]>

Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net

Arm Limited

Simon.Frost@arm.com

Arm Limited

Mathias.Brossard@arm.com

HP Labs

adrianlshaw@acm.org

Linaro

thomas.fossati@linaro.org

Internet-Draft The Arm Platform Security Architecture (PSA) is a family of hardware and firmware security specifications, as well as open-source reference implementations, to help device makers and chip manufacturers build best-practice security into products. Devices that are PSA compliant can produce attestation tokens as described in this memo, which are the basis for many different protocols, including secure provisioning and network access control. This document specifies the PSA attestation token structure and semantics. The PSA attestation token is a profile of the Entity Attestation Token (EAT). This specification describes what claims are used in an attestation token generated by PSA compliant systems, how these claims get serialized to the wire, and how they are cryptographically protected. This document is produced through the Independent RFC Stream and was not subject to the IETF's approval process.

Introduction The Platform Security Architecture (PSA) is a set of hardware and firmware specifications, backed by reference implementations and a security certification program . The security specifications have been published by Arm, while the certification program and reference implementations are the result of a collaborative effort by companies from multiple sectors, including evaluation laboratories, IP semiconductor vendors and security consultancies. The main objective of the PSA initiative is to assist device manufacturers and chip makers in incorporating best-practice security measures into their products. Many devices now have trusted execution environments that provide a safe space for security-sensitive code, such as cryptography, secure boot, secure storage, and other essential security functions. These security functions are typically exposed through a narrow and well-defined interface, and can be used by operating system libraries and applications. As outlined in the RATS Architecture , an Attester produces a signed collection of Claims that constitutes Evidence about its target environment. This document focuses on the output provided by PSA's Initial Attestation API . This output corresponds to Evidence in and, as a design decision, the PSA attestation token is a profile of the Entity Attestation Token (EAT) . Note that there are other profiles of EAT available, such as and , for use with different use cases and by different attestation technologies. Since the PSA tokens are also consumed by services outside the device, there is an actual need to ensure interoperability. Interoperability needs are addressed here by describing the exact syntax and semantics of the attestation claims, and defining the way these claims are encoded and cryptographically protected. Further details on concepts expressed below can be found in the PSA Security Model documentation . This document was published via the IETF Independent RFC Stream, see and .

Conventions and Definitions The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. The terms Attester, Relying Party, Verifier, Attestation Result, Target Environment, Attesting Environment and Evidence are defined in . We use the term "receiver" to refer to Relying Parties and Verifiers. We use the terms Evidence, "PSA attestation token", and "PSA token" interchangeably. The terms "sender" and Attester are used interchangeably. Likewise, we use the terms Verifier and "verification service" interchangeably.

RoT:

Root of Trust, the minimal set of software, hardware and data that has to be implicitly trusted in the platform - there is no software or hardware at a deeper level that can verify that the Root of Trust is authentic and unmodified. An example of RoT is an initial bootloader in ROM, which contains cryptographic functions and credentials, running on a specific hardware platform.

SPE:

Secure Processing Environment, a platform's processing environment for software that provides confidentiality and integrity for its runtime state, from software and hardware, outside of the SPE. Contains trusted code and trusted hardware. (Equivalent to Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), "secure world", or "secure enclave".)

NSPE:

Non Secure Processing Environment, the security domain outside of the SPE, the Application domain, typically containing the application firmware, real-time operating systems, applications and general hardware. (Equivalent to Rich Execution Environment (REE), or "normal world".)

In this document, the structure of data is specified in Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL) .

PSA Attester Model outlines the structure of the PSA Attester according to the conceptual model described in .

PSA Attester | Boot |<---+ Attestation | | | | | | | W | State | R | Service | | | | | '-----+------' '-----' '-------------' | | | '----------------------|----------------------------------------' | | .------------+--------------+---------------. | | .--------|-------------|--------------|----------------|--------. | | | | | | | | | | | .------o-----. .-----o-------. .----o--------. .-----o------. | | | | | Updateable | | Application | | Application | | PSA RoT | | | | | | PSA RoT | | RoT | | Loader | | Parameters | | | | | '------------' '-------------' '-------------' '------------' | | | | Target Environment | | | '---------------------------------------------------------------' | '-------------------------------------------------------------------' Legend: ---> read ---> write ---o measure R W ]]>

The PSA Attester is a relatively straightforward embodiment of the RATS Attester with exactly one Attesting Environment and one or more Target Environments. The Attesting Environment is responsible for collecting the information to be represented in PSA claims and to assemble them into Evidence. It is made of two cooperating components:

• The Main Bootloader, executing at boot-time, measures the Target Environments - i.e., loaded software components, and all the relevant PSA RoT parameters -, and stores the recorded information in secure memory (Main Boot State). See .

PSA Attester Boot Phase | | '--------|-------------|-------------|----' | | | ]]>

• The Initial Attestation Service (executing at run-time in SPE) answers requests coming from NSPE via the PSA attestation API , collects and formats the claims from Main Boot State, and uses the Initial Attestation Key (IAK) to sign them and produce Evidence. See .

