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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-wirtgen-bgp-tls-02" category="exp" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
  <!-- xml2rfc v2v3 conversion 3.23.2 -->
  <front>
    <title abbrev="bgp-tls">BGP over TLS/TCP</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-wirtgen-bgp-tls-02"/>
    <author initials="T." surname="Wirtgen" fullname="Thomas Wirtgen">
      <organization>UCLouvain &amp; WELRI</organization>
      <address>
        <email>thomas.wirtgen@uclouvain.be</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="O." surname="Bonaventure" fullname="Olivier Bonaventure">
      <organization>UCLouvain &amp; WELRI</organization>
      <address>
        <email>olivier.bonaventure@uclouvain.be</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2024" month="October" day="21"/>
    <area>Routing</area>
    <workgroup>IDR</workgroup>
    <keyword>tcp</keyword>
    <keyword>tls</keyword>
    <keyword>bgp</keyword>
    <keyword>tcp-ao</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 86?>

<t>This document specifies the utilization of TCP/TLS to support BGP.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-wirtgen-bgp-tls/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        IDR Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:idr@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/idr/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/idr/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/obonaventure/draft-bgp-tls"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 90?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) <xref target="RFC4271"/> relies on the TCP protocol
to establish BGP sessions between routers. A recent draft
<xref target="I-D.draft-retana-idr-bgp-quic"/> has proposed to replace TCP with
the QUIC protocol <xref target="RFC9000"/>. QUIC brings many features compared to
TCP including security, the support of multiple streams or datagrams.</t>
      <t>From a security viewpoint, an important benefit of QUIC compared to TCP is
that QUIC by design prevents injection attacks that are possible when
TCP is used by BGP <xref target="RFC4272"/>. Several techniques can be used by BGP routers
to counter this attacks <xref target="RFC5082"/> <xref target="RFC5925"/>. TCP-AO <xref target="RFC5925"/>
authenticates the packets exchanged over a BGP session provides similar
features as QUIC. However, it is notoriously difficult to configure the
keys used to protect BGP sessions.</t>
      <t>The widespread deployment of TLS <xref target="RFC8446"/> combined with the possibility of
deriving TCP-AO keys from the TLS handshake <xref target="I-D.draft-piraux-tcp-ao-tls"/>
creates an interest in using TLS to secure BGP sessions. This document
describes how BGP can operate over TCP/TLS.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions">
      <name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      <?line -18?>

<t>This document uses network byte order (that is, big endian) values.
Fields are placed starting from the high-order bits of each byte.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="summary-of-operation">
      <name>Summary of operation</name>
      <t>A BGP over TLS/TCP session is established in two phases:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>establish a transport layer connection using TCP</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>establish a TLS session over the TCP connection</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>The TCP connection <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be established on port TBD1.</t>
      <t>During the establishment of the TLS session, the router that initiates the
connection <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the "botls" token in the Application Layer Protocol
Negotiation (ALPN) extension <xref target="RFC7301"/>. The support for other ALPN <bcp14>MUST
NOT</bcp14> be proposed during the TLS handshake.</t>
      <t>Once the TLS handshake is established and finished, the BGP session is
initiated as defined in <xref target="RFC4271"/> and the protocol operates in the
same way as a classic BGP over TCP session. The difference is that the
BGP session is now encrypted and authenticated using the TLS layer.
As in <xref target="I-D.draft-retana-idr-bgp-quic"/>, the TLS authentication parameters used for this connection
are out of the scope of this draft.</t>
      <t>A first implementation of BGP over TLS/TCP was demonstrated in <xref target="CONEXT24"/>.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>This document improves the security of BGP sessions since the information exchanged over the
session is now protected by using TLS.</t>
      <t>If TLS encounters a payload injection attack, it will generate an alert that immediately
closes the TLS session. The BGP router <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> then attempt to reestablish the session.
