, rather than the PSA token from the attesting endpoint. Therefore, a relying party is not expected to understand the Software Components claim. Instead, it is for the Verifier to check this claim against the available endorsements and provide an answer in form of an "high level" attestation result, which may or may not include the original Software Components claim. text &(measurement-value: 2) => psa-hash-type ? &(version: 4) => text &(signer-id: 5) => psa-hash-type ? &(measurement-desc: 6) => text } psa-software-components = ( psa-software-components-key => [ + psa-software-component ] ) ]]>

Measurement Type The Measurement Type attribute (key=1) is short string representing the role of this software component. The following measurement types MAY be used for code measurements:

• "BL": a Boot Loader
• "PRoT": a component of the PSA Root of Trust
• "ARoT": a component of the Application Root of Trust
• "App": a component of the NSPE application
• "TS": a component of a Trusted Subsystem

The same labels with a "-cfg" postfix (e.g., "PRoT-cfg") MAY be used for configuration measurements. This attribute SHOULD be present in a PSA software component unless there is a very good reason to leave it out - for example in networks with severely constrained bandwidth, where sparing a few bytes really makes a difference.

 Measurement Value The Measurement Value attribute (key=2) represents a hash of the invariant software component in memory at startup time. The value MUST be a cryptographic hash of 256 bits or stronger. This attribute MUST be present in a PSA software component.

Version The Version attribute (key=4) is the issued software version in the form of a text string. The value of this attribute will correspond to the entry in the original signed manifest of the component.

Signer ID The Signer ID attribute (key=5) is the hash of a signing authority public key for the software component. The value of this attribute will correspond to the entry in the original manifest for the component. This can be used by a Verifier to ensure the components were signed by an expected trusted source. This attribute MUST be present in a PSA software component to be compliant with .

Measurement Description The Measurement Description attribute (key=6) contains a string identifying the hash algorithm used to compute the corresponding Measurement Value. The string SHOULD be encoded according to .

Verification Claims

Verification Service Indicator The Verification Service Indicator claim is a hint used by a relying party to locate a verification service for the token. The value is a text string that can be used to locate the service (typically, a URL specifying the address of the verification service API). A Relying Party may choose to ignore this claim in favor of other information. psa-verification-service-indicator-type ) ]]>

Profile Definition The Profile Definition claim encodes the unique identifier that corresponds to the EAT profile described by this document. This allows a receiver to assign the intended semantics to the rest of the claims found in the token. The EAT eat_profile (claim key 265) is used. The URI encoding MUST be used. The value MUST be tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm for the profile defined in . Future profiles derived from the baseline PSA profile SHALL create their unique value, as described in . This claim MUST be present in a PSA attestation token. See , for considerations about backwards compatibility with previous versions of the PSA attestation token format. psa-profile-type ) ]]>

URI Structure for the Derived Profile Identifiers A new profile is associated with a unique string. The string MUST use the URI fragment syntax defined in . The string SHOULD be short to avoid unnecessary overhead. To avoid collisions, profile authors SHOULD communicate upfront their intent to use a certain string using the enquiry form on the website. To derive the value to be used for the eat_profile claim, the string is added as a fragment to the tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa tag URI . For example, an hypothetical profile using only COSE_Mac0 with the AES Message Authentication Code (AES-MAC) may decide to use the string "aes-mac". The eat_profile value would then be: tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#aes-mac.

Backwards Compatibility Considerations A previous version of this specification (identified by the PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1 profile) used claim key values from the "private use range" of the CWT Claims registry. These claim keys have now been retired and their use is deprecated. provides the mappings between the deprecated and new claim keys. Claim Key Mappings

	PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1	tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm
Nonce	-75008	10 (EAT nonce)
Instance ID	-75009	256 (EAT euid)
Profile Definition	-75000	265 (EAT eat_profile)
Client ID	-75001	2394
Security Lifecycle	-75002	2395
Implementation ID	-75003	2396
Boot Seed	-75004	2397
Certification Reference	-75005	2398
Software Components	-75006	2399
Verification Service Indicator	-75010	2400

The new profile introduces three further changes:

• the "Boot Seed" claim is now optional and of variable length (see ),
• the "No Software Measurements" claim has been retired,
• the "Certification Reference" claim syntax changed from EAN-13 to EAN-13+5 (see ).