The word "Initial" in "Initial Attestation Service" refers to a limited set of Target Environments, namely those representing the first, foundational stages establishing the chain of trust of a PSA device. Collecting measurements from Target Environments after this initial phase is outside the scope of this specification. Extensions of this specification could collect up-to-date measurements from additional Target Environments and define additional claims for use within those environments, but these are, by definition, custom.

PSA Attester Run-time Phase | | | | PSA Token | | +---------->| | | | ]]>

The Target Environments can be of four types, some of which may or may not be present depending on the device architecture:

• (A subset of) the PSA RoT parameters, including Instance and Implementation IDs.
• The updateable PSA RoT, including the Secure Partition Manager and all PSA RoT services.
• The (optional) Application RoT, that is any application-defined security service, possibly making use of the PSA RoT services.
• The loader of the application software running in NSPE.

A reference implementation of the PSA Attester is provided by .

PSA Claims This section describes the claims to be used in a PSA attestation token. A more comprehensive treatment of the EAT profile(s) defined by PSA is found in . CDDL along with text descriptions is used to define each claim independent of encoding. The following CDDL type(s) are reused by different claims: Two conventions are used to encode the Right-Hand-Side (RHS) of a claim: the postfix -label is used for EAT-defined claims, and the postfix -key for PSA-originated claims.

Caller Claims

Nonce The Nonce claim is used to carry the challenge provided by the caller to demonstrate freshness of the generated token. The EAT nonce (claim key 10) is used. Since the EAT nonce claim offers flexiblity for different attestation technologies, this specifications applies the following constraints to the nonce-type:

• The length MUST be either 32, 48, or 64 bytes.
• Only a single nonce value is conveyed. The array notation MUST NOT be used for encoding the nonce value.

This claim MUST be present in a PSA attestation token. psa-hash-type ) ]]>

Client ID The Client ID claim represents the security domain of the caller. In PSA, a security domain is represented by a signed integer whereby negative values represent callers from the NSPE and where positive IDs represent callers from the SPE. The value 0 is not permitted. For an example definition of client IDs, see the PSA Firmware Framework . It is essential that this claim is checked in the verification process to ensure that a security domain, i.e., an attestation endpoint, cannot spoof a report from another security domain. This claim MUST be present in a PSA attestation token. psa-client-id-type ) ]]>

Target Identification Claims

 Instance ID The Instance ID claim represents the unique identifier of the Initial Attestation Key (IAK). The full definition is in . The EAT ueid (claim key 256) of type RAND is used. The following constraints apply to the ueid-type:

• The length MUST be 33 bytes.
• The first byte MUST be 0x01 (RAND) followed by the 32-byte unique identifier of the IAK. provides implementation options for deriving the IAK unique identifier from the IAK itself.

This claim MUST be present in a PSA attestation token. psa-instance-id-type ) ]]>

Implementation ID The Implementation ID claim uniquely identifies the hardware assembly of the immutable PSA RoT. A verification service uses this claim to locate the details of the PSA RoT implementation from an Endorser or manufacturer. Such details are used by a verification service to determine the security properties or certification status of the PSA RoT implementation. The value and format of the ID is decided by the manufacturer or a particular certification scheme. For example, the ID could take the form of a product serial number, database ID, or other appropriate identifier. This claim MUST be present in a PSA attestation token. Note that this identifies the PSA RoT implementation, not a particular instance. To uniquely identify an instance, see the Instance ID claim . psa-implementation-id-type ) ]]>

Certification Reference The Certification Reference claim is used to link the class of chip and PSA RoT of the attesting device to an associated entry in the PSA Certification database. It MUST be represented as a string made of nineteen numeric characters: a thirteen-digit , followed by a dash "-", followed by the five-digit versioning information described in . Linking to the PSA Certification entry can still be achieved if this claim is not present in the token by making an association at a Verifier between the reference value and other token claim values - for example, the Implementation ID. This claim MAY be present in a PSA attestation token. psa-certification-reference-type ) ]]>

Target State Claims

Security Lifecycle The Security Lifecycle claim represents the current lifecycle state of the PSA RoT. The state is represented by an integer that is divided to convey a major state and a minor state. A major state is mandatory and defined by . A minor state is optional and 'IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED'. The PSA security lifecycle state and implementation state are encoded as follows:

• major[15:8] - PSA security lifecycle state, and
• minor[7:0] - IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED state.

The PSA lifecycle states are illustrated in . For PSA, a Verifier can only trust reports from the PSA RoT when it is in SECURED or NON_PSA_ROT_DEBUG major states. This claim MUST be present in a PSA attestation token.

