Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) DTLS Chunk

Introduction This document defines a DTLS chunk for the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP), as defined in . This specification defines the actual DTLS chunk, how to enable it usage, how it interacts with the SCTP association establishment to enable endpoint authentication, key-establishment, and key updates. The DTLS chunk is designed to enable mutual authentication of endpoints, data confidentiality, data origin authentication, data integrity protection, and data replay protection for SCTP packets after the SCTP association has been established. It is dependent on a key management function that is defined seperately to achieve all these capabilities. The key management function uses an API to provision the SCTP association's DTLS chunk protection with key-material to enable and rekey the protection operations. Applications using SCTP DTLS chunk can use most transport features provided by SCTP and its extensions. However, there can be some limitations or additional requirements for them to function such as those noted for SCTP restart and use of Dynamic Address Reconfiguration, see and . Due to its level of integration as discussed in next section it will provide its security functions on all content of the SCTP packet, and will thus not impact the potential to utilize any SCTP functionalities or extensions that are possible to use between two SCTP peers with full security and SCTP association state. DTLS is considered version 1.3 as specified in whereas other versions are explicitely not part of this document.

Conventions The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Overview

Protocol Overview The DTLS chunk is defined as a method for secure and confidential transfer for SCTP packets. This is implemented inside the SCTP protocol, in a sublayer between the SCTP common header handling and the SCTP chunk handling. Once an SCTP packet has been received and the SCTP common header has been used to identify the SCTP association, the DTLS chunk is sent to the DTLS Protection Operator that will return the SCTP payload containing the unprotected SCTP chunks, those chunks will then be handled according to their SCTP protocol specifications. illustrates the DTLS chunk layering in regard to SCTP and the Upper Layer Protocol (ULP).

DTLS Chunk Layering in Regard to SCTP and ULP | |<--' | Handler | | Protection Operator | +---------------------+ +---------------------+ | |\ | SCTP Header Handler | +-- SCTP Protected Payload | | +---------------------+ ]]> Use of the DTLS chunk is defined per SCTP association. On the outgoing direction, once the SCTP stack has created the unprotected SCTP packet payload containing control and/or DATA chunks, that payload will be sent to the DTLS Protection Operator to be protected. The format of the protected payload is a DTLS 1.3 record encapsulated in a SCTP chunk which is named the DTLS chunk. The SCTP Protection Operator performs protection operations on the whole unprotected SCTP packet payload, i.e., all chunks after the SCTP common header. Information protection is kept during the lifetime of the association and no information is sent unprotected except than the initial SCTP handshake, DTLS handshake, the SCTP common header, the SCTP DTLS chunk header, the INIT and INIT-ACK of an SCTP association restart, and the SHUTDOWN-COMPLETE chunk. SCTP DTLS chunk capability is agreed by the peers at the initialization of the SCTP association. Until the DTLS protection has been keyed only plain text key-management traffic using a dedicated PPID (4242) may flow, no ULP traffic. The key management function uses an API to key the DTLS protection operation function. Usage of the DTLS 1.3 handshake for initial mutual authentication and key establishment as well as periodic re-authentication and rekeying with Diffe-Hellman of the DTLS chunk protection is defied in a seperate document . When the endpoint authentication and key establishment has been completed, the association is considered to be secured and the ULP is informed about that. From this time on it's possible for the ULPs to exchange data securely. A DTLS chunk will never be retransmitted, retransmission is implemented by SCTP endpoint at chunk level as specified in . DTLS replay protection will be used to supress duplicated DTLS chunks, however a failure to prevent replay will only result in duplicated SCTP chunks and will be handled as duplicated chunks by SCTP endpoint in the same way a duplicated SCTP packet with those SCTP chunks would have been.

DTLS Considerations The DTLS Chunk architecture splits DTLS 1.3 as shown in , where there's a Key Management functionality on top of SCTP Chunks Handler and a Protection Operator functionality interfacing DTLS Chunk Handler. Key Management is the set of data and procedures that take care of key distribution, verification, and update, DTLS connection setup, update and maintenance. Protection Operator functionality is the set of data and procedures taking care of User Data encryption into DTLS Record and DTLS record decryption into User Data. DTLS 1.3 operations requires to directly handshake messages with the remote peer for connection setup and other features, this kind of handshake is part of the Key Management functionality. Key Management function achieves these features behaving as a SCTP User. Key Management sends and receives its own data via the SCTP User Level interface. Key Management's own data are distinguished from any other data by means of a dedicated PPID using the value 4242 (see ). Once the Key Management has established the DTLS 1.3 connection, it can set the Protection Operator for User Data encryption/decription via the API shown in . DTLS 1.3 handshake messages, that are transported as SCTP User Data with dedicated PPID = 4242, SHALL be sent and received as plain DATA chunks until the Association has reached the PROTECTED state (). From that time on, DTLS 1.3 handshake messages SHALL be transported as SCTP User Data with dedicated PPID = 4242 within DTLS chunks, same as ULP data traffic.