To simplify the transition to the token format described in this document it is RECOMMENDED that Verifiers accept tokens encoded according to the old profile (PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1) as well as to the new profile (tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm), at least for the time needed to their devices to upgrade.

Profiles This document defines a baseline with common requirements that all PSA profiles must satisfy. This document also defines a profile () that builds on the baseline while constraining the use of COSE algorithms to improve interoperability between PSA Attesters and Verifiers.

Baseline Profile

 Token Encoding and Signing The PSA attestation token is encoded in CBOR format. Only definite-length string, arrays, and maps are allowed. Given that a PSA attester is typically found in a constrained device, it MAY NOT emit CBOR preferred serializations (). Therefore, the Verifier MUST be a variation-tolerant CBOR decoder. Cryptographic protection is obtained by wrapping the psa-token claims-set in a COSE Web Token (CWT) . For asymmetric key algorithms, the signature structure MUST be a tagged (18) COSE_Sign1. For symmetric key algorithms, the signature structure MUST be a tagged (17) COSE_Mac0. Acknowledging the variety of markets, regulations and use cases in which the PSA attestation token can be used, the baseline profile does not impose any strong requirement on the cryptographic algorithms that need to be supported by Attesters and Verifiers. The flexibility provided by the COSE format should be sufficient to deal with the level of cryptographic agility needed to adapt to specific use cases. It is RECOMMENDED that commonly adopted algorithms are used, such as those discussed in . It is expected that receivers will accept a wider range of algorithms, while Attesters would produce PSA tokens using only one such algorithm. The CWT CBOR tag (61) is not used. An application that needs to exchange PSA attestation tokens can wrap the serialised COSE_Sign1 or COSE_Mac0 in the media type defined in or the CoAP Content-Format defined in . A PSA token is always directly signed by the PSA RoT. Therefore, a PSA claims-set () is never carried in a Detached EAT bundle ().

Freshness Model The PSA Token supports the freshness models for attestation Evidence based on nonces and epoch handles (Section and Section of ) using the nonce claim to convey the nonce or epoch handle supplied by the Verifier. No further assumption on the specific remote attestation protocol is made. Note that use of epoch handles is constrained by the type restrictions imposed by the eat_nonce syntax. For use in PSA tokens, it must be possible to encode the epoch handle as an opaque binary string between 8 and 64 octets.

Synopsis presents a concise view of the requirements described in the preceding sections. Baseline Profile

Issue	Profile Definition
CBOR/JSON	CBOR MUST be used
CBOR Encoding	Definite length maps and arrays MUST be used
CBOR Encoding	Definite length strings MUST be used
CBOR Serialization	Variant serialization MAY be used
COSE Protection	COSE_Sign1 and/or COSE_Mac0 MUST be used
Algorithms	SHOULD be used
Detached EAT Bundle Usage	Detached EAT bundles MUST NOT be sent
Verification Key Identification	Any identification method listed in
Endorsements	See
Freshness	nonce or epoch ID based
Claims	Those defined in . As per general EAT rules, the receiver MUST NOT error out on claims it does not understand.

Profile TFM This profile is appropriate for the code base implemented in and should apply for most derivative implementations. If an implementation changes the requirements described below then, to ensure interoperability, a new profile value should be used (). This includes a restriction of the profile to a subset of the COSE Protection scheme requirements. presents a concise view of the requirements. The value of the eat_profile MUST be tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm. TF-M Profile

Issue	Profile Definition
CBOR/JSON	See
CBOR Encoding	See
CBOR Encoding	See
CBOR Serialization	See
COSE Protection	COSE_Sign1 or COSE_Mac0 MUST be used
Algorithms	The receiver MUST accept ES256, ES384 and ES512 with COSE_Sign1 and HMAC256/256, HMAC384/384 and HMAC512/512 with COSE_Mac0; the sender MUST send one of these
Detached EAT Bundle Usage	See
Verification Key Identification	Claim-Based Key Identification () using Implementation ID and Instance ID
Endorsements	See
Freshness	See
Claims	See