PSA Lifecycle States | Decommissioned |<---------' '----------------' ]]>

The CDDL representation is shown below. provides the mappings between and the data model. psa-lifecycle-type ) ]]> psa-lifecycle-unknown-type is not shown in ; it represents an invalid state that must not occur in a system. Lifecycle States Mappings

CDDL	Lifecycle States
psa-lifecycle-unknown-type
psa-lifecycle-assembly-and-test-type	Assembly and Test
psa-lifecycle-psa-rot-provisioning-type	PSA RoT Provisioning
psa-lifecycle-secured-type	Secured
psa-lifecycle-non-psa-rot-debug-type	Non-Recoverable PSA RoT Debug
psa-lifecycle-recoverable-psa-rot-debug-type	Recoverable PSA RoT Debug
psa-lifecycle-decommissioned-type	Decommissioned

Boot Seed The Boot Seed claim contains a value created at system boot time that allows differentiation of attestation reports from different boot sessions of a particular entity (i.e., a certain Instance ID). The EAT bootseed (claim key 268) is used. The following constraints apply to the binary-data type:

• The length MUST be between 8 and 32 bytes.

This claim MAY be present in a PSA attestation token. psa-boot-seed-type ) ]]>

Software Inventory Claims

Software Components The Software Components claim is a list of software components that includes all the software (both code and configuration) loaded by the PSA RoT. This claim MUST be included in attestation tokens produced by an implementation conformant with . Each entry in the Software Components list describes one software component using the attributes described in the following subsections. Unless explicitly stated, the presence of an attribute is OPTIONAL. Note that, as described in , a relying party will typically see the result of the appraisal process from the Verifier in form of an Attestation Result, rather than the PSA token from the attesting endpoint. Therefore, a relying party is not expected to understand the Software Components claim. Instead, it is for the Verifier to check this claim against the available Reference Values and provide an answer in form of an "high level" Attestation Result, which may or may not include the original Software Components claim. text &(measurement-value: 2) => psa-hash-type ? &(version: 4) => text &(signer-id: 5) => psa-hash-type ? &(measurement-desc: 6) => text } psa-software-components = ( psa-software-components-key => [ + psa-software-component ] ) ]]>

Measurement Type The Measurement Type attribute (key=1) is a short string representing the role of this software component. The following measurement types MAY be used for code measurements:

• "BL": a Boot Loader
• "PRoT": a component of the PSA Root of Trust
• "ARoT": a component of the Application Root of Trust
• "App": a component of the NSPE application
• "TS": a component of a Trusted Subsystem

The same labels with a "-cfg" postfix (e.g., "PRoT-cfg") MAY be used for configuration measurements. This attribute SHOULD be present in a PSA software component unless there is a very good reason to leave it out - for example in networks with severely constrained bandwidth, where sparing a few bytes really makes a difference.

 Measurement Value The Measurement Value attribute (key=2) represents a hash of the invariant software component in memory at startup time. The value MUST be a cryptographic hash of 256 bits or stronger. This attribute MUST be present in a PSA software component.

Version The Version attribute (key=4) is the issued software version in the form of a text string. The value of this attribute will correspond to the entry in the original signed manifest of the component.

Signer ID The Signer ID attribute (key=5) uniquely identifies the signer of the software component. The identification is typically accomplished by hashing the signer's public key. The value of this attribute will correspond to the entry in the original manifest for the component. This can be used by a Verifier to ensure the components were signed by an expected trusted source. This attribute MUST be present in a PSA software component to be compliant with .

Measurement Description The Measurement Description attribute (key=6) contains a string identifying the hash algorithm used to compute the corresponding Measurement Value. The string SHOULD be encoded according to .

Verification Claims The following claims are part of the PSA token (and therefore still Evidence) but aim to help receivers, including relying parties, with the processing of the received attestation Evidence.

Verification Service Indicator The Verification Service Indicator claim is a hint used by a relying party to locate a verification service for the token. The value is a text string that can be used to locate the service (typically, a URL specifying the address of the verification service API). A Relying Party may choose to ignore this claim in favor of other information. psa-verification-service-indicator-type ) ]]> It is assumed that the relying party is pre-configured with a list of trusted verification services and that the contents of this hint can be used to look up the correct one. Under no circumstances must the relying party be tricked into contacting an unknown and untrusted verification service since the returned Attestation Result cannot be relied on. Note: This hint requires the relying party to parse the content of the PSA token. Since the relying party may not be in possession of a trust anchor to verify the digital signature, it uses the hint in the same way as it would treat any other information provided by an external party, which includes attacker-provided data.

Profile Definition The Profile Definition claim encodes the unique identifier that corresponds to the EAT profile described by this document. This allows a receiver to assign the intended semantics to the rest of the claims found in the token. The EAT eat_profile (claim key 265) is used. The URI encoding MUST be used. The value MUST be tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm for the profile defined in . Future profiles derived from the baseline PSA profile SHALL create their unique value, as described in . This claim MUST be present in a PSA attestation token. See , for considerations about backwards compatibility with previous versions of the PSA attestation token format. psa-profile-type ) ]]>

URI Structure for the Derived Profile Identifiers A new profile is associated with a unique string. The string MUST use the URI fragment syntax defined in . The string SHOULD be short to avoid unnecessary overhead. To avoid collisions, profile authors SHOULD communicate upfront their intent to use a certain string using the enquiry form on the website. To derive the value to be used for the eat_profile claim, the string is added as a fragment to the tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa tag URI . For example, an hypothetical profile using only COSE_Mac0 with the AES Message Authentication Code (AES-MAC) may decide to use the string "aes-mac". The eat_profile value would then be: tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#aes-mac.