SCTP DTLS Chunk Buffering and Flow Control DTLS 1.3 operations and SCTP are asynchronous, meaning that the Protection Operator may deliver the decrypted SCTP Payload to the SCTP endpoint without respecting the reception order. It's up to SCTP endpoint to reorder the chunks in the reception buffer and to take care of the flow control according to what specified in . From SCTP perspective the DTLS chunk processing is part of the transport network. Even though the above allows the implementors to adopt a multithreading design of the Protection Operators, the actual implementation should consider that out-of-order handling of SCTP chunks is not desired and may cause false congestion signals and trigger retransmissions.

PMTU Considerations The addition of the DTLS chunk to SCTP reduces the room for payload, due to the size of the DTLS chunk header, padding, and authentication tag. Thus, the SCTP layer creating the plain text payload needs to know about the overhead to adjust its target payload size appropriately. A path MTU discovery function in SCTP will need to know the actual sent and received size of packets for the SCTP packets. This to correctly handle PMTUD probe packets. From SCTP perspective, if there is a maximum size of plain text data that can be protected by the Protection Operator that must be communicated to SCTP. As such a limit will limit the PMTU for SCTP to the maximum plain text plus DTLS chunk and algorithm overhead plus the SCTP common header.

Congestion Control Considerations The SCTP mechanism for handling congestion control does depend on successful data transfer for enlarging or reducing the congestion window CWND (see Section 7.2). It may happen that Protection Operator discards packets due to internal checks or because it has detected a malicious attempt. As those packets do not represent what the peer sent, it is acceptable to ignore them, although in-situ modification on the path of a packet resulting in discarding due to integrity failure will leave a gap, but has to be accepted as part of the path behavior. The Protection Operator will not interfere with the SCTP congestion control mechanism, this basically means that from SCTP perspective the congestion control is exactly the same as how specified in .

ICMP Considerations The SCTP implementation will be responsible for handling ICMP messages and their validation as specified in Section 10. This means that the ICMP validation needs to be done in relation to the actual sent SCTP packets with the DTLS chunk and not the unprotected payload.

Path Selection Considerations When an Association is multihomed there are multiple paths between Endpoints. The selection of the specific path to be used at a certain time belongs to SCTP protocol that will decide according to . The Protection Operator shall not influence the path selection algorithm, actually the Protection Operator will not even know what path is being used. Replay window for DTLS Sequence Number will need to take into account that heartbeat (HB) chunks are sent concurrently over all paths in multihomed Associations, thus it needs to be large enough to accomodate latency differencies.

Dynamic Address Reconfiguration Considerations When using Dynamic Address Reconfiguration in an SCTP association using DTLS Chunk the ASCONF chunk is protected, thus it needs to be unprotected first, furthermore it MAY come from an unknown IP Address. In order to properly address the ASCONF chunk to the relevant Association for being unprotected, Destination Address, Source, Destination ports and VTag shall be used. If the combination of those parameters is not unique the implementor MAY choose to send the DTLS Chunk to all Associations that fit with the parameters in order to find the right one. The association will attempt de-protection operations on the DTLS chunk, and if that is successful the ASCONF chunk can be processed. The section 4.1.1 of specifies that ASCONF message are required to be sent authenticated with SCTP-AUTH . For SCTP associations using DTLS Chunk this results in the use of redundant mechanism for Authentication with both SCTP-AUTH and the DTLS Chunk. We recommend to amend for including DTLS Chunks as Authentication mechanism for ASCONF chunks.

SCTP Restart Considerations This section deals with the handling of an unexpected INIT chunk during an Association lifetime as described in section 5.2 with the purpose of achieving a Restart of the current Association. The SCTP Restart procedure is defined to maintain the security characteristics of a SCTP Association using DTLS Chunk, this requires that SCTP Restart procedure is modified in regards to how it is described in . In order to support SCTP Restart, the SCTP Endpoints shall allocate and maintain dedicated DTLS connections, those connection will be identified in the DTLS chunk with DCIs with the R (restart) bit set (see ). Both SCTP Endpoints shall ensure that Restart DTLS connections and related keys are preserved for supporting the SCTP Restart use case. In order to be available for SCTP Restart purposes, the Restart DTLS connection must be kept in a well-known state so that both SCTP Endpoints are aware of the DTLS sequence numbers and replay window. An SCTP Endpoint SHALL NEVER use the SCTP Restart DTLS connection for any other use case than SCTP Restart. The DTLS Restart Connections, the related key materials, the information related to the sequence numbers and replay window SHALL be stored in a safe way that survives the events that are causing SCTP Restart procedure to be used, for instance a crash of the SCTP stack. The SCTP Restart handshakes INIT/INIT-ACK exactly as in legacy SCTP whilst COOCKIE-ECHO/COOKIE-ACK SHALL be sent as DTLS chunk protected using the keying material for the restart DTLS connection, that is the DTLS Restart Connection and its DCI. A Restart DCI is identified by having the Restart Indicator bit set in the DTLS Chunk (see ). There's exactly one active Restart DCI at a time, the newest. Whereas a number of Restart DTLS connection MAY exist at the same time with the purpose of replace the aging active Restart DTLS connection.