However, this will cause traffic to be interrupted during the connection re-establishement.</t>
      <t>If both BGP peer supports TCP-AO, the TLS stack is protected against payload injection and
this attack can be avoided. When enabled, TCP-AO counters TCP injection
attacks listed in <xref target="RFC5082"/>.</t>
      <t>Furthermore, if the BGP router supports TCP-AO, we recommend an opportunistic
TCP-AO approach as suggested in <xref target="I-D.draft-piraux-tcp-ao-tls"/>. The
router will attempt to connect using TCP-AO with a default key. When the TLS
handshake is finished, the routers will derive a new TCP-AO key using the TLS key.</t>
      <t>TCP-MD5 <xref target="RFC2385"/> <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be used to protect the TLS session if TCP-AO is not available on the
BGP router.</t>
      <t>The use of certificates to secure BGP raises operational concerns. ASes <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> trust external
actors and use their certificates for authentication. The provisioning of BGP over TLS/TCP
certificates and some alternatives to using certificates will be discussed in another
companion draft.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>IANA is requested to assign a TCP port (TBD1) from the "Service Name and Transport
Protocol Port Number Registry" as follows:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Service Name: botls</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Port Number: TBD1</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Transport Protocol: TCP</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Description: BGP over TLS/TCP</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Assignee: IETF</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Contact: IDR WG</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Registration Data: TBD</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Reference: this document</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Unauthorized Use Reported: idr@ietf.org</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>It is suggested to use the same port as the one selected for BGP over QUIC
<xref target="I-D.draft-retana-idr-bgp-quic"/>.</t>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>The authors thank
Dimitri Safonov for the TCP-AO implementation in Linux.</t>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="change-log">
      <name>Change log</name>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC7301">
          <front>
            <title>Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation Extension</title>
            <author fullname="S. Friedl" initials="S." surname="Friedl"/>
            <author fullname="A. Popov" initials="A." surname="Popov"/>
            <author fullname="A. Langley" initials="A." surname="Langley"/>
            <author fullname="E. Stephan" initials="E." surname="Stephan"/>
            <date month="July" year="2014"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a Transport Layer Security (TLS) extension for application-layer protocol negotiation within the TLS handshake. For instances in which multiple application protocols are supported on the same TCP or UDP port, this extension allows the application layer to negotiate which protocol will be used within the TLS connection.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7301"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7301"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4271">
          <front>
            <title>A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)</title>
            <author fullname="Y. Rekhter" initials="Y." role="editor" surname="Rekhter"/>
            <author fullname="T. Li" initials="T." role="editor" surname="Li"/>
            <author fullname="S. Hares" initials="S." role="editor" surname="Hares"/>
            <date month="January" year="2006"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document discusses the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), which is an inter-Autonomous System routing protocol.</t>
              <t>The primary function of a BGP speaking system is to exchange network reachability information with other BGP systems. This network reachability information includes information on the list of Autonomous Systems (ASes) that reachability information traverses. This information is sufficient for constructing a graph of AS connectivity for this reachability from which routing loops may be pruned, and, at the AS level, some policy decisions may be enforced.</t>
              <t>BGP-4 provides a set of mechanisms for supporting Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR). These mechanisms include support for advertising a set of destinations as an IP prefix, and eliminating the concept of network "class" within BGP. BGP-4 also introduces mechanisms that allow aggregation of routes, including aggregation of AS paths.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 1771. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4271"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4271"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4272">
          <front>
            <title>BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis</title>
            <author fullname="S. Murphy" initials="S." surname="Murphy"/>
            <date month="January" year="2006"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4), along with a host of other infrastructure protocols designed before the Internet environment became perilous, was originally designed with little consideration for protection of the information it carries. There are no mechanisms internal to BGP that protect against attacks that modify, delete, forge, or replay data, any of which has the potential to disrupt overall network routing behavior.</t>
              <t>This document discusses some of the security issues with BGP routing data dissemination. This document does not discuss security issues with forwarding of packets. This memo provides information for the Internet community.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4272"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4272"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5925">
          <front>
            <title>The TCP Authentication Option</title>
            <author fullname="J. Touch" initials="J." surname="Touch"/>
            <author fullname="A. Mankin" initials="A." surname="Mankin"/>
            <author fullname="R. Bonica" initials="R." surname="Bonica"/>