Backwards Compatibility Considerations A previous version of this specification , identified by the PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1 profile, used claim key values from the "private use range" of the CWT Claims registry. These claim keys have now been deprecated. provides the mappings between the deprecated and new claim keys. Claim Key Mappings

	PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1	tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm
Nonce	-75008	10 (EAT nonce)
Instance ID	-75009	256 (EAT euid)
Profile Definition	-75000	265 (EAT eat_profile)
Client ID	-75001	2394
Security Lifecycle	-75002	2395
Implementation ID	-75003	2396
Boot Seed	-75004	268 (EAT bootseed)
Certification Reference	-75005	2398
Software Components	-75006	2399
Verification Service Indicator	-75010	2400

The new profile introduces three further changes:

• the "Boot Seed" claim is now optional and of variable length (see ),
• the "No Software Measurements" claim has been retired,
• the "Certification Reference" claim syntax changed from EAN-13 to EAN-13+5 (see ).

To simplify the transition to the token format described in this document it is RECOMMENDED that Verifiers accept tokens encoded according to the old profile (PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1) as well as to the profile defined in this document (tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm), at least for the time needed to their devices to upgrade.

Profiles This document defines a baseline with common requirements that all PSA profiles must satisfy. (Note that this does not apply to .) This document also defines a "TFM" profile () that builds on the baseline while constraining the use of COSE algorithms to improve interoperability between Attesters and Verifiers. Baseline and TFM are what EAT calls a "partial" and "full" profile, respectively. See for further details regarding profiles.

Baseline Profile

 Token Encoding and Signing The PSA attestation token is encoded in CBOR format. The CBOR representation of a PSA token MUST be "valid" according to the definition in . Besides, only definite-length string, arrays, and maps are allowed. Given that a PSA Attester is typically found in a constrained device, it MAY NOT emit CBOR preferred serializations (). Therefore, the Verifier MUST be a variation-tolerant CBOR decoder. Cryptographic protection is obtained by wrapping the psa-token claims-set in a COSE Web Token (CWT) . For asymmetric key algorithms, the signature structure MUST be a tagged (18) COSE_Sign1. For symmetric key algorithms, the signature structure MUST be a tagged (17) COSE_Mac0. Acknowledging the variety of markets, regulations and use cases in which the PSA attestation token can be used, the baseline profile does not impose any strong requirement on the cryptographic algorithms that need to be supported by Attesters and Verifiers. The flexibility provided by the COSE format should be sufficient to deal with the level of cryptographic agility needed to adapt to specific use cases. It is RECOMMENDED that commonly adopted algorithms are used, such as those discussed in . It is expected that receivers will accept a wider range of algorithms, while Attesters would produce PSA tokens using only one such algorithm. The CWT CBOR tag (61) is not used. An application that needs to exchange PSA attestation tokens can wrap the serialised COSE_Sign1 or COSE_Mac0 in the media type defined in or the CoAP Content-Format defined in . A PSA token is always directly signed by the PSA RoT. Therefore, a PSA claims-set () is never carried in a Detached EAT bundle ().

Freshness Model The PSA token supports the freshness models for attestation Evidence based on nonces and epoch handles (Section and Section of ) using the nonce claim to convey the nonce or epoch handle supplied by the Verifier. No further assumption on the specific remote attestation protocol is made. Note that use of epoch handles is constrained by the type restrictions imposed by the eat_nonce syntax. For use in PSA tokens, it must be possible to encode the epoch handle as an opaque binary string between 8 and 64 octets.

Synopsis presents a concise view of the requirements described in the preceding sections. Baseline Profile

Issue	Profile Definition
CBOR/JSON	CBOR MUST be used
CBOR Encoding	Definite length maps and arrays MUST be used
CBOR Encoding	Definite length strings MUST be used
CBOR Serialization	Variant serialization MAY be used
COSE Protection	COSE_Sign1 and/or COSE_Mac0 MUST be used
Algorithms	SHOULD be used
Detached EAT Bundle Usage	Detached EAT bundles MUST NOT be sent
Verification Key Identification	Any identification method listed in
Endorsements	See
Freshness	nonce or epoch ID based
Claims	Those defined in . As per general EAT rules, the receiver MUST NOT error out on claims it does not understand.