Handshake of SCTP Restart for DTLS in SCTP | | Plain SCTP |<-----------------[INIT-ACK]-----------------+ +----------- | | -' | | -. +---------[DTLS CHUNK(COOKIE ECHO)]---------->| | Encrypted |<--------[DTLS CHUNK(COOKIE ACK)]------------+ +---------- | | -' ]]> The shows how the control chunks being used for SCTP Association Restart are transported within DTLS in SCTP. Sending INIT and INIT-ACK plain text guarantees the compliance with the legacy SCTP Restart, whilst the transport of the COOCKIE-ECHO and COOCKIE-ACK by means of DTLS chunk ensures that the peer requesting the restart has been previously validated. A restarted SCTP Association SHALL use the Restart DCI, thus the Restart DTLS connection, for User Traffic until a new traffic DTLS connection will be available. The implementors SHOULD initiate two new DTLS connection as soon as possible, one as replacement restart DCI, the other as a new traffic DCI, so that the time when no Restart DCI are available is kept to a minimum.

New Parameter Type This section defines the new parameter type that will be used to negotiate the use of the DTLS 1.3 chunk during association setup. illustrates the new parameter type. New INIT/INIT-ACK Parameter

Parameter Type	Parameter Name
0x80xx	DTLS 1.3 Chunk Protected Association

Note that the parameter format requires the receiver to ignore the parameter and continue processing if the parameter is not understood. This is accomplished (as described in , Section 3.2.1.) by the use of the upper bits of the parameter type.

DTLS 1.3 Chunk Protected Association This parameter is only used to indicate the request and acknowledge of support of DTLS 1.3 Chunk during INIT/INIT-ACK handshake.

Protected Association Parameter

Parameter Type: 16 bits (unsigned integer): This value MUST be set to 0x80XX.
Parameter Length: 16 bits (unsigned integer): This field has value equal to 4.

RFC-Editor Note: Please replace 0x08XX with the actual parameter type value assigned by IANA and then remove this note.

New Chunk Types

DTLS Chunk (DTLS) This section defines the new chunk type that will be used to transport the DTLS 1.3 record containing protected SCTP payload. illustrates the new chunk type. DTLS Chunk Type

Chunk Type	Chunk Name
0x4X	DTLS Chunk (DTLS)

RFC-Editor Note: Please replace 0x4x with the actual chunk type value assigned by IANA and then remove this note. It should be noted that the DTLS chunk format requires the receiver stop processing this SCTP packet, discard the unrecognized chunk and all further chunks, and report the unrecognized chunk in an ERROR chunk using the 'Unrecognized Chunk Type' error cause. This is accomplished (as described in Section 3.2.) by the use of the upper bits of the chunk type. The DTLS chunk is used to hold the DTLS 1.3 record with the protected payload of a plain SCTP packet.

DTLS Chunk Structure

reserved: 5 bits: Reserved bits for future use. Sender MUST set these bits to 0 and MUST be ignored on reception.
R: 1 bit (boolean): Restart indicator. If this bit is set this DTLS chunk is protected with by an restart DTLS Connection with the index indicated by the DCI. If not set, then a traffic DCI is indicated.
DCI: 2 bits (unsigned integer): DTLS Connection Index is the lower two bits of an DTLS Connection Index counter for the traffic or restart DTLS connection index. This is a counter implemented in DTLS in SCTP that is used to identify which DTLS connection instance that is capable of processing any received packet or DTLS message over an user message. This counter is recommended to be the lower part of a larger variable. DCI is unrelated to the DTLS Connection ID (CID) .
Chunk Length: 16 bits (unsigned integer): This value holds the length of the Payload in bytes plus 4.
Payload: variable length: This holds the encrypted data as one DTLS 1.3 Record .
Padding: 0, 8, 16, or 24 bits: If the length of the Payload is not a multiple of 4 bytes, the sender MUST pad the chunk with all zero bytes to make the chunk 32-bit aligned. The Padding MUST NOT be longer than 3 bytes and it MUST be ignored by the receiver.

Protection Solution Validation Chunk (PVALID) This section defines the new chunk types that will be used to validate the Init/Init-ACK negotiation that selected the DTLS 1.3 chunk. This to prevent down grade attacks on the negotiation if other protection solutions where offered. illustrates the new chunk type. PVALID Chunk Type

Chunk Type	Chunk Name
0x4X	Protection Solution Validation (PVALID)

It should be noted that the PVALID chunk format requires the receiver stop processing this SCTP packet, discard the unrecognized chunk and all further chunks, and report the unrecognized chunk in an ERROR chunk using the 'Unrecognized Chunk Type' error cause. This is accomplished (as described in Section 3.2.) by the use of the upper bits of the chunk type. The PVALID chunk is used to hold a 32-bit vector of offered protection solutions in the INIT.

PVALID Chunk Structure

Chunk Type: 8 bits (unsigned integer): This value MUST be set to 0x4X.
Chunk Flags: 8 bits: MUST be set to zero on transmit and MUST be ignored on receipt.
Chunk Length: 16 bits (unsigned integer): This value holds the length of the Protection Solutions Indicator field in bytes plus 4.
Protection Solutions Indicator: array of 32 bits (unsigned integer): The array has at least one element. The value is set by default to zero. It uses the different bit-values to indicate that the INIT contained an offer of the indiacted protection solutions. Value 0x1 is used to indicate that one offered DTLS 1.3 Chunk.