Collated CDDL psa-boot-seed-type ) psa-client-id-nspe-type = -2147483648...0 psa-client-id-spe-type = 1..2147483647 psa-client-id-type = psa-client-id-nspe-type / psa-client-id-spe-type psa-client-id = ( psa-client-id-key => psa-client-id-type ) psa-certification-reference-type = text .regexp "[0-9]{13}-[0-9]{5}" psa-certification-reference = ( ? psa-certification-reference-key => psa-certification-reference-type ) psa-implementation-id-type = bytes .size 32 psa-implementation-id = ( psa-implementation-id-key => psa-implementation-id-type ) psa-instance-id-type = bytes .size 33 psa-instance-id = ( ueid-label => psa-instance-id-type ) psa-nonce = ( nonce-label => psa-hash-type ) psa-profile-type = "tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm" psa-profile = ( profile-label => psa-profile-type ) psa-lifecycle-unknown-type = 0x0000..0x00ff psa-lifecycle-assembly-and-test-type = 0x1000..0x10ff psa-lifecycle-psa-rot-provisioning-type = 0x2000..0x20ff psa-lifecycle-secured-type = 0x3000..0x30ff psa-lifecycle-non-psa-rot-debug-type = 0x4000..0x40ff psa-lifecycle-recoverable-psa-rot-debug-type = 0x5000..0x50ff psa-lifecycle-decommissioned-type = 0x6000..0x60ff psa-lifecycle-type = psa-lifecycle-unknown-type / psa-lifecycle-assembly-and-test-type / psa-lifecycle-psa-rot-provisioning-type / psa-lifecycle-secured-type / psa-lifecycle-non-psa-rot-debug-type / psa-lifecycle-recoverable-psa-rot-debug-type / psa-lifecycle-decommissioned-type psa-lifecycle = ( psa-lifecycle-key => psa-lifecycle-type ) psa-software-component = { ? &(measurement-type: 1) => text &(measurement-value: 2) => psa-hash-type ? &(version: 4) => text &(signer-id: 5) => psa-hash-type ? &(measurement-desc: 6) => text } psa-software-components = ( psa-software-components-key => [ + psa-software-component ] ) psa-verification-service-indicator-type = text psa-verification-service-indicator = ( ? psa-verification-service-indicator-key => psa-verification-service-indicator-type ) ]]>

Scalability Considerations IAKs can be either raw public keys or certified public keys. Certified public keys require the manufacturer to run the certification authority (CA) that issues X.509 certs for the IAKs. (Note that operating a CA is a complex and expensive task that may be unaffordable to certain manufacturers.) If applicable, such approach provides sensibly better scalability properties compared to using raw public keys, namely:

• storage requirements on the verifier side are minimised - the same manufacturer's trust anchor is used for any number of devices,
• the provisioning model is simpler and more robust since there is no need to notify the verifier about each newly manufactured device,
• already existing and well understood revocation mechanisms can be used.

The IAK's X.509 cert can be inlined in the PSA token using the x5chain COSE header parameter at the cost of an increase in the PSA token size. and provide guidance for profiling X.509 certs used in IoT deployments. Note that the exact split between pre-provisioned and inlined certs may vary depending on the specific deployment. In that respect, x5chain is quite flexible: it can contain the end-entity (EE) cert only, the EE and a partial chain, or the EE and the full chain up to the trust anchor (see for the details). Deciding on a sensible split point may depend on constraints around network bandwidth and computing resources available to the endpoints (especially network buffers).

Implementation Status Implementations of this specification are provided by the Trusted Firmware-M project , , the Veraison project , and the Xclaim library. All four implementations are released as open-source software.

Security and Privacy Considerations This specification re-uses the EAT specification and therefore the CWT specification. Hence, the security and privacy considerations of those specifications apply here as well. Since CWTs offer different ways to protect the token, this specification profiles those options and allows signatures using public key cryptography as well as message authentication codes (MACs). COSE_Sign1 is used for digital signatures and COSE_Mac0 for MACs, as defined in the COSE specification . Note, however, that the use of MAC authentication is NOT RECOMMENDED due to the associated infrastructure costs for key management and protocol complexities. A PSA attester MUST NOT provide attestation evidence to an untrusted challenger, as it may allow attackers to interpose and trick the verifier into believing the attacker is a legitimate attester. Attestation tokens contain information that may be unique to a device and therefore they may allow to single out an individual device for tracking purposes. Deployments that have privacy requirements must take appropriate measures to ensure that the token is only used to provision anonymous/pseudonym keys.