Profile TFM This profile is appropriate for the code base implemented in and should apply for most derivative implementations. If an implementation changes the requirements described below then, to ensure interoperability, a different profile value should be used (). This includes a restriction of the profile to a subset of the COSE Protection scheme requirements. presents a concise view of the requirements. The value of the eat_profile MUST be tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm. TF-M Profile

Issue	Profile Definition
CBOR/JSON	See
CBOR Encoding	See
CBOR Encoding	See
CBOR Serialization	See
COSE Protection	COSE_Sign1 or COSE_Mac0 MUST be used
Algorithms	The receiver MUST accept ES256, ES384 and ES512 with COSE_Sign1 and HMAC256/256, HMAC384/384 and HMAC512/512 with COSE_Mac0; the sender MUST send one of these
Detached EAT Bundle Usage	See
Verification Key Identification	Claim-Based Key Identification () using Instance ID
Endorsements	See
Freshness	See
Claims	See

Collated CDDL psa-boot-seed-type ) psa-client-id-nspe-type = -2147483648...0 psa-client-id-spe-type = 1..2147483647 psa-client-id-type = psa-client-id-nspe-type / psa-client-id-spe-type psa-client-id = ( psa-client-id-key => psa-client-id-type ) psa-certification-reference-type = text .regexp "[0-9]{13}-[0-9]{5}" psa-certification-reference = ( ? psa-certification-reference-key => psa-certification-reference-type ) psa-implementation-id-type = bytes .size 32 psa-implementation-id = ( psa-implementation-id-key => psa-implementation-id-type ) psa-instance-id-type = bytes .size 33 psa-instance-id = ( ueid-label => psa-instance-id-type ) psa-nonce = ( nonce-label => psa-hash-type ) psa-profile-type = "tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm" psa-profile = ( profile-label => psa-profile-type ) psa-lifecycle-unknown-type = 0x0000..0x00ff psa-lifecycle-assembly-and-test-type = 0x1000..0x10ff psa-lifecycle-psa-rot-provisioning-type = 0x2000..0x20ff psa-lifecycle-secured-type = 0x3000..0x30ff psa-lifecycle-non-psa-rot-debug-type = 0x4000..0x40ff psa-lifecycle-recoverable-psa-rot-debug-type = 0x5000..0x50ff psa-lifecycle-decommissioned-type = 0x6000..0x60ff psa-lifecycle-type = psa-lifecycle-unknown-type / psa-lifecycle-assembly-and-test-type / psa-lifecycle-psa-rot-provisioning-type / psa-lifecycle-secured-type / psa-lifecycle-non-psa-rot-debug-type / psa-lifecycle-recoverable-psa-rot-debug-type / psa-lifecycle-decommissioned-type psa-lifecycle = ( psa-lifecycle-key => psa-lifecycle-type ) psa-software-component = { ? &(measurement-type: 1) => text &(measurement-value: 2) => psa-hash-type ? &(version: 4) => text &(signer-id: 5) => psa-hash-type ? &(measurement-desc: 6) => text } psa-software-components = ( psa-software-components-key => [ + psa-software-component ] ) psa-verification-service-indicator-type = text psa-verification-service-indicator = ( ? psa-verification-service-indicator-key => psa-verification-service-indicator-type ) ]]>

Scalability Considerations IAKs () can be either raw public keys or certified public keys. Certified public keys require the manufacturer to run the certification authority (CA) that issues X.509 certs for the IAKs. (Note that operating a CA is a complex and expensive task that may be unaffordable to certain manufacturers.) Using certified public keys offers better scalability properties when compared to using raw public keys, namely:

• storage requirements for the Verifier are minimised - the same manufacturer's trust anchor is used for any number of devices,
• the provisioning model is simpler and more robust since there is no need to notify the Verifier about each newly manufactured device,

Furthermore, existing and well-understood revocation mechanisms can be readily used. The IAK's X.509 cert can be inlined in the PSA token using the x5chain COSE header parameter at the cost of an increase in the PSA token size. and provide guidance for profiling X.509 certs used in IoT deployments. Note that the exact split between pre-provisioned and inlined certs may vary depending on the specific deployment. In that respect, x5chain is quite flexible: it can contain the end-entity (EE) cert only, the EE and a partial chain, or the EE and the full chain up to the trust anchor (see for the details). Constraints around network bandwidth and computing resources available to endpoints, such as network buffers, may dictate a reasonable split point.

PSA Token Verification To verify the token, the primary need is to check correct encoding and signing as detailed in . The key used for verification is either supplied to the Verifier by an authorized Endorser along with the corresponding Attester's Instance ID or inlined in the token using the x5chain header parameter as described in . If the IAK is a raw public key, the Instance ID claim is used to assist in locating the key used to verify the signature covering the CWT token. If the IAK is a certified public key, X.509 path construction and validation () up to a trusted CA MUST be successful before the key is used to verify the token signature. This also includes revocation checking. In addition, the Verifier will typically operate a policy where values of some of the claims in this profile can be compared to reference values, registered with the Verifier for a given deployment, in order to confirm that the device is endorsed by the manufacturer supply chain. The policy may require that the relevant claims must have a match to a registered reference value. All claims may be worthy of additional appraisal. It is likely that most deployments would include a policy with appraisal for the following claims:

• Implementation ID - the value of the Implementation ID can be used to identify the verification requirements of the deployment.
• Software Component, Measurement Value - this value can uniquely identify a firmware release from the supply chain. In some cases, a Verifier may maintain a record for a series of firmware releases, being patches to an original baseline release. A verification policy may then allow this value to match any point on that release sequence or expect some minimum level of maturity related to the sequence.
• Software Component, Signer ID - where present in a deployment, this could allow a Verifier to operate a more general policy than that for Measurement Value as above, by allowing a token to contain any firmware entries signed by a known Signer ID, without checking for a uniquely registered version.
• Certification Reference - if present, this value could be used as a hint to locate security certification information associated with the attesting device. An example could be a reference to a certificate.