RFC-Editor Note: Please replace 0x4X with the actual chunk type value assigned by IANA and then remove this note.

Error Handling This specification introduces a new set of error causes that are to be used when SCTP endpoint detects a faulty condition. The special case is when the error is detected by the DTLS 1.3 Protection that may provide additional information.

Mandatory Protected Association Parameter Missing When an initiator SCTP endpoint sends an INIT chunk that doesn't contain the DTLS 1.3 Chunk Protected Association or other protection solutions towards an SCTP endpoint that only accepts protected associations, the responder endpoint SHALL raise a Missing Mandatory Parameter error. The ERROR chunk will contain the cause code 'Missing Mandatory Parameter' (2) (see Section 3.3.10.7) and the DTLS 1.3 chunk protected association parameter identifier in the missing param Information field. It may also include additional parameters representing other supported protection mechanisms that are acceptable per endpoint security policy.

ERROR Missing Protected Association Paramater Note: Cause Length is equal to the number of missing parameters 8 + N * 2 according to , section 3.3.10.2. Also the Protection Association ID may be present in any of the N missing params, no order implied by the example in .

Error in DTLS Chunk A new Error Type is defined for DTLS Chunk, it's used for any error related to the DTLS chunk's protection mechanism described in this document and has a structure that allows detailed information to be added as extra causes. This specification describes some of the causes whilst the key establishment specification MAY add further causes. When detecting an error, SCTP will send an ABORT chunk containing the relevant Error Type and Causes.

Error in DTLS Chunk Cause Format

Cause Code: 16 bits (unsigned integer): The SCTP Error Chunk Cause Code indicating "Error in Protection" is TBA9.
Cause Length: 16 bits (unsigned integer): Is for N extra Causes equal to 4 + N * 2
Extra Cause: 16 bits (unsigned integer): Each Extra Cause indicate an additional piece of information as part of the error. There MAY be zero to as many as can fit in the extra cause field in the ERROR Chunk (A maximum of 32764).

Editor's Note: Please replace TBA9 above with what is assigned by IANA. Below a number of defined Error Causes (Extra Cause above) are defined, additional causes can be registered with IANA following the rules in .

Error During Protection Handshake The usage of the DTLS Chunk can specify a handshake, for example , in which case that procedure may encounter an error. In such case an ABORT chunk will be sent with error in protection cause code (specified in ) and extra cause "Error During Protection Handshake" identifier 0x01. DTLS may provide a more granular information detailing the reason that drove the protection to fail. Such granular information can be added to the Error List.

Failure in Protection Solution Validation A Failure may occur during protection solution validation, i.e. when the PVALID chunks are exchanged to validate the initialization. In such case an ABORT chunk will be sent with error in protection cause code (specified in ) and extra cause "Failure in Validation" identifier 0x02 to indicate this failure.

Timeout During Protection Handshake or Validation Whenever a T-valid timeout occurs, the SCTP endpoint will send an ABORT chunk with "Error in Protection" cause (specified in ) and extra cause "Timeout During Protection Handshake or Validation" identifier 0x03 to indicate this failure. To indicate in which phase the timeout occurred an additional extra cause code is added. If the protection solution specifies that key management is implemented in-band and the T-valid timeout occurs during the handshake the Cause-Specific code to add is "Error During Protection Handshake" identifier 0x01. If the T-valid timeout occurs during the protection association parameter validation, the extra cause code to use is "Failure in Validation" identifier 0x02.

Critical Error from DTLS DTLS 1.3 MAY inform local SCTP endpoint about errors. When an Error in the DTLS 1.3 compromises the protection mechanism, the protection operator may stop processing data altogether, thus the local SCTP endpoint will not be able to send or receive any chunk for the specified Association. This will cause the Association to be closed by legacy timer-based mechanism. Since the Association protection is compromised no further data will be sent and the remote peer will also experience timeout on the Association.

Non-critical Error in the Protection A non-critical error in DTLS 1.3 means that the Protection Operator is capable of recovering without the need of the whole Association to be restarted. From SCTP perspective, a non-critical error will be perceived as a temporary problem in the transport and will be handled with retransmissions and SACKS according to . When the Protection Operator will experience a non-critical error, an ABORT chunk SHALL NOT be sent.