Verification To verify the token, the primary need is to check correct encoding and signing as detailed in . The key used for verification is either supplied to the Verifier by an authorized Endorser along with the corresponding Attester's Instance ID or inlined in the token using the x5chain header parameter as described in . If the IAK is a raw public key, the Instance and Implementation ID claims are used (together with the kid in the COSE header, if present) to assist in locating the key used to verify the signature covering the CWT token. If the IAK is a certified public key, X.509 path construction and validation () up to a trusted CA MUST be successful before the key is used to verify the token signature. In addition, the Verifier will typically operate a policy where values of some of the claims in this profile can be compared to reference values, registered with the Verifier for a given deployment, in order to confirm that the device is endorsed by the manufacturer supply chain. The policy may require that the relevant claims must have a match to a registered reference value. All claims may be worthy of additional appraisal. It is likely that most deployments would include a policy with appraisal for the following claims:

• Implementation ID - the value of the Implementation ID can be used to identify the verification requirements of the deployment.
• Software Component, Measurement Value - this value can uniquely identify a firmware release from the supply chain. In some cases, a Verifier may maintain a record for a series of firmware releases, being patches to an original baseline release. A verification policy may then allow this value to match any point on that release sequence or expect some minimum level of maturity related to the sequence.
• Software Component, Signer ID - where present in a deployment, this could allow a Verifier to operate a more general policy than that for Measurement Value as above, by allowing a token to contain any firmware entries signed by a known Signer ID, without checking for a uniquely registered version.
• Certification Reference - if present, this value could be used as a hint to locate security certification information associated with the attesting device. An example could be a reference to a certificate.

 AR4SI Trustworthiness Claims Mappings defines an information model that Verifiers can employ to produce Attestation Results. AR4SI provides a set of standardized appraisal categories and tiers that greatly simplifies the task of writing Relying Party policies in multi-attester environments. The contents of are intended as guidance for implementing a PSA Verifier that computes its results using AR4SI. The table describes which PSA Evidence claims (if any) are related to which AR4SI trustworthiness claim, and therefore what the Verifier must consider when deciding if and how to appraise a certain feature associated with the PSA Attester. AR4SI Claims mappings

Trustworthiness Vector claims	Related PSA claims
configuration	Software Components ()
executables	ditto
file-system	N/A
hardware	Implementation ID ()
instance-identity	Instance ID (). The Security Lifecycle () can also impact the derived identity.
runtime-opaque	Indirectly derived from executables, hardware, and instance-identity. The Security Lifecycle () can also be relevant: for example, any debug state will expose otherwise protected memory.
sourced-data	N/A
storage-opaque	Indirectly derived from executables, hardware, and instance-identity.

This document does not prescribe what value must be chosen based on each possible situation: when assigning specific Trustworthiness Claim values, an implementation is expected to follow the algorithm described in .

Endorsements, Reference Values and Verification Key Material defines a protocol based on the data model that can be used to convey PSA Endorsements, Reference Values and verification key material to the Verifier.

IANA Considerations

CBOR Web Token Claims Registration IANA is requested to make permanent the following claims that have been assigned via early allocation in the "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims" registry .

 Client ID Claim

• Claim Name: psa-client-id
• Claim Description: PSA Client ID
• JWT Claim Name: N/A
• Claim Key: 2394
• Claim Value Type(s): signed integer
• Change Controller: Hannes Tschofenig
• Specification Document(s): of RFCthis

 Security Lifecycle Claim

• Claim Name: psa-security-lifecycle
• Claim Description: PSA Security Lifecycle
• JWT Claim Name: N/A
• Claim Key: 2395
• Claim Value Type(s): unsigned integer
• Change Controller: Hannes Tschofenig
• Specification Document(s): of RFCthis

 Implementation ID Claim

• Claim Name: psa-implementation-id
• Claim Description: PSA Implementation ID
• JWT Claim Name: N/A
• Claim Key: 2396
• Claim Value Type(s): byte string
• Change Controller: Hannes Tschofenig
• Specification Document(s): of RFCthis

 Boot Seed Claim

• Claim Name: psa-boot-seed
• Claim Description: PSA Boot Seed
• JWT Claim Name: N/A
• Claim Key: 2397
• Claim Value Type(s): byte string
• Change Controller: Hannes Tschofenig
• Specification Document(s): of RFCthis