 AR4SI Trustworthiness Claims Mappings defines an information model that Verifiers can employ to produce Attestation Results. AR4SI provides a set of standardized appraisal categories and tiers that greatly simplifies the task of writing Relying Party policies in multi-attester environments. The contents of are intended as guidance for implementing a PSA Verifier that computes its results using AR4SI. The table describes which PSA Evidence claims (if any) are related to which AR4SI trustworthiness claim, and therefore what the Verifier must consider when deciding if and how to appraise a certain feature associated with the PSA Attester. AR4SI Claims mappings

Trustworthiness Vector claims	Related PSA claims
configuration	Software Components ()
executables	ditto
file-system	N/A
hardware	Implementation ID ()
instance-identity	Instance ID (). The Security Lifecycle () can also impact the derived identity.
runtime-opaque	Indirectly derived from executables, hardware, and instance-identity. The Security Lifecycle () can also be relevant: for example, any debug state will expose otherwise protected memory.
sourced-data	N/A
storage-opaque	Indirectly derived from executables, hardware, and instance-identity.

This document does not prescribe what value must be chosen based on each possible situation: when assigning specific Trustworthiness Claim values, an implementation is expected to follow the algorithm described in .

Endorsements, Reference Values and Verification Key Material defines a protocol based on the data model that can be used to convey PSA Endorsements, Reference Values and verification key material to the Verifier.

Implementation Status RFC Editor: please remove this section before pubblication. Implementations of this specification are provided by the Trusted Firmware-M project , , the Veraison project , and the Xclaim library. All four implementations are released as open-source software.

Security and Privacy Considerations This specification re-uses the EAT specification and therefore the CWT specification. Hence, the security and privacy considerations of those specifications apply here as well. Since CWTs offer different ways to protect the token, this specification profiles those options and allows signatures using public key cryptography as well as message authentication codes (MACs). COSE_Sign1 is used for digital signatures and COSE_Mac0 for MACs, as defined in the COSE specification . Note, however, that the use of MAC authentication is NOT RECOMMENDED due to the associated infrastructure costs for key management and protocol complexities. A PSA Attester MUST NOT provide Evidence to an untrusted challenger, as it may allow attackers to interpose and trick the Verifier into believing the attacker is a legitimate Attester. This is especially relevant to protocols that use PSA attestation tokens to authenticate the attester to a relying party. Attestation tokens contain information that may be unique to a device and therefore they may allow to single out an individual device for tracking purposes. Deployments that have privacy requirements must take appropriate measures to ensure that the token is only used to provision anonymous/pseudonym keys.

IANA Considerations

CBOR Web Token Claims Registration IANA is requested to make permanent the following claims that have been assigned via early allocation in the "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims" registry .

 Client ID Claim

• Claim Name: psa-client-id
• Claim Description: PSA Client ID
• JWT Claim Name: N/A
• Claim Key: 2394
• Claim Value Type(s): signed integer
• Change Controller: Hannes Tschofenig
• Specification Document(s): of RFCthis

 Security Lifecycle Claim

• Claim Name: psa-security-lifecycle
• Claim Description: PSA Security Lifecycle
• JWT Claim Name: N/A
• Claim Key: 2395
• Claim Value Type(s): unsigned integer
• Change Controller: Hannes Tschofenig
• Specification Document(s): of RFCthis

 Implementation ID Claim

• Claim Name: psa-implementation-id
• Claim Description: PSA Implementation ID
• JWT Claim Name: N/A
• Claim Key: 2396
• Claim Value Type(s): byte string
• Change Controller: Hannes Tschofenig
• Specification Document(s): of RFCthis

 Certification Reference Claim

• Claim Name: psa-certification-reference
• Claim Description: PSA Certification Reference
• JWT Claim Name: N/A
• Claim Key: 2398
• Claim Value Type(s): text string
• Change Controller: Hannes Tschofenig
• Specification Document(s): of RFCthis

 Software Components Claim

• Claim Name: psa-software-components
• Claim Description: PSA Software Components
• JWT Claim Name: N/A
• Claim Key: 2399
• Claim Value Type(s): array
• Change Controller: Hannes Tschofenig
• Specification Document(s): of RFCthis

 Verification Service Indicator Claim

• Claim Name: psa-verification-service-indicator
• Claim Description: PSA Verification Service Indicator
• JWT Claim Name: N/A
• Claim Key: 2400
• Claim Value Type(s): text string
• Change Controller: Hannes Tschofenig
• Specification Document(s): of RFCthis

Media Types No new media type registration is requested. To indicate that the transmitted content is a PSA attestation token, applications can use the application/eat+cwt media type defined in with the eat_profile parameter set to tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm (or PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1 if the token is encoded according to the old profile, see ).