Procedures

Establishment of a Protected Association An SCTP Endpoint acting as initiator willing to create a DTLS 1.3 chunk protected association shall send to the remote peer an INIT chunk containing the DTLS 1.3 Chunk Protected Association parameter (see ) whith the optional information, if any (see ). An SCTP Endpoint acting as responder, when receiving an INIT chunk with DTLS 1.3 Chunk Protected Association parameter, will reply with INIT-ACK with its own DTLS 1.3 Chunk Protected Association parameter and any optional information. Additionally, an SCTP Endpoint acting as responder willing to support only protected associations shall consider INIT chunk not containing the DTLS 1.3 Chunk Protected Association parameter or another by security policy accepted security solution as an error, thus it will reply with an ABORT chunk according to what specified in indicating that for this endpoint mandatory DTLS 1.3 Chunk Protected Association parameter is missing. When initiator and responder have agreed on a protected association by means of handshaking INIT/INIT-ACK the SCTP association establishment continues until it has reached the ESTABLISHED state. However, before the SCTP assocation is protected by the DTLS 1.3 Chunk some additional states needs to be passed. First DTLS Chunk needs be initializied in the PROTECTION INTILIZATION state. This MAY be accomplished by the procedure defined in , or through other methods that results in at least one DCI has initialized state. When that has been accomplished one enters the VALIDATION state where one validates the exchange of the DTLS 1.3 Chunk Protected Association Parameter and any alternative protection solutions. If that is successful one enters the PROTECTED state. This state sequence is depicted in . Until the procedure has reached the PROTECTED state the only usage of DATA Chunks that is accepted is DATA Chunks with the SCTP-DTLS PPID value 4242 used to exchange in-band key establishment messages for DTLS. Any other DATA chunk being received in a Protected association SHALL be silently discarded. If in-band DTLS handshake is used to establish the security parameters for the DTLS Chunks, DTLS 1.3 initializes itself by transferring its own handshake messages as payload of the DATA chunk. The DTLS Chunk initialization SHOULD be supervised by a T-valid timer that accomodates DTLS 1.3 handshake and may also be further adjusted based on whether expected RTT values are outside of the ones commonly occurring on the general Internet, see . The Association initiator and responder will independently enter VALIDATION state when the security parameters are locally installed for the DTLS chunk. During VALIDATION state both initiator and responder SHALL handle plain text chunks as well as DTLS chunks. In case of T-valid timeout, the endpoint will generate an ABORT chunk. The ERROR handling follows what specified in . When keys are installed, the initiator MUST send to the responder a PVALID chunk (see ) containing indication of all offered protection solutions previously sent in the INIT chunk, including the 0x1 value indicating that DTLS 1.3 Chunk Protected Association parameter was included. The transmission of the PVALID chunk will be done reliably using an RTO timeout based mechanism, see below. The responder receiving the PVALID chunk will compare the indicated solutions with the ones previously received as parameters in the INIT chunk. The responder will ignore unknown parameters and security solutions. For the supported solutions if the parameters in the INIT matches what is listed in the PVALID and there are no additional by the endpoint supported solution in the PVALID, it will reply to the initiator with a PVALID chunk containing the chosen proteciton solution, otherwise it will reply with an ABORT chunk. ERROR CAUSE will indicate "Failure in Validation" and the SCTP association will be terminated. If the association was not aborted the protected association is considered successfully established and the PROTECTED state is entered. When entering PROTECTED state, the initiator and the responder independently SHALL stop handling plain text chunks, i.e. those chunks will be silently discarded. PVALID chunks received in PROTECTED state will be threated as retransmission, thus the initiator receiving a PVALID in PROTECTED state SHALL ignore it, whereas the responder receiving a PVALID state in PROTECTED state SHALL properly reply with PVALID chunk as described above. When the initiator receives the PVALID chunk, it will compare with the previous chosen option and in case of mismatch with the one received previously in the protected association parameter in the INIT-ACK chunk, it will reply with ABORT with the ERROR CAUSE "Failure in Validation", otherwise the protected association is successfully established and the initiator enters the PROTECTED state. PVALID chunk will be sent by the initiator every RTO time (see section 6.3.1 of ) until a PVALID or an ABORT chunk is received from the responder or T-valid timer expires. To optimize the completion of the validation in case the PVALID from the responder is lost, if the initiator receives other chunks protected the DTLS chunk it MAY immediately, or with a small delay to ensure that no-reorder has occurred, restransmit its PVALID chunk. If T-valid timer expires either at initiator or responder, the endpoint will generate an ABORT chunk. The ERROR handling follows what specified in . In the PROTECTED state any ULP SCTP messages for any PPID SHALL be exchanged in the protected SCTP association. When entering the PROTECTED state, a Restart DTLS connection SHOULD be created.

Offering Multiple Security Solutions An initiator of an SCTP association may want to offer multiple different security solutions in addition to DTLS 1.3 chunks for the SCTP association. This can be done but need to consider the downgrade attack risks (see ). The initiator MAY include in its INIT additional security solutions that are compatible to offer in parallel with DTLS 1.3 Chunks. This includes or more likely its replacement. This will result in that a number of different SCTP parameters may be included that are not possible to use simultanous. Instead the responder needs to parse these parameters to figure out which sets of solutions that are offered that the implementation support, and apply its security policies to select the most approriate. For example an offer of DTLS 1.3 Chunks and RFC 6083, can be interpreted as three different solutions with different properties, namely DTLS 1.3 Chunks, DTLS/SCTP, and SCTP-AUTH only. The responder selects one or possibly more of compatible security solutions that can be used simultanously and include them in the response (INIT-ACK). If DTLS 1.3 chunks was selected the initiator will later send the PVALID chunk indicating all the offered solutions. This to prevent downgrade attacks where sent solution have been removed on-path.

Termination of a Protected Association Besides the procedures for terminating an association explained in , DTLS 1.3 SHALL ask SCTP endpoint for terminating an association when having an internal error or by detecting a security violation. During the termination procedure all Control Chunks SHALL be protected except SHUTDOWN-COMPLETE. The internal design of Protection Engines and their capability is out of the scope of the current document.