 Certification Reference Claim

• Claim Name: psa-certification-reference
• Claim Description: PSA Certification Reference
• JWT Claim Name: N/A
• Claim Key: 2398
• Claim Value Type(s): text string
• Change Controller: Hannes Tschofenig
• Specification Document(s): of RFCthis

 Software Components Claim

• Claim Name: psa-software-components
• Claim Description: PSA Software Components
• JWT Claim Name: N/A
• Claim Key: 2399
• Claim Value Type(s): array
• Change Controller: Hannes Tschofenig
• Specification Document(s): of RFCthis

 Verification Service Indicator Claim

• Claim Name: psa-verification-service-indicator
• Claim Description: PSA Verification Service Indicator
• JWT Claim Name: N/A
• Claim Key: 2400
• Claim Value Type(s): text string
• Change Controller: Hannes Tschofenig
• Specification Document(s): of RFCthis

Media Types No new media type registration is requested. To indicate that the transmitted content is a PSA Attestation Token, applications can use the application/eat+cwt media type defined in with the eat_profile parameter set to tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm (or PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1 if the token is encoded according to the old profile, see ).

CoAP Content-Formats Registration IANA is requested to register two CoAP Content-Format IDs in the "CoAP Content-Formats" registry :

• One for the application/eat+cwt media type with the eat_profile parameter equal to tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm
• Another for the application/eat+cwt media type with the eat_profile parameter equal to PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1

The Content-Formats should be allocated from the Expert review range (0-255).

Registry Contents

• Media Type: application/eat+cwt; eat_profile="tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm"
• Encoding: -
• Id: [[To-be-assigned by IANA]]
• Reference: RFCthis
• Media Type: application/eat+cwt; eat_profile="PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1"
• Encoding: -
• Id: [[To-be-assigned by IANA]]
• Reference: RFCthis