CoAP Content-Formats Registration IANA is requested to register two CoAP Content-Format IDs in the "CoAP Content-Formats" registry :

• One for the application/eat+cwt media type with the eat_profile parameter equal to tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm
• Another for the application/eat+cwt media type with the eat_profile parameter equal to PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1

The Content-Formats should be allocated from the Expert review range (0-255).

Registry Contents

• Media Type: application/eat+cwt; eat_profile="tag:psacertified.org,2023:psa#tfm"
• Encoding: -
• Id: [[To-be-assigned by IANA]]
• Reference: RFCthis
• Media Type: application/eat+cwt; eat_profile="PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1"
• Encoding: -
• Id: [[To-be-assigned by IANA]]
• Reference: RFCthis

References Normative References Arm GS1 Arm PSA Certified The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format whose design goals include the possibility of extremely small code size, fairly small message size, and extensibility without the need for version negotiation. These design goals make it different from earlier binary serializations such as ASN.1 and MessagePack. This document obsoletes RFC 7049, providing editorial improvements, new details, and errata fixes while keeping full compatibility with the interchange format of RFC 7049. It does not create a new version of the format. Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. There is a need to be able to define basic security services for this data format. This document defines the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) protocol. This specification describes how to create and process signatures, message authentication codes, and encryption using CBOR for serialization. This specification additionally describes how to represent cryptographic keys using CBOR. This document, along with RFC 9053, obsoletes RFC 8152. Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. There is a need to be able to define basic security services for this data format. This document defines a set of algorithms that can be used with the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) protocol (RFC 9052). This document, along with RFC 9052, obsoletes RFC 8152. IANA This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK] Security Theory LLC Qualcomm Technologies Inc. Red Hound Software, Inc. An Entity Attestation Token (EAT) provides an attested claims set that describes state and characteristics of an entity, a device like a smartphone, IoT device, network equipment or such. This claims set is used by a relying party, server or service to determine the type and degree of trust placed in the entity. An EAT is either a CBOR Web Token (CWT) or JSON Web Token (JWT) with attestation-oriented claims. Security Theory LLC Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology Linaro Payloads used in Remote Attestation Procedures may require an associated media type for their conveyance, for example when used in RESTful APIs. This memo defines media types to be used for Entity Attestation Tokens (EAT). In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. This document proposes a notational convention to express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) data structures (RFC 7049). Its main goal is to provide an easy and unambiguous way to express structures for protocol messages and data formats that use CBOR or JSON. A Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) is a compact sequence of characters that identifies an abstract or physical resource. This specification defines the generic URI syntax and a process for resolving URI references that might be in relative form, along with guidelines and security considerations for the use of URIs on the Internet. The URI syntax defines a grammar that is a superset of all valid URIs, allowing an implementation to parse the common components of a URI reference without knowing the scheme-specific requirements of every possible identifier. This specification does not define a generative grammar for URIs; that task is performed by the individual specifications of each URI scheme. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document describes the "tag" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) scheme. Tag URIs (also known as "tags") are designed to be unique across space and time while being tractable to humans. They are distinct from most other URIs in that they have no authoritative resolution mechanism. A tag may be used purely as an entity identifier. Furthermore, using tags has some advantages over the common practice of using "http" URIs as identifiers for non-HTTP-accessible resources. This memo provides information for the Internet community. CBOR Web Token (CWT) is a compact means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a CWT are encoded in the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR), and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) is used for added application-layer security protection. A claim is a piece of information asserted about a subject and is represented as a name/value pair consisting of a claim name and a claim value. CWT is derived from JSON Web Token (JWT) but uses CBOR rather than JSON. Informative References This document describes the function and responsibilities of the RFC Independent Submission Editor (ISE). The Independent Submission stream is one of the stream producers that create draft RFCs, with the ISE as its stream approver. The ISE is overall responsible for activities within the Independent Submission stream, working with draft editors and reviewers, and interacts with the RFC Production Center and Publisher, and the RFC Series Editor (RSE). The ISE is appointed by the IAB, and also interacts with the IETF Administration Limited Liability Company (LLC). This version obsoletes RFC 6548 to replace all references to the Internet Administrative Support Activity (IASA) and related structures with those defined by the IASA 2.0 structure. Microsoft Microsoft Intel Intel Intel Intel® Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) introduces architectural elements designed for the deployment of hardware-isolated virtual machines (VMs) known as trust domains (TDs). TDX is designed to provide a secure and isolated environment for running sensitive workloads or applications. This Entity Attestation Token (EAT) profile outlines claims for an Intel TDX attestation result which facilitate the establishment of trust between a relying party and the environment. Qualcomm Technologies Inc. Qualcomm Technologies Inc. Qualcomm Technologies Inc. An attestation format based