Protection Initialization State Machine

DTLS Chunk State Diagram

Considerations on Key Management When the Association is in PROTECTION INITIALIZATION state, in-band DTLS key management SHALL use SCTP user messages with the SCTP-DTLS PPID value = 4242 (see ) for message transfer that will be sent and received unencrypted. When the Association is in DTLS chunk PROTECTED state and the SCTP assocation is in ESTABLISHED or any of the states that can be reached after ESTABLISHED state, in-band key management are RECOMMENDED to use SCTP Data chunk with dedicated PPID value = 4242, those chunks SHALL be sent and received using DTLS Chunks with the current CID. The use of plain DATA chunk with PPID value = 4242 before the association reaches the PROTECTED state cannot be avoided as no valid DTLS CID exist until that state. Further in-band key management SHALL NOT use plain DATA chunks as this would allow attackers to inject overlapping DATA chunks with protected and impact the content of the SACK block. Based on that, as soon as the initiator or responder independently enter PROTECTED state, they will silently discard any plain chunks. Plain chunks that were sent but not received yet will also be discarded as the SCTP protocol does guarantee the needed retransmissions.

Consideration on T-valid The timer T-Valid supervises initializations that depend on how the handshake is specified for the key establishment used for the DTLS 1.3 chunk and also on the characteristics of the transport network. This specification recommends a default value of 30 seconds for T-valid.

Protected Data Chunk Handling With reference to the DTLS Chunk states and the state Diagram as shown in Figure 3 of , the handling of Control chunks, Data chunks and DTLS chunks follows the rules defined below:

When the association is in states CLOSED, COOKIE-WAIT, and COOKIE-ECHOED, any Control chunk is sent unprotected (i.e. plain text). No DATA chunks are sent in these states and DATA chunks received are silently discarded, see .
When the DTLS Chunk is in state PROTECTED and the SCTP association is in states ESTABLISHED or in the states for association shutdown, i.e. SHUTDOWN-PENDING, SHUTDOWN-SENT, SHUTDOWN-RECEIVED, SHUTDOWN-ACK-SENT as defined by , any SCTP chunk including DATA chunks, but excluding DTLS chunk, will be used to create an SCTP payload that will be encrypted by the DTLS 1.3 protection operation and the resulting DTLS record from that encryption will be the used as payload for a DTLS chunk that will be the only chunk in the SCTP packet to be sent. DATA chunks are accepted and handled according to section 4 of .
If an SCTP restart is occurring there are exception rules to the above. The COOKIE-ECHO and COOKIE-ACK SHALL be sent protected by DTLS chunk using a restart DCI. The DTLS chunk with restart DCI is continuning to protect any SCTP chunks sent while being in SCTP state ESTABLISHED, VALIDATION and PROTECTED, until a newely established traffic DCI are ready to be used instead to protect future SCTP chunks.

Plain Text SCTP Packet The diagram shown in describes the structure of any plain text SCTP packet being sent or received when the DTLS Chunk is in PROTECTION INITIALIZATION, and VALIDATION (for retransmissions).

Protected SCTP Packets The diagram shown in describes the structure of an protected SCTP packet being sent after the DTLS Chunk VALIDATION or PROTECTED state has been reached. Such packets are built with the SCTP common header. Only one DTLS chunk can be sent in a SCTP packet.

Protected Data Chunk Transmission When DTLS Chunk has reached the VALIDATION and PROTECTED state, the DTLS chunk handler will receive control chunks and DATA chunks from the SCTP chunk handler as a complete SCTP payload with maximum size limited by PMTU reduced by the size of the SCTP common header and the DTLS chunk overhead. That plain payload will be sent to the Protection Operator in use for that specific association, the Protection Operator will return an encrypted DTLS 1.3 record. An SCTP packet containing an SCTP DTLS chunk SHALL be delivered without delay and SCTP chunk bundling SHALL NOT be performed. If a SCTP packet with chunk bundling is received the receiver SHALL ignore any subsequent chunk.

Protected Data Chunk Reception When the DTLS Chunk state machine has reached the VALIDATION or PROTECTED state, the DTLS chunk handler will receive DTLS chunks from the SCTP Header Handler. Payload from DTLS chunks will be forwarded to the Protection Operator which will return a plain SCTP Payload. The plain SCTP payload will be forwarded to SCTP Chunk Handler that will split it in separated chunks and will handle them according to . Meta data, such as ECN, source and destination address or path ID, belonging to the received SCTP packet SHALL be tied to the relevant set of chunks and forwarded transparently to the SCTP endpoint.

SCTP Header Handler The SCTP Header Handler is responsible for correctness of the SCTP common header, it receives the SCTP packet from the lower transport layer, discriminates among associations and forwards the payload and relevant data to the SCTP Protection Operator for handling. In the opposite direction it creates the SCTP common header and fills it with the relevant information for the specific association and delivers it towards the lower transport layer.

Abstract API This section describes and abstract API that is needed between a key establishment part and the DTLS 1.3 protection chunk. This is an example API and there are alternative implementations.