            <date month="June" year="2010"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO), which obsoletes the TCP MD5 Signature option of RFC 2385 (TCP MD5). TCP-AO specifies the use of stronger Message Authentication Codes (MACs), protects against replays even for long-lived TCP connections, and provides more details on the association of security with TCP connections than TCP MD5. TCP-AO is compatible with either a static Master Key Tuple (MKT) configuration or an external, out-of-band MKT management mechanism; in either case, TCP-AO also protects connections when using the same MKT across repeated instances of a connection, using traffic keys derived from the MKT, and coordinates MKT changes between endpoints. The result is intended to support current infrastructure uses of TCP MD5, such as to protect long-lived connections (as used, e.g., in BGP and LDP), and to support a larger set of MACs with minimal other system and operational changes. TCP-AO uses a different option identifier than TCP MD5, even though TCP-AO and TCP MD5 are never permitted to be used simultaneously. TCP-AO supports IPv6, and is fully compatible with the proposed requirements for the replacement of TCP MD5. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5925"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5925"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2385">
          <front>
            <title>Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5 Signature Option</title>
            <author fullname="A. Heffernan" initials="A." surname="Heffernan"/>
            <date month="August" year="1998"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This memo describes a TCP extension to enhance security for BGP. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2385"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2385"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CONEXT24">
          <front>
            <title>The Multiple Benefits of a Secure Transport for BGP</title>
            <author initials="T." surname="Wirtgen" fullname="Thomas Wirtgen">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="N." surname="Rybowski" fullname="Nicolas Rybowski">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="C." surname="Pelsser" fullname="Cristel Pelsser">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="O." surname="Bonaventure" fullname="Olivier Bonaventure">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2024" month="December"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on emerging Networking EXperiments and Technologies (CoNEXT'24)" value=""/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.draft-piraux-tcp-ao-tls">
          <front>
            <title>Opportunistic TCP-AO with TLS</title>
            <author fullname="Maxime Piraux" initials="M." surname="Piraux">
              <organization>UCLouvain &amp; WELRI</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Olivier Bonaventure" initials="O." surname="Bonaventure">
              <organization>UCLouvain &amp; WELRI</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Thomas Wirtgen" initials="T." surname="Wirtgen">
              <organization>UCLouvain &amp; WELRI</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="4" month="March" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document specifies an opportunistic mode for TCP-AO.  In this
   mode, the TCP connection starts with a well-known authentication key
   which is later replaced by a secure key derived from the TLS
   handshake.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-piraux-tcp-ao-tls-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="I-D.draft-retana-idr-bgp-quic">
          <front>
            <title>BGP over QUIC</title>
            <author fullname="Alvaro Retana" initials="A." surname="Retana">
              <organization>Futurewei Technologies</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yingzhen Qu" initials="Y." surname="Qu">
              <organization>Futurewei Technologies</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Jeffrey Haas" initials="J." surname="Haas">
              <organization>Juniper Networks</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Shuanglong Chen" initials="S." surname="Chen">
              <organization>Huawei Technologies</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Jeff Tantsura" initials="J." surname="Tantsura">
              <organization>Nvidia</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="7" month="July" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document specifies the use of QUIC Streams to support multiple
   BGP sessions over one connection in order to achieve high resiliency.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-retana-idr-bgp-quic-05"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5082">
          <front>
            <title>The Generalized TTL Security Mechanism (GTSM)</title>
            <author fullname="V. Gill" initials="V." surname="Gill"/>
            <author fullname="J. Heasley" initials="J." surname="Heasley"/>
            <author fullname="D. Meyer" initials="D." surname="Meyer"/>
            <author fullname="P. Savola" initials="P." role="editor" surname="Savola"/>
            <author fullname="C. Pignataro" initials="C." surname="Pignataro"/>
            <date month="October" year="2007"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The use of a packet's Time to Live (TTL) (IPv4) or Hop Limit (IPv6) to verify whether the packet was originated by an adjacent node on a connected link has been used in many recent protocols. This document generalizes this technique. This document obsoletes Experimental RFC 3682. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5082"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5082"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8446">
          <front>
            <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
            <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
            <date month="August" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.</t>
              <t>This document updates RFCs 5705 and 6066, and obsoletes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8446"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8446"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9000">
          <front>
            <title>QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed and Secure Transport</title>
            <author fullname="J. Iyengar" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Iyengar"/>
            <author fullname="M. Thomson" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Thomson"/>
            <date month="May" year="2021"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines the core of the QUIC transport protocol. QUIC provides applications with flow-controlled streams for structured communication, low-latency connection establishment, and network path migration. QUIC includes security measures that ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability in a range of deployment circumstances. Accompanying documents describe the integration of TLS for key negotiation, loss detection, and an exemplary congestion control algorithm.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9000"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9000"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
  </back>
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