on the Entity Attestation Token (EAT) is described. The Qualcomm Wireless Edge Services (QWES) token is used in the context of device onboarding and authentication. It is verified in the same manner as any CBOR Web Token (CWT). This document specifies version 3 of the RFC Editor Model. The model defines two high-level tasks related to the RFC Series. First, policy definition is the joint responsibility of the RFC Series Working Group (RSWG), which produces policy proposals, and the RFC Series Approval Board (RSAB), which approves such proposals. Second, policy implementation is primarily the responsibility of the RFC Production Center (RPC) as contractually overseen by the IETF Administration Limited Liability Company (IETF LLC). In addition, various responsibilities of the RFC Editor function are now performed alone or in combination by the RSWG, RSAB, RPC, RFC Series Consulting Editor (RSCE), and IETF LLC. Finally, this document establishes the Editorial Stream for publication of future policy definition documents produced through the processes defined herein. This document obsoletes RFC 8728. This document updates RFCs 7841, 8729, and 8730. A common design pattern in Internet of Things (IoT) deployments is the use of a constrained device that collects data via sensors or controls actuators for use in home automation, industrial control systems, smart cities, and other IoT deployments. This document defines a Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) 1.2 profile that offers communications security for this data exchange thereby preventing eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery. The lack of communication security is a common vulnerability in IoT products that can easily be solved by using these well-researched and widely deployed Internet security protocols. Linaro Sandelman Software Works This document is a companion to RFC 7925 and defines TLS/DTLS 1.3 profiles for Internet of Things devices. It also updates RFC 7925 with regards to the X.509 certificate profile. The CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) message structure uses references to keys in general. For some algorithms, additional properties are defined that carry parameters relating to keys as needed. The COSE Key structure is used for transporting keys outside of COSE messages. This document extends the way that keys can be identified and transported by providing attributes that refer to or contain X.509 certificates. In network protocol exchanges, it is often useful for one end of a communication to know whether the other end is in an intended operating state. This document provides an architectural overview of the entities involved that make such tests possible through the process of generating, conveying, and evaluating evidentiary Claims. It provides a model that is neutral toward processor architectures, the content of Claims, and protocols. IANA IANA Linaro Linaro The Veraison Project Arm PSA Certified Arm Linaro Arm Ltd Fraunhofer SIT PSA Endorsements include reference values, cryptographic key material and certification status information that a Verifier needs in order to appraise attestation Evidence produced by a PSA device. This memo defines such PSA Endorsements as a profile of the CoRIM data model. Fraunhofer SIT arm arm Intel Huawei Technologies Remote Attestation Procedures (RATS) enable Relying Parties to assess the trustworthiness of a remote Attester and therefore to decide whether to engage in secure interactions with it. Evidence about trustworthiness can be rather complex and it is deemed unrealistic that every Relying Party is capable of the appraisal of Evidence. Therefore that burden is typically offloaded to a Verifier. In order to conduct Evidence appraisal, a Verifier requires not only fresh Evidence from an Attester, but also trusted Endorsements and Reference Values from Endorsers and Reference Value Providers, such as manufacturers, distributors, or device owners. This document specifies the information elements for representing Endorsements and Reference Values in CBOR format. Cisco Systems Fraunhofer SIT MIT Arm Limited Intel This document defines reusable Attestation Result information elements. When these elements are offered to Relying Parties as Evidence, different aspects of Attester trustworthiness can be evaluated. Additionally, where the Relying Party is interfacing with a heterogeneous mix of Attesting Environment and Verifier types, consistent policies can be applied to subsequent information exchange between each Attester and the Relying Party. Arm Limited Arm Limited Arm Limited Arm Limited Arm Limited The Platform Security Architecture (PSA) is a family of hardware and firmware security specifications, as well as open-source reference implementations, to help device makers and chip manufacturers build best-practice security into products. Devices that are PSA compliant are able to produce attestation tokens as described in this memo, which are the basis for a number of different protocols, including secure provisioning and network access control. This document specifies the PSA attestation token structure and semantics. At its core, the CWT (COSE Web Token) format is used and populated with a set of claims in a way similar to EAT (Entity Attestation Token). This specification describes what claims are used by PSA compliant systems.

Examples The following examples show PSA attestation tokens for an hypothetical system comprising a single measured software component. The attesting device is in a lifecycle state () of SECURED. The attestation has been requested from a client residing in the SPE. The example in illustrates the case where the IAK is an asymmetric key. A COSE Sign1 envelope is used to wrap the PSA claims-set. illustrates the case where the IAK is a symmetric key and a COSE Mac0 envelope is used instead. The claims sets are identical, except for the Instance ID which is synthesized from the key material. The examples have been created using the iat-verifier tool .

COSE Sign1 Token The JWK representation of the IAK used for creating the COSE Sign1 signature over the PSA token is: The resulting COSE object is: which has the following base16 encoding:

COSE Mac0 Token The JWK representation of the IAK used for creating the COSE Mac0 signature over the PSA token is: The resulting COSE object is: which has the following base16 encoding:

Acknowledgments Thank you Carsten Bormann for help with the CDDL. Thanks to Nicholas Wood, Eliot Lear, Yaron Sheffer, Kathleen Moriarty and Ned Smith for ideas, comments and suggestions.

Contributors Security Theory LLC

lgl@securitytheory.com

Arm Limited

Tamas.Ban@arm.com

Arm Limited

Sergei.Trofimov@arm.com