Cipher Suit Capabilities The key-management function needs to know which cipher suits defined for usage with DTLS 1.3 that are supported by the DTLS chunk and its protection operations block. All TLS cipher suit that are defined are listed in the TLS cipher suit registry at IANA and are identified by a 2-byte value. Thus this needs to return a list of all supported cipher suits to the higher layer. Request : Get Cipher Suits Parameters : none Reply : Cipher Suits Parameters : list of cipher suits

Establish Client Write Keying Material The DTLS Chunk can use one of out of multiple sets of cipher suit and corresponding key materials. Which has been used are explicitly indicated in the DCI field. The following information needs to be provided when setting Client Write (transmit) Keying material: Request : Establish Client Write Key and IV Paramters :

SCTP Assocation:

Reference to the relevant SCTP assocation to set the keying material for.
DCI:

The DTLS connection index value to establish (or overwrite)
Restart indication:

A bit indicating wheter the DCI is for restart purposes
DTLS Epoch:

The DTLS epoch these keys are valid for. Note that Epoch lower than 3 are not expected as they are used during DTLS handshake.
Cipher Suit:

2 bytes cipher suit identification for the DTLS 1.3 Cipher suit used to identify the DTLS AEAD algorithm to perform the DTLS record protection. The cipher suite is fixed for a (SCTP Assocation, DCI) pair.
Write Key and IV:

: The cipher suit specific binary object containing all necessary information for protection operations. The secret will used by the DTLS 1.3 client to encrypt the record. Binary arbitrary long object depending on the cipher suit used. Reply : Established or Failed

Establish Server Write Keying Material The DTLS Chunk can use one of out of multiple sets of cipher suit and corresponding key materials. Which has been used are explicitly indicated in the DCI field. The following information needs to be provided when setting Server Write (transmit) Keying material: Request : Establish Server Write Key and IV Paramters :

SCTP Assocation:

Reference to the relevant SCTP assocation to set the keying material for.
DCI:

The DTLS connection index value to establish (or overwrite)
Restart indication:

A bit indicating wheter the DCI is for restart purposes
DTLS Epoch:

The DTLS epoch these keys are valid for. Note that Epoch lower than 3 are note expected as they are used during DTLS handshake.
Cipher Suit:

2 bytes cipher suit identification for the DTLS 1.3 Cipher suit used to identify the DTLS AEAD algorithm to perform the DTLS record protection. The cipher suite is fixed for a (SCTP Assocation, DCI) pair.
Write Key and IV:

Destroy Client Write Keying Material A function to destroy the Client Write (transmit) keying material for a given epoch for a given DCI for a given SCTP Association. Request : Destroy client write key and IV Paramters :

SCTP Association
DCI
Restart indication
DTLS Epoch

Reply: Destroyed Parameters : true or false

Destroy Server Write Keying Material A function to destroy the Server Write (transmit) keying material for a given epoch for a given DCI for a given SCTP Association. Request : Destroy server write key and IV Paramters :

SCTP Association
DCI
Restart indication
DTLS Epoch

Reply: Destroyed Parameters : true or false

Set DCI to Use Set which key context (DCI) to use to protect the future SCTP packets sent by the SCTP Association. Request : Set DCI used Paramters :

SCTP Association
DCI
Restart indication

Reply: DCI set Parameters : true or false

Get q Get q, the number of protected messages (AEAD encryption invocations) for a given epoch. Request : Get q Paramters :

SCTP Association
DCI
Restart indication
DTLS Epoch

Reply: q Parameters : non-negative integer

Get v Get v, the number of attacker forgery attempts (failed AEAD decryption invocations) for a given epoch. Request : Get v Paramters :

SCTP Association
DCI
Restart indication
DTLS Epoch

Reply: v Parameters : non-negative integer

Configure Replay Protection The DTLS replay protection in this usage is expected to be fairly robust. Its depth of handling is related to maximum network path reordering that the receiver expects to see during the SCTP association. However as the actual reordering in number of packets are a combination of how delayed one packet may be compared to another times the actual packet rate this can grow for some applications and may need to be tuned. Thus, having the potential for setting this a more suitable value depending on the use case should be considered. Request : Configure Replay Protection Paramters :

DCI
Restart indication
SCTP Association
Configuration parameters

Reply: Replay Protection Configured Parameters : true or false

IANA Considerations This document defines two new registries in the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Parameters group that IANA maintains. Theses registries are for the extra cause codes for protection related errors and the Protection Options identifiers for the PVALID chunk. It also adds registry entries into several other registries in the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Parameters group:

Two new SCTP Chunk Types
One new SCTP Chunk Parameter Type
One new SCTP Error Cause Codes

And finally the update of one registred SCTP Paylod Protocol Identifier.