References Normative References Arm GS1 Arm PSA Certified Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. There is a need to be able to define basic security services for this data format. This document defines the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) protocol. This specification describes how to create and process signatures, message authentication codes, and encryption using CBOR for serialization. This specification additionally describes how to represent cryptographic keys using CBOR. This document, along with RFC 9053, obsoletes RFC 8152. Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. There is a need to be able to define basic security services for this data format. This document defines a set of algorithms that can be used with the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) protocol (RFC 9052). This document, along with RFC 9052, obsoletes RFC 8152. IANA This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK] Security Theory LLC Qualcomm Technologies Inc. Qualcomm Technologies Inc. Red Hound Software, Inc. An Entity Attestation Token (EAT) provides an attested claims set that describes state and characteristics of an entity, a device like a smartphone, IoT device, network equipment or such. This claims set is used by a relying party, server or service to determine the type and degree of trust placed in the entity. An EAT is either a CBOR Web Token (CWT) or JSON Web Token (JWT) with attestation-oriented claims. Security Theory LLC Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology Linaro Payloads used in Remote Attestation Procedures may require an associated media type for their conveyance, for example when used in RESTful APIs. This memo defines media types to be used for Entity Attestation Tokens (EAT). In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. This document proposes a notational convention to express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) data structures (RFC 7049). Its main goal is to provide an easy and unambiguous way to express structures for protocol messages and data formats that use CBOR or JSON. A Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) is a compact sequence of characters that identifies an abstract or physical resource. This specification defines the generic URI syntax and a process for resolving URI references that might be in relative form, along with guidelines and security considerations for the use of URIs on the Internet. The URI syntax defines a grammar that is a superset of all valid URIs, allowing an implementation to parse the common components of a URI reference without knowing the scheme-specific requirements of every possible identifier. This specification does not define a generative grammar for URIs; that task is performed by the individual specifications of each URI scheme. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document describes the "tag" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) scheme. Tag URIs (also known as "tags") are designed to be unique across space and time while being tractable to humans. They are distinct from most other URIs in that they have no authoritative resolution mechanism. A tag may be used purely as an entity identifier. Furthermore, using tags has some advantages over the common practice of using "http" URIs as identifiers for non-HTTP-accessible resources. This memo provides information for the Internet community. The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format whose design goals include the possibility of extremely small code size, fairly small message size, and extensibility without the need for version negotiation. These design goals make it different from earlier binary serializations such as ASN.1 and MessagePack. This document obsoletes RFC 7049, providing editorial improvements, new details, and errata fixes while keeping full compatibility with the interchange format of RFC 7049. It does not create a new version of the format. CBOR Web Token (CWT) is a compact means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a CWT are encoded in the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR), and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) is used for added application-layer security protection. A claim is a piece of information asserted about a subject and is represented as a name/value pair consisting of a claim name and a claim value. CWT is derived from JSON Web Token (JWT) but uses CBOR rather than JSON. Informative References A common design pattern in Internet of Things (IoT) deployments is the use of a constrained device that collects data via sensors or controls actuators for use in home automation, industrial control systems, smart cities, and other IoT deployments. This document defines a Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) 1.2 profile that offers communications security for this data exchange thereby preventing eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery. The lack of communication security is a common vulnerability in IoT products that can easily be solved by using these well-researched and widely deployed Internet security protocols. Linaro Sandelman Software Works This document is a companion to RFC 7925 and defines TLS/DTLS 1.3 profiles for Internet of Things devices. It also updates RFC 7925 with regards to the X.509 certificate profile. The CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) message structure uses references to keys in general. For some algorithms, additional properties are defined that carry parameters relating to keys as needed. The COSE Key structure is used for transporting keys outside of COSE messages. This document extends the way that keys can be identified and transported by providing attributes that refer to or contain X.509 certificates. In network protocol exchanges, it is often useful for one end of a communication to know whether the other end is in an intended operating state. This document provides an architectural overview of the entities involved that make such tests possible through the process of generating, conveying, and evaluating evidentiary Claims. It provides a model that is neutral toward processor architectures, the content of Claims, and protocols. IANA IANA Linaro Linaro The Veraison Project Arm PSA Certified Arm Linaro Arm Ltd Fraunhofer SIT PSA Endorsements include reference values, cryptographic key material and certification status information that a Verifier needs in order to appraise attestation Evidence produced by a PSA device. This memo defines such PSA Endorsements as a profile of the CoRIM data model. Fraunhofer SIT arm arm Intel Huawei Technologies Remote Attestation Procedures (RATS) enable Relying Parties to assess the trustworthiness of a remote Attester and therefore to decide whether to engage in secure interactions with it. Evidence about trustworthiness can be rather complex and it is deemed unrealistic that every Relying Party is capable of the appraisal of Evidence. Therefore that burden is typically offloaded to a Verifier. In order to conduct Evidence appraisal, a Verifier requires not only fresh Evidence from an Attester, but also trusted Endorsements and Reference Values from Endorsers and Reference Value Providers, such as manufacturers, distributors, or device owners. This document specifies the information elements for representing Endorsements and Reference Values in CBOR format. Cisco Systems Fraunhofer SIT MIT Arm Limited Intel This document defines reusable Attestation Result information elements. When these elements are offered to Relying Parties as Evidence, different aspects of Attester trustworthiness can be evaluated. Additionally, where the Relying Party is interfacing with a heterogeneous mix of Attesting Environment and Verifier types, consistent policies can be applied to subsequent information exchange between each Attester and the Relying Party.

Examples The following examples show PSA attestation tokens for an hypothetical system comprising a single measured software component. The attesting device is in a lifecycle state () of SECURED. The attestation has been requested from a client residing in the SPE. The example in illustrates the case where the IAK is an asymmetric key. A COSE Sign1 envelope is used to wrap the PSA claims-set. illustrates the case where the IAK is a symmetric key and a COSE Mac0 envelope is used instead. The claims sets are identical, except for the Instance ID which is synthesized from the key material. The examples have been created using the iat-verifier tool .

COSE Sign1 Token The JWK representation of the IAK used for creating the COSE Sign1 signature over the PSA token is: The resulting COSE object is: which has the following base16 encoding:

COSE Mac0 Token The JWK representation of the IAK used for creating the COSE Mac0 signature over the PSA token is: The resulting COSE object is: which has the following base16 encoding:

Acknowledgments Thanks to Carsten Bormann for help with the CDDL and Nicholas Wood for ideas and comments.

Contributors Security Theory LLC

lgl@securitytheory.com

Arm Limited

Tamas.Ban@arm.com

Arm Limited

Sergei.Trofimov@arm.com