Protection Error Cause Codes Registry IANA is requested to create a new registry called "Protection Error Cause Codes". This registry is part of the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Parameters grouping. The purpose of this registry is to enable identification of different protection related errors when using DTLS chunk and a protection engine. Entries in the registry requires a Meaning, a reference to the specification defining the error, and a contact. Each entry will be assigned by IANA a unique 16-bit unsigned integer identifier. Values 0-65534 are available for assignment. Value 65535 is reserved for future extension. The proposed general form of the registry is depicted below in . Protection Error Cause Code

Cause Code	Meaning	Reference	Contact
0	Error in the Protection Operator List	RFC-To-Be	Authors
1	Error During Protection Handshake	RFC-To-Be	Authors
2	Failure in Protection Operators Validation	RFC-To-Be	Authors
3	Timeout During KEY Handshake or Validation	RFC-To-Be	Authors
4-65534	Available for Assignment	RFC-To-Be	Authors
65535	Reserved	RFC-To-Be	Authors

New entries are registered following the Specification Required policy as defined by .

PVALID Protection Solution Indicators IANA is requested to create a new registry called "PVALID Protection Solution Indicators". This regsitry is part of the of the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Parameters grouping. The purpose of this registry is to assign indicator bits for any security solution that could be offered as an alternative to DTLS chunk or themselves want to use the PVALID chunk mechanism to detect downgrade attacks. Any security solution that is offered through a parameter exchange during the SCTP handshake are potential to be included here. Each entry will be assigned a bit-postion starting from the most significant first bit (bit 0) in the PVALID Protection Solutions Indicator field. Each application should be assigned the next available bit postion, especially avoiding to assign in the next 32 bit position prior to having assigned all previous values. PVALID Protection Solution Indicators

Bit Position	Solution Name	Reference	Contact
0	DTLS 1.3 Chunk	RFC-TBD	Draft Authors
1	SCTP-AUTH	draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc4895-bis-02	Draft Authors

New entries are registered following the Specification Required policy as defined by .

SCTP Chunk Types In the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Parameters group's "Chunk Types" registry, IANA is requested to add the two new entries depicted below in in with a reference to this document. The registry at time of writing was available at: https://www.iana.org/assignments/sctp-parameters/sctp-parameters.xhtml#sctp-parameters-1 New Chunk Types Registered

ID Value	Chunk Type	Reference
TBA6	DTLS Chunk (DTLS)	RFC-To-Be
TBA7	Protected Association Parameter Validation (PVALID)	RFC-To-Be

SCTP Chunk Parameter Types In the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Parameters group's "Chunk Parameter Types" registry, IANA is requested to add the new entry depicted below in in with a reference to this document. The registry at time of writing was available at: https://www.iana.org/assignments/sctp-parameters/sctp-parameters.xhtml#sctp-parameters-2 New Chunk Type Parameters Registered

ID Value	Chunk Parameter Type	Reference
TBA8	DTLS 1.3 Chunk Protected Association	RFC-To-Be

SCTP Error Cause Codes In the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Parameters group's "Error Cause Codes" registry, IANA is requested to add the new entry depicted below in in with a reference to this document. The registry at time of writing was available at: https://www.iana.org/assignments/sctp-parameters/sctp-parameters.xhtml#sctp-parameters-24 Error Cause Codes Parameters Registered

ID Value	Error Cause Codes	Reference
TBA9	DTLS Chunk Error	RFC-To-Be

SCTP Payload Protocol Identifier In the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Parameters group's "Payload Protocol Identifiers" registry, IANA is requested to update the entry depicted below in in with a reference to this document. The registry at time of writing was available at: https://www.iana.org/assignments/sctp-parameters/sctp-parameters.xhtml#sctp-parameters-25 Protection Operator Protocol Identifier Registered

ID Value	SCTP Payload Protocol Identifier	Reference
4242	DTLS Chunk Key-Management Messages	RFC-To-Be

Security Considerations All the security and privacy considerations of the security protocol used as the Protection Operator applies. DTLS replay protection MUST NOT be turned off.

Privacy Considerations Use of the SCTP DTLS chunk provides privacy to SCTP by protecting user data and much of the SCTP control signaling. The SCTP association is identifiable based on the 5-tuple where the destination IP and port are fixed for each direction. Advanced privacy features such as changing Connection ID and sequence number encryption might therefore have limited effect.

AEAD Limit Considerations Section 4.5.3 of defines limits on the number of records q that can be protected using the same key as well as limits on the number of received packets v that fail authentication with each key. To adhere to these limits the key management function can periodically poll the DTLS protection operation function to see when a limit have been reached or is closed to being reached. Instead of periodic polling, a callback can be used.

Downgrade Attacks The pvalid chunk provides a mechanism for preventing downgrade attacks that detects downgrading attempts between protection solutions and terminates the association. The chosen protection solution is the same as if the peers had been communicating in the absence of an attacker. The initial handshake is verified before the DTLS Chunk is considered protected, thus no user data are sent before validation. The downgrade protection is only as strong as the weakest of the supported protection solutions as an active attacker can trick the endpoints to negotiate the weakest protection solution and then modify the weakly protected pvalid chunks to deceive the endpoints that the negotiation of the Protection Operators is validated. This is similar to the downgrade protection in TLS 1.3 specified in Section 4.1.3. of where downgrade protection is not provided when TLS 1.2 with static RSA is used. It is RECOMMENDED to only support a limited set of strongly profiled protection solutions.

Acknowledgments The authors thank Michael Tüxen for his invaluable comments helping to cope with Association Restart, ASCONF handling and restructuring the Protection Operator architecture.